California Family Law Attorney
California Family Law Lawyer Attorney Profile Click here to visit our blog Links Resources
Contact the Law firm of Thurman W. Arnold III
California Family Law Areas of Practice
Contact the Law Office of Thurman W. Arnold III
225 South Civic Drive Suite 1-3 Palm Springs, CA 92262

Recent Posts in Co-Parenting Category

February 26, 2012
  Mindfully Redefining the Expectations Surrounding Divorce
Posted By Thurman Arnold

The Challenge of Seeing Things As They Really Are

Q.    What is meant by the concept "redefining the expectations surrounding divorce"?

A.  We all have an amazing ability to rewrite history. We often view the circumstances of our marriage quite differently in hindsight from how mindfulness in divorce they originally seemed, and it is natural that our minds invent stories about the other party that color how we approach divorce. But what if you could choose what your divorce and its aftermath might look like? How would you hope to view all 'those wasted years' today, tomorrow, next week, next year, in 10 years, or as you reflect upon your life as you prepare for your own inevitable exit?

We rarely consider these questions with balanced interest. Instead, our minds become stuck on stories that tend to cause our experience in reality to replicate the attitudes in our heads. These stories often just aren't true, or are quite incomplete. This is mindlessness in practice, and it is our default condition.

As with most questions, it is to be expected that we will formulate our answers from the core of our own interests.

If you could set aside your fear and anger, how might you like your divorce to feel for you and for your spouse?

Mindfulness is a great teacher if we can listen, and it may offer a framework for understanding why we become conflicted. It teaches us to pay attention to the thoughts and attitudes that arise within us in order to test whether they are true - and not to judge or suppress our "answers". It can be illuminating to notice how wounded answers operate to control the course of our lives.

Our views about what is happening to us are always linked to how our self-centered "me" feels. This egoic personality is sometimes called the "Little Me". Our worse fantasies, most selfish or destructive thoughts, and our day to day self centeredness all derive from a sense of a wounded Little Me.

The Little Me is our egoic conditioning. Recognizing the "Little Me" for what it is is an amazing accomplishment. It opens the door to recognizing something infinitely larger - that which notices the Little Me. Spiritual philosphers call this the "Inner Guru." Our highest aspirations, and our most transcendent moments, resonate within and are observed and recognized by our Inner Guru. We are all familiar with both characters, whatever we name them.

"Little Me" is the character that we think we are. It is the filter that judges our selves and everyone else, the one with the committe and all its opinions. It shifts and inverts from moment to moment. Little Me wants above all to be entertained, and it attaches to material things and romantic imagery. It is the part of you that is always in argument with what is happening.

Our Little Me is not awake. Sure, it moves, it bustles around, it can seem quite energetic - hell, it bounces off the walls all the time. But that is not a state of Awakeness. The Little Me might beg to differ, but let it beg. No answer or response will satisfy it anyway. The Little Me is our 2 year old personality structure at an arrested emotional stage of development. It can be quite beguiling like any child, dripping with sweetness and unction one moment and the most terrible tyrant the next. Little Me is a chameleon, and getting rid of the Little Me is like trying to rid yourself of your shadow. Better to know that is not what is going to happen, and if you go to war with your Little Me it is just the Little Me pretending to battle itself.

Your Inner Guru is something quite larger. It is wise enough to be all embracing and all inclusive, and it loves the Little Me with uncompromising compassion. To the Little Me the Inner Guru seems to fly on gossamer wings, and seems tied to some other inaccesible dimension. That perception is not true.

Mindfulness is nothing more than the aliveness of the Inner Guru expressing its aliveness in any given moment. It is allowing the natural spontaneous truth of life to express itself. It seems quite a task to remember that. This sense of difficulty is natural, but it is simply a mistaken apprehension.

So, what might one do?

To find an answer, it is important to consider who or what is asking the question. If the aspect of ourselves that we may call Little Me is asking the question, buckle up.

It is through mindfulness whether as a meditation practice, gentle self-inquiry, or just a gradual flowering of recognition and intention, that we allow the Inner Guru to address the question. 

We might ask the question differently: How would my Inner Guru wish this divorce of mine to feel, to me and all other beings? 

There is a transformative power in this question. Do you notice that when the Little Me drops out of the equation, when "I" am not the central questioner, previously unnoticed possibilities pop into view?

We need to begin somewhere, and a list is as good a place as any. When we connect to a heartfelt place of best intentions, and examine those intentions in a committed manner, certain themes arise that we did not before consciously consider and could not otherwise organize. This allows us to peer deeper than when stuck in the autopilot of trance conditioning, as we often are. It doesn't matter whether you list what you don't want or what you do want, but try listing it from both directions. Pick which ever is easiest for you to begin, and grab a sheet of paper or better yet a journal. Do any of these resonate?

    I don't want to cause pain to my loved ones. 

    I don't want my children to suffer. 

    I don't want to repeat my own parent's experience. 

    I don't want to be angry. 

    I don't want to be scared. 

    I am tired of blame. 

    I am tired of shame. 

    I don't even want to cause pain for myself. 

    I don't want to be stuck. 

    I don't want to be self-centered all the time. 

    I don't want to impose my story of suffering on those around me. 

    I don't want to feel vulnerable all the time. 

    I don't want to feel a victim. 

    I don't want to be sad. 

    I don't want to feel physically unwell. 

    I don't want to react all the time. 

    I don't want to need to apologize because of what I've said or done. 

    I don't want ______

Do this exercise with gentle humor and patient kindness and understand what is written above may be a long list for you, or maybe a short list. The key is keep listing until you've exhausted the thoughts and feelings that arise and wish to express themselves. You can also run another sheet at the same time, or wait until you are finished with your first one, but however you approach the list, each item will suggest its opposite.

    I want to love. 

    I want to be loved. 

    I want peace. 

    I want to be a positive force. 

    I want to be awake. 

    I want to be mindful. 

    I want to forgive. 

    I want to be forgiven. 

    I want to get on with my life.

    I want _______. 

Now, when you are done with both lists, ask yourself this question: Is the best of what I want for myself, the same as what I want for all others? Is the best of what I want, what I want for my divorce? Is it what I want for my spouse or partner? Is is possible that they would want the same things for themselves and for me? And even if they don't want the same things for me, does that matter - for me?

Finally, write down what resonated for you in making these lists. Entitle it "Mission Statement" or something else. And consider making a prayer, or whatever you wish to call it, that these goals remain your highest intention and that you may remind mindful of them, in pursuing them.

Then, congratulate yourself. You have just examined more than most people ever consider! You have glimpsed deep mindfulness, and have a sense what it looks like and where to access it. You have expressed an intention to be present and well, and so begun a journey to healing. You have realized that just because you have a story of who did what to whom, that doesn't make the story true - indeed, you now have a reason to be immediately suspicious of such stories.

And you have arrived at the door to a way of being that may guide and carry you safely through the journey, all the way home.

mindful parenting and divorce trance

Continue reading "Mindfully Redefining the Expectations Surrounding Divorce" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
November 16, 2011
  2nd Appellate District Severely Limits GRANDPARENT VISITATION Under Family Code Section 3102
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Rich v. Thatcher (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1176 

In what reads to me to be a myopic opinion, Justice Yegan of Division Six of the Second Appellate District has declared that biological grandparents have a burden to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that denying them visitation pursuant to Family Code section 3102 would be detrimental to a child before they can hope to win access to their children's children, when their own child dies. in the face of a "fit" parent's objection. Attaching a burden of proof by "clear and convincing" evidence is usually the kiss of death to any litigant who has that burden.

The appellate decision appears to combine a species of "bad facts make bad law" with a reluctance to discuss the underlying facts that were determined by the Ventura trial court to such an extent that we are left guessing (but possibly not) where the grandmother went wrong, since clearly she made an extremely bad impression on both courts. Hence, my critical feeling towards the decision may be due to sensing that some important information is being withheld from "we the readers" that deserved this draconian outcome, and also from a sense that both the trial court and the appellate are being reactive to undisclosed facts, and that as a consequence a brand new rule has been established in California that will impact many grandparents who are innocent of whatever transgression Ms. Rich may have committed.

And, more important from my perspective, this decision reflects a collision between what the mental health and family sciences believe about taking a generational and cooperative approach to parenting. At this level of the case apparently nobody weighed on behalf of either grandparents specifically, or the family sciences generally - no amicus curie briefs seem to have been sought. I really hope that this decision gets appealed to the California Supreme Court so that we can begin to look at the very important role that grandparents potentially play within families. Unfortunately, grandparents don't seem to have much of an organizational voice. It seems as if the AARP ought to be interested in these issues given their constitutency.

The decision tells us that Carol Rich is the grandmother and that Rochelle Thatcher is the surviving parent ("Thatcher" is a big name in Ventura, but I don't know if there is any relation). Carol's son and Rochelle never married, but they produced a son together in December, 2006. The father died in 2010 of a drug overdose and the decision tells us cryptically that he "left two suicide notes." Grandmother and mother did not "get along", and grandmother apparently accused mother of having something to do with her son's death. "Their hostility was open and clear." 

All of this suggests that grandmother had a very hard time accepting her son's death, and that she felt that the mother was in some way responsible. If so, grandmother's position may have reasonably led a trial court to conclude that she would be a destabilizing and even poisonous influence on the minor, but if that is how the justices felt it would be nice if they had said so. Instead they have spanked all grandparents with one flat judicial palm.

Grandmother did get a lengthy hearing in June, 2010, where a number of witnesses were called. At the conclusion the trial court "expressed 'great concern over [grandmother's] veracity.'"  It further found that while grandmother had established some relationship with the child, she failed to establish a "deep and abiding relationship." Instead, grandmother's relationship was instead limited to interactions with the grandchild when grandmother was serving to supervised visits ordered in the parties' Paternity case. Hence, it sounds as if this grandmother's relationship with her grandson existed, but that it historically had not been substantial. The child was 4 1/2 at the time of trial.

The trial court imposed a clear and convincing standard on grandmother to "rebut the presumption that Mother is acting in the best interest of [grandchild] in denying visitation to Grandmother at this time or that denial of visitation would be detrimental to [grandchild]." Nonetheless, the trial court continued that in any event "it would not be in [grandchild's] best interest to interject court-ordered visitation with Grandmother, particularly in light of the longstanding animosity between Mother and Grandmother."

Hence, this ruling is another cautionary tale for grandparents - if you so ally yourself with you own child against the person with whom they chose to produce a child, it will hurt you later. Grandparents do too often tend to become allied and enmeshed in their children's lives, and this is a real problem in support cases where parents are paying for their children while those children refuse or fail to become independent and so try to stick the other party with a financial burden - something we will likely see an importance case on soon. But I digress.

Justice Yegan, who clearly does not brook fools, strongly supports the lower trial courts when they make discretionary calls that are supported by the evidence. Quoting from his own earlier decision this year (see link above), he states in a footnote to this decision "[a]s we indicated in In re Marriage of Greenberg
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1095) the trial court's comment on grandmother's veracity is tantamount to an "adverse factual finding." This is a poor platform upon which to predicate a successful appeal. ( Id. , at p. 1099.)

That is the fact upon which this case really seems to turn. Justice Yegan continues in this decision:

"Grandmother contends that the trial court erred in applying the clear and convincing burden. We disagree with her and agree with the trial court's legal conclusion. We hold as follows: To overcome the presumption that a fit parent will act in the best interest of the grandchild, a grandparent has the burden of proof and must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that denial of visitation is not in the best interest of the grandchild, i.e., denial of visitation would be detrimental to the grandchild. The fair import of the word "detriment" is damage, harm, or loss. (See American Heritage Dict. (2d college ed. 1982) P. 388, col. 2.) If grandparent visitation is in the grandchild's 'best interest,' it is not 'detrimental.' If grandparent visitation is not in the grandchild's 'best interest,' it is 'detrimental.' [citations omitted].

Until today, no appellate court has expressly held that section 3102 requires clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption. 'There is some authority for the proposition that the same test which applies to a custody award to a nonparent should apply to a visitation award to a nonparent that is, that "judicially compelled visitation against the wishes of both parents" "must not be allowed unless it is clearly and convincingly shown that denial of visitation would be detrimental to the child." (
In re Marriage of Gayden (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1510, 1517, 1520 ... [involving a motion for visitation by a biologically unrelated person under former Civil Code section 4601 (now Fenn v. Sherriff , supra , 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1486; see also dictum in In re Marriage of W. , supra , 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 74 ['Where natural parents are unified in opposition, nonparental visitation can be ordered only if such visitation is in the best interest of the child and denial of visitation would be detrimental to the child'].)

'The degree of burden of proof applied in a particular situation is an expression of the degree of confidence society wishes to require of the resolution of a question of fact. (Citation).' [Citations omitted]. There is no question that a grandparent has an important interest in visiting with a grandchild. But the higher degree of the burden of proof that we adopt simply demonstrates that there is a preference in favor of the presumably correct choice of a fit sole surviving parent. Such choice is 'first.'

In formulating our holding, we are guided by and adopt the cogent analysis of Justice Chin in his concurring and dissenting opinion in
In re Marriage of Harris, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 247-250; see also the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Brown at pages 251-253. To adequately protect a fit sole surviving parent's constitutional right to raise a child, a "mere preponderance" burden as to "best interest" is not sufficient. The "clear and convincing" burden, i.e. evidence "so clear as to leave no substantial doubt," promotes a parent's constitutionally protected "first" choice. The higher evidentiary burden preserves the constitutionality of section 3102 and insures against erroneous fact finding. ( Id., at p. 248.)

The clear and convincing burden is not insurmountable. We can certainly envision a case where a trial court could factually find and rule that grandparent visitation is appropriate over the objection of the fit sole surviving parent. This, however, is not such a case. The trial court did not credit grandmother's testimony.

Even if the trial court had erroneously applied too strict of a burden for grandmother, we we would still affirm the order denying visitation based upon the trial court's alternative ruling. As indicated, we commend the trial court for its well-articulated order. First, it ruled that the "clear and convincing" burden was appropriate. This was a debatable issue which we now settle. But it was also prescient in articulating its alternate best interest ruling which is rooted in traditional family law principles. 'We may not reverse . . . simply because [in theory] some of the court's reasoning was faulty, so long as any of the stated reasons are sufficient to justify the order. [Citation.]' ( Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 830, 844.)"

Note to reader -
I've added some emphasis to this.

So, we now have a rule that is clearly intended to honor the constitutional issues addressed to some extent in the U.S. Supreme Court's Troxel decision. But the decision omits to discuss any of the legislative history of Family Code section 3102 as to whether the burden of proof that is associated with it is nearly as hard as what the decision makes it become. While "clear and convincing evidence" is not an "insurmountable burden," practically speaking any lawyer will tell you it almost is. Morever, while the decision admits that grandparents have important interests in visiting with grandchildren, it totally ignores the rights of children to know their families of origin. There is no mention that any lawyer was ever appointed for the minor in this case. 

This decision should also be evaluated in light of a Fourth Appellate District decision issued less than a month ago. In Hoag v. Diedjomajor the Riverside based appellate district upheld a trial court order for visitation after a grandparent's child died. The burden of proof applied by the Court was not discussed, but was implicitly by a "preponderance of the evidence."

The outcome was the opposite than here, but in many ways it is entirely consistent with Justice Yegan's decision - and here is what is interesting for me: If a parent refuses visitation, even if they don't get along, to spite the grandparent, they lose. But if the grandparent seeks visitation after spiting the non-biological surviving parent, they lose.

And, I wonder, how can a "fit" parent (by definition) deny any access at all between their child and that child's grandparents, especially when the intergenerational parent is dead, except under the most outrageous of circumstances? Yet, having said that, I must confess that if a grandparent does behave outrageously, then their rights should be limited or nonexistent. Oy vey, possibly the record that we will never see discloses that such was the case here - but we must take it on faith, apparently, that it was. I don't see how we need to impose a burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to ensure that bad grandparents are fenced in - I mean "fenced out".

Another question bothers me - the decision points out that there were nine other witnesses who testified at the trial beyond the grandmother in this case. Did these include the maternal grandparents, who possibly were more favorably received? So often these types of litigation wars can only be funded by older people who have accumulated some wealth. Often these family battles include or are really between parents' parents. I notice that the mother in this case appears to have had premiere local counsel, and that must not have been cheap. The paternal grandmother will foot some of their bill in this case since costs were assessed against her.

But then, of course, other losers as a result of this decision are the grandchildren of grandparents who can behave themselves who may be affected by this new burden of proof. IMHO. But you may disagree - please feel free to comment if you do!

Continue reading "2nd Appellate District Severely Limits GRANDPARENT VISITATION Under Family Code Section 3102" »

Permalink  | Comments(2)
 
October 31, 2011
  GRANDPARENT RIGHTS: Recent RIVERSIDE Case Orders VISITATION To GP After DEATH OF PARENT
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS


Hoag v. Diedjomahor (October 17, 2011), E050935

The Facts

The Fourth Appellate Division released a published opinion on October 17, 2011 in the case of Hoag v. Diedjomahor, a case which was decided by recently retired Commissioner Michael McCoy in Indio, California, involving grandparent visitation rights upon the death of a parent per Family Code section 3102. Commissioner McCoy's ruling in favor of the grandmother was upheld on appeal. Interestingly, the grandmother did not participate in the appellate level proceedings but nonetheless succeeded. Overturning a well reasoned trial court decision, where an abuse of discretion must first be shown, is always a difficult proposition.

Melville Diedjomahor (the father) and Kristen Hoag (the mother) were married in 2005. They lived with Kristen's mother, Shannon Hoag (the grandmother) in an apartment in La Habra. Kristen gave birth to their first daughter in 2006. Thereafter the parties separated. Melville moved to Desert Hot Springs, California, while Kristen and the minor remained with the maternal grandmother. Then the parties reconciled, and the family - including Shannon Hoag - moved into a residence together in DHS. In 2008 a second daughter was born.

Kristen filed for divorce in Indio in February, 2009. A month later she died unexpectedly as a result of previously undiagnosed epilepsy. Immediately following the death the children remained with the grandmother, and the father would come visit every few days.

Several months later the grandmother told the father she intended to file a guardianship proceeding. In reaction thereto, Melville demanded that she turn the children over to him. The proceeding was filed, alleging that the father was unfit because of injuries and also because he was in the country illegally and subject to deportation. Communications between the two rapidly deteriorated such that - according to grandma, he refused to give her any further visitation except that which was court-ordered; the father denied imposing this limitation to the trial court. In any event the GM was denied access to the children for some weeks after she filed her guardianship petition, until Commissioner McCoy entered visitation orders some three weeks later.

To complicate matters, grandmother was living together with Kristen's uncle, where the children and Kristen had also stayed for a time before her death, and - as we so regularly see if high conflict family law cases - father alleged that the uncle had improperly touched his niece, Kristen, years before when she was a minor. In 1993 grandmother's children had been removed from her custody because she had been using drugs. For these reasons grandmother should not have extended visitations, he argued.

Nonetheless, grandmother received visitation with the minors pending a trial. The guardianship proceedings were dismissed and continued within the family law action that Kristen had initiated. This visitation gave the grandmother three hours every Wednesday and 48 hours every other weekend, and she was allowed a daily phone call. This became her proposal for the final visitation order. It was based upon the mediator's recommendations.

Melville claimed at trial that he would permit grandmother to visit, but objected to any orders issuing for same and instead insisted it should be left to his discretion for day to day and moment to moment. He contended that overnights were not safe because the children might be exposed to the uncle (by this time the grandmother had moved into an apartment by herself, in the same complex as dad), that he wanted to study the kids on Wednesday, and he objected to daily calls because they interrupted what he was doing. He explained that once grandmother had filed court proceedings she had breached any trust that had previously existed between them. Hence, his final non-court order proposal was eight hours every other Saturday and one week during the summer with no sleep overs, and eight hours on grandmother's birthday.

Ultimately Commissioner McCoy found that while the father was in fact a fit parent, but that he had opposed grandmother's requests for what was in fact a reasonable visitation schedule. The Court specifically found that the father's testimony that he would allow non-court ordered visitation to occur to not be credible, and the trial court also dismissed the allegations regarding the uncle and the grandmother's past conduct (although noting that Commissioner McCoy had prohibited such contact in any event). It found that visitation was in the children's best interest, particularly so given the the years that grandmother had acted as a third parent for the children and the parties before the divorce was filed. Essentially, the trial Court ruled that a parent does not have unfettered discretion to impose visitation conditions at their whim where grandparents have played such an important historic role for children.

The Law Concerning Grandparent Visitation

This decision does an excellent job in reviewing and cleaning up California decisions about grandparent visitation in the wake of Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, decided by the United States Supreme Court almost twelve years ago. Like Troxel, this case involves a grandparent, whose adult child has died, seeking visitation with that child's minor children over the objection of their surviving parent.

As noted by Justice Richli, who wrote the opinion for our local Riverside County based appellate division, Troxel commands the courts to presume that the surviving parent's objection to grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the children. "However, this does not mean that the surviving parent is free to use the denial of visitation as Big Bertha in his or her personal war with the grandparent." Here, the trial court found that the surviving parent's claimed reasons for objecting to visitation were not reasonable and not credible; in essence, as he practically admitted on the stand, he objected to visitation mainly to spite the grandparent. Moreover, he admitted that grandparent visitation would be in the best interest of the children. Thus, the presumption that he was acting in the best interest of his children was overcome, and the trial court constitutionally could and did grant the grandparent's visitation petition.

The trial court understood the law to be that it could constitutionally apply section 3102, including its best-interest test, provided the father was either (1) unfit, or (2) "opposed to occasional visitation." It expressly found that he was a fit parent. It concluded that "the issue really turns on whether dad is opposed to occasional visitation. If he is, then the court then addresses what visitation, if any, is in the children's best interest." It found that the father was "opposed [to] any . . . reasonable visitation involving the children and grandma." Thus, it proceeded to apply a standard best-interest test.

The father challenged this reasoning by arguing that the trial court erred by finding that he was opposed to meaningful visitation. Second, even assuming that he was opposed to meaningful visitation, he was still entitled to a presumption that his decision was in the best interest of the children.

The justices in this case stated:

"In Troxel, the surviving parent's willingness to allow visitation was just one of a number of factors that the Supreme Court took into account. Thus, the significance of this single factor, standing alone, is not at all clear. We have no way of knowing what the outcome would have been if the surviving parent had not been willing to offer meaningful visitation.

On one hand, the Troxel plurality cited, with approval, various state statutes allowing courts to award visitation to a nonparent when a parent has denied visitation; it evidently viewed these as constitutional. ( Troxel, supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 71-72 [plur. opn.].) On the other hand, it adopted a broad 'presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.' ( Id. at p. 68.) It would seem that this should apply not only to a decision to limit visitation, but also to a decision to deny visitation entirely.

In fact, Troxel's discussion of willingness to allow visitation puts the parent in a 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' position. If the parent voluntarily allows some visitation, that could be viewed as a concession that visitation is in the best interest of the child. Certainly it is a decision regarding the child's best interest, to which the court must {Slip Opn. Page 15} accord 'special weight.' If, however, the parent refuses to allow any visitation voluntarily, that, too, weighs in favor of court-ordered visitation. What is a parent who genuinely believes that visitation would be detrimental supposed to do?

Because this issue is fraught with difficulty, we choose to assume - solely for the sake of argument - that the trial court erred by ruling that it was free to apply a best-interest test solely because the father was not willing to offer meaningful visitation voluntarily. This would mean that it was still required to presume that the father's visitation determination was in the best interest of the children and to accord special weight to that determination.

The trial court's other findings, however, show that, even if it had applied this standard, it would still have allowed visitation. Most crucially, it found that the father's claimed reasons for objecting to visitation were not reasonable and not credible. This left, as his real reason, a desire to retaliate against the grandmother for her attempt to take the children away from him. Indeed, he testified that he was contesting visitation because she had breached his trust by trying to take the children away from him, and she had been 'disrespectful' to him. We hasten to add that this is a completely understandable reaction. Nevertheless, it is not based on the best interest of the children. To the contrary, it punishes the children for the sins of the grandmother. [Emphasis added].

Moreover, in closing argument, the father's counsel conceded that visitation with the grandmother would be in the best interest of the children. He merely argued that court-ordered visitation would be detrimental. Thus, the trial court did not simply disagree with the father concerning the best interest of his children. Moreover, it did not fail to give sufficient weight to his determination of their best interest. Rather, based on its findings (and his concession), the presumption that his visitation determinations were in the best interest of the children was thoroughly overcome.

Evidently the father's counsel was trying to achieve the same outcome as in Kyle O. The father there, too, admitted that visitation with the grandparents was in his daughter's best interest and claimed that he would allow visitation voluntarily. He testified, however, that court-ordered visitation was detrimental because it increased the hostility between him and the grandparents. ( Kyle O. v. Donald R., supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 858-859, 863-864.) He also introduced evidence that court-ordered visitation had interfered with the child's opportunities to spend time with him and her paternal relatives and that it conflicted with her other activities. ( Id. at pp. 857-858.) The appellate court concluded that "his preference for a less structured and more normal and spontaneous manner of visitation must be given deference." ( Id. at p. 863.)

Kyle O. is distinguishable, however, because here, the father (and his counsel) never really explained why he objected to court-ordered visitation, even though he was supposedly willing to allow visitation voluntarily. When asked, he simply raised objections to the existing temporary visitation schedule. For example, he claimed that the Wednesday evening visit prevented him from "study[ing]" with the children.

This was not an objection to court-ordered visitation.

In this appeal, the father claims that it was reasonable for him to be opposed to court-ordered visitation, as opposed to voluntary visitation, because the grandmother had 'a pattern of hostility' toward him. He argues that, unlike voluntary visitation, court-ordered visitation would give her a stick to beat him with - any time he violated an order, she would undoubtedly seek sanctions against him.

The problem with this argument is that the father himself never testified, at trial, that this was why he opposed court-ordered visitation. Thus, the trial court did not have to accept this theory.

The father also argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his concerns about whether the children would be safe with the grandmother. The trial court, however, specifically found that these concerns were neither reasonable nor credible. Substantial evidence supports this finding. The supposed molestation was remote; it had occurred when the uncle was about 12 and mother was about 5. It was described as 'improper[] touch[ing];' the grandmother characterized it as 'playing doctor.' The children had stayed at the uncle's house for over a month without being molested. In any event, by the time of trial, the grandmother was no longer living with the uncle. The trial court could and did order that the children not be left alone with him.

The grandmother's drug use was similarly remote. Her loss of custody, although due, in part, to her use of drugs, had been only temporary. It did not appear that she had ever used drugs again. Last, but not least, again, the father admitted that visitation was in the best interest of the children and claimed that he was willing to allow visitation voluntarily.

Next, the father argues that the trial court erroneously placed the burden on him to prove that his objections to visitation were in the best interest of the children. Not so. He does not cite any portion of the record to support his claim, and we have found none.

Finally, the father argues that even if the trial court did not err by allowing some visitation, it erred by adopting a more extensive visitation schedule than he was willing to offer. He does not support this argument, however, with any analysis or citation of authority. Accordingly, we deem it forfeited....

We do not mean to suggest that, if not forfeited, it would have merit. The trial court found that the father's objections to visitation did not arise out of a genuine concern for the best interest of the children. Thus, the constitutionally established presumption that he was acting in the best interest of the children was overcome. This not only allowed but affirmatively required the trial court to determine what visitation schedule was in the best interest of the children.

* * *
The father argues that ... the trial court could not order visitation unless and until he had been given an opportunity to negotiate visitation voluntarily.

He had such an opportunity, however, in the course of the guardianship, as well as in this action. He even participated in mediation (which regrettably produced no agreement).

According to the father, however, a grandparent must ask the surviving parent for a voluntary visitation arrangement before the grandparent can even file a visitation petition with the court. Thus, in his view, the fact that he had an opportunity to negotiate a voluntary visitation arrangement after this proceeding had already been filed is irrelevant. We find no authority for this in Troxel or Punsly. Indeed, Punsly is, if anything, to the contrary. It understood Troxel to mean that "the parent must be given an opportunity to voluntarily negotiate a visitation plan," but it added that it was "irrelevant" when or why the parent did so. (Punsly v. Ho, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1108.) Moreover, it held that, in the case before it, this requirement had been satisfied by the parent's agreement 'to voluntarily arrange visitation . . . both before and after the [ grandparents] petitioned the court for visitation.' ( Ibid., italics added.)

The father argues that it would be good public policy to make a request for voluntary visitation a precondition to filing a visitation petition. Even if so, this is an argument that must be made, if at all, to the Legislature. Section 3102 contains no such requirement, and the federal Constitution, as construed in Troxel, does not impose one."

Comments

Commissioner McCoy did an outstanding job in making a thorough and well-reasoned decision based upon the evidence. To resist visitation by a grandparent who has a close and substantial relationship with grandchildren, there needs to be real evidence in the record that the children's best interests in continuing, stable relationships with these third party nonparents, are not being ignored simply out of spite.

This case is a must read for all grandparents, or custodial parents, faced with a grandparent or other request for visitation rights by a non-parent. I will upload the opinion itself in a few weeks. It gives rich fodder for how to structure arguments on both sides in these often acrimonious, but always unfortunate, disputes.

However, as it turns out, this decision is not the final answer on the matter. I will discuss the more recent case of Rich v. Thatcher, out of Ventura County, shortly. But, this is not the Ventura "Thatchers", is it?

Please note that this decision is based upon Family Code section 3102, which only applies where one parent has died. The other grandparent visitation statutes are Family Code section 3103 and  FC section 3104. I would suspect, however, that this case will nonetheless generalize, to an extent that remains to be seen, to grandparent visitation where both parents are still living.

Thurman Arnold, III, CFLS

Continue reading "GRANDPARENT RIGHTS: Recent RIVERSIDE Case Orders VISITATION To GP After DEATH OF PARENT" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
May 03, 2011
  San Diego Trial Court REVERSED (Again) in MOVE-AWAY Case
Posted By Thurman Arnold, C.F.L.S.

Parental Relocations and Move-Away

In response to a recent article I posted about the case of F.T. vs. L.J., the mother of the Mother in Mark T. vs. Jaime Z. submitted a comment about a new reversal of a case involving Judge Lisa C. Schall, in San Diego, on this Blog - for which I thanked her. I am grateful that family law litigants in these published appeals are increasingly airing their side of the experience here, and I invite you to as well!

The decision in her daughter's case was published on Friday, last week, so I now understand what the maternal grandmother, "Shelly," was referencing.

My sense is that appellate courts are expecting more out of trial judges, like never before, and lawyers too, to be sure, and therapists and court services personnel and litigants themselves! An interesting footnote is that the father's attorneys in this case were certified family law specialists, and (presumably) local San Diego heavyweights, and the mother represented herself and yet succeeded "against all odds." Is this an Elkins Aftermath, leveling the playing field for unrepresented parties against experienced adversaries?


Mark T. and Jamie Z. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1115

In Mark T. v. Jamie Z. certified for publication on April 28, 2011 by the Fourth Appellate District, a San Diego trial court was again reversed in a move-away case where she effectively refused to permit a custodial parent to move out of state without addressing what custody orders should issue if the parent did move. In F.T. vs. L.J. it was the Father who wanted to relocate - here it was the Mother but in both cases it was the same judicial officer.

Judge Lisa C. Schall doesn't like move-aways, it appears. These applications challenge the non-moving parent and can negatively impact a child's access to that parent, and disrupt parent-child bonding, if a holistic parenting plan under the move-away regime is not developed. 

Judge Schall bears the indignity of being reversed twice now in less than 30 days in a reported appellate decision - quite a scolding. Family law is damned tough for judicial officers, who are doing their best to protect children and weigh in consistently with the cutting edge policies of current mental health science as well as their in-house (FCS) advisors. The problem at present is that the opinions of MHP's (mental health providers), and the wisdom of the reviewing courts, are in conflict. The science of move-away as it affects families from the MHP perspective is still developing, and it collides with certain cherished assumptions the law makes about the rights of Americans, and specifically parents in California under our current statutory scheme ( see Family Code section 7501 and the Burgess case) to move freely. 

In both cases Judge Schall accepted (mostly) the independent opinions of outside, court-appointed, mental health forensics and ignored the opinions of the Family Court Services mediator - here the very same Lynne Waldman who made recommendations in the F.T. case. FCS mediator Waldman's belief was that Jamie's move away request should be granted, noting that Jamie had been L.'s primary caretaker since his birth, that Jamie had been unable to find a job in San Diego and was "living in poverty," and that Jamie appeared "to have a clear plan for the move."

Judge Schall now has two strikes against her for using judicial body language to create a result that she felt was fair and appropriate, and her findings on the record illustrate her dilemma. I'm reminded of my early youth playing pool (not so much) and hoping if I twisted my body hard enough, the ball would fall in the pocket. Most of us are doing the best we can. Trial judges, however, have a script they must follow.

In effect, Judge Schall's mistake was to refuse to permit a move-away by a Mom with a 22 month old child who had indeed been the child's "primary caretaker since birth." By effectively coercing Mom not to move by denying her move-away request, and by ignoring the question of "in whose custody" the child's best interests were served" or what arrangement should be imposed were Mom to move, Judge Schall committed reversible error. The justices ruled:

"The court must decide de novo what physical custody arrangement would be in the child's best interests, assuming that the requesting parent will relocate ." Therapist Dr. Lori Love (we can't invent this name stuff) was appointed to evaluate the family for the Court and opined that "[t]his examiner understands the importance of having extended family around for support however this cannot be justified as being in [L.'s] best interest[s] when it means removing him from a loving and capable father. Jamie stated that she did not have an active father in her life and very much wants that to happen for [L.] It would be virtually impossible for Mark to be an active father from across the country." Dr. Love urged the child was too young for the move and went on to recommend that Mom not "be permitted to move out of the County of San Diego. At the same time, this forensic therapist was unwilling to recommend a primary change in custody and assumed that the mother would in fact remain the primary caretaker in San Diego county. She made no recommendations about what custodial arrangement should become effective when or if the Mother moved.

The appellate justices ruled: "Where, as here, a parent who shares joint custody of a minor makes a request to relocate the child in the context of an initial custody determination, the trial court must decide de novo what physical custody arrangement would be in the child's best interests. In making its custody determination, the court must proceed on the assumption that the parent who is making the request will relocate his or her own residence, regardless of whether the court grants or denies the request. In this case, the court erroneously failed to conduct its best interests analysis based on the presumption that Jamie would be relocating to Minnesota."

The trial court adopted the recommendations of Dr. Love, even though Dr. Love failed to address what should happen if and when Jamie relocates out of state. "The very issue that Dr. Love was supposed to address is what parenting plan would be in L.'s best interests, given that Jamie intended to move to Minnesota .... The court misapplied the law in adopting Dr. Love's recommendations, because in making those recommendations, Dr. Love incorrectly assumed that preserving the status quo parenting arrangement was an option, even in the face of Jamie's expressed intent to move...."
 
At trial the Father's attorney asked Mother whether she would move if the court were to deny her request to relocate, and Mom's response showed she was tortured by the question. The appellate court ruled that this question by counsel was improper - courts cannot consider whether the primary parent might alter their plan of relocate depending upon how the court rules. As a trial lawyer this is interesting to me, because this question is often used to telegraph a message to the Court that implies it can deny the move because the moving parent evidently doesn't want to move 'badly enough.'

Apparently the trial court suspected Mother's motives for moving might include frustrating Father's access, but the court did not actually make such findings. "The court's comments regarding Jamie's reasons for moving to Minnesota appear to constitute second-guessing as to the wisdom of Jamie's decision to move (i.e., questioning the "necessity" of the relocation), as opposed to a finding that her decision to move was made 'simply to frustrate the noncustodial parent's contact with the minor child.'" There is no requirement that a parent who has the right to custody of a child establish the necessity of a proposed move. "[E]ven where the court finds that a move away request is being made in bad faith, the court must view this finding as only one potential factor in deciding whether to allow the child's residence to be moved; it does not permit the court to deny the move away request on the presumption that in denying the request, the court can assure that the requesting parent will not in fact move, and that the court can thereby maintain the status quo parenting arrangement. That one parent may have been motivated, in part, to relocate the child's residence by a desire to lessen the child's contact with the other parent does not mean that the court should apply any standard other than what would be in the best interests of the child."


The Bottom Line

If a parent with the right of custody seeks to relocate with a child and there is no final custody decree then in existence, the trial court must determine what the new custodial arrangement should be based upon the child's best interests under these new circumstances. The court cannot substitute its wisdom for that of the moving parent, or refuse a move simply because it disagrees with the parent's reasoning for leaving. Even if it finds the moving parent is moving to frustrate visitation with the other parent, that is but one factor among several affecting the child's best interest and it is not itself sufficient, without more, to change custody.

Judges cannot refuse to permit the child to move in the hopes of coercing the parent into staying locally instead. It is improper for judges and lawyers to ask moving parents whether they would still move if they lost custody, or to even consider this question. This means that it is similarly improper for outside evaluators to ask or consider the question either, or to report any such answer (or an opinion about what the answer might be) to the Court.

Most important, recommending therapists and family court services personnel must evaluate and render an opinion about what is in the child's best interest, and specifically what a parenting plan should look like, by taking it as granted that the parent who wants to move really will move. Otherwise, they've wasted everybody's time and money no matter how good their intentions or how firmly they feel about the current mental health literature, or their own clinical experience, concerning the negative effects of move-away.

The issue to be decided in move-aways is not whether a parent can move, but what the custody and visitation arrangement should be assuming the move will occur, once they announce that they intend to relocate. 

There is something implicit here that suggests that once everybody agrees that the moving parent is the better prime time parent, the move must be approved (again, the real question is "who should have custody" not whether the move is to be "allowed") and the inquiry then shifts to what the remaining parent's visitation shall be.

Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S.

Continue reading "San Diego Trial Court REVERSED (Again) in MOVE-AWAY Case" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
March 14, 2011
  FAMILY LAW SANCTIONS and DUE PROCESS: Santa Barbara Trial Court Reversed in IRMO DURIS
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS
Visitors to my websites know that I am biased in favor of mediation, believing that parties to litigation involving their family should opt to resolve their disputes themselves rather than undertake the perils of having a judge, or anyone else, decide their matters for them. This includes mediators (whose role is not to decide your issues for you but to facilitate you finding solutions). However, I admit that sometimes this doesn't seem possible. Too often one or both parties are reacting so deeply to their hurt or resentment and spinning with angry, busy minds that they perceive family court as the killing field for their unresolved conflict - a public forum for the spectacle of flogging the other side.

A recent reported decision illustrates the financial waste that occurs in high conflict family court battles, where there are no winners and only losers. My remarks are not intended to convince you to hire me, or to impugn judges whom I contend are struggling valiantly to protect children and mete out justice as best they can within a system that is not equipped to cope with the multi-dimensional challenges of emotional divorce and its aftermath: The trial judges are not broken, but the framework for government sponsored attempts to regulate the processes of divorce and domestic partnership dissolution is. Nor should it be read as an indictment of divorce lawyers or any particular barrister. An adversary model for resolving family disputes guarantees that the experience of everyone connected with these cases will be ... adversarial. Surprise!

In the meantime appellate justices are stepping forth to triage for the litigants, their attorneys, and the lower courts. But is it realistic to expect lawyers (in that small relative percentage of domestic cases where people can afford them) or judges to not be swept into the reactive thinking that the parties' disputes are personifying? I say "no". Our brains are hard-wired to respond to conflict in predictable ways. While we all ought to conduct our affairs in increasingly enlightened and ethical ways, and lawyers and judges surely benefit by incorporating the wisdom of the mental health sciences, a legal and cultural framework grounded in adversarial processes can never escape them. How could it be otherwise?

Marriage of Duris & Urbany

On March 14, 2011, the Second Appellate District (Division Six) reversed Santa Barbara trial judge Colleen K. Sterne's decision to discipline a self-represented litigant (an unemployed attorney) for, among other things, her earlier attorney's tactics in filing a motion to compel document production evidently without first attempting to resolve the disagreement informally. Discovery motions generate large fees and consume valuable judicial resources.

At the end of the hearing on Wife's original requests (the custody and support modification request she'd filed eight months earlier), the trial court imposed $10,000 in attorney fee sanctions against the Wife. Husband's attorney had evidently suggested that the Court do this somewhere in his Reply paperwork, and reiterated the request in his closing argument. The trial court took the bait. Its ruling was found to be an abuse of discretion.

According to the Husband, by the time of the hearing on original OSC to modify custody and support he had spent $25,000 for fees. Wife probably spent a similar but slightly lesser amount since she was in pro per for many months. Their fees and costs for the appeal probably were $20,000 more apiece (but Mr. Urbany handled his own appeal). Husband will get none of his money back, and Wife will recover only a portion of hers. Neither will achieve an emotionally satisfying resolution and their matter likely obsessed their lives over the year and a half. This case is "a pox on both your houses."

Wife's former attorney, Jacqueline Misho, was hired some six months into the proceedings, initiated when the Wife filed a motion for "100% physical and legal custody" of the parties' two children, plus more child support. Attorney Misho took an aggressive stance in advancing her client's claims and filed a discovery motion to compel production of documents. This was unsuccessful. The attorney was then let go. A week later the Wife's custody motion was heard. Although sanctions against her had not been requested by way of a noticed motion (possibly because there was little time in which to file one), Husband urged that she should pay his attorney fees. At hearing end when Judge Sterne announced her intent to hit Wife with $10,000 in sanctions as a share of the Husband's costs in part based upon the prior discovery motion filed by Misho, Wife complained "How am I being penalized for hiring [Misho]? How was I supposed to know? I thought she was the best there was." In my experience, "the best there [is]" often means the meanest and toughest. Many family law attorneys advertise themselves in such a fashion.

I have no personal knowledge about either party's attorney beyond what Google searches of their names retrieve and what a review of the California State Bar website discloses. Both are reputed to be tenacious divorce litigators. The problem with vociferous advocacy, irrespective whether it occurred in this case or not, is that it tends to generate a story of its own and so to increase the conflict noise volume - I confess I know this from my own past personal experiences. It can infect the process - there is something of a reciprocal feedback loop that occurs between high conflict litigants and their attorneys that is difficult to resist. Sometimes it seems to be the only choice, but usually that justification is borne of the tensions within the conflict itself and is not necessarily true.

Family law litigation becomes particularly nasty when attorneys for each side compete to inflame the trial judge with sound bite characterizations about the other. Some clients demand this from their counsel or become quite perturbed if their advocate doesn't respond in kind to these sorts of attacks. Lawyers who are being paid large sums are pressured to speak their client's minds (read: resentments) or risk a loss of confidence by their client. Of greater concern to the integrity of the legal professional generally, there are many family law attorneys whose entire strategy is geared around slandering the other litigant (or their attorney), often by exaggerating or misrepresenting the facts or history of the case solely as a means of confusing the judge or just plain pissing the court off in the hope of creating a favorable bias. Tit for tat then threatens to overwhelm the process. This sort of behavior can include ignoring the procedural rules for raising the issues to be decided, which is a form of ambush that can be effective exactly because the answering party is unable respond to an oncoming train if there is no forewarning.

I am not saying that this was either attorney's conduct in Duris as I lack sufficient details to make a full assessment; instead I am pointing out that adversary litigation programs lawyers and unrepresented parties to use whatever tactics that might work, and sometimes to try them all. This seems to be viewed as not only within the standard of care for zealous advocacy but to be required by that standard. I can comment that one irony of this case is that while the Wife's attorney allegedly failed to act in a cooperative manner in choosing to file a motion to compel without first attempting to solve the argument informally, Husband's attorney seized upon that misstep to buttress a request for sanctions that was never properly placed before the court. Sometimes these sound bites do stick; they did here, at least with Judge Sterne. Unfortunately, under these rules of engagement lawyers are thus encouraged to act as badly as the talking heads we see arguing on many 'news' programs, something that the American public views as a form of 'entertainment.'

This is one of the many dangers of adversarial litigation. Both sides feel righteously indignant, and attorneys tend to internalize their client's upset so that the boundaries between the client's experience and the attorney's own blurs. It is a recipe for disaster, but understandable given that emotional and angry ex-spouse pressure-cookers are letting out steam on both sides of the table all at once.

The appellate court's decision doesn't give us sufficient facts to discern whether the mother's initial application was well-merited, but Judge Sterne's decision suggests she did not view mom's motives (or her attorney's decision-making) to be in good faith. Wife's request for 100% custody looks to be retaliatory and frankly when this is true - and too often it is, even if not here (Judge Sterne referred to Wife's prior discovery motion as a "fee sink") - trial courts need to discourage such conduct in strong ways, especially when it generates unnecessary fees for the other party or damages children. Some people only respond to monetary slaps. I can merely speculate about these proceedings without reviewing the trial briefs and reporter's transcripts, and emphasize that reading 'between the lines' cannot give the whole picture.

Still this is a published decision of the 2nd Appellate District. Following on the heals of Marriage of Fong released for publication on March 3, 2011, these decisions, along with Marriage of Tharp, should be read together to glean the larger message. Reviewing courts are holding everyone accountable - litigants, attorneys, and bench officers. Due process and fundamental fairness require every side to cross their own t's and dot their own i's. This is welcome instruction to the entire spectrum of family court members and participants.

Be Careful What You Ask For,
and Consider Asking for Something Different

However inappropriate Ms. Duris' conduct may have been (if at all), the appellate justices ruled that due process required that she be informed in advance that the court was considering sanctions in order to have an opportunity to muster and present evidence in opposition. Husband's request for relief should have been properly placed before the Court and not have been based upon offhand arguments buried somewhere in his reply pleadings or first presented in closing argument. This is a good thing. Last year's Elkins legislation spotlights the public policy goal of ensuring transparency for self-represented and represented family law contestants alike.

Now, eighteen months later the odyssey is not yet ended - the Sterne decision is sent back to the trial court (not likely to be Judge Sterne, who can be disqualified as the judge on the next go-round) "with instructions to conduct a new hearing with proper notice." In other words, to relitigate whether sanctions should be assessed against the Wife.

In the meantime, she is awarded her costs on appeal. No appellate case costs only $10,000, the amount in controversy that led to this appeal. Hence, Husband - who won a short-lived victory at the trial court level - will now likely end up footing not only the bill for his trial attorney, but the Wife's attorney fees on appeal as well (be careful what your attorney asks for!) The saga can be now rebooted. Might it end differently this go-around? I'd wager (and I hope) the parties have had enough and that will agree that Wife will forego her appellate costs while Husband will waive a second sanction's motion. But divorce trance is stubborn stuff.

There are only losers in Marriage of Duris. The children of these two warring parents seem utterly forgotten. The take away is that using California court judges to beat up the person you now find despicable (who then smacks back) may blow up in the face of each contestant; given that people often view justice from the lens of their own desires it is a small wonder that government regulated divorce hasn't found a way to respond to such expectations, and possibly never will until the entire system is jettisoned and recreated.

In the meantime try a different tact, if you wish it and if you can. Work together to resolve your disputes collaboratively or through mediation. Even if the other side seems incorrigible, you determine how you respond. Remember, litigation induces trance - seek equanimity and send your kids to college instead!

Here is a link to Marriage of Duris & Urbany.


Thurman W. Arnold, III, CFLS

Continue reading "FAMILY LAW SANCTIONS and DUE PROCESS: Santa Barbara Trial Court Reversed in IRMO DURIS" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
December 12, 2010
  ELLEN KELLNER'S CO-PARENTING BOOK Inspired Me: How Can I Get My Ex Into Counseling?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I found Ellen Kellner's book "The Pro Child Way, Parenting With An Ex" on your Desert Collaborative Divorce website some weeks ago, and ordered it from Amazon.com.  I have been eagerly reading it, especially because of the up-coming holidays.  I am wondering if you can tell me, is there any way in California to force my ex-husband to do some child-centered counseling with me?  I think we could start talking better if we were in a safe environment.

Rebecca in San Dimas

A.  Rebecca, I am so pleased that you are taking the time to read Ellen's book!  She is a dear friend of mind, and a tireless proponent of co-parenting techniques for the sake of children.  I have copies of her book which I give away to my clients, since finding resources for dealing with divorce and parenting issues is crucial to moving on.  (I recently had a concerned grandmother waiting for me to finish my work with her son, and I noticed the book seemed stuck to her hand!)

California Family Code section 3190 authorizes Family Courts to require parents (or any other party) who are involved in a custody or visitation dispute to participant in outpatient counseling for up to a year. 

Unfortunately, the court needs to first make findings that the dispute "poses a substantial danger to the best interests of the child" and that counseling is in the best interests of the child.  It is quite ironic that in order to get counseling the dispute must reach such a magnitude of dysfunction.  Custody proceedings must be pending, but even if they aren't it should be sufficient to just file a motion or OSC, allege facts that meet section 3190's requirements, and request the orders.  In cases involving a history of domestic violence or abuse, this counseling can be ordered separately per FC section 3192.

I am so pleased for you and your children that you are motivated enough to investigate these options.  They are well-served.

BTW, Ellen is available for phone and possibly Skype based consults if you think it might be helpful to meet with her for further ideas and direction.

Happy holidays to you and your family!


T.W. Arnold, CFLS
Continue reading "ELLEN KELLNER'S CO-PARENTING BOOK Inspired Me: How Can I Get My Ex Into Counseling? " »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
February 20, 2010
  Overcoming PARENTING CONFLICTS With OURFAMILYWIZARD.COM
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Overcoming PARENTING CONFLICTS with OurFamilyWizard

Visitation and parenting exchange disputes often occur simply because of confusion or poor communication skills between parents, but they can be deeply embarrassing and distressing for children and a source of continuing anxiety and reactivity on the part of parents.  Sometimes these disputes can reflect a pattern of parental alienation. They can cost divorcing parents needless expense when they feel impelled to report these frustrations to their attorneys, taking time off from work battling about who really said what and when in court, and where they feel forced to engage each other within the legal system.   This wastes valuable judicial resources with a court process that tends to perpetuate conflict rather than ending it.

As a custody, visitation, and move-away lawyer I commonly receive complaints from my clients - and sometimes allegations about them - concerning failed visitation exchanges, holiday plans, or unseemly conduct between family court litigants.  Often these complaints are evidenced by texting and emails, but usually they are reported to me as my client's memories of angry telephone calls back and forth.   Either way, it is difficult for me to know and prove what was really said and in what order, or to sensibly provide proof to opposing counsel, family judges, or to court mediators and evaluating therapists.  Even where a text log can be created or downloaded, or where emails exist, it is not only time consuming to put them into a declaration or letter form but the fact is that nobody who is umpiring such conflicts wants to read them all.  Family Court judges are overburdened and don't have the time.   If a non-judicial professional spends the time to review them and reports back to the Court, this probably means they are being paid by you or the other party to do so.  Email communications are one of the more unwieldy forms of evidentiary records to wade through, since what occurred is contained in email threads that appear in reverse order in the form of replies.  

Moreover, in my experience, people having highly charged parenting conflicts typically write texts and emails that range from being merely improvident to outrageous.  Often these folks are writing with the expectation someone will read and buy into their position later, and at other times they just say something provocative or mean and hit 'send' before they can be mindful of what they are doing and how it might be interpreted later.  Or how the negativity trickles down to their children.

This is a real problem for families, and it is financially and emotionally expensive.  

Many Courts particularly in Los Angeles and Orange counties California, have ordered high-conflict parents to enroll with www.OurFamilyWizard.com with some very positive results in terms of dialing down the hostilities between them and so reducing trips to court.   These include a significant decline in these cases finding their way back to court.  This only benefits children and the parents themselves.

www.OurFamilyWizard.com presents a valuable mindfulness tool which holds possibilities that range from simply offering a forum for notification of soccer games, birthday, and vacation time with grandparents and others and confirming homework assignments and parent-teacher conferences to creating a 'safe' environment where one or both parents can avoid those nasty phone calls or ugly emails that so often trigger a never ending cycle of action and reaction.  As such, it promises to impose some accountability, to help parents reflect upon their speech and even body language, and to make children's lives easier.  It can be a valuable tool for judges and mental health professionals, as well as lawyers, to have an easily accessed record of what really happened.

www.OurFamilyWizard.com has a number of useful features.   It provides a Calendar that maps out visitation schedules and any imaginable event, like doctor visits, birthdays, or other reminders.  Parents have the ability to confirm or modify their intentions as to any given event.  Parents can offer to switch visitation days, and there is a record of the offer and whether or not it was accepted and if so upon what terms.

It has a separate Journal function that allows private or shared entries, and gives the parent an appropriate place to praise or vent about the other parent.

It has an Expense Log function that enables parents to make requests about child support or expense reimbursements, and even to upload medical or school uniform and any other invoices so that the other parent can verify the authenticity of the requests.   Payment can even be made between banks on-line with a fee far below what credit cards charge.

It allows for email or text notification of posts.  There is a message board.  

Benefits to using www.OurFamilyWizard.com

  • It can provide an exclusive means of communicating for high-conflict parents.  This allows the parents to avoid phone calls at any hour of the day or night that sometimes turn accusatory or demanding.  One can take their former partner out of the loop in that sense, which may be less disruptive to new mates or even one's children who don't have hear her mother or father arguing by cell phone on the way home from school.
  • It can be a one stop scheduling forum and marketplace for parents who are not in high conflict, but who are naturally time-challenged and pressured over remembering where they are supposed to be and when.
  • It provides a record that cannot be undone or manipulated after the fact. For instance, emails threads can be manipulated and changed by a parent in that one can always rewrite one someone supposed said within the thread and print it out and submit it as evidence.  These changes earlier on in an email thread might even go unnoticed because people don't usually suspect it and so check the thread for falsification before submitting it to courts.
  • Where parents have agreed, it has been so ordered, or where records need to be subpoenaed if a family court dispute does arise, the information is available in an efficient way.  The owners say they can respond to a subpoena with an appropriate declaration from the custodian of records, which makes them admissible over objection for lack of foundation and hearsay, with 24 hours.
  • One can modify some functions - like schedules up to the day of an event -but thereafter entries become locked and so cannot be altered after the fact.
  • It can help parents become more mindful of what they say.  If parents resist the desire to attack the other parent or make unfortunate derogatory comments about the other parent or their new spouse or boy friend or girlfriend and so on, it can de-escalate conflict and reduce tit-for-tat.
  • Record print outs can be obtained without subpoena when it so agreed and utilized in court proceedings.
  • A parent who is being harassed by the other can use the system as a shield not only from personal vitriol but also in defending against a campaign of case making by the other parent.
  • It makes huge sense in domestic violence settings.

Potential disadvantages to using www.OurFamilyWizard.com

  • It requires Internet access and costs about $100/year.
  • If given permission, or if ordered by the Court, other people can be granted access to the records.  These people could include judges, lawyers, family mediators, and mental health professionals.   While this may be a good thing, as a family lawyer I see this function as dangerous because:
    • Hearsay which would otherwise not be admitted in a family court proceeding might be reviewed by one of these persons.

    • There is no way of knowing how judicial officer's or evaluator's views and hence their recommendations for orders were caused or affected by what they read, or even what it is that they read.

  • A particular problem is also that one or both parents may still skew the facts or write or an imaginary audience.  In other words, a parent can insincerely make offers 'for the record' that appear reasonable at first glance but that are really more sinister in terms of promoting their own agenda.  In this sense it can be wrongfully used as a posturing sword.
  • If one parent by nature is less vocal or less computer savvy than another, then their silence in response to repeated commentary or requests could be misinterpreted by a reader.
  • In cases where one parent is constantly firing off messages or offers or demands, the other parent may be forced to be in constant response.

These of course are not shortcomings of the Family Wizard program, but are a consequences of the tendency of people in high conflict relationship breakup to manipulate appearances.

At least where court proceedings are concerned, which does appear to include the majority of users and to be a major justification for the product, the disadvantages can be minimized if judges and lawyers tailor ground rules for what functions will be used and how they will be used.  These would include stipulations about who can access the on-line account, and what foundation is required before the records are introduced into evidence.

Continue reading "Overcoming PARENTING CONFLICTS With OURFAMILYWIZARD.COM" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 

California Family Law Attorney | Contact Thurman W. Arnold III | Sitemap  | Disclaimer
Professional Web Design 
The information on this website is for general information purposes only. Nothing on this site should be taken as legal advice for any individual case or situation. This information on this website is not intended to create, and receipt or viewing of this information does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship.

© 2012 by Thurman Arnold III Law Offices. All rights reserved.


Address: 225 South Civic Drive   Suite 1-3   Palm Springs, CA 92262            Phone: (760) 320-7915 

Administration