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Recent Posts in 2011 Amendments to Family Code Category

March 27, 2012
  Judicial Council Releases New Rules of Court for CHILD TESTIMONY Re CUSTODY PREFERENCES
Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, III

California Rules of Court For Children's Testimony
Expressing Parental Preferences Per
Family Code Section 3042 - C.R.C. RULE 5.250


On January 1, 2011 amended Family Code section 3042 became effective. It changed prior law involving custody and visitation of children by, in principle, mandating that Family Court judges consider the voices of kids before making custody and visitation determinations affecting them. These revisions would represent a major shift from how judges and commissioners have traditionally viewed their discretion whether to listen, or ignore, what children might have, directly, to say. While my first inclination was to express a painfully obvious "duh, of course" kind of response, we may see whether this turns out to have benefitted and protected children, in time.
 
Per subsection (h) of 3042 the California Judicial Council was given until January 1, 2012 to promulgate "a rule of court establishing procedures for the examination of a child witness, and include guidelines on methods other than direct testimony for obtaining information or other input from the child regarding custody or visitation." 

That task is complete. We have sparkling new Cal.Rules of Court, Rule 5.250. It is of epic length....

Rule 5.250 is a must read for any lawyer or self-represented party who desires to offer or resist a proffer of a child's testimony about these hugely uncomfortable topics
.

I began a conversation with you about my opinions on this important topic in December 2010, expressing a bias against Family Code section 3042 testimony because of a concern that parents will consciously or unconsciously be encouraged to enlist children into custody battles, creating a power imbalance in the family triad that children have few defenses against. Since mothers statistically have custody of children (and not for statistical reasons as some men ought recognize), this has the potential to separate genders into a kind of class struggle. But that is not news. It creates incentives for behaviors around your children that contain layers of intention beyond the simple joys of modeling how you believe one should act in the world.

Supporters of section 3042 believe that children should have a much greater voice in the family court process when their circumstances are being decided, and this makes sense. Custody decisions should be informed. Children, as the center of the controversy, could be made to be the most important informers. 

In particular, I suspect that some trial courts will tend to return to their prior personal views on the matter, meaning that while Rule 5.250 requires a court to state certain findings on the record in order to overcome the 'presumption' of the statute that child testimony should be allowed, all that is generally required of judges to avoid being reversed on appeal is compliance with the rule (i.e., explaining why they ignored it) and evidence that they thought about the subject before deciding.

I apologize for not getting this to you sooner - but here you have it. Anyway, I'll expand this Blog topic soon.
Continue reading "Judicial Council Releases New Rules of Court for CHILD TESTIMONY Re CUSTODY PREFERENCES" »

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May 02, 2011
  Announcing the REVENGE of ELKINS - How Family Courts Are Making Your DIVORCE More Expensive Than Ever Before!
Posted By Thurman Arnold, C.F.L.S.

The consequences from the 2011 Elkin's Task Force changes to the Family Code are beginning to take roost, making your efforts to obtain a California divorce, legal separation, annulment, or dissolution of domestic partnership way more expensive then ever before. Which may be a good thing, since we should all be mediating and settling these cases (and financial incentives like this manage to force some litigants to behave more sensibly)!

Family Code section 217 introduced the requirement for live-testimony hearings at OSC's and at notice of motion hearings, and we just don't have the budgetary ability to manage and accommodate all these new contests. The courts were already over-burdened, but Elkin's Revenge guaranteed that the system would begin to collapse (as I predicted) and we are now beginning to see that this is so. More will be revealed.

The result is that trial judges have, in April, 2011, decided to impose a vast new set of requirements on family law litigants that promises to make their experience of Family Court more expensive and complicated than ever before. Which is a good thing for family law specialists, like myself, ... except that I really do want you to get out of this mess intact and with some money left over for your children's college educations (or just a little peace)! I can't imagine how non-represented parties will navigate through this latest morass, however.

Effective April, 2011, the San Bernardino Family Court has adopted this new form which must be filed with the Court prior to any mandatory settlement conference and before you get a trial date.

Similarly, Riverside County adopted this form under similar circumstances last month. Oh, and this one too if you are requesting spousal or domestic support. Expect other counties to follow suit. You may be sanctioned for failure to comply with these new informational requirements, and/or you may find you cannot conclude your case until you do comply.

Now I am not saying this is a "conspiracy" to punish recalcitrant litigants and in fact the work that someone (including otherwise lazy family law practitioners) must do to fill these things out guarantees the case is really ready for settlement or trial, on your dime. However, it will take five hours of extra fees in any middle class case with any marriage of significant duration to get them done, and as a non-lawyer do you have any idea what is now expected of you (from reading the questions you must answer)?  I doubt it, because it takes a certified family law specialist in California to understand what information is being requested and why it is relevant (and it is). Pro-pers... good luck!

The system is broken because we are all so damned conflicted that nobody wants to give an inch. Give an inch, gain a mile!

Settle your family law disputes (or not as you wish, I have a mortgage to pay too!)

Thurman W. Arnold, III, California Certified Family Law Specialist

Continue reading "Announcing the REVENGE of ELKINS - How Family Courts Are Making Your DIVORCE More Expensive Than Ever Before!" »

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March 07, 2011
  Making DIVORCE JUDGES ACCOUNTABLE - What Is A STATEMENT OF DECISION?
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Given the 2011 changes to the California Family Code brought about by the recommendations of the Elkins Task Force, you need to know about something called a "statement of decision". This is because many family law cases involving temporary or interim orders now require an evidentiary hearing - or a trial or 'mini-trial' - on matters that used to be decided as motions based only upon declarations and argument of the parties or counsel. California Code of Civil Procedure §632 governs this device, and it is not available in straight law and motion proceedings. It is available only on matters where there has been a trial of factual issues.

Newly enacted Family Code §217 directs family court judges and commissioners to hold hearings with live testimony unless the parties stipulate otherwise, or unless the trial court finds good cause to dispense with such hearings. I've written about the Elkins changes extensively elsewhere on this Blog, so please try the search engine at the top of each page for more information about them.

A statement of decision requires the family law trial court to state, on the record, or in a subsequent written opinion, why it ruled the way it did on any questioned fact. It is essentially the same thing as a statement of the court's findings and its conclusions on any controverted issue. Judge's don't necessarily appreciate such requests, however, because they force the bench officer to expend additional time to explain at least some of the aspects of their reasoning, and some feel that it is provocative to ask them to explain their reasoning; the conventional wisdom for lawyers therefore is "don't ask unless you fear you are going to lose." 

Statements of decision in family law cases, as with hearings on OSC requests and certainly bifurcated or full on trials, are most important as a tool for a potential appeal. Without them the record on appeal may be quite unclear since the appellate court will have a difficult time determining the fact basis for the trial court's reasoning. Effectively, absent a SOD, this means that the appellate court will only reverse the trial court ruling for errors at law - the reviewing court will presume that the trial court made every factual finding necessary to support its decision. This is one of the problems of asking for them - you are saying to the judge "I think you may rule against me and so I am doing this to protect the record on appeal."

There are important rules about when to request a statement of decision. Where a trial is completed in one calendar day or less (or less than eight total hours over several days), a request for a statement of decision must be made before the court issues its ruling (i.e., before the matter is submitted for decision). This means, before you hear the judge's ruling, not after! There are technical rules about how to add up these hours. This will be the typical family law OSC or Notice of Motion situation where testimony may last from 30 minutes to several hours under FC section 217. Until January 1, 2011, these situations typically included only domestic violence hearings since evidentiary hearings were already required in those cases.

The procedures for statements of decision are to be contrasted with certain statutory requirements that courts make and express their findings on the record in certain statutorily enumerated situations, whether or not these are specifically requested. I will identify those sections in the future.

Check back for further Blogs and pointers on these subjects. If you have a contested hearing with testimony, and you get the sense the judge views things differently then you do, ask for a statement of decision before you hear the decision!



Thurman W. Arnold, III
Certified Family Law Specialist

Continue reading "Making DIVORCE JUDGES ACCOUNTABLE - What Is A STATEMENT OF DECISION?" »

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December 20, 2010
  2011 REVISIONS to the California FAMILY CODE: "CHILD CUSTODY RECOMMENDING COUNSELORS"
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS
Family Code section 3183, which governs custody mediators who are required by Family Code section 3160 to be offered by all California Superior Courts, has been revised effective 1/1/11 to mandate that any recommendations be "first provided [to] the parties and their attorneys, including counsel for any minor children, ... in writing in advance of the hearing." The court is required to confirm that this has occurred before commencing with a custody for visitation hearing. It also changes and presumably unifies what courts and litigants call these mediators, as quoted below.

Old section 3183 relied solely on local court rules to determine when and to whom the recommendation would be delivered, and new 3183 retains the same language. This is the new portion of the statute:

"... if the mediator has first provided the parties and their attorneys, including counsel for any minor children, with the recommendations in writing in advance of the hearing. The court shall make an inquiry at the hearing as to whether the parties and their attorneys have received the recommendations in writing. If the mediator is authorized to submit a recommendation to the court pursuant to this subdivision, the mediation and recommendation process shall be referred to as 'child custody recommending counseling' and the mediator shall be referred to as a 'child custody recommending counselor.' Mediators who make those recommendations are considered mediators for purposes of Chapter 11 (commencing with Section 3160), and shall be subject to all requirements for mediators for all purposes under this code and the California Rules of Court. On and after January 1, 2012, all court communications and information regarding the child custody recommending counseling process shall reflect the change in the name of the process and the name of the providers."

While this creates uniformity among all California Family Courts in requiring the parties and their lawyers receive the report "in advance" of the hearing, it begs the question of "when." The day of? The day before? Ten days prior? Evidently at the moment this is still left to local rule or a judge by judge policy since the question is left to the discretion of the judge.

Many smaller courts are forced to rely on outside counselors to provide mediation services. This is true in Blythe, for instance, and I believe in Joshua Tree. Larger courts have in-house teams of salaried mediators. I imagine the statute is written to bring the courts with small budgets in line with state-wide practices of giving advance notice of recommendations, and to call all of these workers by the same title.
Continue reading "2011 REVISIONS to the California FAMILY CODE: "CHILD CUSTODY RECOMMENDING COUNSELORS"" »

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December 14, 2010
  2011 REVISIONS to the California Family Code: Child Abuse and Temporary Orders
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS
Effective January 1, 2011, Family Code section 3027 has been amended to authorize courts to "take any reasonable, temporary steps as the court, in its discretion, deems appropriate ... to protect the child's safety until an investigation has been completed" when allegations of child abuse have been made.

Previously this section only applied to allegations of "sexual abuse." 

This will include allegations made by so-called "mandatory reporters," although the statute speaks only to child custody proceedings that are already pending.  Presumably the innocent parent will file something at once and seek no-visitation orders based upon this section.

Thurman W. Arnold III
Certified Family Law Specialist
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December 13, 2010
  2011 REVISIONS to the California Family Code: Serving POST-JUDGMENT OSC's and MOTIONS
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS
Effective January 1, 2011, you may serve post-judgment motions to modify custody, visitation, or child support orders by regular mail and file with the Court a declaration of mailing. 

This is revised Family Code section 215. Until now applications to change these orders needed to be personally served upon the other party. This created hardship and added expense for many people, since it can be difficult to locate the whereabouts of the other parent in some families months or years after a Judgment for Paternity, Nullity, or Dissolution of Marriage or Domestic Partnership. This often necessitated service by publication if there was no good address - publication in a newspaper can approximate $400, and service is not deemed effective for at least a month after the fourth week of being published. Moreover, an order permitting Service by Publication also needed to be obtained, which itself costs money and time. To this extent the revision is a good thing.

The bad news is that this provision may encourage fraud, which might result in hearings where only one party really knew to be present. Litigants may claim that the papers were mailed when they weren't. Perhaps the person who signs the declaration (grandma) doesn't walk the letter to the mailbox. Perhaps a girlfriend claims she sent the notice but doesn't - how could it be proved? What happens when someone doesn't get the mail on the receiving end, whether because of the letter is lost, by inadvertence, or for having moved? So long as the moving papers contain the required Proof of Service they are presumptively valid and orders will issue even when the responding party fails to show up for the hearing.

Hence, the burden of attacking a modification taken by default shifts to the answering party. For instance if an order is issued by reason of their mistake, inadvertence, or surprise it remains valid until and unless a successful challenge is filed and upheld. These motions are expensive, and judges tend to disfavor them. Here your remedies are (a) filing a motion to quash service, which you won't be able to prove (how does one establish the pleadings weren't mailed?) and/or (b) filing a set aside motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, which generally must occur no later than six months from the date an order is entered. Likewise, while there is no time limit for setting aside orders obtained by  extrinsic fraud (i.e., perjury), this is hard to prove. Third, the other party must bear all the initial expense, which can be considerable since these motions are technical and require the help of an attorney. Fourth, anyone responding to a motion is already at a disadvantage. The moving party has whatever time they needed to draft their paperwork, but once this is "served" the respondent must answer within about 15 days of the date of mailing (I will Blog the exact timing separately). Fifth, it is hard to un-ring a bell once a Court has heard from one party.

FC 215 streamlines litigation where people are responsible. It applies only to cases involving minor children. I imagine the public policy includes not feeling too protective of parents who have gone 'walk about.' The greatest likelihood for abuse is with child support modifications.

One thing is for sure: You must keep updated address information on file with the Court for any case involving kids until they turn 18, or 19 if they are still in high school and live with the first parent. If you move and fail to notify the court, and a modification occurs in your absence, you may not be relieved of your carelessness once you finally learn of the new orders!


Thurman W. Arnold, CFLS
Continue reading "2011 REVISIONS to the California Family Code: Serving POST-JUDGMENT OSC's and MOTIONS" »

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December 05, 2010
  ATTORNEY FEES In CUSTODY Cases: 2011 Family Code Amendments
Posted By Thurman Arnold III, CFLS

Along with other changes to the California Family Code brought about by the Elkins Committee's recommendations, Family Code section 3121 has been amended to make its language consistent with revised section 2030.  Amended Family Code section 3121 is effective January 1, 2011.

Family Code section 3121 has always been more liberal than other attorney fees provisions in the California Family Code, but in my experience most lawyers, parties, and judges have acted like it did not exist.  I have rarely seen an attorney argue for attorney fees under this section, probably because such arguments historically fell on deaf ears.  That may be changing.  

Section 3121 authorizes attorney fees in certain types of cases that are otherwise not mentioned in §2030, like paternity cases.  It applies whenever custody is at issue.

An important difference between section 3121 and Family Code section 2030, besides the fact that 2030 deals with actions generally (dissolution, annulment, and legal separation) while 3121 is aimed at custody proceedings taking place in an OSC (Order to Show Cause) or NOM (Notice of Motion) format, is that attorney fee requests can be made "by an oral motion in open court" either at "the time of the hearing" or at any other time before entry of a judgment against a party whose default has been taken. 

In other words, the request can be made without prior notice for the first time when the parties appear in court on a custody related application.  However, I have never seen a Court willing to grant such an oral request, although clearly trial courts are directed to consider them.  Possibly this will change, and certainly attorneys and parties seeking to get money to hire an attorney should be arguing the Elkins changes to stubborn judges.  The likelihood that these judges will be reversed on appeal now for refusing to award fees to needy parties in appropriate cases is vastly improved beginning in 2011.

For more information about the grounds and procedures for seeking attorney fees in family law cases, please try my on-site search engine.



Thurman W. Arnold III, CFLS*
*State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization
Continue reading "ATTORNEY FEES In CUSTODY Cases: 2011 Family Code Amendments" »

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December 04, 2010
  Making Attorneys Accessible to Family Law Litigants: 2011 ATTORNEY FEE REVISIONS TO THE FAMILY CODE
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CLFS
December is new legislation month at the California Family Law Blog presented by southern California Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in your family law matters and hopefully to help you to reach results that are fairer for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.

Effective January 1, 2011, a very important change to the rules that family courts must apply in deciding whether and when to award attorney fees to spouses (and domestic partners) who may have a relative inability to access the funds necessary to secure justice becomes effective. 

This is revised Family Code section 2030.  It is a welcome and much needed change in the California law impacting attorney fee awards in proceedings that take place in Family Courts.  It is intended to assist parties who historically have been the "out spouse" or "out partner" in marriages and domestic partnerships, by reason of the fact that they may lack independent wealth or assets, or may not during the relationship have managed the community property, or who are otherwise marginalized in terms of access to such funds as are required to conduct litigation and protect their interests because one spouse acted first and grabbed all the funds. 

Without money people cannot hire competent matrimonial law attorneys.  This effectively created an imbalance of power that family court judges were too often not redressing (otherwise there would have been no need for the revisions). 

As a result of the Elkins Task Force's year long study, which included obtaining commentary from jurists, lawyers, and family law specialists among others, the legislature has declared that the times when one spouse was able to grab or control community funds and so starve the other out in the course of adversary litigation, are ending.

Family Code section 2030 changes this playing field importantly by minting new judicial policies that include: 
  • Facilitating access to counsel by parties early on in the proceedings should be encouraged, and attorney fee awards help to accomplish this.  This is because cases are more likely to settle when people begin with a parity of access to resources, and settlement is always the ultimate goal.  FC §2030(a). 
  • Courts must now make findings on whether an award for attorney fees and costs is appropriate, including based upon the question whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for the legal representation of both parties.  FC §2030(b).  This revision directs trial courts to apply a variation of the disparity of earnings analysis that was first expressed in Marriage of Hatch (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1213, an appellate decision that some trial courts had ignored.  Relative access measured in terms of such disparity is now key.  "Disparity" implies 'a great distance or gap.'
  • The California Judicial Council is directed, by January 1, 2012, to promulgate and adopt state-wide court rules in order to implement this directive in terms of what information is to be submitted to court's to support attorney fee requests.

From an experienced family lawyer's point of view, my take on this revision is that its greatest value is in telling family court judges that attorney fee awards in appropriate cases are to be the standard and not the exception.  I suspect, however, that judges and commissioners will remain overly conservative.

From a family sciences point of view I believe it is a significant improvement in the law if we are to equalize power between spouses and, frankly, genders.  More often than not women have been on the losing side of the attorney fee question in the sense that they have not controlled community or other resources to the same extent, and in the same manner, as many of their husbands.  I think that it will advance woman's rights in family law litigation.  

I do not want to overstate the power of this revision.  It is a move in the right direction, but nonetheless something of a baby step.  We will await appellate court pronouncements as to what standards family courts should apply as trial courts are reversed for being too timid or parsimonious, or even too generous.  The California Judicial Council is given to 2012 to propose state wide guidelines that will give direction to courts, and that may help to foster uniformity between different venues, in coming years.

Continue reading "Making Attorneys Accessible to Family Law Litigants: 2011 ATTORNEY FEE REVISIONS TO THE FAMILY CODE" »

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December 03, 2010
  ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Elkins Task Force

The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011. 

It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners. 

This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.

Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations.  Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues.  Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.

What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases."  Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification: 

        "We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel.  [Reference omitted].... 

        In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures. But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice.  Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute. It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support.... 

         Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function.  If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."

Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented.  Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions.  Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants.  Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court."   Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.

The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011.  Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217 It states:

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 

December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.

T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization)
Continue reading "ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!" »

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December 01, 2010
  New Family Code Section 3042 - Will It Serve to Accelerate the GENDER CUSTODY WARS?
Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, III, CFLS

custody gender wars hurt children

AB 1090, sponsored by Assemblywoman Fiona Ma, becomes law on January 1, 2011 as  revised Family Code section 3042.  It directs courts to allow children age 14 or over to testify about their custody preferences except where judges make findings on the record why they will not permit it beginning January 1, 2012.  The legislation also directs the California Judicial Council to develop policies and procedures for examining child witnesses in the meantime.

Is section 3042 a good idea?  On balance I strongly doubt it.  The likelihood of misusing this new license, given how we humans tend to behave when we are steeped in relationship conflict, will for many parents be just too powerful a force to avoid.  Parents will feel invited to have discussions that were previously considered inappropriate under the guise of fulfilling a perceived legislative mandate to inquire into childhood preferences.  And it won't stop with "Johnny, who would you rather live with, your mom or me" but will inevitably expand into questions about what underlies Johnny's preferences.  California is theoretically a no-fault state at least in terms of grounds for dissovling marriage, but fault has always lurked beneath the surface in custody contests.  Newly enacted section 3042 takes this to a new, much messier level that potentially assaults children directly as potential co-conspirators with parents who have no concept of age appropriate boundaries.  The legislation is silent on creating resources to help parents understand that children are not supposed to be one parent's best friend after the other parent leaves the family.

Which is not to imply that no children will benefit from it. Still,....

While it is true that children are routinely blocked from meaningfully expressing important preferences in custody cases under current law before this change, I have to observe that in my years of family law practice I have had many clients (both mothers and fathers) who I have either witnessed or suspected of pressuring children in alienating ways to express a preference in that parent's favor (and I also attempted to put a stop to it by explaining the emotional damage this may cause).  I have seen many more parents on the opposing side who do so, and their lawyers whom I believed encouraged such activity. 

What happened at father's house, at mother's house, with their new spouse or girlfriend or boyfriend, and so much more is just too enticing a subject for some parents and now that information will be considered relevant by parents who may feel they are being invited to obtain children's statements of parental preference.  These parents will attempt to introduce such information to the court, whether in their own declarations and testimony or through the voice of the kids.  Children will be questioned and interviewed by parents, and enlisted as co-participants in particularly the high conflict parenting struggles. If the parents are unable to maintain a sensible decorum in managing discussions with their children, how can we expect children not to be cast adrift on the seas of emotion that accompany divorce and custody contests?

Under the new statute either minor's counsel, an evaluator, investigators, or mediators who provide custody recommendations to the court, must indicate to the Judge whether the child wishes to address the court - and the judge is also required to ask this question.  Either parent's attorney may also make that representation to the Court, which then triggers the issue.  It is hard to imagine that any attorney or self-represented party who finds themselves on the otherwise loosing end of a custody evaluation or recommendation will not make this request. Indeed, it will be attorney malpractice not to do so!

An unfortunate consequence of this new statute will be to aggravate what I see as the gender wars between mothers and fathers in custody disputes.  Some mothers believe that they are by nature better suited to child rearing, and the reality is that many do serve their children very well as the primary psychological parent particularly in early life.  Some fathers believe that they are disenfranchised by such views, and make a conscious decision to step out of children's lives "until they get older".  Any battle is unfortunate, and also creates victims.  We all decry in theory the lack of fathering in our society.

Since mothers are statistically in greater control of children than fathers (again, perhaps for good and valuable reasons), the effects of this statute will fall more heavily in favor of mothers and so against fathers - which is possibly, but not of a certainty, one reason why Assemblywoman Ma may have introduced it.  More likely, the idea sounded better than the reality may become.

I suspect I will be accused of gender bias in saying this.  But because mothers more commonly find themselves as children's primary parents for much of children's adolescence (sometimes by default since some fathers don't seem willing to assume the role or take on a greater parenting responsibility) this statute will have an effect of encouraging behaviors that promote manipulating discussions with children about which parent they should prefer.  Few parents of either sex will likely resist the challenge of not overstating their child's supposed desires in their own favor.

Courts and the Judicial Council will need to develop policies and procedures that minimize the negative impacts of this new battlefield on our children.  There are certain to be child casualties, however, and I am left wondering which outweighs the other:  the costs to children of conflicted parents, or the benefits?
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December 01, 2010
  Can My CHILDREN TESTIFY About Their PARENT PREFERENCE in Our Custody Case?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  We have a hearing coming up before the Christmas holidays over custody and visitation issues.  I believe my children should testify in court about their father's living conditions, as well as what they have told me about some things involving the woman he has sleeping over, and what their preferences are as to custody.  Is this possible?

A.  It is possible under current Family Code section 3042.  It may or may not be a wise choice for the sake of your kids, however, since it sounds as if you expect one or more of them to say things to the judge that might be make them feel as if they've betrayed their dad, chosen you over them, or that they are being placed into the middle of your dispute.  I beg you think carefully about what you say to your children, and what you do here.

AB 1050 passed both houses of the California legislature in August, 2010.  It becomes law on January 1, 2011 as revised Family Code section 3042.  However, it is not implemented until 1/1/2012.  Existing law required family courts "if a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, to consider and give due weight to the wishes of the children" in making custody orders.  

New Family Code section 3042 will require courts to permit a child who is 14 years of age or older to address the court regarding custody or visitation unless the court determines that doing so is not in the child's best interests, and in that case the court must explain that finding on the record.  When judges and family court commissioners are instructed to state their findings on the record, it can sometimes be easier for them not to error on the side of permitting the testimony - which is why such provisions are added to statutes by their supporters.  At the same time, requiring judges to state their reasoning does cause thinking judges to better evaluate the issues before them. 

New Family Code section 3042 requires the court to provide an alternative means of obtaining information regarding the child's preferences if it does not allow a child 14 or older to testify as a witness.

Either minor's counsel, an evaluator, investigators, or mediators who provide custody recommendations to the court, must indicate to the Judge whether the child wishes to address the court - and the judge is also required to ask this question.  Either parent's attorney may also make that representation to the Court, which then triggers the issue. 

According to its author, Assemblywoman Fiona Ma, current law was not sufficient because children over a certain age who had the capacity to express important preferences were routinely not allowed to testify under former section 3042.  Hence, she believed that children's wishes were ignored except through the voices of third party evaluators or minor's counsel, and even then that they were not given proper weight.  In my experience this was factually true.  There is a longstanding judicial antipathy towards the unseemingless of testimony from children, questions about the reliability of such testim

The statute does not preclude younger children from testifying and so the law is essentially unchanged as to them - in their cases the court is not required to make findings on the record if it does not permit testimony.

The Bill's author also stated that nothing in the statute will require a child to express his or her preference.  Instead she claims that section 3042 is strictly intended to provide a better avenue for participation in the proceedings and not to pressure children to express their wishes against their will.  By the way, Assemblywoman Ma also sponsored Assembly Bill 102 of 2007, which permitted parties to registered domestic partnerships to change their names to the last name of their new legal partner, which I support.

Accordingly, the Bill directs the California Judicial Council to promulgate standards and guidelines and rules and procedures for the examination of child witnesses, and to suggest alternate and less intrusive methods for obtaining the information about preferences beyond directly questioning them in court.

Hence, at least as to your children's custody preferences, depending upon their ages, after January 1, 2012, you will likely be able to have the judge listen to them, particularly since there will be a period of confusion, especially in smaller jurisdictions, about how to manage child testimony for months to come. 

I beg you to be careful with the power this new law gives custodial parents, which I fear if misused may become an invitation and an opportunity to increase conflictual and alienating behaviors rather than a simple and useful means of allowing children a voice in the proceedings.


T.W. Arnold, III, CFLS
December 1, 2010

parentall preferences and alienation


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December 01, 2010
  What STANDARDS Are JUDGES Likely to APPLY When A REQUEST FOR CHILD TESTIMONY Is Made?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I have heard that children will be able to decide which parent they want to live with in 2011, is this true?

A.  No.  However, at certain ages their imput may become more important to courts in deciding the question effective 1/1/2012.

Revised Family Code section 3042, effective January 1, 2011 but not implemented until January 1, 2012, directs trial courts to allow testimony from children who are aged 14 years or more on issues relating to custody or visitation, unless the judge or family court commissioner makes a finding on the record that doing so would not be in the child's best interest.  In the event a court makes such a finding, it is nonetheless required to "provide an alternate means of obtaining input from the child."  This statute is on its face intended to allow children to express preferences about their relationships with their parents, whether they be in terms of primary residences or visitations, but it opens the door to much more.  Some judges will struggle to limit its application, for some reasons. 

I predict that it is going to become a time-consuming, destructive mainstay in the diet of family law courts and custody attorneys or that judges will develop a method of nullifying the intent of the statute.  As an experienced custody and family law attorney, I believe it is a really bad idea.  But for now the reality is that children will be testifying in court like never before.  How will family law courts deal with this legislative mandate?  I suspect quite reluctantly since family judges see the problem more clearly than our legislators apparently do.

Judicial policy is likely to require, as a threshold question, a balancing of a number of concerns.  These include the need to protect the child from perceived harm from the act and consequences of testifying, the new statutory obligation to consider children's expressed wishes and their supposed desire to express those wishes (as probably urged by the proponent parent), and the probative value of the child's input in deciding the issuers at hand (this probative value is implicit in the statute).  I think most judges will want to avoid such testimony, but are going to have figure out reasons they can readily articulate why not to take the testimony in order to avoid reversals by appellate courts.

In arguing in favor or against introducing such testimony, you will want to be able to talk to the court about the following likely threshold judicial concerns:
  • Will it be useful to the court to permit questioning of this child?
  • What will be the risks and benefits to a particular child of being permitted to testify in favor or against a parent?
  • How shall testimony occur?  Will it be allowed in open court, or in the judge's chambers? 
  • Will there be uniformity between jurists or branches or counties in terms of court policies, or will it just be every department decides for itself how and what rules apply?
  • Who besides the judge will be allowed to ask questions of the child?  This includes questioning outside the court proceeding, say when a third party is appointed to obtain the information for the court.
  • What type of cross-examination will be permitted, since cross-examination is essential to assuring due process within the adversary court setting by testing the credibility and basis for testimony?
  • Will any safety measures be adopted, and will there be any sensitivity to the potential consequences to children once kids are drawn into testifying, since they can't possibly have any understanding of how such testimony will affect their parental relationships with the nonfavored parent?
  • Should different standards be applied in deciding to allow testimony from children about their parental preference when those requests are made after therapist based or similar recommendations come out and disfavor a party, as opposed to before they recommendations are known?  After all, what is to stop every disgruntled parent from demanding that their child state their preference (which that parent doesn't like or accept) in every case?
  • What testimonial facts will be relevant?  A child's stated preference is one thing, but shouldn't a party or their attorney then be permitted to ask questions about parental coaching?  Spoiling and buying kid's loyalty?  Whether the child wants to live with mom or dad because they don't impose rules in their home?
  • Does the court even have enough information to answer the threshold question of whether a child should be permitted to testify without first seeking outside assistance?

In order to succeed in achieving a client's goal of hearing from children when it serves that parent's agenda or perceptions, or in limiting either a child's input or damage to the child by having to voice a preference for one parent over another, custody lawyers and self-represented parties will do well to consider these questions in advance of making requests to the court.

It will be interesting to see if some judges effectively nullify the statutory mandate by imposing roadblocks or alternate routes that keep the questioning outside the family court proceeding itself.

Note: The Judicial Council has now, a year after this article was written, adopted Cal.Rules of Court Rule 5.250. Be sure you read and follow it carefully if a child wishes to express a preference.

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