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May 15, 2011
  RECURRING GIFTS From Parents May Be "INCOME" For Purposes of Determining Need for ATTORNEY FEES!
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS
As I have been trumpeting now for months, the appellate courts are actively attempting to control and limit family law litigants, their lawyers, trial courts, and the rest of the professionals involved in these cases and to curb the excesses of high conflict divorce and custody disputes. Following on the heals of the momentous decision in Irmo Davenport, another court has responded to an excessive attorney fee claim by a family court disputant. In Davenport it is a party who was sanctioned for the aggressive tactics of her attorney; now in the Kevin Q. opinion, it is the lawyer herself who is undone because it appears she will never be paid for hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees run up in the course of her representation.

I raised the question in my Davenport blog whether we can expect Family Code section 271 to be amended to impose sanctions against attorneys themselves for litigious conduct (there is a split of appellate authority on whether 271 includes attorneys). While neither the attorney nor the client in Kevin Q. was sanctioned (and apparently the conduct of the litigation did not rise to sanctionable levels), they were nonetheless denied any contribution to their fees from the other side. An attorney who handles cases "on the come" who finds herself not getting paid is pretty much equivalent a form of sanction. Kevin Q. blew up in the face of the mother's attorney (although I applaud family lawyers who care enough to carry a case for a time, in appropriate settings). For those attorneys who tend to over-litigate cases, basic behaviorist principles of reward and punishment are likely to impact their decision-making. This is a message that I believe the appellate justices intend.

Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 633 

The Fourth Appellate District has taken the next predictable step for litigants who hope to force the other side to contribute to exorbitant attorney fees incurred in certain high conflict family law cases. In so doing the law as it relates to the "relative circumstances" of the parties has been expanded to require that trial courts treat recurrent monetary infusions made by family members as "income" for purposes of interpreting the larger picture as it relates to attorney fee requests.  Previously that argument only existed within the realm of support obligations.

This is the first case that deals with what happens to attorney fees claims, in a situation family lawyers know is common where grandparents may be effectively encouraging (and often funding) a rancorous custody battle between their child and a now estranged former partner. Often in family court litigation there are not merely two individuals at war - their relatives have also been sucked into the trance. Many wealthier Americans are able to fund their child's litigation attorneys, or pay that child's household bills so that their need to find work is reduced. The parents of these children may feel forced to underwrite this status quo, effectively spending the family inheritance now. This may be the real subtext to the case.

Kevin Q. is a natural evolution of a doctrine which was recently stated in Marriage of Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 718. In Alter the trial court found gifts from the former husband's mother to be disguised as loans and imputed income to him for these gifts in deciding his ability to pay child and spousal support.

In Kevin Q. and Lauren W., published on May 13, 2011, the two parties incurred over $400,000 in lawyer's fees combined fighting over the paternity of a boy born outside of marriage. That these are warring high-conflict parents is made clear from the fact that this is their second published appeal (see Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1119). Mother won the first appeal; Kevin prevailed here. Both sets of litigants have had the same attorneys throughout the proceedings. Kevin Q. is himself an attorney who practices family law in Orange County. As it turned out in the earlier case, Kevin is not the child's biological father but he alleged he was the child's psychological parent - the appellate ruling was that Kevin was not the boy's "legal" father. Unfortunately for the child, it sounds as though the man declared to be the legal father went "walkabout." I cannot tell whether Kevin continued to maintain any relationship with the child after he lost his paternity claim ('once a psychological parent, always a psychological parent?'). Perhaps the parties or their attorneys will weigh in this Blog so I can have the facts corrected.

The first decision is dated June 19, 2009. In December, 2009, Lauren moved the court to order that Kevin pay her outstanding attorney fees, including those from the earlier appeal. Kevin had contributed a total of $20,000 up to that point. Her attorney was Debra Opri of Opri & Associates; Kevin was represented by Marjorie G. Fuller and Marc S. Tovstein. Hence, all the litigation after the first decision appears to be over recovering attorney fees relating to it (but this is unclear). Fees upon fees?

In this round Attorney Opri filed a declaration stating that there was $55,754 due from the earlier work and that another $178,581 and costs of $6,589 was incurred thereafter. Hence, Lauren's total unpaid fees amounted to $227,746. Opri's hourly billing rate was $575 and her law clerk's was $225/hour. Of these fees, Attorney Opri had only received the $20,000 from Kevin plus $28,280, which included a payment of $15,600 from Lauren's father. Lauren urged that Opri had been effectively working for free. She owes her father "tens of thousands" and he was tapped out.

Kevin responded that Lauren's fees were unreasonable. She'd incurred $311,242 in fees for the entire case while his fees totaled $141,384. He complained that $4,200 in charges were for driving time for her attorney to travel from Beverly Hills to Orange County.

The matter was submitted for decision to the trial court, with the issue being identified as whether "attorney fees should be paid to [Lauren], based on need and ability to pay, as set forth in ... [Family Code] sections 2030, 2032, 7605, and 7640." Lauren urged that because the underlying dispute concerned paternity, Family Code section 7605 and section 7640 governed and that these statutes required a different analysis than under sections 2030 and 2032.

The court made the following findings: Kevin's average monthly income was $12,803. He had borrowed $50,000 from his relatives for attorney fees, which he was paying back at the rate of $150/month. He had monthly expenses of $13,320 leaving a deficit of $517.

Lauren had zero income from employment and had not worked since 2006, although she had a master's degree in psychology and is a certified chemical dependency counselor. She received $8,700 per month from "others." Her monthly expenses were $9,197, leaving a shortfall of $497.

Which Statutes Control Attorney Fee Requests in Paternity Actions?

The court concluded that it had to apply Family Code section 2032(b) and so "consider the practicality of the expense of litigation consistent with the parties['] overall financial resources." While it appreciated that Lauren's counsel had expended time and talent to the case without substantial payment in advance, "[o]nly the wealthiest of our citizens can afford to expend more than $500,000 on their family law disputes. The fact that an attorney voluntarily takes on the lower earner does not mean that the law gives him or her carte [blanche] to litigate the case without limitation regardless of the parties['] ability to pay."

The court noted that Family Code section 2032(d) provides a mechanism that offers the parties and their counsel to early on seek to implement a case management plan for the purpose of allocating fees in an amount and to the extent that circumstances allow - Lauren did not avail herself of that opportunity "and forged ahead, incurring attorney's fees far in excess of either party's reasonable ability to pay." (Notably the appellate court did not weigh in on this question). It concluded that "neither party ha[d] a substantially greater ability to pay the other's fees" and therefore denied Lauren's request that Kevin contribute to hers.

On appeal Lauren contended that the trial court failed to limit its inquiry to the language of Family Code sections 7605 and 7640, which she felt would result in a different analysis than that under 2030 and 2032. The chief difference between the wording of the two sets of statutes is that "[u]nder section 2032, '[t]he court may make an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 2030 . . . where the making of the award, and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.' Section 2032 further provides: 'In determining what is just and reasonable under the relative circumstances, the court shall take into consideration the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party's case adequately, taking into consideration, to the extent relevant, the circumstances of the respective parties described in Section 4320. The fact that the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs has resources from which the party could pay the party's own attorney's fees and costs is not itself a bar to an order that the other party pay part or all of the fees and costs requested. Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances.'"

Family code section 4320 is the key California spousal support statute. Of course, this was a paternity action and since the parties were never married no spousal support could have been awarded. Nonetheless, the Fourth Appellate District concluded that the legislature's reference to 4320 in section 2032 meant that the factors set forth in 4320 were relevant here. These included "the earning capacity of each party," "the obligations and assets of the parties," the "age and health of the parties," "the balance of hardships to the parties," and the "goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time." Thus the appellate court concluded that "sections 2030, 2032 and (where relevant) 4320 form a statutory package" where fee awards must comply with all three provisions - at least in marital proceedings.

The Fourth District decided that the trial court did not error by taking into account the standards and circumstances pertinent under a section 2032 comparative analysis. "By dong so, the court was able to perform a more thorough evaluation of the parties' respective abilities to pay."

Loans vs. Gifts From Family Members

Lauren urged on appeal that the trial court erred by treating her father's payments to her as income, asserting these were loans and not gifts and that her father's financial support was not "an infinite obligation, regular or steady...." She argued that the trial court did not find the amount of her fees to be unreasonable.

The appellate court read the trial court decision as including a finding that Lauren's fees were in fact unreasonable. The court had stated that the law does not give either party carte blanche "to litigate the case without limitation." It noted the disparity in the amounts of fees charged by the two sets of attorneys. And the court had observed that Lauren's counsel had "forged ahead, incurring attorney's fees far in excess of either party's reasonable ability to pay."

The two seminal cases on imputing income derived from gifts from parties' parents are the Alter case, cited above, and In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519. In Schulze a noncustodial father challenged an order requiring him to pay spousal and child support. The trial court there ordered him to pay $7,500 immediately and in full for his former wife's attorney fees. The trial court had presumed he could get this money from his parents because they had previously lent him about $8,000 to pay his own fees. This part of the ruling was reversed with the now oft quoted holding that "Charity, once extended, is still not an entitlement." As the Kevin Q. opinion notes "[b]ut that statement related to a loan made by the parents for a particular purpose, as opposed to regular, recurrent monetary gifts intended as support for living expenses." Lauren responded that the trial court ignored the $50,000 loaned by Kevin's parents, but these were not the same as "recurrent payments" made over a lengthy period of time to cover Kevin's living expenses. And, Kevin's attorneys were smart enough to produce evidence that Kevin was paying back those loans.

Alter similarly examined recurrent gifts to an adult child. "There, the appellate court stated that 'where a party receives recurring gifts of money, the trial court has discretion to consider that money has income for purposes' [of determining] child support. The former husband in Alter, who sought reduction of an existing child support order, had received regular monthly payments from his mother for many years. He claimed the payments were loans, produced promissory notes as evidence, and averred his mother's loans to him 'would not continue.' The appellate court found substantial evidence the payments were gifts, noting that no evidence showed the former husband 'ever repaid any of the money.' The Court of Appeal then addressed whether these gifts may be characterized as income under the relevant child support statute. It concluded 'that nothing in the law prohibits considering gifts to be income for purposes of child support so long as the gifts bear a reasonable relationship to the traditional meaning of income as a recurrent monetary benefit.' In reaching this conclusion, Alter found it 'irrelevant that there is no legal obligation on the part of the donor to continue making the gifts or that the flow of cash does not appear on the income tax return.'  'Few, if any, sources of income are certain to continue unchanged year in and year out. People can lose their jobs, interest rates can fall, business conditions can wipe out profits and dividends.' In sum, 'the question of whether gifts should be considered income for purposes of the child support calculation is one that must be left to the discretion of the trial court.' Alter concluded the trial court had not abused its discretion in considering the payments to be income because they were 'periodic and regular,' resulting in money available to the former husband for the support of his children."

Hence, the Kevin Q. court ruled that "the regular, recurrent monetary infusions made by Lauren's father to her over a lengthy period of time, which relieved her of the need to work outside the home, constituted support (and, impliedly, monetary gifts) to her. The court explains: 'While the Court recognizes that [Lauren's] receipts from 'others' are not income as defined in the Family Code, they are however funds on which [Lauren] relies in order to maintain her lifestyle. It is clear to the Court that these funds received are not loans, in that [Lauren] reports debt only in the amount of $26,000, all from institutional lenders. [Lauren] reports that she has not been gainfully employed since August of 2006. She discloses that she has a bachelor's degree in English, a master's degree in psychology and is a certified dependency counselor. [Lauren] does not report receiving or applying for any benefits for disability income from any state or federal agency or private insurance provider. The weight of the evidence therefore supports the proposition that [Lauren] chooses to remain a 'homemaker and mother' and is able to do so as long as other persons contribut[e] to her support. That support, in this Court's mind, is relevant to the issue of [Lauren's] need and ability to pay attorney fees.'" [Emphasis added].

The court did not abuse its discretion by considering those gifts to be support (or income) for purposes of calculating Lauren's ability to pay her attorney fees. The gifts bore "a reasonable relationship to the traditional meaning of income as a recurrent monetary benefit."

The Take Away

Parties to family court litigation who don't work, or have limited access to resources, find themselves in a catch-22: If they look to their families for financial support which they then receive as recurrent gifts, or unpayable loans, this stream of money will increasingly be classified as "recurrent income." Here Lauren's parents regularly supported her, at a pretty high standard of living at $8,700/month. One can't but help feel sorry for her parents for bearing this burden. I suspect that as naturally tends to happen her parents bought into her victimhood and sided with her against the evil empire that Kevin represented. Often high conflict litigation isn't simply a war between two parties: It is a war between two families, which isn't a lawyer's fault - but is still always a shame. (Mirroring conflict between two religious groups; or two political parties; or two races; or two countries; or human beings vs. the rest of the natural world. Does any of this sound familiar? But I digress.)

True loans from parents may remain different from "recurrent income" depending how and how often it is received. Kevin was wise to show some repayment, however meaningless ($150/month towards a $50,000 debt is minimal at best).

We now know that Family Code section 2032 provides the central standard of measuring how attorney fees may successfully be sought from the other side in probably any manner of case that can be filed under the California Family Law Act. It gives trial courts wide discretion to look at all the relative circumstances, no matter whether the case is between married persons, domestic partners, and paternity contestants. Arguably the same result should control when dealing with attorney fee requests in domestic violence cases (Family Code section 6344).
Continue reading "RECURRING GIFTS From Parents May Be "INCOME" For Purposes of Determining Need for ATTORNEY FEES!" »

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May 06, 2011
  Marriage of Davenport: Trial Court SANCTIONS Wife Under FC Section 271 for Her ATTORNEYS' "UNBRIDLED AGGRESSION" In Family Court Proceedings!
Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.

A Shifting Judicial Response to Overzealous Advocacy:
Excessively Exuberant and Inflammatory Litigation Tactics
Will Not Be Tolerated in California


Justice Richman of the First Appellate District for Sonoma County, California, issued this week a momentous opinion that signals that courts will no longer passively allow attorneys who embark on rampaging attacks in high conflict divorce, or elsewhere, to do so without meaningful reprisals. Clients who encourage or permit their lawyers to manage their cases in this style may find their purses and wallets pried open. 

While my review of the case may seem harsh, I believe that it reflects the frustration of the appellate court. I have endeavored to quote the decision itself as much as possible for readability. The trend in recent reported appellate decisions suggests that the pendulum is swinging against litigants who get sucked into divorce trance and its insane warfare. Marriage of Davenport excoriates not only one lawyer and his client but also the Santa Rosa law firm for which the attorney worked.

Mediators, collaborative attorneys, ethical divorce practitioners, and holistic lawyers will appreciate that a major California appellate decision has outed the adversarial elephant in the courtroom for the destructive creature that it is, affirming consequences for litigious behavior that are necessary and overdue. Courts are not merely imposing monetary punishments, they are publicly shaming those professionals (attorneys, mental health professionals, and even trial court judges) who fail to act within the bounds of due process, fiduciary duty obligations, and the rules of civility. Indeed, last month the Second Appellate District in Ventura County upheld a sanctions award against a self-represented attorney in a family law proceeding, and reported him to the California State Bar as well.

Still, Davenport raises some important questions. These include: 
  • What level of vitriol and sarcastic behavior is permissible in the trenches of high-conflict divorce proceedings? When does zealous advocacy so exceed the bounds of civility that the behavior of litigants or their attorneys receives as much attention as the underlying property division and support issues in the case?
  • Is it possible to remain a civil advocate without sacrificing the zeal that is required and expected of lawyer warriors?
  • If attorneys, or the clients in their stead, are to be held accountable for conduct that increases the adversarial tone of the proceedings might this have a chilling effect upon strong and courageous advocacy, making less empowered parties more vulnerable to exploitative litigation tactics employed by the other side?
  • Should the California legislature amend Family Code section 271 to authorize trial courts to sanction family law attorneys directly for abuses they themselves commit? Good arguments exist for and against (another day, another blog).  


Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507

Marriage of Davenport was published May 4, 2011. It may be the most important annunciation in years by California jurists that some litigants and lawyers are stubbornly out of control, recognizing that the survival of our current family court legal scheme requires that the judiciary manage the worst behavior of such participants. Davenport will be cited as a textbook illustration of what to overcome and avoid. Click here for the full opinion.

Jill and Ken Davenport married in 1948 and separated in 1990, amassing an estate worth near 57 million dollars. Ken was a talented car salesman and real estate investor. It wasn't until March 1, 2006 that Jill filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. During that 16 years "there was agreement and cooperation, including their participation in joint estate planning favorable to Jill, and agreement to sell off many of the [community properties]." Jill was then 75 years of age, and Ken was 78.

This cooperation ended on February, 3 2006 when something set Jill onto the road to calamity. She fired a first salvo in the form of a letter to Ken which accused him of having "stepped over the line," having "lied to me," warning he being taken advantage of by others (sweet irony?), and demanding money and property. Although the parties had  co-existed peaceably for almost 16 years, the status quo exploded with this letter. 

What had changed for Jill? That month or before she'd retained the law firm of O'Brien Watters and Davis to protect and advance her interests. When her Petition was filed, senior attorney Michael Watters was named as her attorney of record. However, in November 2005 Andrew Watters (Michael's nephew), passed the California Bar and joined the law firm effective February, 2006. He was introduced to Jill three days later and became her gladiator, so beginning an odyssey that would continue unabated for more than five years. According to Andrew, thereafter he "personally handled or [was] personally involved in each and every transaction between the parties ..., as well as each and every discovery request, discovery event, court proceeding, and other substantive matter." As the First Appellate District court dryly notes, "[i]n short, Andrew Watters became the lead lawyer for Jill in what would necessarily be a complex family law litigation." "Early on, a young and inexperienced attorney at that firm [Andrew] became Jill's primary attorney, and interacted with Ken's attorneys for the next two years, interactions that would generate a 35-page register of actions and 19 volumes of court files."

Out of the gate Andrew Watters pursued a campaign of attack against Ken and his attorneys that seemed ill-fated. Five months into the proceedings, he filed a motion to compel further answers to Form Interrogatories after making negligible efforts to resolve the discovery dispute informally. California has long required that before litigants file motions to compel discovery, the record must show that they made reasonable and sincere efforts to resolve the argument informally. Proof of this is contained in what are called "meet and confer" letters. Unfortunately, these letters are often authored with a threatening tone, reflect posturing and grandstanding, and sometimes hope to set up the other side for sanctions when a motion to compel is heard. In this case, Andrew wrote a single letter, failed to respond to Ken's attorney's reply, and he didn't attempt to discuss the issues with Ken's attorneys directly before filing his motion. The trial court declared these efforts to be "unreasonable" and "admonished [counsel for both parties] to change their meet and confer practices so that meeting and conferring is meaningful and not just a token gesture."

Over the next two years Wife's side would file eight discovery motions. The court file came to consist of 19 volumes, something that the experienced trial judge, Judge Cerena Wong, would later describe as "outrageous" for a family law case. Wife filed three OSC re Contempts against the Husband, including one in which the Court in August, 2006, ordered the parties to meet and confer in a 4-way, as to which Ken "refused to meet and confer if attorney Andrew G. Watters was present in the room." Oh boy. Unfortunately, this reaction is not uncommon but risks forming a vacuum where the business of cooperatively resolving the case stalls.


The FC §271 Sanctions' Requests

On May 23, 2008, attorney Watters filed two motions that ultimately blew up in Jill's face, led to this appeal, but now provides a roadmap for how not to behave when representing parties to matrimonial proceedings. One motion requested Family Code section 271 sanctions and attorney fees.

Wife's initial motion paperwork was "blank", evidently designed to reserve hearing dates on the court's calendar. The appellate court notes that "Andrew Waters did not consult with [Ken's attorney] on the date, nor even advise him of the filings, causing him to complain about the timing of the motions, including that they were filed late in the afternoon of May 23, 2008, the Friday before the Memorial Day weekend, and at the last possible moment." 

Family Code section 271(a) reads in pertinent part:

"the court may base an award of attorney's fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction.... In order to obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award...."

Jill sought legal fees of $600,861 and costs of $332,933. Her attorney filed a 52-page declaration which attached 1250 pages of exhibits. Much of Watters' declaration was "inappropriate, asserting hearsay, argument, opinion, and conclusion, and was improper on several bases. An early passage ... illustrates some of this, where Andrew Watters purports to describe Jill's description of Ken's 'negotiating tactics, habits, and personality traits,' which he labeled 'Deal in the pocket,' 'Poor mouth,' and 'Artificial crisis,'...." This sort of sarcasm doesn't warm the hearts of judges.

Although the record is not clear, it appears that Watters requested that Ken's attorneys also be sanctioned. If so, personalizing sanctions between attorneys is always a dangerous mistake.

Watters' tone was reportedly sarcastic, deprecatory, improperly personal, and lacked objectivity (see several paragraphs below for the juicier stuff). Effectively he was "testifying" on behalf of his client. His declaration included assertions that:

  • "I've seen first hand that Ken can be a very persuasive person, and that Ken seems to use all of his abilities and skill to get the best deals for himself. Unfortunately we've learned that Ken has also used this great skill and ability to take care of his wife."
  • "I was skeptical ... that someone could really use these tactics effectively outside of a car dealership.... However, throughout our dealings with Ken in this matter, I have personally observed Ken use each of the aforementioned tactics."
  • "During the pendency of this proceedings,...., the 'inconvenient truth' here is that Ken has used his unusually strong business skill and acumen against his spouse despite his fiduciary duties..."

Wife's attorney asserted several breaches of fiduciary duty including that Ken (1) omitted two assets worth $3.1 million on his schedule of assets and debts; (2) produced a written statement of the parties' net worth to be $30.5 million, when several months earlier he gave a financial statement to a loan officer showing the net worth to be twice that; (3) that his schedule of assets and debts failed to state values for many of the listed items; and (4) engaged in various discovery abuses, including stalling the taking of his deposition for ten months.

Watters' motion included Points and Authorities citing but one case: In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470. Feldman is the most important fiduciary duty case of the last decade. It upheld $250,000 in sanctions against a Husband who clearly was frustrating the resolution of that case, and who was secreting assets from the Wife. "Feldman" has become the rallying cry behind many well-intentioned efforts by California Family Law attorneys to force the other side to comply with their fiduciary duties.

Many divorce attorneys have "Feldman letters" loaded and cocked on their computers, to fire off where the other side is 'hiding the ball.' Several years ago these were widely circulated within the family law community with a certain amount of glee. Some attorneys use these letters as an intimidation tactic. Feldman sanctions' threats are indeed sometimes required to remind the other side they are straying from their obligations to be transparent - but misconduct must be egregious in order to succeed on a Feldman claim.  Feldman is important authority for curbing and remedying abusive and dishonest conduct in divorce proceedings, but like all things it can be over-used, blunting its utility. 

Watters urged: "'Here, the Davenport matter might as well be called In re Marriage of Feldman - The Sequel. If ever a dissolution of marriage action in Sonoma County warranted the imposition of sanctions on a party, this is the case.... indeed, 'this case is worse than what happened in Feldman.'" The decision asserts  "F eldman would become Jill's short-hand description of all that was claimed to be wrong with Ken's conduct,..." "Feldman, Feldman, Feldman, Jill repeated below,..." The appellate justices noted that "Jill remains relentless ...."  

For those who have been on the receiving end of nasty Feldman letters, this is the first reported decision that provides an antidote. However, at the same time, Feldman is important authority to assist under-empowered spouses in family law litigation.

Ken naturally opposed Jill's Feldman motion, and gave notice that he would seek too would seek Section 271 sanctions. Jill's Reply argued Ken's motion was technically defective and filed on the wrong forms, and that Ken's requested fees "have little or no connection with the alleged 'sanctionable' conduct of Jill" as opposed to that of Jill's attorney. It is not clear that they challenged the amount of these fees.

The trial of these dueling Feldman claims took place over five days in October and November, 2008. Wife's attorney filed detailed evidentiary objections to the declarations and exhibits that Ken submitted, including motions to strike portions of his pleadings, and Judge Wong essentially ignored these objections making "it abundantly clear that she could separate the wheat from the chaff."  Davenport deals a blow to the common practice of using evidentiary objection briefs to attack declarations from the opposing side that contain improper matter (the function of these is to emphasize to the Court the lack of admissible evidentiary support for statements contains in these declarations, and to strike some of the contents of these pleadings from the record). Judge Wong stated "as far as I'm concerned, fighting over comments or statements made as to whether or not they're relevant or whether or not they're objectionable, you know, this is not a jury trial for heaven's sake. I'm a judge. You know, I can sift through this stuff. I might have some comment about what I think to be more lawyerly conduct and lawyerly language . . . . You should be able to rely on the court being able to read what it reads and eliminate what's not relevant." 

Well, maybe.... Judges are as human as the rest of us. Exactly what argument or "evidence" a court is relying upon in reaching its conclusions is of rightful concern to litigants and their attorneys. Short-circuiting a proper record that makes effective appellate review possible carries a danger of giving trial courts too much power and discretion.

Judge Wong issued a statement of decision that found that:

  • Jill's counsel's failure to meet and confer before filing her motion, and during the proceedings, is sanctionable conduct.
  • The facts Jill alleged "do not rise to the level [of Feldman]."
  • No valid evidence or support was presented that justified an expedited hearing (normally Feldman motions are heard at the conclusion of a dissolution action, when the Court has the larger picture before it, but Attorney Watters had urged that an immediate hearing was required here to deter what he claimed was continuing sanctionable conduct by Ken and his attorneys.
  • Jill's counsel's hostile and disrespectful correspondence is sanctionable.
  • Jill's attorney repeatedly made references to what was said and presented in a mediation that the parties had undertaken, in violation of Evidence Code section 1119.
  • Watters' surreptitious conduct with computer consultants in relation to extracting computer data on a computer in his possession that was believed to include privileged material was inappropriate and sanctionable (in connection with retrieving data stored on a computer that Wife controlled, Watters switched the computer experts, replacing the agreed upon forensic with an IT person whom he'd met at a karaoke Bar where he claimed such "nerds" are known to hang out).
  • All fees relating to Wife's motions could have been avoided by Wife's counsel. Had he done any of the following, it was likely the costly motions and hearings relating thereto could have been avoided: (1) Met and conferred with counsel; (2) been more respectful and cooperative; (3) used the assigned case manager; (4) accepted Husband's counsel's offers to agree to a neutral forensic accountant.
  • Watters' insistence on a expedited Feldman trial in the middle of the case rather than at its conclusion was unnecessary and unreasonably expensive to the parties, and wasted the Court's limited resources.

Judge Wong denied Jill's motions. "There has been a failure of proof sufficient to penalize husband and his attorneys Merrill, Arnone, Benoit or Johnson." She granted Ken's request that the Court find that the Petitioner, through her attorneys, engaged in a course of conduct that was sanctionable. Judge Wong observed:

"'The Court questions the wisdom of such a large firm as O'Brien, Watters to choose to 'educate' a newly admitted lawyer with a case that involved millions of dollars of varied assets in California and other states, with a long term marriage and complicated trust holdings. With no background in either civil or family law litigation, Mr. Andrew Watters admitted to the Court that he was taught to litigate this case with unbridled aggression. These uncooperative and uncivil courses of action have caused Mrs. Davenport unnecessary delays and unnecessary attorney fees and costs.'" [Italics and emphasis added].

I don't know if this last reference is a typographical mistake , but if not Judge Wong's message that Jill's gladiators poorly served her is remarkable. It also spells "malpractice."  

The court also criticized Ken, who had early on stated he would not engage in a court-ordered 4-way if Attorney Watters "was in the room." Judge Wong saw this position as "inexcusably rude and uncalled for. Respondent's arrogance must have hit a sensitive nerve in counsel because Petitioner's case became a case that rapidly deteriorated into unprofessionally rude conduct and speech after that."


What Divorce Lawyers Might Avoid

The appellate court found that "Andrew Watters' demeaning comments to opposing counsel were contrary to the California Attorney Guidelines of Civility and Professionalism promulgated by the State Bar in 2007 (Guidelines). These guidelines reflect that "attorneys have an obligation to be professional with . . . other parties and counsel, [and] the courts," which obligation "includes civility, professional integrity, . . . candor . . . and cooperation, all of which are essential to the fair administration of justice and conflict resolution." (Guidelines, supra, Introduction, p. 3.) Section 4 of the Guidelines further counsels that "An attorney should avoid, hostile, demeaning or humiliating words," further providing in relevant part that: "An attorneys communications about the legal system should at all times reflect civility, professional integrity, personal dignity, and respect for the legal system. An attorney should not engage in conduct that is unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. For example, in communications . . . with adversaries: [¶] . . . [¶] c. An attorney should not disparage the intelligence, integrity, ethics, morals or behavior of the court or other counsel, parties or participants when those characteristics are not at issue. [¶] . . . [¶] f. An attorney should avoid hostile, demeaning or humiliating words." (Guidelines, supra, § 4, pp. 4-5.)"

Justice Richman continued "there is abundant evidence of Andrew Watters treatment - more accurately, mistreatment - of his opposing counsel in his correspondence with them. Bad enough that such correspondence occurs in any litigation. It is utterly inconsistent with a fundamental aspect of proper family law practice. "Family law cases are not supposed to be conducted as adversarial proceedings. Quite the contrary, the goal is to reduce acrimony and adversarial approaches common to general civil litigation and, instead, to foster cooperation between the parties and their counsel with a view toward settlement short of full-blown litigation. [See Fam. C. §§ 2100 (b), § 271(a) (sanctions for uncooperative conduct in family law cases); see also Cal. Atty. Guidelines of Civility & Professionalism § 19-in family law proceedings an attorney should seek to reduce emotional tension and trauma and encourage the parties and attorneys to interact in a cooperative atmosphere, and keep the best interest of the children in mind']."

"The record is replete with correspondence from Andrew Watters to Ken's attorneys that contained abusive, rude, hostile, and/or disrespectful language, correspondence that Andrew Watters himself acknowledged was substantial evidence, when in the course of his closing argument he stated that '[p]erhaps some unpleasant letters that could offend someone did substantially increase the cost of litigation.' Perhaps it did indeed. A few illustrations should suffice:

  • his November 22, 2006 letter to Mr. Merrill referring to Ken's nonappearance for deposition, which letter provided in pertinent part as follows: 'Regarding your client's failure to appear once again for his continued deposition, we too regret that your client chose not to appear. As you know, we duly noticed his continued deposition for 11/20/06-11/22/06. Once again, you offer the same tired, old, and shopworn excuse. Your continued blustering about mutually agreeable dates, efficiency and promptness, and convenience is pathetic when your client's actions negate any semblance of cooperation. Talk is cheap. Actions speak louder than words. Your credibility is at stake here.'
  • his March 13, 2007 letter to Mr. Benoit included remarks that were rude, including 'Enough already with the delays.' Worse, his letter indicated that he did not believe Mr. Benoit-the person he described as "the dean of the Family Law Bar"-telling him: 'We don't accept your implication that you didn't already have [the Request to Inspect] . . . . Perhaps you didn't look hard enough, because we filed a Motion to Compel . . . in which I attached RTI Set one to my Declaration. Or you weren't counting that copy.' And the letter ends with utter disrespect, with observations such as: 'this seems like a case of the pot calling the kettle black'; 'In your last paragraph, your first suggestion is illusory. . . ."; and, "Your last paragraph rings hollow.'
  • his September 11, 2008 letter to Mr. Johnson which, bad enough, insinuated untruthfulness: 'We've noticed that, in the past, you have had some trouble keeping things straight. We also noticed that you tend to stretch things somewhat too far in the name of appearances.' Worse, it accused Mr. Johnson of unethical conduct: 'It's no surprise, then, that your letter of 8/7/08 appears to be an attempt to create a false and misleading exhibit for use at a later law and motion hearing so that your client can sit in court with a halo over his head, and so you can say look how many times Ken offered to settle! That wouldn't surprise us at all, given your practice of attaching a large pile of exhibits to your declarations without any testimony from you concerning their truth.'

Later confronted with such correspondence, Andrew's response was not apologetic. He indicated at one point it might have been "unfortunate," but that was it. In his words, 'So I should note if I caused undue emotional pain on the other side in terms of writing unpleasant letters, if I offended anyone, then that's unfortunate and certainly a learning process for me, but the fact is I am not on trial here. And, in any event, the attorneys on the other side-I'm sure they can handle it. Mr. Mike Merrill, I think, is a 35 year attorney, former Marine officer in Vietnam, has seen it all. Mr. Benoit is a 35- or 40 year family law lawyer. He's seen it all. Mr. Johnson was in the Navy, I believe. These are not attorneys not able to do lawyering because of unpleasant letters from a baby lawyer on the other side.' [Italics added].

The appellate justices observed that Jill's position on appeal was equally unrepentant where, referring to "the tone of some of [Andrew Watters'] written communications," she describes it as "the expressions (sometimes intemperate) of a young lawyer frustrated that Ken was systematically obstructing the search for the truth by his actions in resisting routine discovery, which is supposed to be self-executing. Ken and his attorneys then created a smokescreen that prevented the trial court from seeing the substance of the communications in context."

Strong, strong language. An important caveat for the lawyers who will inevitably attempt to use Davenport to support sanctions' motions for uncivil conduct by opposing counsel is that just accusing the other side of behaving like Mr. Watters may itself seem abusive to a trial court. While the justices' opinion does not appear "overstated" given a record so rich in illustrations of what not to do, I think we need to be careful not to ourselves overstate it, or to try to fit conduct we don't like into a Davenport box where that conduct fails to speak for itself. That is a species of risk that has blunted the edge of Feldman claims since that decision was rendered, making it a less viable tool for under-empowered litigants. The corollary is that "trance begets trance." We don't want to make the same mistakes and so seem as aggressive as our opponents.


 The Adversarial Tone Continued On Appeal

Accordingly, Jill was ordered to pay $100,000 in sanctions plus $304,387 in attorney fees to Ken. Unfortunately for her, Wife's attorneys' strategies on appeal remained obdurate. By this point Andrew Watters had gone "walkabout" and left the firm (following the trial court decision). O'Brien, Watters continued with the same verve as it had at the trial court level. For example, their briefs targeted Judge Cerena Wong with a number of  arguments that one (including the appellate justices) might find to be offensive. The appellate court stated "[i]n sum, Jill manifests a treatment of the record that disregards the most fundamental rules of appellate review."

For instance, in addition to being highly histrionic, Jill's appellate arguments scolded the judge, accusing her of relying on inadmissible evidence while ignoring admissible evidence. Jill's brief posed the question: "Imagine if a high school civics class had been on a field trip to the court that day. How would the teacher be able to explain to his/her students that the judge said she would not follow the rules?" It is mind-boggling that seasoned attorneys would argue that high school students would see that the judge was not following the rules when the judge herself could not. Of course, the appellate justices concluded that just the reverse was true, and that all of Judge Wong's conclusions were well supported by the record and the law but that Jill and her "team" lacked a comprehension of the rules of evidence and basic propriety. 

Frankly, Wife's team had reasons to be concerned about Judge Wong's treatment of the evidentiary objections, but is it possible that in assailing the trial court with the tone that they apparently used that this triggered a defensive reaction in the appellate justices which ultimately took center stage over the legal issues?

Jill argued that whatever the appropriateness of the statements made by attorney Andrew Watters, such communications were covered all by the "litigation privilege" set forth in California Civil Code section 47 and hence could not properly generate a sanctions' award. Similarly, Jill on appeal argued that Andrew Watters' communications were protected by the bounds of free speech and zealous advocacy. Not so ruled the Court. Family law is not the Wild West, nor is it a frontier where "anything goes".


What Went Wrong
(Or, 'Should People Living in Glass Houses Throw Stones')

We family court lawyers are not entirely to blame for getting lost in the dark woods of adversarial divorce to such an extent that some misplace their ethics or, as here, lose control of our emotions - our clients' experiences of divorce are devastating, and lawyers respond to the felt needs of the consuming public like any other industry. Some clients entice us with a willingness to pay "whatever it takes" to personify their angst in formulating our strategies for them - and it is extremely difficult not to become enmeshed in their emotional struggles to an extent that blur the boundaries between their experiences and perspectives and our own.

Particularly as a younger lawyer I confess at times I was deluded into buying my clients' attitudes and personalizing the pain within the stories, and sometimes adopted an arrogance and one-sidedness in accepting their views as the entire picture. This remains a struggle for me at times today. Caring, which I suspect all the members of the O'Brien law firm share, is what is honorable about "zealous advocacy." Unfortunately, relationship wars tend to challenge us all beyond our capacity to stay mindful - within depth of caring lies a trap. We can care too much, and strong emotions in any direction are a potent drug. I for one need to constantly reground myself, and to release the ferocity that accumulates from the frustrations of interacting with high conflict litigants and attorneys. And since this is so for me, it must be so for the others - a realization that can offer some balance and even crack a door to forgiveness.

The Mission Statement of O'Brien, Watters & Davis LLP as published on their website identifies their aspirations as follows: "To render quality legal services and maintain the highest ethical standards; to provide excellent service to clients; to use our best efforts to have our clients succeed and achieve results; to make a reasonable and fair profit; to maintain an excellent reputation in the community and within the legal profession; to be actively involved in and give service to the community; and to have mutual respect and support for one another." I trust that they mean this. Something strikes me as odd, however, about it. I sense a wisp of a sentiment that implies that rendering quality legal services might be inconsistent with maintaining the highest ethical standards; that excellent service is only measured by achieving results, which in traditional lawyer-speak means winning (and not necessarily settling) cases; and that achieving reasonable and fair profits is dependent on strategies for winning adversarially. I guess it is hard to not interpret their advertisement outside the light of what went on in Davenport

O'Brien Waters, me the writer of this Blog, and you the reader are given the invitation and opportunity to reflect upon, re-evaluate, and close the gaps between our intention and actions, every day. Which is always a good reason to be grateful, since we can dust ourselves off and start out anew.  

Marriage of Davenport is a wake up call. Andrew Watters is no demon, but this case contains a concentrated dose of the pitfalls of the adversarial paradigm. Is anybody listening?

Save yourself unnecessary grief and expense, and live a longer life. Seek out family law specialists who have the genuine desire and interest to help you set (and reset as required) a tone that might free you from this mess, rather than binding you more tightly within it!



I believe that the law firm that assisted Ken in this case deserve recognition and naming for their role in this landmark case: Perry, Johnson, Anderson, Miller & Moskowitz by John E. Johnson and Deborah S. Bull. Congratulations!


Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.

Continue reading "Marriage of Davenport: Trial Court SANCTIONS Wife Under FC Section 271 for Her ATTORNEYS' "UNBRIDLED AGGRESSION" In Family Court Proceedings!" »

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December 03, 2010
  ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Elkins Task Force

The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011. 

It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners. 

This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.

Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations.  Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues.  Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.

What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases."  Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification: 

        "We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel.  [Reference omitted].... 

        In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures. But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice.  Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute. It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support.... 

         Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function.  If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."

Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented.  Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions.  Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants.  Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court."   Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.

The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011.  Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217 It states:

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 

December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.

T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization)
Continue reading "ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!" »

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October 18, 2010
  How Do I Get An Order for ATTORNEY FEES in a COMPLEX CASE?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  My divorce seems like it has stalled.  My wife operates our family business, we own several properties including a commercial building and she collects the rents, she isn't cooperating with me on custody on our kids, and I need money to pay my attorney.  She is controlling this case, and I am getting nowhere.  Any recommendations?

[Please note - this Blog is updated with a recent Blog Article detailing the 2011 Revisions to the California Family Code affecting attorney fee awards 12/9/10]

A.  I frequently hear from people whose cases are "stalled" because they have no money to pay their attorney, and no money to hire forensic experts.  It is a problem I face in my practice with certain clients.  It takes money to develop your case, and if there is really none available it is difficult to get anyone to pay attention.  Often there are assets that only one spouse controls.  That spouse or RDP (registered domestic partner) usually claims those assets to be their "separate property" even when the claim is ridiculous (for instance, closely held stock issued as "their sole and separate property" when the vesting of title in their name alone during marriage was just their manipulation and you didn't agree to it). 

When there are assets that exist there is much that you can do.  These assets, whether they be allegedly separate or community, are available to be borrowed against, or sold, to raise money so you can pay your attorney and hire experts to do the work that must be done.

However, your attorney needs to understand how to accomplish this or find one who does.  Specifically one method that works well is to have a referee appointed under Code of Civil Procedure section 639 to oversee a "case management plan" under the circumstances described in Family Code section 2032(d).

Specifically, have your attorney ask the Court in a motion to make a finding that your case involves "complex or substantial issues of fact or law."  These can be related to property rights, custody, visitation, and support and may include bifurcations of issues.  If you don't have an attorney, this would still be a start to obtaining findings that will generate money to hire one. 

Once the Court so designates your case, it will itself begin to implement a plan or assign someone else - like an outside lawyer whom the court recognizes as an expert, to make recommendations as a referee.  While the Court is not obligated to follow the recommendations of these referees, they ususally do.  And if they don't the court may find itself overturned on appeal as happened 10/1/10 in In Re Marriage of Tharp, a case I will be writing about in detail as time permits.

This is a major step in not only getting someone to look more closely at the attorney fees you need (judges, after all, have really limited time) but also a good way to jump start a stalled dissolution or other family law case.

BTW, under the new statutes that take effect in 2011 as a result of the Elkins Task Force recommendations, case management may become the norm in California in family law proceedings.

TW Arnold
10/18/10

Continue reading "How Do I Get An Order for ATTORNEY FEES in a COMPLEX CASE?" »

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