Recent Posts in Bank (Deposit) Accounts Category
| August 16, 2011 |
| Marriage of MARGULIS - Fiduciary Duties of MANAGING SPOUSES |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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Marriage of Margulis, Part 2 - Duties of Managing Spouses
Please see Part I of my evaluation of
IRMO Margulis as the launching point for understanding the appellate court's outline of interspousal fiduciary duties.
The Margulis rule states that once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets.
The rule is justified by examining the scope of fiduciary duties imposed by the California Family Code. Interestingly, the trial court had found that the Husband (Alan) had breached his fiduciary duties to Wife (Elaine) "to maintain proper records of all community assets which he had exclusive control and management over...." Yet, other than imposing $20,000 in sanctions and assessing $30,000 in attorney fees against Alan, the trial court did not believe Elaine had produced sufficient evidence to explain what had really happened to the deposit accounts that were at issue beyond Exhibit 18, 'the smoking gun'. $50,000 in sanctions was a cheap price to pay relative to the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It was reversed for applying too narrow a breach of fiduciary duty and applying the wrong remedy.
Since Margulis contains a great explanation of how statutory fiduciary duties operate I quote the decision as follows:
"Family Code provisions detailing the fiduciary obligations between spouses provide strong support for shifting the burden of proof to the managing spouse when determining the value and disposition of missing assets. The starting point is section 721, which provides that accountability for the management of community assets is a fundamental aspect of the fiduciary duties owed between spouses.
Section 721, subdivision (b), states, in relevant part: between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in Sections 16403, 16404, and 16503 of the Corporations Code, including, but not limited to, the following: ¶(1) Providing each spouse access at all times to any books kept regarding a transaction for the purposes of inspection and copying. ¶(2) Rendering upon request, true and full information of all things affecting any transaction which concerns the community property. Nothing in this section is intended to impose a duty for either spouse to keep detailed books and records of community property transactions. ¶(3) Accounting to the spouse, and holding as a trustee, any benefit or profit derived from any transaction by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse which concerns the community property.
Section 721's specific incorporation of the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in• section 16403 of the Corporations Code, makes clear that the duty to disclose relevant information concerning transactions affecting the community property is an affirmative and broad obligation. Corporations Code section 16403 requires each partner to furnish to a partner ... [¶] (1) Without demand, any information concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the partnership agreement or this chapter.... (Corp. Code, § 16403, subd. (c), italics added.)
Section 1100 further delineates the scope of a managing spouse's accountability. That statute not only prohibits a spouse from engaging in certain conduct, such as making a unilateral gift of community personal property or disposing of it for less than fair and reasonable value, without the written consent of the other spouse (§ 1100, subd. (b)), but it also requires each spouse to act as a fiduciary toward the other in the management of community assets in accordance with the general rules governing fiduciary relationships ... as specified in Section 721, until such time as the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court. This duty includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an interest.... (§ 1100, subd. (e).)
Importantly, section 1101 creates a right of action and specific remedies for the breach of fiduciary duty between spouses. Subdivision (a) of section 1101 gives each spouse a claim against the other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse's present undivided one-half interest in the community estate.... The statutory remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty, specifically including a breach of those [duties] set out in Sections 721 and 1100, include a mandatory award of 50 percent of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney's fees and court costs.... (§ 1101, subd. (g).)
If the nondisclosure or wrongful disposition of community property falls within the ambit of Civil Code section 3294 (punitive damages upon clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud or malice), the court must award to injured spouse the entire value of
the asset (§ 1101, subd. (h)).
Finally, section 2100 makes clear that these fiduciary obligations of disclosure and accounting continue to bind spouses after separation until final distribution of assets. Section 2100 states: [A] full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties.... Moreover, each party has a continuing duty to immediately, fully, and accurately update and augment that disclosure to the extent there have been any material changes so that at the time the parties enter into an agreement for the resolution of any of these issues, or at the time of trial on these issues, each party will have a full and complete knowledge of the relevant underlying facts. (§ 2100, subd. (c), italics added; see also § 2102, subd. (a)(1) [from date of separation to date community assets are distributed, spouses are subject to § 721's fiduciary duty to disclose assets and update material changes].)
Taken together, these statutes impose on a managing spouse affirmative, wide-ranging duties to disclose and account for the existence, valuation, and disposition of all community assets from the date of separation through final property division. Simply put, these statutes require the spouse to account for his or her management of the property. The managing spouse must reveal if the community property changes value, ceases to exist, or is transferred for less than its worth, thereby depriving the nonmanaging spouse of his or her half-interest. Because of the fiduciary relationship between spouses, the managing spouse must reveal any self-dealing or other conduct that impaired the value of the property and entitles the other spouse to compensation.
Applying these statutes to the facts of this case, a trial court could conclude Alan breached his fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting. A court could find he breached his duty to provide full and accurate disclosure of all community assets when in pretrial exchanges he failed to inform Elaine that $20,000 was in the Charles Schwab IRA's, asserting that the only existing community property was the Sycamore house. A trial court similarly could find Alan breached his duty to disclose immediately and fully any material changes in the community property (§ 2100, subd. (c)), by failing to tell Elaine until just before trial that all the community investment and checking accounts he had managed were virtually empty. Additionally, by refusing to provide Elaine with any documentary or other corroborating proof of what actually happened to the money that had once been in those accounts, Alan may have breached his duty to furnish to Elaine any information concerning the [community's] business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of [her] rights (Corp. Code, § 16403, subd. (c)(1); § 721, subd. (b)), which included her right to pursue a claim against Alan for impairment to [her] ... one-half interest in the community estate (§ 1101, subds. (a), (g) & (h)).
The trial court, however, found a single, narrow breach of duty by Alan: a breach of the duty to keep and provide adequate records. In so ruling, the trial court impliedly found Alan did not owe broader fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting. The trial court's erroneous finding on the scope of Alan's duties led it to apply the wrong remedy. Instead of awarding Elaine at least 50 percent of the value of undisclosed or wrongfully transferred assets (§ 1101, subds. (g) [50 percent], (h) [100 percent upon proof of oppression, fraud or malice]), the trial court ordered Alan to pay Elaine $20,000 as sanctions, plus attorney fees.
The trial court's failure to find Alan breached his broader fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting stemmed from the court's denial of Elaine's request to charge Alan with the exhibit 18 asset values unless he disproved those values or proved he properly disposed of those assets. Although the trial court found that Elaine had satisfied the requisite foundation to admit the exhibit, it accorded the document little or no weight because Elaine had not prepared it and had no evidence to support it. Consequently, according to the trial court, Elaine failed to carry her burden of proving the accounts itemized in exhibit 18 ever had the values listed in that document, and Alan could not be charged with wrongfully disposing of assets he never possessed. But, as discussed above, the trial court misapplied the burden of proof.
Elaine's introduction of exhibit 18, which Alan conceded he prepared, satisfied her initial burden. The statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting then effectively shifted the burden to Alan to rebut the presumption he should be charged with the assets listed on exhibit 18, a document that was prima facie evidence of the account values it stated."
Based upon the foregoing the case was reversed and remanded to the trial court. The sanctions award of $20,000 plus $30,000 was also reversed "so that the court may revisit the question of the appropriate remedy should the evidence establish Alan's breach of fiduciary duty" - in other words, the appellate court is directing the trial court to hit Alan harder than was amounted to a slap on the wrist. As Justice Aronson wryly directs:
"Alan's cross-appeal merits little discussion. His challenge to the trial court's finding that he breached his fiduciary duties to Elaine is meritless. Likewise, his additional challenges to the award against him for sanctions and attorney fees fails, given the clear statutory authorization for both awards in light of Alan's breach of duty.... Nevertheless, we reverse the attorney fees and sanctions award so the court may revisit the question of the appropriate remedy should the evidence established Alan's breach of duty." Elaine is to be awarded her attorney fees and costs for this appeal.
Margulis also contains an excellent discussion regarding Epstein credits, debt payment in lieu of support, and tracing issues. I will endeavor to blog that portion of the decision in Part III.
Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S. |
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| August 15, 2011 |
| IRMO MARGULIS - Managing Spouse Has BURDEN OF PROOF To Explain MISSING ASSETS |
| Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S. |
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Marriage of Margulis (8/11/2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 277
Part One
I am always pleased to report cutting edge rulings by our appellate courts, and this is one of the most important decisions in recent years affecting who has the burden of proof to explain what happens to assets that disappear after marriage partners separate, and what the consequences are for managing "in-spouses" who cannot explain what happened to liquid (or other assets) that existed at separation but seem to have evaporated in the meantime. While upon reflection it is hard to imagine how this decision could be news because it makes such perfect sense, the Fourth Appellate District's pronouncements (by the Honorable J. Aronson) are indeed a new extension of existing law - which is why the trial court in this case was reversed.
Special kudos to Attorneys Stephen Temko and Dawn Gray on behalf of the Association of Certified Law Specialists (an organization serving the public interest that I am proud to be a member of) for weighing in with amicus curiae briefs that probably helped to inform the appellate justices in positive ways.
Because this case is important I am going to help it be digested in two gulps - this is Part I.
The root holding of IRMO Margulis is this: Once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets. It is now clear that managing spouses have the burden of proof to account for missing assets that they controlled.
Family Code section 1100 states that "either spouse has the [right of] management and control of the community personal property, ..., as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse."
But when parties separate the more empowered partner often grabs or already manages all the marbles, and then enjoys the advantage of continuing to carry those marbles around and even spending them down until the community property pot is ultimately divided. Without accountability this frequently led to abuses and misappropriations that - in the absence of this new rule - favored that party and facilitates their practical ability to defraud the community property estate, notwithstanding a legal duty per Family Code section 721(b) to account for what went where. Until now. The
Margulis rule is necessary to protect the rights of an "out-spouse" as a matter of basic fiduciary protections.
The facts of the case as set forth in the appellate decision are these (and are reminiscent of the facts of the Davenport decision): Alan and Elaine separated after 33 years of marriage in August, 1996. Alan moved out of the parties' Irvine home and moved to Chicago to start a new job. Elaine remained in the family residence. They owned a home in Palm Desert, California.The marriage yielded two children who are now adults.
During the marriage Alan was the sole working spouse and exercised "complete control" of the couple's finances - sound familiar? This included retirement, bank, and investment account personal property assets. Although Alan moved out in 1996, Elaine did not file for divorce for another six years - in 2002. Five more years passed before Alan even filed a response in those proceedings. Throughout this period Alan paid Elaine just enough, evidently, for her to be satisfied with the financial status quo so that she undertook no steps to move the divorce towards a conclusion. I can only speculate what psychological and emotional dynamics were at play in these people's lives, but infer that Elaine trusted Alan enough that she did not perceive that she needed to take vigorous steps to protect herself. Which gave him free reign for a long, long time.
Once the case did begin to move forward, as often happens when there is a significant power imbalance in relationship, it began to move quickly and that pace certainly further advantaged the husband. Commonly it is the in-spouse who is rushing the case to trial while the out-spouse plays catch-up and the parties, or the in-spouse, play discovery games and hide and seek with assets, disclosures, and backup. Bank accounts are easily susceptible to this type of abuse because they are document intensive, and expensive to evaluate. In and out transactions (deposits in, transfers out) must each be traced in order for forensic experts and the court to know how to characterize and characterize transactions and the flow of cash. Here Alan filed his Response to Elaine's 2002 Petition on February 21, 2007, and the parties found themselves in a pre-trial Mandatory Settlement Conference only six months later. This means that Elaine's team had very little time to prepare since Alan knew where the marbles were but elected not to share their identity and location.
There was a single "smoking gun" in the case which consisted of what became at trial "Exhibit 18." This was a two-page document that was entitled "confidential personal financial statement" for "Alan/Elaine Margulis," dated February 1, 1999. It reflected total assets of $1,305,500. The liquid (i.e., cash) portion amounted to more than half of that number.
At trial Elaine testified that, as the nonmanaging spouse, she had no personal knowledge or records of the value of the accounts at any time. This was the sole extent of her evidence at trial about the status of the assets near the date of separation, and essentially Alan's attorneys argued that this proved nothing. Elaine's attorney responded insightfully that the effect of this document was to shift the burden of proof to Alan to explain and show that he had properly disposed of those assets, or that the stock holdings lost their value as a result of market conditions - as opposed to them having been withdrawn or mismanaged by him or for his sole benefit. But the trial judge disagreed, which set up this reversal in favor of Elaine.
The trial court explained "I don't believe it supports, standing alone [that] your assets listed did, in fact, exist." Wife had no other evidence to prove that they did - hence, without the rule established by Justice Aronson in this case, she would be out of luck. Her proof would have failed on the contested issues, and it did fail at the trial court level. Before this decision the trial court's perspective was a bit shallow but not surprising. It takes bold judges with considerable family law experience to read the sub-text.
Who has the burden of proof on a topic is often key to which party wins or loses on a given issue. This is why Marulis is important to control of asset cases.
Shifting the Burden of Proof
There are two common principles linked to the concept of the "burden of proof." One is the burden of persuasion and the other is the burden of producing evidence. Often if a party cannot produce evidence on a subject that the law imposes a burden upon them to produce in order to prevail, they lose. Irmo Margulis has implications beyond family law.
The Margulis decision observes: "the trial court concluded that Elaine, the nonmanaging spouse who lacked both personal knowledge and records concerning the assets listed on exhibit 18, failed to meet the difficult burden of proving these now missing assets had existed....
The trial court's failure to place the burden of the duty on Alan relieved him of the duty to account for his postseparation management of these assets. Thus, Alan did not have to prove the
amounts
that had been in these accounts or that he had properly disposed of those sums. This lack of accountability poses a risk of abuse and runs afoul of the statutory scheme imposing broad fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting on a managing spouse." [Emphasis added].
It continued: "Given that 'bedrock concerns' of 'policy and fairness' drive the analysis [citation omitted]
, it is not surprising that a common trigger for burden-shifting is 'when the parties have unequal access to evidence necessary to prove a disputed issue. 'Where the evidence necessary to establish a fact essential to a claim lies peculiarly within the knowledge and competence of one of the parties, that party has the burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue although it is not the party asserting the claim.'....
Concerns over 'unequal access to evidence' [citations omitted]
are particularly pressing in the context of a marital dissolution where financial records can be crucial to ensuring the equal division of property required by Family Code section 2550.... Undoubtedly, in marriages and separations like the Margulis's where one spouse exercised exclusive control over community property, the parties will have vastly
unequal
access to evidence concerning the disposition of that property. When this occurs, fairness requires shifting to the managing spouse the burden of proof on missing assets. Moreover, ..., the statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting owed between spouses further justify that result."
The Appellate Court goes on to explain why this result is fair in light of the fiduciary obligations between spouses that I have written about so much over the past few years. I will separately blog that portion of the decision.
But as I have been trumpeting now for many months, the appellate courts are working overtime to save the existing California scheme of family law to ensure transparency - it is my opinion long overdue but much appreciated!
For those in-spouses who do act in good faith after separation and the pendency of the marital proceedings, Margulis is a cautionary tale - managing spouses had better keep records of transactions affecting the community property estate and make all required disclosures or find themselves assuming the risk of loss or diminution of the value of those assets.
Please note that the appellate Court's initial decision of August 11, 2011, was modified on August 26 and September 9, 2011. The citation to the modified opinion is Marriage of Prentis-Margulis v. Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252. I have yet compare the differences in the two decisions.
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| June 27, 2011 |
| I Am Filing for Divorce and Believe My Spouse is Hiding Funds in a SAFE DEPOSIT BOX. What Can I Do? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold. CFLS |
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Q. I intend to file for divorce shortly, but believe my spouse has placed a significant amount of cash in a safe deposit box. Any recommendations on how I might keep that money from disappearing?
A.
California Financial Code section 1620 sets forth a procedure I have used many times to freeze access to a safe deposit box in order to prevent the other party from looting it after a case is filed. I highly recommend employing it in cases where you have a good reason to believe that any assets value are contained in one, because although the ATRO's (automatic temporary restraining orders) in principle prohibit a party from removing or concealing cash (or gold, coin or any other asset) - these apply only
after that person has been served with the Summons - and, if the other spouse does remove the contents of a deposit box, you may never be able to prove what these contents consisted of.
By properly serving a "Notice of Adverse Claim" per section 1620 on any banking institution where a safe deposit box is located, you can stop your spouse from accessing that deposit box for up to three court days. You would use that time to file for and obtain ex parte restraining orders from a family court judge that would then direct the bank (or at least the other spouse) to refuse or not have access to the box except upon the specific terms set forth in the order, like "until further order of the court".
Typically your motion would ask that these contents be inventoried in the presence of a third party, and that if there was cash or bullion that those monies be placed out of the reach of both parties pending a subsequent court order awarding or distributing them.
Please note that Financial Code section 1620 replaces former section 1650 effective January 1, 2012.
Thurman Arnold, Family Court Attorney
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| October 22, 2010 |
| How Can I STOP My Spouse From LIQUIDATING OUR COMMUNITY PENSION? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. I am afraid my husband may liquidate our 401k and IRA's that are in his name. Is there anything I can to do freeze the accounts or make sure he can't empty them out before I can hire a lawyer or file for dissolution?
A. There is always the risk that one party will loot the community estate in anticipation of a family law proceeding, or that they may even act innocently but still wind up depriving the other spouse of their community interest in a pension asset.
If the spouse in whose name an IRA, 401k, or other pension device is held wants to access these monies and you object, or just want to make it impossible for them to do so without first securing your agreement, there are important steps that will work so long as you undertake them in time.
Two situations with pension plans or retirement assets are common: 1) a retired or disabled spouse is already drawing upon them on a monthly or other basis and 2) or they may want to liquidate the account entirely. The latter situation is especially common, in my experience, with plans valued under $50,000.
Lets assume your husband has a Roth IRA for $50,000. It was opened during marriage when all contributions were made, and half therefore belongs to you. He instructs Fidelity Investments to cash it out. Since this is an early withdrawal (presumably), there is a both a 15% penalty to the IRS (unless the money is rolled into a new IRA within 60 days, or the withdrawal occurs within 60 days from the date of entry of a Divorce Judgment dividing the assets) and the monies he receives will be taxed as ordinary income at rates that depend upon his bracket.
If there is sufficient other property in the community estate to ensure that you will get your half from some other source down the road, this may not be a problem for you. However, down the road has a habit of never arriving and in this economy other assets from which you expected a reimbursement might evaporate.
Perhaps, this is not okay with you from a number of angles. For instance, an exception to the automatic restraining orders contained in the California Dissolution Summons regarding the prohibition from invading accounts allows parties to do so to generate the monies to hire their lawyers. These "ATRO's" will not likely protect you from this type of withdrawal after the fact - however, it may protect you as a preemptory strike. As always I urge you to act fairly and not to abuse power or be manipulative in your divorce.
You have a couple of options for protecting your interests, including joining the pension plan into the family law proceedings.
But the most important and immediate device you can use is a notice to the Plan Administrator pursuant to Family Code section 755(b). Essentially this written demand tells them that you are claiming an adverse interest in the pension assets and its legal effect is to put the Plan on the hook for any payments they make after receiving the notice. They will not release any money once you properly draft and serve it.
Serve it either personally through a process server (which may be difficult and expensive if they are in another town or state), or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
Keep in mind that joinder of certain types of pensions - like federal public entity plans - cannot be achieved through a California joinder pursuant to Family Code section 2060. Thus, this §755 Notice is really important to freeze the status quo pending an ultimate QDRO.
By the way, this will also work to freeze other forms of payments - for instance from insurance companies.
T.W. ARNOLD
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| October 11, 2010 |
| What does "COMMUNITY PROPERTY WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP" Mean? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. I am considering a divorce. I have found the deed to our home, and I see that the grant deed by which we took title is held like this "to Jim ... and Mary ..., husband and wife, as Community Property, with Right of Survivorship." What does this mean for me?
A. There are several very important consequences that flow from this language. The way is which title is held (or "form of title") is also called "vesting." Everything I say here applies to title for any form of property - bank or brokerage accounts, for instance, as well as any kind of real estate and the types of personal property for which we use title documents.
First, a "right of survivorship" means that if one party dies - but only before a final judgment of termination of the marriage of domestic partnership, or where a termination of marital status or partnership status occurs before the rest of the case is resolved in judgment form, the party that survives them inherits 100% of the dying party's share of the community property. It does not matter that there exist a Will or Estate document that purports to create a different transfer upon death. Where a right of survivorship exists there is no need to probate an estate in order to obtain full title - all that is required is that a Affidavit of Death of Joint Tenant be recorded with the County Recorder for the County where the real property is located. A Death Certificate must be attached to it. The transfer is then complete.
For other forms of property, as with jointly held bank accounts, the same results occur. However instead of recording an Affidavit of Death with the County Recorder's Office, a Certified Copy of the Death Certificate is simply provided to the banking institution. As a practical matter vehicle titles are different in the sense (a) they are filed with any DMV office in California and (b) the title language rarely references "community property" or 'rights of survivorship', and instead titles the property to Jim "and" "or" Mary. I will have to discuss the rules relating to inheritances and surviving widows and widowers in a different blog.
Second, if a party dies after a Final Judgment dissolving a marriage or domestic partnership, or after a "status termination" before final judgment, but title to the property has never been changed for whatever reason then there is no automatic right of survivorship - in legal effect, the survivorship rights were terminated (severed) upon the by operation of law as a consequence of the Status Termination.
Likewise, if a party to a divorce proceeding dies before the termination of status then the survivorship right controls (see below). Since people don't expect this, something lawyers call a "Blair warning" based upon a particular appellate decision is set forth in the
Family Law Summons Form FL-110 that no one ever seems to actually read (hopefully your lawyer told you about it).
This is one reason by marital bifurcations can have unforseen consequences and should be taken seriously when another spouse in the course of a divorce seeks to terminate status before the entire case is resolved by Final Judgment.
Third, in California when property is vested in both parties as "CP with right of survivorship" it is the equivalent of a "joint tenancy." All the same rules apply. Thus, what we are speaking to applies whether the "CP with right of survivorship" language was used for more common "to Jim and Mary as Joint Tenants is used."
Fourth, there does not need to be any reference to whether the parties are "husband and wife" for these rules to apply. Non-married people can be joint tenants as to any form of real (land) or personal property and the death of one vests the remaining title in the other - however, since there will be no termination of marital status since there is no marriage (assuming no domestic partnership either), there is only one way to destroy the right of survivorship: By transferring at least one party's interest as a "joint tenant" to themselves as a "tenant in common". The transfer of tenant in common interests after death follow the rules of testacy (a will exists and directs who gets what) and intestacy (no will exists, and specific legal rules declare who gets one depending upon their familial relationship to the decedent.
Fifth, many lawyers and savvy unrepresented parties will destroy the right of survivorship before the termination of marital status through the method outlined directly above. It only requires one party to accomplish this and it does not require the other party's consent. This has risks, however, since if you destroy a joint tenancy interest prematurely and other spouse dies then you will not inherit their interest but you will of course inherit you own 50%. If you are a child of a parent married to a nonparent or estranged parent and wish to protect your inheritance rights for an ailing father or mother - and they want you to inherit - you should consult a lawyer to assist in destroying the right of survivorship in a legally enforceable way. Note that a termination of this survivorship right violates the automatic temporary restraining orders that arise at the moment that every California dissolution or legal separation proceeding is filed, and that special rules exist for terminating joint tenancies which - if ignored - may not only render the attempt transfer void but further subject you to contempt or other penalties including attorney fees for trying to sever it improperly. Family Code section 2040(b)(c).
Sixth, and most important for the average divorce and in answer to your question, important legal presumptions arise from the Form of Title that have a huge impact on whether property is considered as community or separate. Way simply put, title held as you describe will almost certainly be declared community property for purposes of divorce and each spouse will be entitled to an equal one-half equity interest. However, that outcome does not require the "community property" language to be present in order to apply - any form of title acquired in joint names (tenancies in common, joint tenancies, tenancies by the entirety) triggers the presumption. The relevant Family Code section here is 2581.
Seventh and last for this Blog article, title presumptions are a kind of "super presumption" under the law in the sense that generally in order to rebut (disprove) them, the evidence that you submit must be "clear and convincing." A garden variety presumption in comparison is the rule that property acquired during marriage in whatever form (including title) is presumed to belong to the community. Family Code section 760.
Although FC section 760 doesn't use the word "presumption" that is what it means, and this presumption is the ordinary "by a preponderance of the evidence" presumption - meaning 51% likely or better. Clearing and convincing can be considered as 75% or better - although that is a simplification. Take a look at FC section 2581(a) and (b).
Unfortunately, that is not the end of the analysis because even where property is titled jointly, a party who can trace separate property contributions to its acquisition or certain improvements to it can recover those (Family Code section 2640) if they can follow the money through written records in a legally sufficient way in the event of a divorce. In the event of a death, these reimbursements are extinguished.
I discuss "tracings" on this Blog.
Different but similar rules apply to Living Trusts which are beyond the subject of today's Blog. I can see this is a good topic and "I'll be back." |
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| September 16, 2010 |
| How Are Funds in a JOINT BANK ACCOUNT Treated in Dissolution or Legal Separation? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. My Wife removed all the money from our joint savings account immediately before filing for divorce. Some of that money included an inheritance from my grandmother. What are my rights to recover any of it?
A. When there is a joint bank account in the names of parties who are married, their net contributions to the account is presumed under the law to be and remain their community funds. This applies regardless whether the deposit agreement with the institution describes them as married. Probate Code section 5305(a).
Affected "accounts" mean a contract for deposit of funds between a depositor and a financial institution and includes a checking or savings account, a certificate of deposit, share account, and similar arrangements. Probate Code section 5122(a).
However, this presumption can be rebutted - as in the case of your inheritance contributions to the account if you can meet your burden of proof by either of the following:
- If some or all of the funds on deposit you contend are your separate property can be traced from separate property (i.e., the inheritance) they will be confirmed to you unless your wife can establish you made a written agreement that expressed a clear intent that those sums would become community property (a transmutation)
- If the two of you made a written agreement, separate from the deposit agreement itself, that expressly provided that the deposited sums that are claimed not to be community property were in fact not to be community property then you will not be reimbursed.
Hence, you need the paper trail for the receipt of the inheritance monies into this joint account in order to establish they still belong to you as separate property. As long as you do trace these funds, your wife's argument that you gifted the monies to her or the both of you by verbal agreement or by your conduct will not succeed.
However, when monies are commingled over time this tracing becomes more difficult. Particularly in checking accounts, money comes in from other sources (like community earnings) and goes out (often to pay community expenses). The question becomes which money is applied to what outflows?
The law presumes that money that goes out of a commingled account is spent first on the community needs and expenses, meaning that what remains is more likely to be considered separate. The law expects the community to pay community expenses, not that you first use your separate property - as long as their are sufficient community funds on hand. If these community funds become exhausted then withdrawals of what is your separate remaining monies may be lost to the community.
In your situation you have a reimbursement claim for what she took and you should receive a credit on the marital balance sheet. She may owe you 100% of the inheritance and 50% of the balance. Your worst case is that she owes you half of what she took. Immediately begin to collect the needed bank and inheritance records to prove your claims.
Maintaining records during and after marriage is the most important thing you can do to preserve and protect your interests. Unfortunately, few people realize this until after the horse has left the barn. |
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