Recent Blog Posts in September 2010

Q.  I am considering filing for divorce, and am beginning to pencil out what the division of our assets and debts might look like.  What is a good way to go about this?

• Use net value numbers, i.e., equity in homes and automobiles. Secured debt is subtracted from fair market value - it is not divided as unsecured debt would be.  If you take the house, you take 100% of the mortgage.

• Be sure to use realistic fair market value numbers. Don't make your final decisions based on Zillow. If your assumptions are flawed, your balance sheet analysis will be of limited use.

• Use wholesale Kelly Blue Book values for cars or at least make sure whatever yardstick you use is consistent for both parties.

• Obtain accurate and current pay-off information as to debts. Typically that will be the value of the debts on the date they are assigned, as adjusted for Epstein Credits. 

• Don't treat apples and oranges as apples. For instance, list pension assets as a class separate from other assets - the present value of IRA's, 401k's, and other defined contribution plans is always different than the present value of a bank account. These pension accounts are not valued in real dollars but must be discounted, and that may require a pension forensic or CPA.

• Don't include separate property (the other spouse may dispute that characterization). Pure SP doesn't go on the marital balance sheet. 

• Assign the debts, placing those numbers in parentheses to ensure they are subtracted and not added in your running total. Remember that it doesn't matter in whose name a credit card is parked. If a debt was incurred during marriage the general rule as between spouses is that each owes 50-50.

• Separate property debts don't go onto the balance sheet because they don't get evenly divided and if they were listed you may inadvertently charge yourself for half.

• Use total values rather than 1/2 community values. These numbers get divided as one of the last steps.

• Don't include support or support arrears.

• Include Epstein credits.

• Calculate and note Watts' and Jeffries' claims

• List professional practices and businesses but realize you probably have no practical way to put a number on them, would be entirely guessing as to their value, and would probably be wrong anyway. Understand that business are worth more than the sum of their balance sheets or book values.

• If you share this document with your spouse, be sure to write "Confidential Evidence Code section 1152 Materials" on it, which makes them inadmissible as evidence against you. Otherwise you may find yourself stuck with your preliminary numbers when that is not what you intended.

• Realize that if you share this document, no matter how preliminary it is, with your spouse you will be creating in them expectations concerning value or division that they may become stuck on.

• Be careful how you treat negative equity on property. For instance, if you own a car that is worth $15,000 but you owe $25,000 and want that vehicle awarded to you, the other party will not be charged for one-half of the $10,000 in negative equity.  

• Leased vehicles should be identified but have no value. I believe it is a good idea to list everything that you own or owe whether or not it has a value or can be valued at that time, since this list becomes an important road map for you and your lawyer.

• Make a note of alleged breach of fiduciary duty claims, but don't value them.

• Don't include your separate property. Include their separate property if you claim it to be all or partly community, but understand those aren't real numbers until a judge rules.  

• Don't leave the document lying around where someone else might find it.

• If property is held in one spouse's name alone but a mortgage or taxes were paid during marriage, or if it was improved or refinanced during marriage, understand that the community probably has some Moore-Marsden interest in that property but that you will have great difficulty figuring out what that is without expert assistance.

• Similarly, if one spouse owned property (i.e, real estate) prior to marriage and the other was placed on title during the marriage, note to yourself that the property has community and separate property attributes and understand you will need more information or help to value those competing interests.

• Make a note of all separate property contributions you made for the acquisition or improvement of any property. These are called Family Code section 2640 credits.

• List all other reimbursements due to the community. For instance, there are many situations where the community property is used to pay one party's separate obligations (i.e., child support from a previous marriage) and if you know to assert the claim the community may be entitled to a reimbursement.

• List consumer goods like furniture at garage sale prices unless there is something truly special about the items. Nothing is valued at its purchase price or even its replacement cost new.

• Be sure to include loans from parents, work, or family members that were made during the marriage and assign those that relate to your family or work to you.

• Make a note of any gifts to one or the other of you alone that were used to purchase or improve community property, whether they were received before or during the marriage. 

• Look at your bank balances at the date of separation and assign those balances appropriately. If your husband emptied the savings account the day before he walked out, list the amount he took under his column.

This is just a starting point and is valuable as a roadmap to get you thinking about what needs to be done to conclude the divorce. Once you discipline yourself to begin to overcome any paralysis you might feel, the marital balance sheet will speak to you about what is important for you, what the issues are, and will give you some idea of what important paperwork you need to obtain to evaluate your interests now or in the future. Get that paperwork at once. You are going to have to do this exercise anyway once a legal action is filed. 

This the some of the information that you must provide in your Declarations of Disclosure. It is an efficient idea to use those forms from the beginning. These California Judicial Council Forms include:

• The Fl-142 Schedule of Assets and Debts
• The FL-150 Income and Expense Statement
• The FL-160 Property Declaration

Getting started on this early will make any meeting with a family attorney cheaper and far more useful then if you've not even thought about these things.

To the extent you can determine values or ranges of values, add up the net equity in your column for the community property you want or get, and subtract 100% of the debts that are to be assigned to you. Again, chances are there will be categories where you can't put a number on the items. But if you had the numbers, then after totalling the total net to the other party, subtract the two net numbers. One of you will show a higher number. This number will reflect the over-credit amount to that person which needs to be equalized between you. Divide this number by 2, and the person who netted more owes that resulting number to the one who received less. This amount is called an "equalization payment."

This is just one way to do a marital balance sheet. Often times there is no money to pay the equalization payment because all or most of the community is held in the form of personal and real property. An equalization payment is no good to you unless you can collect it.  Perhaps you can get a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on the family residence that is awarded to the wife. That is usually a bad idea - you don't want to become a bank, with all the attendant risks of default and depreciation.

Another option once you have these numbers are pencilled out is to go back and rethink how the property was divided. Maybe you should take those Peter Max lithographs after all. Maybe the residence or that vacant lot must be sold to raise money for the equalization payment. It is frequently seen in Stipulated Judgments or Marital Termination Agreements. It is not common in litigated judgments because courts generally must equalize the division at the time of trial, not in the future. This is why property may be ordered sold to ensure an equal, current division of the estate.

If defined contribution pension plans exist these are a good place to find the money to assure the equalization payment is actually honored. But a 401k with a net asset value of $100,000 might only be worth $80,000 after penalties and ordinary income taxes are charged on it. Pensions can be divided without tax consequences (QDRO's) but if you are owed a $100,000 equalization, creating a new pension in your name and transferring $100,000 from the other party's interest in it is like being handed a check for $80,000. 

Q.  I have been occupying our family home alone since my wife left over a year ago.  I pay all the interest only mortgage, property taxes, and insurance with no help from her.  Does she owe me half of any of this?

A.  You may be owed you something, but not necessarily one-half of what you have paid out, and different categories of expenses may be treated differently.

This situation involves at least three potential legal concepts:

    * Epstein Credits (Payment of CP Debts Reimbursed)
    * Watts Credits (Reimbursement for Exclusive Use of CP)
    * Jeffries Credits (Combination of Epstein and Watts Reimbursements)

Epstein Credits

"Epstein credits" is a doctrine that holds that as a general rule courts must reimburse one spouse who uses earnings or other separate funds after separation to pay pre-existing community estate obligations.  Courts may not order this reimbursement if under the circumstances it would be unreasonable for the paying spouse to have expected reimbursement.  Where payments are made on account of a debt for an asset that the paying spouse was or is using and the amount was not substantially in excess of the value of the use, the Court may decline to order reimbursement.  This Blog addresses your question in terms of Watts and Jeffries credits that may be owing you upon divorce or legal separation - the prior blog details Epstein credits.  

Watts and Jeffries Credits

We speak in terms of "Watts credits" when one party has the exclusive beneficial use of community property.  When money is owed on that asset, "Jeffries" reimbursements or set-offs for the payment of that debt also come into play. On the one hand you are enjoying the use of a valuable jointly owned asset and should reimburse the community for that use; on the other you are paying something to a creditor for that use, and that amount should be deducted from what you owe the community.  Watts is a calculation for the value of what should be charged for an exclusive enjoyment of community property by one spouse; Jeffries combines the value of that use with reimbursements under an Epstein analysis.  Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 373-374; Marriage of Jeffries (1991) 228 Cal.App. 3d 548, 552-553. 

Family lawyers most often see Watts and Jeffries issues arise in disputes over residences occupied by one spouse alone.  In practice none of these concepts are typically applied to automobiles, although in theory they should be, or other consumer goods.  

While Epstein credits are generally viewed by trial judges to be mandatory reimbursements, allowing Watts and Jeffries credits is discretionary.  Having a working knowledge of your local judicial bench officer's attitude on these subjects is an important bit of information for you to obtain.

Watts credits and Jeffries credits are obviously implicated in your question since you occupy the house for which you seek mortgate and other payment credits and reimbursements. 

This is how Watts Credit issues typically arise - you and  your wife jointly own a home, and both of you are obligated on the mortgage.  Assume the monthly mortgage payment is $3,200 (interest only in your case), the taxes average $400/month, and insurance costs $1,200/year.  Mortgage payments are made on the 15th of the month, and she moves out on January 14, 2009.  You were unable to make the payment on December 15, 2008, so there are two payments due on January 15.  On January 15 you make these two payments, and then continue to make all these payments until the present time or the date of settlement or trial.  You occupy the residence the entire time.  You also incur charges for water for the landscaping, etc., along with the cable bill, electricity, phone and trash.  You have a gardner and a poolman that together amount to $250/month.

Hence, you are spending $3,700 on the mortgage, taxes, and insurance plus the $250 for upkeep, along with whatever you pay for utilities each month.  Over time this amount can grow to a considerable number. 

Assume you had to borrow the money to pay December late from your mother.  This is your separate property debt to Mom if borrowed after separation.  But because your wife lived at the house up until the day she moved which include all of January, you are entitled to the equivalent of an Epstein reimbursement.  Watts and Jeffries don't yet apply.  The obligation existed before separation, was paid after separation, and the source of payment was your separate property.  The community estate owed the payment, which means you owed one-half too (she also owes one-half the utilities charged during the same period as well that were paid with your separate property).

Watts and Jeffries credits answer questions how to deal with expenses you paid after she left where you had use of the home during some some of or the entire period.  Watts credits deal with the value of that use, and Jeffries deal with the value of the use less a reimbursement claim for the cost to you of that use.  Both parties can have these claims for the same property at different times, or one party may assert these reimbursements as against one property while the other may assert them as to another. 

What if instead of you living in the home after separation, it was rented to others but the rent didn't cover all the house related debt service?  The rents are deducted from the total and you each owe one-half of the shortfall.  If you advanced the difference, you are entitled to one-half back from your wife.

Watts' Analysis

So, where one party enjoys exclusive use of a CP asset how is the reimbursement calculated?

As a pure Watts credit analysis, assume a community property house is free and clear other than upkeep and utilities and that you lived there for a time - effectively rent free since there is no mortgage.  You can imagine how it might be unfair for you to receive this benefit without paying for it.  The amount of reimbursement you owe the community depends upon the property's fair rental value.  Fair rental value (FRV) is what you would expect to pay monthly to rent the same or a similar property on the open market in an arm's length tranactions.  It is usually proven by expert broker or appraiser testimony, but as an owner of property you are free to testify to what you think its fair rental value is (as is the other spouse).  Whether your opinion is believed or given weight by the court depends upon the assumptions you make in arriving at your opinion of FRV (as well as perceived credibility).  

If the FRV is $3,000/month, and you reside in the house for 15 months from date of separation to time of trial, the total value of your use is $45,000.  From this you would deduct fixed expenses like taxes ($400/month) and insurance ($100/month).  You would therefore owe the community $2,500 x 15 = $37,500, but since you own half the community the net reimbursement to the other party is one-half that amount.  You may also be able to deduct the gardner and poolman particularly where those payments help to maintain the asset itself.  You might even deduct repairs depending upon the circumstances (installing a solid gold toilet wouldn't qualify). 

All of these reimbursements are "Watts charges" to you.  They are "Watts credits" to the party to be reimbursed. 

Jeffries' Analysis

The more commmon situation is that some mortgage debt for the house you occupy is being paid monthly.  Assume it to be $2,000 combined (including mortgage, taxes, and insurance).  If the FRV is $3,000/month but you pay $2,000 monthly then the net benefit to you is $1,000 each month or $15,000 total.  You would owe a Watts reimbursement of one-half that sum, or $7,500, on the marital balance sheet or as a direct payment to your spouse.

This is a Jeffries situation.  Note that it assumes that these costs to you were paid by your separate property.  If instead you used community monies remaining in a bank account after the DOS to pay this debt (or CP funds from some other source) then you do not subtract that from the fair rental value because the community estate has already been charged.  
 
BTW, an interesting twist on this question these days involves what happens when there is a mortgage but the party in possession fails or refuses to pay it.  They are living there at no effective charge while the other spouse may be actually paying rent elsewhere.  In that case you should not receive a credit for one-half the debt you did not actually pay, but it is difficult to predict how a judge will handle this.  After all, you may continue to owe the money and have to repay it later.  Now what happens if you then decide to file a bankruptcy, so then never have to pay it because the debt is discharged?  That bankruptcy if properly drafted should also destroy any reimbursement claims of your spouse altogether.  Great unfairness can occur in these situations.  In my experience many of the legal rules for these reimbursement claims developed in a completely different economy and fairness and common sense is struggling to keep up with the new world order.

These days with the mortgage and real estate bust another situation frequently arises:  The amount a spouse pays to maintain the mortgage and related asset expenses may exceed the FRV of the property.  Should the other spouse be charged with half of this net loss, and so forced to underwrite some of it?

Assume in the illustration above that the costs remain the same, but the mortgage is $4,000/month.  Since FRV is $3,000, you are overpaying by $1,000.  Are you entitled to a credit back for one-half of the net loss?  In my experience most courts won't give it to you but make the argument anyway.  Courts seem to feel that if you choose to live in a place that you want the other side to help underwrite, when cheaper alternate arrangements are available, then your choice to stay there should not bind the other person.  The court cannot tell you what choices to make, but it can refuse to let you benefit unfairly by them.

This makes sense on at least one level - imagine that you have a large, beautiful, expensive home that is way under water, and that your estranged wife insists on continuing to live in it despite the fact that the costs to keep it are far in excess of what comparable lodgings would cost.  Naturally she wants you to absorb as much of this to whatever extent possible which lowers her incentive to move.  If she was allowed to stay and charge you for one-half the difference between a $10,000 mortgage and its $5,000 rental value, she might continue to reside in this losing, nonproductive asset if she effectively only paid $7,500/month after credit for your $2,500.

Conclusion

While Epstein reimbursements appear to be mandatory in dividing the community assets and liabilities, Watts and Jeffries credits are viewed as discretionary reimbursements.  Many judges don't favor these reimbursements and so exercise their disrection to deny them.  I tell my clients not to count on them in negotiating settlements, and many lawyers refuse to take the argument seriously when negotiating settlement.  Another reason why lawyers tend to treat them as inconsequential, besides bluffiing, is that they can be expensive to prove and so you are being tested as to whether you have the stamina or the money to assert these claims at trial.  After all, it is best to have forensic experts testify to them, and these individuals may include an accountant and a broker/appraiser.

One solution is to request the family court to bifurcate the issue so that a short, separate trial occurs on the Watts/Jeffries issues alone.  Once the amount of Watts or Jeffries credits is fixed by judicial decision you can now place it on the marital balance sheet in your settlement discussions on the remaining issues.

The success of a Watts or Jeffries claim are fact specific.  In doing justice and equally dividing the community estate, there is broad spectrum of fairness running from "its not big deal" to being "really unfair."  You will not get much traction where the consequence of not reimbursing Watts credits or imposing Watts charges is a small number.  But where one party enjoys the asset alone without paying creditors, a very strong argument exists in favor of finding reimbursements.

Finally, be sure to include reference to Esptein reimbursements and Watts and Jeffries in your Declarations of Disclosure to make it clear that you are asserting such a claim.  If you are the spouse in possession omit any reference to it.  It is not your job to assert that argument against yourself.

• Epstein Credits
• Watts Credits
• Jeffries Credits

This particular Blog addresses your question in terms of Epsteins - the next blog deals specificially with Watts and Jeffries credits. 

Epstein Credits

I have described Epstein Reimbursements in another Blog.  "Epstein credits" is a doctrine derived from the case of Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85.  It holds that as a general rule, courts must reimburse one spouse out of the community property who uses earnings or other separate funds after separation to pay pre-existing community obligations.  This commonly occurs with credit cards where there was a balance remaining when the parties separated that one or the other pays after that date.  Epsteins only apply to payments on the portion of a debt that existed at date of separation, and not new debt on an old card that was incurred afterwards.  The rule is not limited to credit cards but can apply to almost any class of debts.

Courts are required not to order this reimbursement if under the circumstances it would be unreasonable for the paying spouse to have expected reimbursement.  If there was an agreement that a party would not be reimbursed, if the paying spouse intended the payment as a gift, or when the payment is made on account of a debt for an asset that the paying spouse was or is using and the amount was not substantially in excess of the value of the use, the Court may decline to order reimbursement.  This idea of the value of use of some property acquired through debt that continues to exist after separation underlies the concepts of Watts credits and Jeffries credits, and is obviously implicated in your question since you occupy the house for which you seek credits and reimbursements.

So, Epsteins are almost always granted as to post-separation payments for expenses, or goods and services, that didn't leave a tangible asset behind that is now being exclusively enjoyed by only one of the two spouses. 

As an example of how this works if there is $15,000 owing Visa for that trip to Hawaii, some groceries, and a child's school tuition at the time of separation and one party pays it off or makes monthly installments on the debt with their earnings or other separate property after that date, a benefit has been conferred upon the community because a joint obligation has been extinguished or reduced.  That benefit must be equalized by a payment to the payor of one-half the amount paid or a credit or set-off against other property that gets divided.  One-half is paid because the paying spouse owed their half anyway.  Any portion paid before the DOS (date of separation) ordinarily will not be reimbursed. 

This is generally true even if only one of the parties actually took the trip to Hawaii, unless that trip was in breach of a marital or fiduciary duty (if the husband snuck off with his paramour to Hawaii, an argument exists that he should not be reimbursed for paying that portion of the debt over the wife's objection).  Family Code section 2625 directs courts to award a debt incurred by one spouse to them alone if debt was not "incurred for the benefit of the community."   Family Code section 2602 empowers courts to "award ... the amount the court determines to have been deliberately misappropriated by the party to the exclusion of the interest to any other party in the community estate."  FC section 2625 is a powerful and much underused statute (many attorneys seem to be unaware of it or try to bluff as though it didn't exist).

Compare this with a situation where a credit card was used to buy a dishwasher that the paying spouse possesses or receives in the divorce - since they are retaining a tangible asset it may not be fair to allow them to both keep the asset and get reimbursed for one-half its costs.  Applying Epsteins can become fairly fact specific.

In situations involving use of a family residence or other tangible assets that continue to exist after separation and which are used and enjoyed by only one of the spouses, an Epstein analysis provides only a part of the answer to the reimbursement question.  In effect first the amount of the Epstein reimbursements are determined, and then the question requires a Watts analysis to determine under equitable principles whether it is fair to actually order reimbursement and, if so, in what amount.

Hence, to resolve your issue you would begin by adding up the costs of everything related to the house that is spent to preserve or protect the asset.  Property taxes are included, but utilities are not.  The utilities you used after the physical separation are your obligation anyway, because they were not incurred during 'the marriage.'  (Please see the Blog Category "Physical Separation.")  Mortgage payments and insurance are considered, and probably the poolman or gardner as well.

Please continue on to the next blog for detailed infomation concerning Watts credits.

Epstein Credits and Fiduciary Duty Issues

Sometimes a spouse or domestic partner will raid the credit cards and take cash advances or buy a new wardrobe, or fix a car, during the weeks prior to separating.  If it later appears that their intention was to stick the other spouse for one-half of this expense, the presumption that this is a community debt (because incurred during marriage) may be overcome and so it may be assigned to the one spouse alone.  It is not fair to hold both parties responsible for debts incurred in anticipation of separation.

However, when one partner incurs a debt frivolously as opposed to recklessly before separation, in a situation not amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty - even over the prior objection of the other spouse - it is likely to be equally divided and Epstein reimbursements ordered.  Both spouses have, under California law, equal rights of management and control of the community property and community credit.

Courts in my experience are reluctant to find breaches of fiduciary duty in Esptein situations unless the behavior was fairly eggregious.  Charging 10 pairs of shoes at Macy's a month before separation may not be viewed as a big deal.  If the debt was incurred in pursuit of an illegal activity like supporting a drug habit or sex addiction, many judges are less reluctant to declare a breach. 

To illustrate another twist, if the credit card was used to pay the spouse's tuition expense instead a child's schooling as in my example above, it may also be unfair to charge the non-schooled parent with one-half the tuition portion of the credit card balance.  A court is likely to look at whether this schooling benefited the community in some way before splitting that debt betwen the parties - i.e., because of the schooling did the student spouse earn more money which was then contributed to the community standard of living and so confer a benefit on both?  Pure student loans are usually awarded to the party who incurred the debt as their separate property obligation.  

One problem is timing - if you file an OSC then the clerk sets the hearing date, which in most jurisdictions will be about the same time as your form interrogatory answers are due - and you can expect your ex to toy with you and so you may not get useful answers within the 30 days after you propound them.  When interrogatories are served by mail, they are due 35 days after mailed, plus the responding party can mail the responses and so this adds another 5 days. 

His answers may come in after the time your Reply to any Responsive Declaration must be filed and served, so you can't bring the quality (or lack thereof) or information contained in the responses to the judge's attention in a procedurally correct fashion.  I usually go with a Notice of Motion format where I want some discovery completed before the hearing - and set the date 60 to 75 days out to give time for the other side to have a reasonable opportunity to have gotten it done and to appear unreasonable or obstructionist if they have not. 

It never hurts to send out a set of form interrogatories because at least you can complain about the other party's failure/refusal to comply with their discovery obligations, which may win you a continuance or some bias against the ex. 

However, form interrogatories are extremely limited in their usefulness except when seeking general information in the course of a dissolution or legal separation action.  A better or additional practice would be to use a demand for production instead of or in addition to form rogs, or possibly special interrogatories if you can draft them properly.  You can use a Notice to Appear and Produce Documents at the hearing, assuming  you are looking for specific records.  I don't have that form up on my website and I'm not sure if there is a Judicial Council form for it.  Subpoenas to third parties can be useful in small jurisdictions particularly when those records won't be lost by the clerk's office, but third parties often ignore them and judges usually don't grant continuances based upon the lack of a response (for subpoean's, always demand that the custodian of records actually appear on the date and at the time specified rather than giving them the option of not appearing).

If you had a lawyer and if a lot of money was involved, you might consider a deposition.  They require only 10 day's personal service when the Notice is served personally, unless they include a document production request.  C.C.P. § 2025.270.

Finally, you might hit the "Other" box on the FL-300 and FL-310 application forms and specifically ask the Court to allow you to complete specific discovery before your application is heard on its merits, as in "I request an order permitting me to complete the following discovery (state it, but make the discovery as short and pin-pointed as you can) before this application is decided by the Court."

How this goes for you depends a lot on the personality of the judge and their custom and practices in managing their calendar.  If you have a reasonable and narrow discovery request, no good judge will preclude you from exercising these rights.

Finally, be careful not to draft your application as a sort of disguised motion for reconsideration.  If the Court feels you are just trying to take another bite of the apple from a recent hearing, unless you have material new evidence that wasn't disclosed by the other party you may not get much traction.

One more thing - I am assuming this set aside is a post-judgment application.  If you are in the middle of a dissolution, legal separation, or paternity action and no final judgment has been entered then you are free to do discovery and then file the motion afterwards or do both concurrently.  On the other hand, if there has already been a judgment and the set aside deals with an order that came as a result of a post-judgment motion either of you filed, then one route is follow my recommendations above.

Thurman W. Arnold III
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Palm Springs, CA  92262

760-320-7915
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Website:  http://www.ThurmanArnold.com

Q.  If my wife is living with a male renter, and I suspect they are boyfriend-girlfriend, does this affect the amount of spousal and child support that I have to pay?


A.  The supported party's cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex gives rise to a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof of decreased need for spousal support. FC § 4323(a)(1).  It has no impact on child support obligations, however.

FC § 4323 states:

As stated in Marriage of Schroeder (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1154, 238 Cal.Rptr. 12, the policy underlying section 4323 [former Civil Code section 4801.5]

Schroeder involved a post judgment modification of a permanent support order by the payor, not an initial pendente lite request by the supported spouse. The evidence was the former wife had been living with a man of the opposite sex for 18 months, that he didn’t pay rent, that he was regularly employed, that he did not contribute to utilities, but that he did contribute to joint vacations. The appellate court found those facts to strongly suggest a cohabitation. Even then, the issue on remand was not a termination of the support obligation but a determination of the value of the benefits incurred by the former wife which might reduce her needs.

Cohabitation has been loosely defined as not necessarily holding oneself out to be Husband and Wife, but is more than a simple roommate or "boarding arrangement." There must be a showing of a sexual, romantic or at least a "homemaker-companion" relationship. Marriage of Regnery (1989) 214 CA3d 1367, 263 CR 243.

Marriage of Geraci (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1278 reversed a trial court failure to consider the effect of an admitted cohabitation lasting several years with the following comments:

* * *

In Marriage of Bower (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893,117 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 there were two permanent support modification hearings filed by the payor husband, one held in 1997 and the second in 2000. At the 1997 hearing the evidence was that the Wife was sharing expenses and living full time at a residence with a man described as a ‘roommate.’ The Bower court noted that the Husband had been wise in not appealing that order. However, by the time of the second application over three years later in 2000, there was evidence that she was sharing at least one bank account with her "roommate," and she even stipulated she was cohabitating.

Under those circumstances, together with evidence of an increased income from her employment, it was not an abuse of discretion to reduce the Wife’s spousal support and then terminate it at the end of one year.

Bower and those cases cited herein regarding cohabitation are dealing with modifications of Permanent Spousal Support orders. They all are based upon the "two can live more cheaply than one" theory or upon actual expenses of the supported party being regularly paid for by the cohabitant beyond loans and gifts. There is no reported case that upholds a trial court refusal to provide spousal support at the temporary hearing stage.  However, I suspect most courts will apply the presumption there as well.

The philosophy underlying the cohabitation statute is that parties who share a household and live in a meretricious relationship should not benefit by continuing to receive spousal support without consideration of the reduced need this sharing produces.

Finding cohabitation just allows for the aid of a statutory presumption to assist in the presentation of factual evidence. The effect is the same without the presumption even for mere roommates, as those contributions to the obligee's living expenses may also support a factual finding sufficient to modify spousal support since rent is income.

Nonetheless, cohabitation is offensive to some judges and they be willing to terminate the spousal support obligation instead of merely reducing it.

Note that once you prove a cohabitation the burden of proof shifts to the supported party to show that they still need support. That is their problem, not yours.  Nonetheless, if you can show a substantial reduction or the end of any need for alimony you would be well advised to present that evidence.

Finally, you are not entitled to know the income of the other party as new-mate income cannot be considered by the Courts. 

For domestic partnerships, even though the statute speaks in terms of opposite sex couples it is highly unlikely that a trial court would not reduce or terminate partner support with a same-sex couple where male former partner is cohabiting with a male and so on.  Since 2005 the California Family Code is to be interpreted as applying evening to same sex couples.

If a homosexual (as opposed to bi-sexual male) is now living with a female should the opposite sex presumption be applied?  The answer would seem to turn on whether the relationship is romantic and/or intimite.  Similarly, if a former wife is now living with a female roommate and it can be established that relationship is intimate, then the same reasoning as in the above cases will likely apply.  We await appellate court pronouncements on these interesting questions.

• If some or all of the funds on deposit you contend are your separate property can be traced from separate property (i.e., the inheritance) they will be confirmed to you unless your wife can establish you made a written agreement that expressed a clear intent that those sums would become community property (a transmutation)

• If the two of you made a written agreement, separate from the deposit agreement itself, that expressly provided that the deposited sums that are claimed not to be community property were in fact not to be community property then you will not be reimbursed.

Hence, you need the paper trail for the receipt of the inheritance monies into this joint account in order to establish they still belong to you as separate property.  As long as you do trace these funds, your wife's argument that you gifted the monies to her or the both of you by verbal agreement or by your conduct will not succeed. 

However, when monies are commingled over time this tracing becomes more difficult. Particularly in checking accounts, money comes in from other sources (like community earnings) and goes out (often to pay community expenses).  The question becomes which money is applied to what outflows?  
  
The law presumes that money that goes out of a commingled account is spent first on the community needs and expenses, meaning that what remains is more likely to be considered separate.  The law expects the community to pay community expenses, not that you first use your separate property - as long as their are sufficient community funds on hand.  If these community funds become exhausted then withdrawals of what is your separate remaining monies may be lost to the community.

In your situation you have a reimbursement claim for what she took and you should receive a credit on the marital balance sheet.  She may owe you 100% of the inheritance and 50% of the balance.  Your worst case is that she owes you half of what she took. Immediately begin to collect the needed bank and inheritance records to prove your claims.

Maintaining records during and after marriage is the most important thing you can do to preserve and protect your interests.  Unfortunately, few people realize this until after the horse has left the barn.  

• The parties expressly agreed in writing to the contrary [FC §2641(e)]; or
• The contributions were for ordinary living expenses that would be incurred regardless of whether the spouse attended school, stayed home, or worked [Marriage of Watt (1989) 214 CA3d 340, 354].

If the loan is still outstanding at the time of dissolution, the balance is not divided but is instead assigned to the party who was educated or trained, except when the parties expressly agreed in writing to the contrary. [FC §2641(b)(2) (e).]

Nonetheless, the Court may reduce or modify the reimbursement and assignment of educational loans to the extent circumstances render such a disposition unjust, including the following [FC §2641(c)]:

• When the community substantially benefited from the education, training, or loan incurred for the education or training of the party. There is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that the community has not substantially benefited from community contributions to the education or training made fewer than 10 years before the commencement of the proceeding. On the other hand, it is presumed that the community substantially benefited from community contributions to the education or training made more than 10 years before the commencement of the proceeding.
• The education or training received by the party is offset by the education or training received by the other party for which community contributions have been made.
• The education or training enables the party receiving the education or training to engage in gainful employment that substantially reduces the need of the party for support that would otherwise be required.

Professional licenses and education are not "property" that can be divided in divorce or legal separation in California.  Reimbursement for community contributions and assignment of loans under FC §2641 is the exclusive remedy of the community or a party for education or training costs and any resulting enhancement of a person's earning capacity.

However, importantly, the Court should consider the effect of the education, training, or enhancement, or the amount reimbursed, on the circumstances of the parties in ordering permanent spousal support pursuant to Family Code section 4320(b). [FC §2641(d).]

A "deferred sale of home order" means an order that temporarily delays the sale and awards the temporary exclusive use and possession of the family home to the custodial parent of a minor child or child for whom support is authorized under FC §§3900 and 3901 or under FC §3910. It is authorized whether or not the custodial parent has sole or joint custody. Such an order is made to minimize the adverse impact of dissolution of marriage or legal separation on the welfare of the child.[FC §3800(b)].

If one of the parties requests a deferred sale of home order, the judge must first determine whether it is economically feasible to maintain [FC §3801(a)]:

• The payments of any note secured by a deed of trust, property taxes, and insurance for the home during the period the sale of the home is deferred; and
• The condition of the home comparable to that at the time of trial.

In making this determination, the court must consider all of the following[FC §3801(b)]:

• The resident parent's income;
• The availability of spousal support, child support, or both spousal and child support; and
• Any other sources of funds available to make those payments.

The legislative intent behind these determinations include [FC §3801(c)]:

• Avoiding the likelihood of possible defaults on the payments of notes and resulting foreclosures,
• Avoiding inadequate insurance coverage,
• Preventing deterioration of the condition of the familyhome, and
• Preventing any other circumstance that would jeopardize both parents' equity in the home.

A judge asked to consider the issue will consider the following in determining whether a deferred sale is necessary to minimize the adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the child. [FC §3802(a).]  Factors considered in exercising discretion include all of the following [FC §3802(b)]:

• The length of time the child has resided in the home;
• The child's placement or grade in school;
• The accessibility and convenience of the home to the child's school and other services or facilities used by and available to the child, including child care;
• Whether the home has been adapted or modified to accommodate any physical disabilities of a child or a resident parent in a manner that a change in residence may adversely affect the ability of the resident parent to meet the needs of the child;
• The emotional detriment to the child associated with a change in residence;
• The extent to which the location of the home permits the resident parent to continue employment;
• The financial ability of each parent to obtain suitable housing;
• The tax consequences to the parents;
• The economic detriment to the nonresident parent of a deferred sale of home order; and
• Any other factors the court deems just and equitable.

Q.  How are defined contribution plans divided in California dissolutions?

A.  A defined contribution pension plan is a plan in which the employer's obligation is based only on its annual contribution. The benefit for the employee on retirement depends on the value of the employee's account at that time. There is no need for expert testimony to determine the present value of a defined contribution plan at dissolution because its value equals [Marriage of Bergman (1985) 168 CA3d 742, 748-749 n4]:

1. The amount of contributions made between the marriage and separation, plus accruals; plus

    2.   Accruals between the date of separation and trial of the issue.

• Highest income level achieved,
• Years of service at retirement, and
• Age at retirement.

To determine the present value of such a plan, it is necessary that expert testimony, normally from an actuary, be presented. This testimony includes the expert's opinion as to present value, and what economic, health, and other factors the expert considered in reaching the opinion. [Marriage of Bergman, supra.]

The valuation of a participant's interest in a defined benefit retirement plan is calculated by [Marriage of Stephenson (1984) 162 CA3d 1057, 1083]:

1. Determining the value of the pension measured at the future retirement date, then
2. Discounting that value back to the present date of valuation.

    * In-Kind Division: Each party takes one-half of assets such as bank accounts and stock in a corporation, and/or one-half of the debts.

    * Trade-off Division: You may stipulate to settle your property disputes, without regard to value, by agreeing one of yoiu will take certain items of property, e.g., the furniture, and the other will take other items, e.g., the car.

    * Piece-of-Cake Division: This method gets its name from the common situation where two children have a piece of cake to be cut in half. To avoid the argument over who gets the "bigger" half, it is agreed that one will cut the cake and the other gets to choose which piece he or she will receive. In the marital property context, one party makes up two lists of the property in question that he or she believes are equal, and the other party chooses which list of items she or he will take. (You may want to agree not to break up sets, e.g., a dining room set, a set of dishes, matching art works, etc.) The piece-of-cake method is particularly useful for dividing furniture and furnishing that usually have a real value to the parties far in excess of their fair market value. The method is also useful in short-term marriages for dividing wedding gifts.

    * One Values, the Other Chooses: One of you places a value on each item of community property in dispute and the other party chooses those items he or she will take at the stated value up to one-half the total value. Alternatively, the party choosing may choose any, all, or none of the items, with any items not chosen going at the stated value to the one who set the value. An equalization payment can be required. In dividing furniture and furnishings, an alternative to piece-by-piece choice is to list furniture and furnishings room-by-room, and each party chooses by room.

    * You Take It or I Will Take It: One party places a value on an asset at which that party is willing to let the other party be awarded the asset, or else the former will be awarded the asset at that value.

    * Appraisal and Alternate Selection: An appraiser is selected by stipulation to value each of the items in question. The parties then choose items alternately until all items are taken. The one to make the first choice can be designated by the flip of a coin. Another approach is to let one party go first and the other party then gets two selections, after which choices are made alternately. It is usually preferable to agree that sets not be broken up. It might be agreed that if a party takes a set it counts as that many choices, e.g., a dining room table and four matching chairs counts as five choices, and the other party then makes the next five choices.

    * Sale: The parties agree that the items in question be sold at a public sale or to a particular buyer with the proceeds divided equally, or in whatever other proportion is necessary to accomplish a satisfactory or equal division, considering the other marital assets or obligations each is receiving. For modest furniture or furnishings, the sale may be a garage sale.

    * Sealed Bid: Each of the parties submits a sealed bid on each item of property in dispute, using the same list. The bids are opened simultaneously and the one bidding the highest amount for an item gets that item valued at the figure he or she bid, with an equalizing payment to be made, if necessary. This method can also be used for disposition of the family home, other real property, or a family business that both parties have operated, where each seeks to have it awarded to him or her.

    * Interspousal Auction: This is a straight auction between the parties, usually with an agreed minimum incremental increase over the last bid being required. The high bidder gets the asset at the amount of his or her bid with an equalizing payment being made, if necessary. To the extent a major asset is involved such as a family business or real estate, the stipulation might provide that each of the parties have an advisor present during the bidding.

    * Arbitration: The valuation and division of the community property in question is determined by an arbitrator selected by the parties. The parties should understand that the arbitrator is not required to follow the law, and his or her decision, for all practical purposes, is final and not subject to appeal. Because arbitration usually takes much less time than a court trial, the parties might consider stipulating with your consent that you hear the case as an arbitrator.

    * Mediation: Mediation is greatly underutilized in family law cases. It can be a very effective and satisfying way for the parties to reach agreement on the value and division of their marital property.

    * Real Property: If both parties want community real property, one of the foregoing methods of resolution can be used. If neither wants it, it can be listed for sale with a broker stipulated to by the parties, at a listing price recommended by the broker. If one wants the property but the other feels that he or she is offering too little, the latter can list it for sale with a broker of his or her choosing. If the property does not sell within a specified period of time, the listing price will be periodically reduced until it reaches the figure where the net proceeds would be equal to what the other party offered. The property then goes to the offering party for the amount of the offer.

    * Combination: When more than one marital asset is in dispute, one of the foregoing methods might be used for one asset, while one or more other methods might be used for other assets.