California Family Law Attorney
California Family Law Lawyer Attorney Profile Click here to visit our blog Links Resources
Contact the Law firm of Thurman W. Arnold III
California Family Law Areas of Practice
Contact the Law Office of Thurman W. Arnold III
225 South Civic Drive Suite 1-3 Palm Springs, CA 92262

Recent Posts in Community Property Category

December 30, 2011
  Attorney Michael C. Peterson Speaks About FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY (Before and Once Divorce Happens)
Posted By Michael C. Peterson

Advice for Couples in 2012, Including How to Balance Power in Your Marriage

One of the most common problems I see arising in (and sometimes leading to) any divorce action is a lack of financial transparency between the spouses or partners. Often, over time, and for various personal, practical and familial and historical reasons, one party has assumed a dominant or exclusive role in the management of community assets, including depository accounts, real estate, investments, and small businesses.That role effectively puts a managing spouse in a position to have vastly superior information about the family finances, and the power to act on such information in the context of divorce to the detriment of the non-managing spouse. This may wind up prejudicing one party if the relationship ends.

It has been my repeated experience that, in anticipation of a divorce action, an unethical or abusive spouse will take strategic steps to hide assets and obfuscate the methods used to hide them. The ramifications to the non-managing spouse can include not only an unfair disbursement of community assets upon resolution of the case, but also manifest into reduced calculations of temporary and permanent spousal support and child support. 

California family law attempts to minimize the potential for financial fraud during the life of a divorce action. For example, it creates rules for mandatory disclosures of assets. It creates fiduciary duties for managing spouses. It creates methods for discovery of financial and asset information (but only in the context of a legal action, after the relationship has broken down). It creates pre-judgment and post-judgment penalties for non-disclosure. 

In a perfect world such legal tools alone would fully prevent the potential for financial dishonestly between separating spouses. But the reality is that the law routinely fails to protect the financial interests of the non-managing spouse in this regard, and the root cause of that failure occurs because non-managing spouses don't take steps to equalize the playing field when it comes to information about family finances during the course of the marriage. Stated another way, individual non-managing spouses are often unable to utilize the tools that the law provides to ensure they receive a just and equitable share of the fruits of the community's efforts during the course of the marriage because they lack the information necessary to have their lawyer fully protect their interests.  Too many non-managing spouses wait until the time of separation to learn about the family finances.  By then, non-managing spouses and their attorney are playing catch up, and not always winning. As such, it is of paramount importance that a non-managing spouse be proactive in learning as much information about the family finances as possible, and do so not only on the eve of a divorce, but also during the entire course of the marriage itself.   In this day and age, knowledge is the coin of the realm.

Economists recognize that one source of market failure (i.e. inefficient allocation of resources) is caused by a phenomenon called asymmetric information. Asymmetric information affects decisions in transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. In adverse selection models, the ignorant party lacks information while negotiating a contract to the transaction. Common examples of information asymmetry include 'insider' trading in the stock market, or buying a 'lemon' used car. Understanding and combating asymmetric information is crucial to economists because market failure leads to net losses for society as a whole. Understanding and combating asymmetric information should be equally important to the non-managing spouse and his/her attorney because of its strong potential to lead to inequitable settlements or trial results.  In the economic sense, asymmetric information between spouses about the family finances is a form of market failure. To be sure, if you are contemplating or undergoing a divorce action, you will (in most cases) effectively be negotiating a transaction that will bind you and impact your financial future.

The best way overall way to combat a managing spouse 's tendency to commit acts of misfeasance or non-disclosure regarding financial interests is to equalize the flow of financial information from the very outset of the marriage, with information parity being a non-managing spouse's goal.

Hand-in-hand with the goal of information parity is a mindset that fosters such parity being present throughout the marriage. That mindset is, simply stated, one of equality and mutual appreciation. Two people will divide labor in a marriage so as to maximize their relative strengths and weaknesses, and in so doing the synergy benefits the martial community as a whole to a greater extent than either person could do individually. Economists refer to this phenomenon as comparative advantage, and recognize that such a situation is optimal in the context of maximizing social utility. So too is comparative advantage optimal for managing a household. 

As a simple 'traditional' example, assume Chris and Pat are married. Chris has a greater income earning potential due to holding a doctorate degree and having a good network of people to whom Chris is favorably known in the locale. Pat has greater domestic abilities due to having a bachelors degree in nutrition a work background in home decor. Based on these comparative strengths, Chris and Pat decide that Chris will work full-time and Pat will take care of the home full-time. Pat's excellent meals keep Chris energized and in good health.  Pat's superior aesthetic tastes keep Chris in style with cool cloths. Chris's boss comes over for dinner and is impressed by the feng shui of the domicile. Over time Chris gets promoted and raises. Chris uses the additional income to make financial investments, go on vacations with Pat, and purchase a better home. By Chris and Pat each doing what they are relatively strong at, they, both individually and as a whole, are made economically better off. But more to the point, it is their interdependence that necessarily caused the mutual gain. The law recognizes this fundamental principal in the context of divorce by creating the concept of community property; that regardless of whether it was Chris's paycheck that allowed for the growth of assets, Pat's contributions to Chris's earned income are equally important and therefore necessitate equal division should Pat and Chris's relationship end. So as to a non-managing spouse's mindset, I strongly encourage all such people who are contemplating marriage, married, contemplating divorce, or involved in a divorce have one that recognizes their contributions to the community and requires takes a role.

On the practical side of things, here is a list of information parity objectives that I believe healthy marital relationships should achieve:

  • Spouses should store copies of written financial documents in a safe place and where the other spouse doesn't have access.
  • Spouses should have all depository, investment, retirement, and debt account numbers written down in an asset ledger. Annual inventories of all assets with a value over $500.00 should be maintained and signed off on by spouses and kept in the asset ledger.
  • Spouses should keep copies of income information, including payroll stubs and other documents showing income such as rental checks from investment property or brokerage statements from securities dealers. 
  • Spouses should copy and store all financial account information from banks savings and loans, credit unions, particularly monthly statements. Spouses should also copy and store other banking information such as passbooks, check registers, and deposit slips. 
  • Spouses should agreed to have all financial information statements should be sent to each spouse individually, directly from the applicable financial institution, and be received only at that spouses primary residential address (and not, for example, at a business). If one spouse insists on receiving their financial information from home or stops receiving financial information mail at the residence, it is often a red flag. 
  • Spouses should maintain copies of tax documents, including personal tax returns and business tax returns, and attached forms, for the preceding five years.
  • Spouses should receive and keep business financial statements, including net worth and income statements, in the case of a small business.
  • Spouses should keep copies of all wills and trusts, and attachments thereto (such as a grant deed that has been recorded in favor of a trust for the benefit of the spouses).
  • Spouses should keep copies of all life insurance policies.
  • Spouses should keep copies of all outstanding debts incurred during the marriage that are in either spouses name.
  • Spouses should keep a list of all personal and real property owned prior to the marriage.
  • Spouses should keep a list of all safe deposit boxes and their contents.

Other tips you should know about and red flags you should watch out for to protect you from an unscrupulous spouse:

  • Don't wait until things are going badly in the relationship to achieve financial information parity. Work towards that goal from the outset.
  • Conduct asset searches of your spouse's biographical information by professional third-parties on an annual basis.
  • Be aware that there is a statistically higher incidence of spouses hiding money in their second, third, or later marriages.
  • Its best to have only a certified public accountant prepare the spouses' tax returns (as opposed to 'bookkeepers' of other unlicensed persons acting as pseudo-accountants), as they are subject to professional  conflict of interest rules. Do not sign any document seeking your informed consent to waive any conflict of interest rules with respect to accountants without consulting an attorney.   
  • Particularly in the case of a small business, become knowledgeable about the business's employees, its normal income, its normal expenses, and how it accounts for them. A small business in particular is breeding grounds for accounting tricks to make it appear less valuable. I have seen this occur by the managing spouse: favor/incentivize cash payments from customers, funnel personal expenses as payments from the business, creating and paying fake employees (including the spouses' own children) and then voiding the uncashed checks after the divorce is final, or delaying new long-term business opportunities (i.e. taking new customer orders, signing new clients, or receiving transfers from escrow-like accounts such as paypal.com). It's important to be familiar with the inner-workings of a small business so you can note when something is amiss. Carefully review and copy customer/client payment agreements and accounts where a small business operates on a largely cash basis.
  • Review financial statements on a regular basis. It is easier to access and digest three months of recent transactions than five years of relatively distant transactions. Look out for large or out-of-the ordinary deposits or withdrawals, and try to trace the source/end-point of the transaction to the best of your ability.
  • Be aware that municipal bonds and certain savings bonds, because they are tax-free, are not reported to the IRS and therefore can be a vehicle for asset hiding because they do not need to be disclosed on tax returns. Look out for large investments in these assets.
  • Non-managing spouses should be careful about signing joint tax returns that claim large deductions for various expenses, particularly in the case where a small business is involved. Although it might mean a larger tax burden in a particular year, in the context of a divorce it often results in lower spousal support and a lower business valuation, with attestation proof presented to a judge in the form of your signature.
  • Big changes to the administration of finances can be a red flag: applying for large new loans, the closing of a bank account or change to an investment portfolio, particularly without the input of the non-managing spouse, might give opportunity to hide money.
  • Know your spouse's boss well, and make sure they like you. I have experienced collusion between employers and employee so as to show short-run decreases (bonus or raise deferral) to income agreed on increases after the divorce is complete.  If you separate from your spouse, let your spouse's boss know that event has occurred in writing. 
  • Do not sign deeds or other papers concerning real estate papers without consulting an attorney.
  • Watch out for bank accounts opened in the name of spouse's children, as they do not get listed on that spouse's tax statements they can be a method of hiding community assets.
  • Also watch out for overpayments on taxes. A managing spouse may try to receive a tax return later after the divorce is final by overpayment now, or alternatively filing amended taxes.
  • Avoid 'loans' to friends or family.           
  • Be a Missourian, i.e. don't take your spouse's word. Have the managing spouse show you with the documents that corroborate what they tell you about the family finances. 
  • Don't allow fear of ruining the relationship, cultural values, or laziness prevent your pro-activity in becoming astute in the family finances. Defensive responses to your inquiries and requirements for financial information parity by the managing spouse may indicate diversion of community assets.  
  • Always remember that the burden of proof rests on the accuser, not the accused, to prove diverted assets to a court. Take all actions to protect your interests with this rule in mind.

These are my thoughts at the end of 2011 - I wish each of you, and each of us, a Happy New Year in 2012, and I hope that we all strive to be transparent and ethical during the coming year!



Michael C. Peterson, Esq. - Indio and Coachella Valley Divorce Attorney  
Continue reading "Attorney Michael C. Peterson Speaks About FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY (Before and Once Divorce Happens)" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
August 16, 2011
  Marriage of MARGULIS - Fiduciary Duties of MANAGING SPOUSES
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Marriage of Margulis, Part 2 - Duties of Managing Spouses

Please see Part I of my evaluation of  IRMO Margulis as the launching point for understanding the appellate court's outline of interspousal fiduciary duties.

The Margulis rule states that once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets.

The rule is justified by examining the scope of fiduciary duties imposed by the California Family Code. Interestingly, the trial court had found that the Husband (Alan) had breached his fiduciary duties to Wife (Elaine) "to maintain proper records of all community assets which he had exclusive control and management over...." Yet, other than imposing $20,000 in sanctions and assessing $30,000 in attorney fees against Alan, the trial court did not believe Elaine had produced sufficient evidence to explain what had really happened to the deposit accounts that were at issue beyond Exhibit 18, 'the smoking gun'. $50,000 in sanctions was a cheap price to pay relative to the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It was reversed for applying too narrow a breach of fiduciary duty and applying the wrong remedy.

Since Margulis contains a great explanation of how statutory fiduciary duties operate I quote the decision as follows:

"Family Code provisions detailing the fiduciary obligations between spouses provide strong support for shifting the burden of proof to the managing spouse when determining the value and disposition of missing assets. The starting point is section 721, which provides that accountability for the management of community assets is a fundamental aspect of the fiduciary duties owed between spouses.

Section 721, subdivision (b), states, in relevant part: between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in Sections 16403, 16404, and 16503 of the Corporations Code, including, but not limited to, the following: ¶(1) Providing each spouse access at all times to any books kept regarding a transaction for the purposes of inspection and copying. ¶(2) Rendering upon request, true and full information of all things affecting any transaction which concerns the community property. Nothing in this section is intended to impose a duty for either spouse to keep detailed books and records of community property transactions. ¶(3) Accounting to the spouse, and holding as a trustee, any benefit or profit derived from any transaction by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse which concerns the community property.

Section 721's specific incorporation of the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in• section 16403 of the Corporations Code, makes clear that the duty to disclose relevant information concerning transactions affecting the community property is an affirmative and broad obligation. Corporations Code section 16403 requires each partner to furnish to a partner ... [¶] (1) Without demand, any information concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the partnership agreement or this chapter.... (Corp. Code, § 16403, subd. (c), italics added.)

Section 1100 further delineates the scope of a managing spouse's accountability. That statute not only prohibits a spouse from engaging in certain conduct, such as making a unilateral gift of community personal property or disposing of it for less than fair and reasonable value, without the written consent of the other spouse (§ 1100, subd. (b)), but it also requires each spouse to act as a fiduciary toward the other in the management of community assets in accordance with the general rules governing fiduciary relationships ... as specified in Section 721, until such time as the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court. This duty includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an interest.... (§ 1100, subd. (e).)

Importantly, section 1101 creates a right of action and specific remedies for the breach of fiduciary duty between spouses. Subdivision (a) of section 1101 gives each spouse a claim against the other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse's present undivided one-half interest in the community estate.... The statutory remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty, specifically including a breach of those [duties] set out in Sections 721 and 1100, include a mandatory award of 50 percent of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney's fees and court costs.... (§ 1101, subd. (g).)

If the nondisclosure or wrongful disposition of community property falls within the ambit of Civil Code section 3294 (punitive damages upon clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud or malice), the court must award to injured spouse the entire value of
the asset (§ 1101, subd. (h)).

Finally, section 2100 makes clear that these fiduciary obligations of disclosure and accounting continue to bind spouses after separation until final distribution of assets. Section 2100 states: [A] full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties.... Moreover, each party has a continuing duty to immediately, fully, and accurately update and augment that disclosure to the extent there have been any material changes so that at the time the parties enter into an agreement for the resolution of any of these issues, or at the time of trial on these issues, each party will have a full and complete knowledge of the relevant underlying facts. (§ 2100, subd. (c), italics added; see also § 2102, subd. (a)(1) [from date of separation to date community assets are distributed, spouses are subject to § 721's fiduciary duty to disclose assets and update material changes].)

Taken together, these statutes impose on a managing spouse affirmative, wide-ranging duties to disclose and account for the existence, valuation, and disposition of all community assets from the date of separation through final property division. Simply put, these statutes require the spouse to account for his or her management of the property. The managing spouse must reveal if the community property changes value, ceases to exist, or is transferred for less than its worth, thereby depriving the nonmanaging spouse of his or her half-interest. Because of the fiduciary relationship between spouses, the managing spouse must reveal any self-dealing or other conduct that impaired the value of the property and entitles the other spouse to compensation.

Applying these statutes to the facts of this case, a trial court could conclude Alan breached his fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting. A court could find he breached his duty to provide full and accurate disclosure of all community assets when in pretrial exchanges he failed to inform Elaine that $20,000 was in the Charles Schwab IRA's, asserting that the only existing community property was the Sycamore house. A trial court similarly could find Alan breached his duty to disclose immediately and fully any material changes in the community property (§ 2100, subd. (c)), by failing to tell Elaine until just before trial that all the community investment and checking accounts he had managed were virtually empty. Additionally, by refusing to provide Elaine with any documentary or other corroborating proof of what actually happened to the money that had once been in those accounts, Alan may have breached his duty to furnish to Elaine any information concerning the [community's] business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of [her] rights (Corp. Code, § 16403, subd. (c)(1); § 721, subd. (b)), which included her right to pursue a claim against Alan for impairment to [her] ... one-half interest in the community estate (§ 1101, subds. (a), (g) & (h)).

The trial court, however, found a single, narrow breach of duty by Alan: a breach of the duty to keep and provide adequate records. In so ruling, the trial court impliedly found Alan did not owe broader fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting. The trial court's erroneous finding on the scope of Alan's duties led it to apply the wrong remedy. Instead of awarding Elaine at least 50 percent of the value of undisclosed or wrongfully transferred assets (§ 1101, subds. (g) [50 percent], (h) [100 percent upon proof of oppression, fraud or malice]), the trial court ordered Alan to pay Elaine $20,000 as sanctions, plus attorney fees.

The trial court's failure to find Alan breached his broader fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting stemmed from the court's denial of Elaine's request to charge Alan with the exhibit 18 asset values unless he disproved those values or proved he properly disposed of those assets. Although the trial court found that Elaine had satisfied the requisite foundation to admit the exhibit, it accorded the document little or no weight because Elaine had not prepared it and had no evidence to support it. Consequently, according to the trial court, Elaine failed to carry her burden of proving the accounts itemized in exhibit 18 ever had the values listed in that document, and Alan could not be charged with wrongfully disposing of assets he never possessed. But, as discussed above, the trial court misapplied the burden of proof.

Elaine's introduction of exhibit 18, which Alan conceded he prepared, satisfied her initial burden. The statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting then effectively shifted the burden to Alan to rebut the presumption he should be charged with the assets listed on exhibit 18, a document that was prima facie evidence of the account values it stated."

Based upon the foregoing the case was reversed and remanded to the trial court. The sanctions award of $20,000 plus $30,000 was also reversed "so that the court may revisit the question of the appropriate remedy should the evidence establish Alan's breach of fiduciary duty" - in other words, the appellate court is directing the trial court to hit Alan harder than was amounted to a slap on the wrist. As Justice Aronson wryly directs:
 
"Alan's cross-appeal merits little discussion. His challenge to the trial court's finding that he breached his fiduciary duties to Elaine is meritless. Likewise, his additional challenges to the award against him for sanctions and attorney fees fails, given the clear statutory authorization for both awards in light of Alan's breach of duty.... Nevertheless, we reverse the attorney fees and sanctions award so the court may revisit the question of the appropriate remedy should the evidence established Alan's breach of duty." Elaine is to be awarded her attorney fees and costs for this appeal.

Margulis also contains an excellent discussion regarding Epstein credits, debt payment in lieu of support, and tracing issues. I will endeavor to blog that portion of the decision in Part III.




Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.
Continue reading "Marriage of MARGULIS - Fiduciary Duties of MANAGING SPOUSES" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
August 15, 2011
  IRMO MARGULIS - Managing Spouse Has BURDEN OF PROOF To Explain MISSING ASSETS
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Marriage of Margulis (8/11/2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 277

Part One

I am always pleased to report cutting edge rulings by our appellate courts, and this is one of the most important decisions in recent years affecting who has the burden of proof to explain what happens to assets that disappear after marriage partners separate, and what the consequences are for managing "in-spouses" who cannot explain what happened to liquid (or other assets) that existed at separation but seem to have evaporated in the meantime. While upon reflection it is hard to imagine how this decision could be news because it makes such perfect sense, the Fourth Appellate District's pronouncements (by the Honorable J. Aronson) are indeed a new extension of existing law - which is why the trial court in this case was reversed.

Special kudos to Attorneys Stephen Temko and Dawn Gray on behalf of the Association of Certified Law Specialists (an organization serving the public interest that I am proud to be a member of) for weighing in with amicus curiae briefs that probably helped to inform the appellate justices in positive ways.

Because this case is important I am going to help it be digested in two gulps - this is Part I.

The root holding of IRMO Margulis is this: Once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets. It is now clear that managing spouses have the burden of proof to account for missing assets that they controlled. Family Code section 1100 states that "either spouse has the [right of] management and control of the community personal property, ..., as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse." 
 
But when parties separate the more empowered partner often grabs or already manages all the marbles, and then enjoys the advantage of continuing to carry those marbles around and even spending them down until the community property pot is ultimately divided. Without accountability this frequently led to abuses and misappropriations that - in the absence of this new rule - favored that party and facilitates their practical ability to defraud the community property estate, notwithstanding a legal duty per Family Code section 721(b) to account for what went where. Until now. The Margulis rule is necessary to protect the rights of an "out-spouse" as a matter of basic fiduciary protections.

The facts of the case as set forth in the appellate decision are these (and are reminiscent of the facts of the Davenport decision):  Alan and Elaine separated after 33 years of marriage in August, 1996. Alan moved out of the parties' Irvine home and moved to Chicago to start a  new job. Elaine remained in the family residence. They owned a home in Palm Desert, California.The marriage yielded two children who are now adults.

During the marriage Alan was the sole working spouse and exercised "complete control" of the couple's finances - sound familiar? This included retirement, bank, and investment account personal property assets. Although Alan moved out in 1996, Elaine did not file for divorce for another six years - in 2002. Five more years passed before Alan even filed a response in those proceedings. Throughout this period Alan paid Elaine just enough, evidently, for her to be satisfied with the financial status quo so that she undertook no steps to move the divorce towards a conclusion. I can only speculate what psychological and emotional dynamics were at play in these people's lives, but infer that Elaine trusted Alan enough that she did not perceive that she needed to take vigorous steps to protect herself. Which gave him free reign for a long, long time.

Once the case did begin to move forward, as often happens when there is a significant power imbalance in relationship, it began to move quickly and that pace certainly further advantaged the husband. Commonly it is the in-spouse who is rushing the case to trial while the out-spouse plays catch-up and the parties, or the in-spouse, play discovery games and hide and seek with assets, disclosures, and backup. Bank accounts are easily susceptible to this type of abuse because they are document intensive, and expensive to evaluate. In and out transactions (deposits in, transfers out) must each be traced in order for forensic experts and the court to know how to characterize and characterize transactions and the flow of cash. Here Alan filed his Response to Elaine's 2002 Petition on February 21, 2007, and the parties found themselves in a pre-trial Mandatory Settlement Conference only six months later. This means that Elaine's team had very little time to prepare since Alan knew where the marbles were but elected not to share their identity and location.

There was a single "smoking gun" in the case which consisted of what became at trial "Exhibit 18." This was a two-page document that was entitled "confidential personal financial statement" for "Alan/Elaine Margulis," dated February 1, 1999. It reflected total assets of $1,305,500. The liquid (i.e., cash) portion amounted to more than half of that number.

At trial Elaine testified that, as the nonmanaging spouse, she had no personal knowledge or records of the value of the accounts at any time. This was the sole extent of her evidence at trial about the status of the assets near the date of separation, and essentially Alan's attorneys argued that this proved nothing. Elaine's attorney responded insightfully that the effect of this document was to shift the burden of proof to Alan to explain and show that he had properly disposed of those assets, or that the stock holdings lost their value as a result of market conditions - as opposed to them having been withdrawn or mismanaged by him or for his sole benefit. But the trial judge disagreed, which set up this reversal in favor of Elaine. The trial court explained "I don't believe it supports, standing alone [that] your assets listed did, in fact, exist." Wife had no other evidence to prove that they did - hence, without the rule established by Justice Aronson in this case, she would be out of luck. Her proof would have failed on the contested issues, and it did fail at the trial court level. Before this decision the trial court's perspective was a bit shallow but not surprising. It takes bold judges with considerable family law experience to read the sub-text. 

Who has the burden of proof on a topic is often key to which party wins or loses on a given issue. This is why Marulis is important to control of asset cases.

Shifting the Burden of Proof

There are two common principles linked to the concept of the "burden of proof." One is the burden of persuasion and the other is the burden of producing evidence. Often if a party cannot produce evidence on a subject that the law imposes a burden upon them to produce in order to prevail, they lose. Irmo Margulis has implications beyond family law.

The Margulis decision observes: "the trial court concluded that Elaine, the nonmanaging spouse who lacked both personal knowledge and records concerning the assets listed on exhibit 18, failed to meet the difficult burden of proving these now missing assets had existed....

The trial court's failure to place the burden of the duty on Alan relieved him of the duty to account for his postseparation management of these assets. Thus, Alan did not have to prove the amounts that had been in these accounts or that he had properly disposed of those sums. This lack of accountability poses a risk of abuse and runs afoul of the statutory scheme imposing broad fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting on a managing spouse." [Emphasis added].

It continued: "Given that 'bedrock concerns' of 'policy and fairness' drive the analysis [citation omitted] , it is not surprising that a common trigger for burden-shifting is 'when the parties have unequal access to evidence necessary to prove a disputed issue. 'Where the evidence necessary to establish a fact essential to a claim lies peculiarly within the knowledge and competence of one of the parties, that party has the burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue although it is not the party asserting the claim.'....

Concerns over 'unequal access to evidence' [citations omitted]
are particularly pressing in the context of a marital dissolution where financial records can be crucial to ensuring the equal division of property required by Family Code section 2550.... Undoubtedly, in marriages and separations like the Margulis's where one spouse exercised exclusive control over community property, the parties will have vastly unequal access to evidence concerning the disposition of that property. When this occurs, fairness requires shifting to the managing spouse the burden of proof on missing assets. Moreover, ...,  the statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting owed between spouses further justify that result."

The Appellate Court goes on to explain why this result is fair in light of the fiduciary obligations between spouses that I have written about so much over the past few years. I will separately blog that portion of the decision.

But as I have been trumpeting now for many months, the appellate courts are working overtime to save the existing California scheme of family law to ensure transparency - it is my opinion long overdue but much appreciated!

For those in-spouses who do act in good faith after separation and the pendency of the marital proceedings, Margulis is a cautionary tale - managing spouses had better keep records of transactions affecting the community property estate and make all required disclosures or find themselves assuming the risk of loss or diminution of the value of those assets.

Please note that the appellate Court's initial decision of August 11, 2011, was modified on August 26 and September 9, 2011. The citation to the modified opinion is Marriage of Prentis-Margulis v. Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252. I have yet compare the differences in the two decisions. 




Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S.
Continue reading "IRMO MARGULIS - Managing Spouse Has BURDEN OF PROOF To Explain MISSING ASSETS" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
June 27, 2011
  I Am Filing for Divorce and Believe My Spouse is Hiding Funds in a SAFE DEPOSIT BOX. What Can I Do?
Posted By Thurman Arnold. CFLS
Q.  I intend to file for divorce shortly, but believe my spouse has placed a significant amount of cash in a safe deposit box. Any recommendations on how I might keep that money from disappearing?

D.M.
San Francisco

Dear D.M. 

California Financial Code section 1620 sets forth a procedure I have used many times to freeze access to a safe deposit box in order to prevent the other party from looting it after a case is filed. I highly recommend employing it in cases where you have a good reason to believe that any assets value are contained in one, because although the ATRO's (automatic temporary restraining orders) in principle prohibit a party from removing or concealing cash (or gold, coin or any other asset) - these apply only  after that person has been served with the Summons - and, if the other spouse does remove the contents of a deposit box, you may never be able to prove what these contents consisted of.

By properly serving a "Notice of Adverse Claim" per section 1620 on any banking institution where a safe deposit box is located, you can stop your spouse from accessing that deposit box for up to three court days. You would use that time to file for and obtain ex parte restraining orders from a family court judge that would then direct the bank (or at least the other spouse) to refuse or not have access to the box except upon the specific terms set forth in the order, like "until further order of the court".

Typically your motion would ask that these contents be inventoried in the presence of a third party, and that if there was cash or bullion that those monies be placed out of the reach of both parties pending a subsequent court order awarding or distributing them.

Please note that Financial Code section 1620 replaces former section 1650 effective January 1, 2012.




Thurman Arnold, Family Court Attorney
Continue reading "I Am Filing for Divorce and Believe My Spouse is Hiding Funds in a SAFE DEPOSIT BOX. What Can I Do?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
May 23, 2011
  FORM OF TITLE Trumps COMMUNITY PROPERTY PRESUMPTION Where Life Insurance Is An Asset in DIVORCE
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS



Marriage of Valli, B222435

PLEASE NOTE - The California Supreme Court granted review of this decision on 8/24/11 and as a result the opinion reviewed below has been vacated.

8/26/11
TWA


The California Second Appellate District issued its ruling in Marriage of Valli on May 18, 2011, reversing a Los Angeles trial court that had found that a $3.75 million insurance policy purchased during marriage was the parties' community property. Instead Justice Stanley Mosk declared that the 'super-presumption' contained in Evidence Code section 662 trumps the more general presumption per Family Code section 760 that property acquired during marriage is jointly owned. Interestingly, this was true even in the absence of direct evidence of the title to the policy itself; it was sufficient that the insurance agent who sold the policy testified the policy was issued in the name of the Wife and that he'd been told it was being purchased for the protection of the family.

At issue was who owned a 'blended universal life insurance contract' on Husband's life (this is THE singer Frankie Valli) bought some eighteen months before separation that had a cash surrender value of $365,032 by time of trial. Husband argued that since the policy was acquired during marriage and paid for with community funds, it belonged to the community and each party was therefore entitled to one-half. Wife contended that Husband had told her from the inception of the policy that she was to be the owner of the policy and its sole beneficiary, and this was not disputed. She introduced testimonial evidence that the policy listed her as its owner. The trial court sided with the Husband. The decision turns on legal and not factual issues, and I think it deserves mentioning that this appears to be a case that was ethically litigated - Mr. Valli was wholesomely honest and resisted the temptation to assert a version of what happened that included allegations of "pillowtalk" or other reassurances, for instance, from Wife that she had admitted the policy was joint because these did not occur (nor would they have been helpful) - something that is otherwise common in the "liar's contests" that many dissolutions devolve into.

Family Code section 2550 assigns trial courts a mandatory duty to value and divide equally the parties' community property estate. But what is community property? Generally, factors determinative of whether property is separate or community are the time of acquisition; operation of various presumptions, particularly those concerning the form of title; and whether the spouses have transmuted or converted the property from separate to community or vice versa ...." (In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 291).

Family Code section 760 states "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property." This is the "time of acquisition" rule, and it creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of the creation of CP. That presumption can be overcome by a "preponderance of the evidence" - that is by evidence that shows by a 51% likelihood that it is separate property. FC section 760 is the starting point for any analysis of assets and debts acquired during marriage for purposes of defining the marital balance sheet.

Evidence Code section 662 is an evidentiary presumption, found outside the California Family Code. It states "[t]he owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof." The "clear and convincing" standard of proof is considered to be a "super-presumption" exactly because of what it takes to overcome it. The public policy basis for this evidentiary presumption is to ensure the stability of titles to property and within the insurance context it is important that insurance companies have the ability to rely on their information of who holds title to a policy in paying out death benefits, and in not exposing themselves to multiple claims (and paying the wrong person or heir) upon death.

Hence, under some circumstances, when the general CP presumption and the form of title presumptions collide the form of title presumption trumps the more general presumption.

Here the evidence at trial was largely undisputed. A year before the parties separated crooner Valli was experiencing medical problems and told Wife that he wanted to buy a policy on his own life to make sure he took care of his family in the event he might die. He wanted to ensure the kids could go to college and that "there would be enough money for everybody." At that time the parties had no plans to split up.

Accordingly, he bought the policy from his insurance agent. Husband's business manager told Wife that they intended to make her the owner, and Husband himself testified that he "put everything in [Wife's] name, figuring she would take care and give to the kids what they might having coming." His insurance agent testified at trial the policy was issued in Wife's name. Of interest, however, the policy itself was never introduced into evidence.

Hence, on appeal Wife urged that "the act of taking title to property in the name of one spouse during marriage with the consent of the other spouse effectively removes that property from the general community property presumption. In that situation, the property is presumably the separate property of the spouse in whose name title is taken." Since Husband had failed to introduce "clear and convincing" proof that overcame the title presumption, the equity in the policy belonged to her. Nothing required that proof of the form of title be through documentary evidence where there was sufficient indirect testimony that the policy was titled in Wife's name.

The Second Appellate District Court agreed. "Frankie did not present evidence of an agreement or understanding with Randy [the Wife] that when the policy was placed solely in Randys name as owner, they intended title to the policy to be other than Randy's separate property. (In re Marriage of Brooks, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.) Likewise, Frankie did not present evidence that he was unaware that title to the policy was taken solely in Randys name. That Frankie knew the policy was taken solely in Randy's name is supported by substantial evidence. Frankie testified that he put everything in Randy's name, and Randy testified that Frankie and Siegel told her that they were going to make [her] the owner' of the policy."

Husband also unsuccessfully argued that Family Code section 721 creates an additional presumption of undue influence where one party by taking title in their name solely gains an advantage over the other, and that given that presumption the EC section 662 super-presumption could not come into play. However, 721 applies in interspousal transactions and this was not a transaction between the two married persons but between one of them and the insurance agent. "Randy could not have owed a fiduciary duty to Frankie in a transaction in which she did not participate." Moreover, even if the presumption of undue influence did arise there was sufficient proof rebutting Husband's clear intention to make Wife the owner; Wife had no role in the transaction whatever.

Moreover, the justices noted that there was no evidence that the cash surrender value of the life insurance policy was intended to be a "savings device." Instead, Husband's intent at the policy inception was clear that it was for the benefit of the Wife.

Finally, they dismissed Husband's argument that there had not been a valid transmutation of the policy from community to Wife's separate property. "A 'transmutation' is an interspousal transaction or agreement that works to change the character of property the parties already own. By contrast, the initial acquisition of property from a third person does not constitute a transmutation and thus is not subject to the [Family Code section 852, subdivision (a)] transmutation requirements." Keep in mind that Husband had purchased the policy only 18 months before the parties separated. They had had a 20 year marriage. In order to amass $365,032 in policy equity over such a short period, the community had to have made quite substantial premium payments to fund it. Mr. Valli was 69 when he acquired the coverage, and the cost of the policy had to be exorbitant.

Normally one might reasonably think that the claim that the cash surrender value was now Wife's separate property would require proof of a transmutation from the community to separate property - this is what the trial court assumed to be the case when it found in favor of the Husband. However, Wife's counsel never claimed a transmutation, a wise strategic move.

While this outcome might, at least for Husband, seem unfair it illustrates that in the realm of community verses separate property, when form of title presumptions come into play, as a matter of public policy favoring the stability of financial transactions with third parties (and not just between the spouses alone), the manner in which title is taken controls unless rebutted by extremely compelling evidence. This is not intuitively or even rationally obvious. In California matrimonial law certain fictions may dictate the outcome. This decision is important for any lawyer or self-represented party where one asset acquired during marriage is a life insurance policy. Common sense, and even the expectations of people who are married until the day of separation comes, would seem to militate in favor of a different result.

In remanding the case to the trial court (i.e., sending it back with instructions to enter a new decision consistent with the appellate court's reasoning), the Valli opinion does "leave to the trial court any reallocation of assets or award of reimbursement in light of our holding." Presumably that reimbursement applies to premiums paid by Husband after the date of separation that increased the cash value of the life insurance policy, but does not form a basis for reimbursing what was paid before. Since the policy was acquired in 2003 but trial occurred five years later, this reimbursement is not insubstantial. Of course, Frankie is too old now to be able to acquire a new $3.75 million dollar policy and Wife will receive this money upon his passing if the policy remains in force.

Wife was represented by the divorce powerhouse Los Angeles law firm of Jaffe and Clemens and Husband's appellate team included the highly notable legal scholar Garrett C. Dailey.



Thurman W. Arnold, CFLS

Continue reading "FORM OF TITLE Trumps COMMUNITY PROPERTY PRESUMPTION Where Life Insurance Is An Asset in DIVORCE" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
April 30, 2011
  271 SANCTIONS Ordered Against PRO PER ATTORNEY - Lawyers Are Some of the Most Conflicted Parties to Matrimonial Litigation
Posted By Thurman Arnold, C.F.L.S.

I have recently been reflecting on the fact that in my experience, lawyers who are parties to family law litigation behave far worse than most people suffering through the emotional ravages of relationship breakup. There is something about being a lawyer that threatens, and for some tends, to transform us into bullies and petty tyrants.

Lawyers should be even more mindful than the average litigant about taking bad faith positions. Courts hold attorneys to a higher standard, as they should. Not only are they more likely to be monetarily sanctioned for abusive behaviors, attorneys may also find themselves the focus of a State Bar investigation that ends with discipline including suspension or disbarment - an accountability unique to being a member of the legal profession. Hence, attorney pro se litigants have a lot more to lose than the average disputant. Aside from their ethical obligation to be act better than the rest as "officers of the court," there are practical reasons why they should exercise restraint.

There is a trend among our California appellate courts to fix boundaries and impose consequences for all divorce litigants who engage in uncooperative and dishonest behavior in marital and partnership dissolutions. This is a good thing: As I urge in my Blogs, the family law system for resolving disputes isn't working because the participants often approach them with so much blind rage and reactivity that their conduct overburdens the courts' resources and are too often manifested in attempts to beat the other person into the ground by increasing costs unnecessarily, by misrepresenting information, and by playing "hide the ball." We teach our children to self-regulate their behaviors, but sometimes we can't seem to get a grip on our own. We don't want judges to act as through they were our parents, but people often force them to.


Marriage of Greenberg (April 28, 2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1095

As if to emphasize this phenomena, the Second Appellate District out of Santa Barbara issued its decision in Marriage of Greenberg on April 28, 2011. Self-represented Attorney Robert Greenberg was sanctioned in the amount of $2,800 in attorney fees to be paid to his former spouse by a Ventura County trial court when he took a meritless position to justify his stubborn refusal to pay a court ordered equalization payment to her. The trial court found that he was not only not credible in identifying his income in opposing a spousal support request, but declared that he'd engaged in perjury about his earnings and expenses. Moreover, the argument he urged to avoid paying the equalization payment was one that "should not have been an issue in the first place."

Accordingly, per Family Code section 271 sanctions were upheld as entirely appropriate and within the trial court's discretion. But that is not what is striking about the court's decision - and indeed $2,800 for uncooperative and dishonest behavior in family litigation is a very light slap.

Mr. Greenberg was not satisfied to accept his lumps and move on; instead, he filed a frivolous appeal from that order. Because Wife had not filed any brief in opposition to Husband's appeal Husband dodged a second monetary sanctions' award - but he did not dodge the bullet. BTW, Husband may have believed that because Wife could not afford to hire an appellate lawyer, given that it makes little sense to pay $10,000 to defend a $2,800 judgment, he would win in effect by default - he was sorely mistaken, however, since appellate courts don't accept arguments as valid simply because they are unopposed.

The Court concludes its opinion with the following:

"The record on appeal does not show that the trial court reported husband to the State Bar. We order the clerk of this court to send a copy of this opinion affirming the trial court's order to the State Bar. Whether husband should be disciplined is addressed to the judgment of the State Bar and we express no opinion thereon."

I suspect the author of that final sentence was smiling when they wrote it. Given the citations to Mr. Greenberg's tactics in the appellate record, it is hard to imagine that he will not be sanctioned by the Bar in the near future. Ironically, if the trial court's perjury findings have not previously been brought to the attention of the State Bar, Mr. Greenberg's insistence on pursuing a frivolous appeal guarantees they now will be. This is a wonderful example of an obsessed divorce litigant completely 'blowing themselves up.'

Justice Yegan, J. for the Second Appellate District begins this strongly worded opinion with the sentences: "Abraham Lincoln once said, 'He who represents himself has a fool for a client.' Here, the client is an attorney who represented himself in the trial court. He now represents himself on appeal. He is unschooled in the basics of appellate law, suggesting that Lincoln's observation applies on appeal. We understand that emotions run high in family law litigation and that this may cloud the  judgment of a party. But that does not excuse the filing of a 'creative' (i.e., misleading or incomplete or inaccurate) income and expense declaration; or perjury,..., or the filing of a frivolous appeal." [Italics added].

The decision ends with this dry and understated observation: "Husband, a pro per attorney, suffers from a lack of objectivity." This fact, universal in differing degrees for those who are ending relationships, is at the core of why family litigation is so distressing and expensive for everyone involved, and in need of a major retrofit. But in the meantime, trial courts are repeatedly being given the green light to reign in parties who act like errant children so long as their due process rights are duly protected. Along with Marriage of Tharp, Marriage of Fong, and Marriage of Duris & Urbany, Marriage of Greenberg constitutes a warning to all family law litigants that abusive conduct will not be countenanced.

Also, Greenberg is important as good authority for the proposition that unfounded legal positions at the trial court level are sanctionable under FC §271. It should be cited to any judge where you encounter difficulties with the other side that sound familiar here, including advocating meritless claims.

Divorce trance is strong stuff. It causes most people to lose their minds for a time, before they can regain some balance and equanimity. Some high conflict litigants seem to never regain their poise (if they ever had it), and lawyers as parties to matrimonial matters seem to personify some of the coarsest aspects of our lower natures. One of the benefits of hiring a seasoned attorney, even if you think you can otherwise represent yourself, is that they can guide you to act in ways that are less destructive than what your impulses demand. Good lawyers don't just perform the mechanics of divorce, they help to set the tone. Conversely, seeking out "aggressive" lawyers whose advice mirrors or panders to your inner tension assures that your experience of the divorce and of the courts will be all the more unpleasant and unsatisfactory - oh, and expensive too.

Do yourself a favor - don't imagine that family court is your stage for expressing your upset and rage. Throw tantrums and the consequences may be more painful than a "time-out."
 
Or consider a different tact, if you wish and if your limbic "lizard" brain will allow it. Fortunately, we have other areas that we can access with just a smidgeon of mindfulness.

Thurman W. Arnold, III, CFLS

A disclaimer: 

Very few humans can behave impeccably every time, and I don't want to create an impression that I claim to be freed from all personal reactivity. My discussion is aimed at reminding you and I that we have two primary choices: 1) Get lost in the trance of resentment and within our busy minds, and so be persistently and stubbornly deprived of any real decision-making ability or 2) to increasingly gently and firmly restore and ground ourselves, and exercise the choice to suffer less rather than more by resisting the impulse to jump and scream when we feel threatened or angry. This latter possibility exists apart from all proclaimed external "causes" to our misery - and requires that we not respond in kind to the perceived insults and injustices that others may seek to inflict upon us.

Every day we enjoy a fresh chance to re-evaluate our direction and so to reset our conditioned negative momentums. Might succeeding one time in ten be better than the alternative?

When I am distressed but lucky, the mantra "stop..., clear..., reset" sometimes comes to my mind. And sometimes, hopefully more often than not, this works for me. Find your own mantra and save yourself from needless pain.

The opportunity for freedom resides within us, not without! Conversely stated, victims tend to choose to be.
Continue reading "271 SANCTIONS Ordered Against PRO PER ATTORNEY - Lawyers Are Some of the Most Conflicted Parties to Matrimonial Litigation" »

Permalink  | Comments(2)
 
April 19, 2011
  Are WORKER'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS Community Property? Yes and No!
Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, III
Q. Are worker's compensation benefits received during marriage community property and so subject to division in dissolution proceedings?

A. Some of it, at least.

Marriage of Ruiz (Opinion Published 4/14/11) E049310

In the recently published Fourth Appellate case of Marriage of Ruiz out of Riverside County, the parties' marriage lasted 32 years - married in 1973 (not the summer of love), they separated in March, 2005. A major bone of contention was how to characterize Wife's lump-sum worker's comp settlement of $250,000 received several years before the breakup, which netted $172,364 after attorney fees and costs. Wife believed it was all hers in the absence of proof by Husband of what portion of the money she received should be allocated between compensation for loss of past income verses what portion was intended to compensate her for loss of future earning capacity. Not surprisingly if Husband indeed had the burden of proof on this issue, he was never going to meet it - worker's compensation awards and financial settlements relating to personal injuries are simply gross numbers that some insurance bean counter crunches and then offers a gross settlement to resolve. No one in Wife's work compensation team was thinking about a fixed amount that was intended to resolve temporary compensation benefits as opposed to wife's lifetime loss of income producing ability - these claims just don't get settled in that fashion. Hence, if Husband had the burden of proving an imaginary apportionment he would never be able to do so and Wife would take all.

This case illustrates what can happen where one party or another has the "burden of proof" on a particular issue - often this is a short hand way of saying "you lose."

Four years later their divorce proceedings resulted in a discretionary trial court finding that $103,033 of the award was CP, with a balance of $71,311 being Wife's separate property. This finding was upheld on appeal as a reasonable exercise of discretion by Judge Irma Poole Asberry.

Wife argued that despite the statutory community presumption per Family Code section 760 that property acquired during marriage belongs to the community, existing caselaw (Raphael v. Bloomfield) (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 617) required a conclusion that the award is community property only to the extent that it is intended to compensate for the injured spouse's reduced income during the marriage and before separation, and for injury-related expenses that were paid with community funds. She urged that the remainder of an injured spouse's recovery is intended to compensate her for their diminished earning capacity and/or medical expenses which continue after the DOS.

Therefore, the Wife here argued that Raphael carved an exception to the rebuttable presumption that all property acquired during marriage is community property, instead creating a presumption that the award is the injured spouse's separate property. If true, this would impose the burden of proof as to allocation upon the noninjured spouse. Hence, she argued, if neither party could show evidence of how the award was calculated the party with the burden of proof would lose. The record on appeal was clear that neither party produced any evidence one way or the other because - frankly - there was and could be none.

Judge Asberry correctly declined to find that the general overriding FC § 760 presumption could be trumped by this supposed exception. Since Wife evidently concluded her best litigation strategy was not to offer any compromise solution for determining the competing community verses separate property interests, the court applied a formula suggested by Husband for apportioning the award as between CP and SP. Wife took and all or nothing position that was a high stakes gamble, and she lost. Interestingly, the decision is clear that had she suggested some other valuation method the trial court could have found that was more equitable than Husband's proposal instead, and it would not have been reversed.

Play hard ball, get slammed.

The rule reiterated by the Ruiz court is simple, fair, and obvious. It is already established that period disability retirement payments which are received during marriage are community property, in that they are intended to compensate the community for loss of income that the injured spouse would otherwise have earned. Periodic disability payments received after separation are the separate property of the injured spouse alone for his or her diminished earning capacity. Citing the California Supreme Court in Marriage of Jones (1975) 13 Cal.3d 457, the Riverside justices stated "[s]o long as the marriage subsists, the [injured spouse's] reduced earnings worked a loss to the community. But such community loss does not continue after dissolution; at that point the earnings or accumulations of each party are the separate property" of each.  "[O]nly such payments as are received during marriage are community property."

But within the context of worker's compensation permanent disability awards, as was presented here, Raphael had concluded that the timing of the award (i.e., whether received before or after separation) should not dictate the outcome - instead the inquiry was what portion was intended to compensate the injured spouse for his/her reduced earnings during the marriage, which would be CP. Again, a question that is not likely to be answered by the non-injured spouse because they have no access to such information assuming it even was part of the settlement calculation; yet, this perhaps reasonably did suggest to Wife's attorney he might successfully argue that the burden of proof was hence placed upon the Husband.

The Ruiz Court decided that neither party had a burden of proof that would create a rebuttable presumption in the favor of one or the other because the trial court properly concluded that the award was part community and part separate property of Wife. The issue was then for the trial court to decide in terms of equitable apportionment of the competing interests. "In doing so, the court may use any method which fairly apportions the assets or its value between community and separate property interests. Because it is the court's obligation to make an equitable apportionment, neither party has the burden of proof in the sense that a failure of proof will result in an award of the asset in its entirety to the other party."

Thus, in equitable apportionment cases involving disability awards, which includes all hybrid mixes of community/separate attributes, a disadvantaged party (here the Husband who could not marshal much less control the evidence of what the worker's comp carrier intended when it settled Wife's case) does not lose simply because of a failure of their access to proof. Instead trial courts are free to fashion any result which works substantial justice. This was fair because nothing indicated that Wife had received any temporary disability benefits during the marriage that got banked - this lump sum settlement was all that she apparently received for the total loss occasioned to her, and to the community, for the injuries she suffered.

To the extent that the Wife argued the trial court's division of the CP amounts vs. the SP amounts was arbitrary, she had no right to complain because she never suggested any other measure that the trial court might use in supporting a different allocation scheme.

So, the lesson is this: Play hardball, get slammed..... (mediate your disputes instead, and don't disconnect from reasonableness - one never knows how a court might rule!)



Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S

Continue reading "Are WORKER'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS Community Property? Yes and No!" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
December 19, 2010
  What Are TRACINGS In California DIVORCE Proceedings? Tossed Salad and Mixed Vegetables!
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  My attorney has used the word "tracings" several times, and I really don't understand how this works.  Can you give me a simple explanation?


A.  Unlikely (sorry!).

Tracings may be required by California law in a number of settings in order to find out what each spouse's share of the community property is. They generally show up in several recurring situations, but unfortunately for simplicity's sake there are numerous permutations of where tracings come into play. Chief among them is where cash or assets that was used to purchase property was "commingled" (think tossed salad with separate property lettuce leaves and community property mixed vegetables) at the time it was contributed. Please use the search engine at the upper right to see my Blog Articles for the definitions of community and separate property.

These include:

  • Determining the community verses separate property attributes of an asset that was acquired with funds contributed during marriage that were a combination of each (CP and SP). This is called "characterization" - does the asset belong in whole or in part to the community estate, or to one party's separate estate, or both in different degrees? The community component is sometimes earnings that were used to pay down secured debt each month when, for instance, a mortgage principal payment is made for a separate property asset (a Moore-Marsden situation). It can include one time downpayments from joint bank accounts that contain community income or earnings (or separate property accounts that may have been commingled with joint funds or not or community property accounts that include separate property components) further complicated in the case of a refinance, and more.
  • It is extremely common that a community property asset (acquired during marriage, possibly but not necessarily in joint names), or improvements to it, traces partly or 100% to a separate property source. Many parents 'gift' their child part or all of  the downpayment for the couple's first home. Or, a separate property asset (acquired during marriage but titled in one spouse's name alone - usually seen with real estate) may be purchased using joint funds.  In either event there is a tracing right of reimbursement per Family Code section 2640 to the respective community or separate property interests that bought it, in the event of a dissolution or legal separation. FC §2640 is in the top five of all California property division statutes and is critical for an understanding of what your legal interests are if either spouse has any colorable claims to separate property used during marriage. Many middle income and high asset property division cases are a puzzle map of assets that are not what they seem at first glance.
  • There are a number of situations where reimbursement claims arise from the payment of joint or separate debts using money that the other spouse had an interest in (whether community funds or separate). Under limited situations there may be a right for the community, or the other spouse's separate property, to be reimbursed, but you will be required to trace these funds to claim them.
  • Often intended or unintended transmutations have occurred. Family Code section 852 is the chief transmutation statute, and another of the top five California dissolution property statutes. Transmutations involve a change in the character of property, from community to separate or from separate to community or separate to the other party's separate property. These commonly require tracings in order to establish the FC § 2640 interest. For instance, husband and wife own a residence together in joint names. It was purchased during marriage. But there is need for a refinance, and one spouse's credit is bad. The parties agree that husband will borrow the money, and the lender requires that wife sign a quitclaim deed before escrow can close. Husband assures wife 'not to worry.' Wife signs the transfer deed and doesn't seek legal advice. She has unwittingly transmuted her community interest to husband's separate property. Years later the property has appreciated. What is Wife's interest? (Breach of fiduciary duty questions have to be the subject of a separate Blog but, again, please try our search engine for more information!)

Did I say I would give a simple answer?  No?  Good!

In order to unwind transactions during marriage where monies and property with separate and community property attributes have been mixed together, the "separatizer" (the party seeking to establish their separate property contributions to the community or separate property of the other spouse or partner) has the burden of proof to present reliable tracing evidence to the Court. In order to settle even mildly complex dissolutions as between the parties without going to trial, this information must be provided and laid out in a concrete manner to convince the other side that you have the ability to meet your burden.

Here are some of the rules that apply the mechanics of tracings in dissolution actions and legal separations.

If the commingled funds are used to purchase property, the party who deposited the separate funds may attempt to trace the source of the funds used to purchase the property to establish that it is separate because separate funds were used to purchase it. This may overcome the presumption that property acquired during marriage is community. Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604.

If separate and community property or funds are commingled in such a manner that it is impossible to trace the source of the property or funds, the whole must be treated as community property. Marriage of Mix, supra.

If the title to the property was taken jointly, tracing cannot be used to overcome the presumption from the form of title. Marriage of Lucas (1980) 27 Cal.3d 808, 813–814.

Direct tracing and tracing through family expenses are two independent methods of tracing to establish that property purchased with commingled funds is separate property.

Direct Tracing

Separate funds do not lose their separate character when commingled with community funds in a bank account so long as the amount of separate funds can be ascertained and at no time period were the funds spent down below the balance of SP claimed unless replenished with SP instead of CP. Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604.

If money is withdrawn to purchase specific property, questions of fact that must be determined include (Marriage of Mix, supra):

  • Whether separate funds continue to be on deposit; and

  • Whether the drawer intended to withdraw separate funds.

The party seeking to establish a separate interest in presumptive community property must keep adequate records. The party must show the exact amount of money allocable to separate property and the exact amount of money allocable to community property before it can be said that the money allocable to separate property is not so commingled that all funds in the account are community property. Marriage of Frick (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 997. If the payments claimed to be separate were made periodically, each payment must have been made when separate property funds were in the account and must have been accompanied by an intent to use those funds rather than community funds. Marriage of Higinbotham (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 322, 329.

Tracing Through Family Expenses

The second method of tracing to establish that property purchased with commingled funds is separate property requires a consideration of family expenses. This tracing method is based on the presumption that family expenses are paid from community funds.

If at the time the property is acquired it can be shown that all community cash and income in a commingled account was exhausted by family expenses, then all funds remaining in the account at the time the property was purchased were necessarily separate funds. Marriage of Mix, supra.

This method can be used only when, through no fault of the spouse claiming separate property, it is not possible to ascertain the balance of income and expenditures at the time property was acquired. See v See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 778, 784.

The spouse claiming separate property must keep adequate records to overcome the presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property. See v See, supra.  Most people don't.

The take-away:  If you are contemplating a divorce and have tracing issues, protect your records now so that they do not 'disappear.'  It can be very expensive to obtain bank statements and canceled checks dating back years, and with all of the bank failures and mergers today these records may become impossible to obtain.  If you cannot meet your tracing burden of proof, you lose on the particular reimbursement issue.

As you probably have guessed, tracings are quite expensive and typically involve the assistance of a forensic accountant. Moreover, not just any attorney will know what to do with this information!


Thurman W. Arnold III, CFLS
All Rights Reserved
Continue reading "What Are TRACINGS In California DIVORCE Proceedings? Tossed Salad and Mixed Vegetables!" »

Permalink  | Comments(1)
 
December 03, 2010
  ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Elkins Task Force


The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011. 

It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners. 

This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.

Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations.  Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues.  Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.

What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases."  Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification: 

        "We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel.  [Reference omitted].... 

        In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures.  But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice.  Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute.  It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support.... 

         Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function.  If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."

Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented.  Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions.  Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants.  Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court."   Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.

The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011.  Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217.  It states:

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 


December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.


T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization)

Continue reading "ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!" »

Permalink  | Comments(1)
 
October 28, 2010
  What Do I Do to Protect My Community Interest In PERS and STRS RETIREMENT PLANS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  What should I consider to ensure that I have a claim in my husband's teacher's retirement plan once he files for divorce?


A.  CalPERS (PERS) is the California Public Employee's Retirement System.  California Government Code sections 20000 to 21703 describe it.  This includes all kinds of California state employees including police officers, firefighters, emergency services employees, and other public safety employees as well as university teachers, professors, and other professionals.

CalSTRS (STRS) is the State Teachers' Retirement System, which is governed by California Education Code sections 22000-25115.

Both require a joinder pursuant to Family Code section 2060 as a condition to complying with an order against the plan, and they are generally cooperative in facilitating this.  Likewise, most other municipal plans require joinder and cooperate with parties who are attempting to accomplish it.

In order to protect your rights, we recommend that you not only serve the Joinder Summons and related pleadings (see our Family Law Forms Library page) but that you also give written notice, by certified mail, on the Plan per Family Code section 755.

The joinder process for those California employee benefits that you can join is easy.  The forms you need are the

It is important to name the plan correctly.  The plan is a separate entity from the employer.  Next, they do need to be properly served per FC section 2062.

Within 30 days the plan must respond by a Notice of Appearance.  However, they rarely do.  If they fail to, the clerk must enter their default.  As a practical matter, the Plan will likely accept the order of the court or any settlement you reach thereafter so long as it meets the plan administrator's requirements.



Thurman W. Arnold III, CFLS

www.ThurmanArnold.com

Continue reading "What Do I Do to Protect My Community Interest In PERS and STRS RETIREMENT PLANS?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
October 22, 2010
  Are STOCK OPTIONS COMMUNITY PROPERTY?
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS
Q.  How are stock options treated if I decide to dissolve my domestic partnership?


A.  Stock options are commonly used to attract or retain key employees with incentives outside the basic salary structure. Whether you are dissolving a marriage or a RDP (registered domestic partnership), valuing and dividing stock options can be tricky. 

The simplest situation is where the stock options were earned before separation. In such cases they are clearly CP.  But often there is a question of when these benefits were in fact "earned" because employee services that generate them are sometimes contributed over long periods. These may include a pre-marriage period (when time, skill, and efforts of either party are always SP) and they may extend for some time past the date of physical separation (and so be SP). The question when stock options were earned becomes quite fact specific and depends a lot on what the employer intended and what kind of options they are. In re Marriage of Hug (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676.

Stock options that are earned during the marriage, but vest afterwards, generally belong to the community. They are treated as deferred compensation, like certain types of pensions. Usually an employee is granted the right to buy stock, now or in the future, at a fixed price. They may be forced to sell that stock back to the company if they leave. What controls whether the options are characterized as community or separate is when they are granted and when they vest. If they do not vest at all, as where a minimum number of years of service by the employee are required which is not met (even where the employee-spouse quits after separation and so blows them up), they are neither separate or community property - instead, they are not viewed as a property interest at all.  In those cases they were a "mere expectancy" that never matured.

In cases where an employee must work for the company for a fixed number of years to be eligible, but the spouses or RDP's separate before those years have been served, the options have both community and SP attributes. To the extent that they result from post-separation efforts too, they must be apportioned between CP and SP. As with how interests in pensions are commonly evaluated, courts tend to follow a "time-rule". The time rule looks like this:

DOG to DOS
__________  X  # of Shares Exercisable = C/P shares
DOG to DOV
    
        DOG = Date of Grant
        DOS = Date of Separation 
        DOV = Date of Vesting

Stock options that are granted after the DOS are usually treated as the separate property of the recipient, even where some of the employee's contributions occurred before. This is because of the importance of what the employer intended to the analysis.

This Blog is intended just to give you some sense of the law over these potentially complex questions. As with everything, different facts can lead to different outcomes and stock options are complicated financial devices. 

Also, stock option disputes sometimes involve claims of fraud - as where a small closely held company or family business tries to funnel or manipulate how when the options are granted or vest in an effort to favor one spouse over another. 

Perhaps the only practical way that a former spouse or partner may learn that stock options exist or when they vest or are exercised is by the self-disclosure of the employee. The law is clear that spouses and domestic partners are required by their fiduciary obligations to make these disclosures. Refusals to disclose can have severe consequences under Family Code section 1101.


T. W. Arnold III
http://www.MindfulDivorces.com

Continue reading "Are STOCK OPTIONS COMMUNITY PROPERTY?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
October 11, 2010
  What does "COMMUNITY PROPERTY WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP" Mean?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I am considering a divorce.  I have found the deed to our home, and I see that the grant deed by which we took title is held like this "to Jim ... and Mary ..., husband and wife, as Community Property, with Right of Survivorship."  What does this mean for me?

A.  There are several very important consequences that flow from this language.  The way is which title is held (or "form of title") is also called "vesting."  Everything I say here applies to title for any form of property - bank or brokerage accounts, for instance, as well as any kind of real estate and the types of personal property for which we use title documents.

First, a "right of survivorship" means that if one party dies - but only before a final judgment of termination of the marriage of domestic partnership, or where a termination of marital status or partnership status occurs before the rest of the case is resolved in judgment form, the party that survives them inherits 100% of the dying party's share of the community property.  It does not matter that there exist a Will or Estate document that purports to create a different transfer upon death.  Where a right of survivorship exists there is no need to probate an estate in order to obtain full title - all that is required is that a Affidavit of Death of Joint Tenant be recorded with the County Recorder for the County where the real property is located.  A Death Certificate must be attached to it.  The transfer is then complete.

For other forms of property, as with jointly held bank accounts, the same results occur.  However instead of recording an Affidavit of Death with the County Recorder's Office, a Certified Copy of the Death Certificate is simply provided to the banking institution.  As a practical matter vehicle titles are different in the sense (a) they are filed with any DMV office in California and (b) the title language rarely references "community property" or 'rights of survivorship', and instead titles the property to Jim "and" "or" Mary.  I will have to discuss the rules relating to inheritances and surviving widows and widowers in a different blog.

Second, if a party dies after a Final Judgment dissolving a marriage or domestic partnership, or after a "status termination" before final judgment, but title to the property has never been changed for whatever reason then there is no automatic right of survivorship - in legal effect, the survivorship rights were terminated (severed) upon the by operation of law as a consequence of the Status Termination. 

Likewise, if a party to a divorce proceeding dies before the termination of status then the survivorship right controls (see below).  Since people don't expect this, something lawyers call a "Blair warning" based upon a particular appellate decision is set forth in the Family Law Summons Form FL-110 that no one ever seems to actually read (hopefully your lawyer told you about it).

This is one reason by marital bifurcations can have unforseen consequences and should be taken seriously when another spouse in the course of a divorce seeks to terminate status before the entire case is resolved by Final Judgment.

Third, in California when property is vested in both parties as "CP with right of survivorship" it is the equivalent of a "joint tenancy."  All the same rules apply.  Thus, what we are speaking to applies whether the "CP with right of survivorship" language was used for more common "to Jim and Mary as Joint Tenants is used."

Fourth, there does not need to be any reference to whether the parties are "husband and wife" for these rules to apply.  Non-married people can be joint tenants as to any form of real (land) or personal property and the death of one vests the remaining title in the other - however, since there will be no termination of marital status since there is no marriage (assuming no domestic partnership either), there is only one way to destroy the right of survivorship:  By transferring at least one party's interest as a "joint tenant" to themselves as a "tenant in common".  The transfer of tenant in common interests after death follow the rules of testacy (a will exists and directs who gets what) and intestacy (no will exists, and specific legal rules declare who gets one depending upon their familial relationship to the decedent.

Fifth, many lawyers and savvy unrepresented parties will destroy the right of survivorship before the termination of marital status through the method outlined directly above.  It only requires one party to accomplish this and it does not require the other party's consent.  This has risks, however, since if you destroy a joint tenancy interest prematurely and other spouse dies then you will not inherit their interest but you will of course inherit you own 50%.  If you are a child of a parent married to a nonparent or estranged parent and wish to protect your inheritance rights for an ailing father or mother - and they want you to inherit - you should consult a lawyer to assist in destroying the right of survivorship in a legally enforceable way.  Note that a termination of this survivorship right violates the automatic temporary restraining orders that arise at the moment that every California dissolution or legal separation proceeding is filed, and that special rules exist for terminating joint tenancies which - if ignored - may not only render the attempt transfer void but further subject you to contempt or other penalties including attorney fees for trying to sever it improperly.  Family Code section 2040(b)(c).

Sixth, and most important for the average divorce and in answer to your question, important legal presumptions arise from the Form of Title that have a huge impact on whether property is considered as community or separate.  Way simply put, title held as you describe will almost certainly be declared community property for purposes of divorce and each spouse will be entitled to an equal one-half equity interest.  However, that outcome does not require the "community property" language to be present in order to apply - any form of title acquired in joint names (tenancies in common, joint tenancies, tenancies by the entirety) triggers the presumption.  The relevant Family Code section here is 2581.

Seventh and last for this Blog article, title presumptions are a kind of "super presumption" under the law in the sense that generally in order to rebut (disprove) them, the evidence that you submit must be "clear and convincing."  A garden variety presumption in comparison is the rule that property acquired during marriage in whatever form (including title) is presumed to belong to the community.  Family Code section 760.
Although FC section 760 doesn't use the word "presumption" that is what it means, and this presumption is the ordinary "by a preponderance of the evidence" presumption - meaning 51% likely or better.  Clearing and convincing can be considered as 75% or better - although that is a simplification. Take a look at FC section 2581(a) and (b).

Unfortunately, that is not the end of the analysis because even where property is titled jointly, a party who can trace separate property contributions to its acquisition or certain improvements to it can recover those (Family Code section 2640) if they can follow the money through written records in a legally sufficient way in the event of a divorce.  In the event of a death, these reimbursements are extinguished.  I discuss "tracings" on this Blog.

Different but similar rules apply to Living Trusts which are beyond the subject of today's Blog. I can see this is a good topic and "I'll be back."




T. Wesley Arnold
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com

Continue reading "What does "COMMUNITY PROPERTY WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP" Mean?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
September 25, 2010
  How Do I Use a MARITAL BALANCE SHEET to Figure Out How to Best DIVIDE OUR PROPERTY?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  I am considering filing for divorce, and am beginning to pencil out what the division of our assets and debts might look like.  What is a good way to go about this?


A.  Prepare a Marital Balance Sheet.  This will give you an idea of how your property could be divided in a dissolution or legal separation, and to allow you to try out different combinations of division. 

Its usefulness will depend the accuracy of your assumptions.  Often times more information or outside opinions are required to do this with any degree of correctness.  Sometimes the outside opinion that is required is the judge's decision on a disputed issue.  Marital balance sheets can range from being exquisitely simple to exceedingly complex. Remember that it is the duty of the Court to divide the community estate equally - this division means an equal division in dollars, not that you divide the family residence with a chain saw. 

The format itself is simple.  You want two columns, one for you and one for your partner or spouse.  You will categorize, value, and assign the community property between each of you.  Some categories might be listed on a different balance sheet, like pensions. 

Here are some suggestions for drafting a Marital Balance Sheet you can work with.
  • Use net value numbers, i.e., equity in homes and automobiles.  Secured debt is subtracted from fair market value - it is not divided as unsecured debt would be.  If you take the house, you take 100% of the mortgage.
  • Be sure to use realistic fair market value numbers.  Don't make your final decisions based on Zillow.  If your assumptions are flawed, your balance sheet analysis will be of limited use.
  • Use wholesale Kelly Blue Book values for cars or at least make sure whatever yardstick you use is consistent for both parties.
  • Obtain accurate and current pay-off information as to debts.  Typically that will be the value of the debts on the date they are assigned, as adjusted for Epstein Credits. 
  • Don't treat apples and oranges as apples.  For instance, list pension assets as a class separate from other assets - the present value of IRA's, 401k's, and other defined contribution plans is always different than the present value of a bank account.  These pension accounts are not valued in real dollars but must be discounted, and that may require a pension forensic or CPA.
  • Don't include separate property (the other spouse may dispute that characterization).  Pure SP doesn't go on the marital balance sheet. 
  • Assign the debts, placing those numbers in parentheses to ensure they are subtracted and not added in your running total.  Remember that it doesn't matter in whose name a credit card is parked.  If a debt was incurred during marriage the general rule as between spouses is that each owes 50-50.
  • Separate property debts don't go onto the balance sheet because they don't get evenly divided and if they were listed you may inadvertently charge yourself for half.
  • Use total values rather than 1/2 community values.  These numbers get divided as one of the last steps.
  • Don't include support or support arrears.
  • Include Epstein credits.
  • Calculate and note Watts' and Jeffries' claims
  • List professional practices and businesses but realize you probably have no practical way to put a number on them, would be entirely guessing as to their value, and would probably be wrong anyway.  Understand that business are worth more than the sum of their balance sheets or book values.
  • If you share this document with your spouse, be sure to write "Confidential Evidence Code section 1152 Materials" on it, which makes them inadmissible as evidence against you.  Otherwise you may find yourself stuck with your preliminary numbers when that is not what you intended.
  • Realize that if you share this document, no matter how preliminary it is, with your spouse you will be creating in them expectations concerning value or division that they may become stuck on.
  • Be careful how you treat negative equity on property.  For instance, if you own a car that is worth $15,000 but you owe $25,000 and want that vehicle awarded to you, the other party will not be charged for one-half of the $10,000 in negative equity.  
  • Leased vehicles should be identified but have no value.  I believe it is a good idea to list everything that you own or owe whether or not it has a value or can be valued at that time, since this list becomes an important road map for you and your lawyer.
  • Make a note of alleged breach of fiduciary duty claims, but don't value them.
  • Don't include your separate property.  Include their separate property if you claim it to be all or partly community, but understand those aren't real numbers until a judge rules.  
  • Don't leave the document lying around where someone else might find it.
  • If property is held in one spouse's name alone but a mortgage or taxes were paid during marriage, or if it was improved or refinanced during marriage, understand that the community probably has some Moore-Marsden interest in that property but that you will have great difficulty figuring out what that is without expert assistance.
  • Similarly, if one spouse owned property (i.e, real estate) prior to marriage and the other was placed on title during the marriage, note to yourself that the property has community and separate property attributes and understand you will need more information or help to value those competing interests.
  • Make a note of all separate property contributions you made for the acquisition or improvement of any property.  These are called Family Code section 2640 credits.
  • List all other reimbursements due to the community.  For instance, there are many situations where the community property is used to pay one party's separate obligations (i.e., child support from a previous marriage) and if you know to assert the claim the community may be entitled to a reimbursement.
  • List consumer goods like furniture at garage sale prices unless there is something truly special about the items.  Nothing is valued at its purchase price or even its replacement cost new.
  • Be sure to include loans from parents, work, or family members that were made during the marriage and assign those that relate to your family or work to you.
  • Make a note of any gifts to one or the other of you alone that were used to purchase or improve community property, whether they were received before or during the marriage. 
  • Look at your bank balances at the date of separation and assign those balances appropriately.  If your husband emptied the savings account the day before he walked out, list the amount he took under his column.

This is just a starting point and is valuable as a roadmap to get you thinking about what needs to be done to conclude the divorce.  Once you discipline yourself to begin to overcome any paralysis you might feel, the marital balance sheet will speak to you about what is important for you, what the issues are, and will give you some idea of what important paperwork you need to obtain to evaluate your interests now or in the future.  Get that paperwork at once.  You are going to have to do this exercise anyway once a legal actin is filed. 

This the some of the information that you must provide in your Declarations of Disclosure.  It is an efficient idea to use those forms from the beginning.  These California Judicial Council Forms include:

Getting started on this early will make any meeting with a family attorney cheaper and far more useful then if you've not even thought about these things.

To the extent you can determine values or ranges of values, add up the net equity in your column for the community property you want or get, and subtract 100% of the debts that are to be assigned to you.  Again, chances are there will be categories where you can't put a number on the items.  But if you had the numbers, then after totalling the total net to the other party, subtract the two net numbers.  One of you will show a higher number.  This number will reflect the over-credit amount to that person which needs to be equalized between you.  Divide this number by 2, and the person who netted more owes that resulting number to the one who received less.  This amount is called an "equalization payment."

This is just one way to do a marital balance sheet.  Often times there is no money to pay the equalization payment because all or most of the community is held in the form of personal and real property.  An equalization payment is no good to you unless you can collect it.  Perhaps you can get a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on the family residence that is awarded to the wife.  That is usually a bad idea - you don't want to become a bank, with all the attendant risks of default and depreciation.

Another option once you have these numbers are pencilled out is to go back and rethink how the property was divided.  Maybe you should take those Peter Max lithographs after all.  Maybe the residence or that vacant lot must be sold to raise money for the equalization payment.  It is frequently seen in Stipulated Judgments or Marital Termination Agreements.  It is not common in litigated judgments because courts generally must equalize the division at the time of trial, not in the future.  This is why property may be ordered sold to ensure an equal, current division of the estate.

If defined contribution pension plans exist these are a good place to find the money to assure the equalization payment is actually honored.  But a 401k with a net asset value of $100,000 might only be worth $80,000 after penalties and ordinary income taxes are charged on it.  Pensions can be divided without tax consequences (QDRO's) but if you are owed a $100,000 equalization, creating a new pension in your name and transferring $100,000 from the other party's interest in it is like being handed a check for $80,000. 



Thurman W. Arnold III
September 25, 2010
All Rights Reserved
Continue reading "How Do I Use a MARITAL BALANCE SHEET to Figure Out How to Best DIVIDE OUR PROPERTY?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
September 24, 2010
  My Ex Has Been EXCLUSIVELY USING Our RESIDENCE - Is There an EPSTEIN CREDIT For This?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I have been occupying the home after my wife left over a year ago.  I pay all the interest only mortgage, property taxes, and insurance with no help from her.  Does she owe me half of any of this?

A.  You may be owed you something, but not necessarily one-half of what you have paid out.

This situation involves at least three potential legal issues:
  • Epstein Credits
  • Watts Credits
  • Jeffries Credits

This particular Blog addresses your question in terms of Epsteins - the next blog deals specificially with Watts and Jeffries credits. 

Epstein Credits

I have described Epstein Reimbursements in another Blog.  "Epstein credits" is a doctrine derived from the case of Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85.  It holds that as a general rule, courts must reimburse one spouse out of the community property who uses earnings or other separate funds after separation to pay pre-existing community obligations.  This commonly occurs with credit cards where there was a balance remaining when the parties separated that one or the other pays after that date.  Epsteins only apply to payments on the portion of a debt that existed at date of separation, and not new debt on an old card that was incurred afterwards.  The rule is not limited to credit cards but can apply to almost any class of debts.

Courts are required not to order this reimbursement if under the circumstances it would be unreasonable for the paying spouse to have expected reimbursement.  If there was an agreement that a party would not be reimbursed, if the paying spouse intended the payment as a gift, or when the payment is made on account of a debt for an asset that the paying spouse was or is using and the amount was not substantially in excess of the value of the use, the Court may decline to order reimbursement.  This idea of the value of use of some property acquired through debt that continues to exist after separation underlies the concepts of Watts credits and Jeffries credits, and is obviously implicated in your question since you occupy the house for which you seek credits and reimbursements.

So, Epsteins are almost always granted as to post-separation payments for expenses, or goods and services, that didn't leave a tangible asset behind that is now being exclusively enjoyed by only one of the two spouses. 

As an example of how this works if there is $15,000 owing Visa for that trip to Hawaii, some groceries, and a child's school tuition at the time of separation and one party pays it off or makes monthly installments on the debt with their earnings or other separate property after that date, a benefit has been conferred upon the community because a joint obligation has been extinguished or reduced.  That benefit must be equalized by a payment to the payor of one-half the amount paid or a credit or set-off against other property that gets divided.  One-half is paid because the paying spouse owed their half anyway.  Any portion paid before the DOS (date of separation) ordinarily will not be reimbursed. 

This is generally true even if only one of the parties actually took the trip to Hawaii, unless that trip was in breach of a marital or fiduciary duty (if the husband snuck off with his paramour to Hawaii, an argument exists that he should not be reimbursed for paying that portion of the debt over the wife's objection).  Family Code section 2625 directs courts to award a debt incurred by one spouse to them alone if debt was not "incurred for the benefit of the community."  Family Code section 2602 empowers courts to "award ... the amount the court determines to have been deliberately misappropriated by the party to the exclusion of the interest to any other party in the community estate."  FC section 2625 is a powerful and much underused statute (many attorneys seem to be unaware of it or try to bluff as though it didn't exist).

Compare this with a situation where a credit card was used to buy a dishwasher that the paying spouse possesses or receives in the divorce - since they are retaining a tangible asset it may not be fair to allow them to both keep the asset and get reimbursed for one-half its costs.  Applying Epsteins can become fairly fact specific.

In situations involving use of a family residence or other tangible assets that continue to exist after separation and which are used and enjoyed by only one of the spouses, an Epstein analysis provides only a part of the answer to the reimbursement question.  In effect first the amount of the Epstein reimbursements are determined, and then the question requires a Watts analysis to determine under equitable principles whether it is fair to actually order reimbursement and, if so, in what amount.

Hence, to resolve your issue you would begin by adding up the costs of everything related to the house that is spent to preserve or protect the asset.  Property taxes are included, but utilities are not.  The utilities you used after the physical separation are your obligation anyway, because they were not incurred during 'the marriage.'  (Please see the Blog Category "Physical Separation.")  Mortgage payments and insurance are considered, and probably the poolman or gardner as well.

Please continue on to the next blog for detailed infomation concerning Watts credits.


Epstein Credits and Fiduciary Duty Issues

Sometimes a spouse or domestic partner will raid the credit cards and take cash advances or buy a new wardrobe, or fix a car, during the weeks prior to separating.  If it later appears that their intention was to stick the other spouse for one-half of this expense, the presumption that this is a community debt (because incurred during marriage) may be overcome and so it may be assigned to the one spouse alone.  It is not fair to hold both parties responsible for debts incurred in anticipation of separation.

However, when one partner incurs a debt frivolously as opposed to recklessly before separation, in a situation not amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty - even over the prior objection of the other spouse - it is likely to be equally divided and Epstein reimbursements ordered.  Both spouses have, under California law, equal rights of management and control of the community property and community credit.

Courts in my experience are reluctant to find breaches of fiduciary duty in Esptein situations unless the behavior was fairly eggregious.  Charging 10 pairs of shoes at Macy's a month before separation may not be viewed as a big deal.  If the debt was incurred in pursuit of an illegal activity like supporting a drug habit or sex addiction, many judges are less reluctant to declare a breach. 

To illustrate another twist, if the credit card was used to pay the spouse's tuition expense instead a child's schooling as in my example above, it may also be unfair to charge the non-schooled parent with one-half the tuition portion of the credit card balance.  A court is likely to look at whether this schooling benefited the community in some way before splitting that debt betwen the parties - i.e., because of the schooling did the student spouse earn more money which was then contributed to the community standard of living and so confer a benefit on both?  Pure student loans are usually awarded to the party who incurred the debt as their separate property obligation. 



T. W. Arnold III
http://www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com
Continue reading "My Ex Has Been EXCLUSIVELY USING Our RESIDENCE - Is There an EPSTEIN CREDIT For This?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
September 16, 2010
  How Are Funds in a JOINT BANK ACCOUNT Treated in Dissolution or Legal Separation?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  My Wife removed all the money from our joint savings account immediately before filing for divorce.  Some of that money included an inheritance from my grandmother.  What are my rights to recover any of it?

A.  When there is a joint bank account in the names of parties who are married, their net contributions to the account is presumed under the law to be and remain their community funds.  This applies regardless whether the deposit agreement with the institution describes them as married.  Probate Code section 5305(a).

Affected "accounts" mean a contract for deposit of funds between a depositor and a financial institution and includes a checking or savings account, a certificate of deposit, share account, and similar arrangements.  Probate Code section 5122(a).

However, this presumption can be rebutted - as in the case of your inheritance contributions to the account if you can meet your burden of proof by either of the following:
  • If some or all of the funds on deposit you contend are your separate property can be traced from separate property (i.e., the inheritance) they will be confirmed to you unless your wife can establish you made a written agreement that expressed a clear intent that those sums would become community property (a transmutation)
  • If the two of you made a written agreement, separate from the deposit agreement itself, that expressly provided that the deposited sums that are claimed not to be community property were in fact not to be community property then you will not be reimbursed.

Hence, you need the paper trail for the receipt of the inheritance monies into this joint account in order to establish they still belong to you as separate property.  As long as you do trace these funds, your wife's argument that you gifted the monies to her or the both of you by verbal agreement or by your conduct will not succeed. 

However, when monies are commingled over time this tracing becomes more difficult. Particularly in checking accounts, money comes in from other sources (like community earnings) and goes out (often to pay community expenses).  The question becomes which money is applied to what outflows?  
  
The law presumes that money that goes out of a commingled account is spent first on the community needs and expenses, meaning that what remains is more likely to be considered separate.  The law expects the community to pay community expenses, not that you first use your separate property - as long as their are sufficient community funds on hand.  If these community funds become exhausted then withdrawals of what is your separate remaining monies may be lost to the community.

In your situation you have a reimbursement claim for what she took and you should receive a credit on the marital balance sheet.  She may owe you 100% of the inheritance and 50% of the balance.  Your worst case is that she owes you half of what she took. Immediately begin to collect the needed bank and inheritance records to prove your claims.

Maintaining records during and after marriage is the most important thing you can do to preserve and protect your interests.  Unfortunately, few people realize this until after the horse has left the barn.




Thurman W. Arnold III

www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com


 

Continue reading "How Are Funds in a JOINT BANK ACCOUNT Treated in Dissolution or Legal Separation?" »

Permalink 
 
September 14, 2010
  How do CALIFORNIA COURTS divide EDUCATION LOANS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  My husband completed his training as a doctor after we married.  He incurred substantial educational loans which we paid off during the marriage.  What rights to I have for recovering those costs?

A.  The community estate is supposed to be reimbursed for community contributions to education or training of a spouse that substantially enhances that person's earning capacity. The amount reimbursed must include interest at the legal rate, accruing from the end of the calendar year in which the contributions were made. [FC §2641(b)(1); see FC §2627.]

Reimbursement is not appropriate in the following circumstances:
  • The parties expressly agreed in writing to the contrary [FC §2641(e)]; or
  • The contributions were for ordinary living expenses that would be incurred regardless of whether the spouse attended school, stayed home, or worked [Marriage of Watt (1989) 214 CA3d 340, 354].

If the loan is still outstanding at the time of dissolution, the balance is not divided but is instead assigned to the party who was educated or trained, except when the parties expressly agreed in writing to the contrary. [FC §2641(b)(2) (e).]

Nonetheless, the Court may reduce or modify the reimbursement and assignment of educational loans to the extent circumstances render such a disposition unjust, including the following [FC §2641(c)]:

  • When the community substantially benefited from the education, training, or loan incurred for the education or training of the party. There is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that the community has not substantially benefited from community contributions to the education or training made fewer than 10 years before the commencement of the proceeding. On the other hand, it is presumed that the community substantially benefited from community contributions to the education or training made more than 10 years before the commencement of the proceeding.
  • The education or training received by the party is offset by the education or training received by the other party for which community contributions have been made.
  • The education or training enables the party receiving the education or training to engage in gainful employment that substantially reduces the need of the party for support that would otherwise be required.

Professional licenses and education are not "property" that can be divided in divorce or legal separation in California.  Reimbursement for community contributions and assignment of loans under FC §2641 is the exclusive remedy of the community or a party for education or training costs and any resulting enhancement of a person's earning capacity.

However, importantly, the Court should consider the effect of the education, training, or enhancement, or the amount reimbursed, on the circumstances of the parties in ordering permanent spousal support pursuant to Family Code section 4320(b). [FC §2641(d).]

Continue reading "How do CALIFORNIA COURTS divide EDUCATION LOANS?" »

Permalink 
 
September 13, 2010
  How are DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS divided in California DIVORCE?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  How are defined contribution plans divided in California dissolutions?

A.  A defined contribution pension plan is a plan in which the employer's obligation is based only on its annual contribution. The benefit for the employee on retirement depends on the value of the employee's account at that time. There is no need for expert testimony to determine the present value of a defined contribution plan at dissolution because its value equals [Marriage of Bergman (1985) 168 CA3d 742, 748-749 n4]:

  1. The amount of contributions made between the marriage and separation, plus accruals; plus

    2.   Accruals between the date of separation and trial of the issue.


Continue reading "How are DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS divided in California DIVORCE?" »

Permalink 
 
September 13, 2010
  How Are DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS divided in California Divorce?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  How are defined benefit plans divided under California law?

A.  In a defined benefit pension plan, the benefit does not depend on the dollars contributed by employee or employer, but is based on a combination of factors, including the following [Marriage of Bergman (1985) 168 CA3d 742, 748 n4]:
  • Highest income level achieved,
  • Years of service at retirement, and
  • Age at retirement.

To determine the present value of such a plan, it is necessary that expert testimony, normally from an actuary, be presented. This testimony includes the expert's opinion as to present value, and what economic, health, and other factors the expert considered in reaching the opinion. [Marriage of Bergman, supra.]

The valuation of a participant's interest in a defined benefit retirement plan is calculated by [Marriage of Stephenson (1984) 162 CA3d 1057, 1083]:

  1. Determining the value of the pension measured at the future retirement date, then
  2. Discounting that value back to the present date of valuation.

Family Code section 2610 is the most important statute on pension benefits and rights in dissolution, but federal law governs many pension rights and obligations.



Continue reading "How Are DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS divided in California Divorce?" »

Permalink 
 
September 13, 2010
  My Husband and I Want to Informally DIVIDE OUR PROPERTY. What are some IDEAS for How We Go About It?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.   My Husband and I are separating and plan to divorce.  Can you give us some ideas for informally dividing our property without court intervention between ourselves?

A.  The following are alternative methods for resolving community property division and valuation disputes. [See Marriage of Cream (1993) 13 CA4th 81, 94-95.]  They cannot be ordered by a Court, but are frequently suggested by family law judges and lawyers.  You need first to stipulate to the method used, since absent a Stipulation your division may not be later enforceable if either of you refuse to ratify and abide by it.  Oral agreements about how you will divide your property are not by themselves enforceable, even if they have been fully executed (i.e., complied with).

    * In-Kind Division: Each party takes one-half of assets such as bank accounts and stock in a corporation, and/or one-half of the debts.

    * Trade-off Division: You may stipulate to settle your property disputes, without regard to value, by agreeing one of yoiu will take certain items of property, e.g., the furniture, and the other will take other items, e.g., the car.

    * Piece-of-Cake Division: This method gets its name from the common situation where two children have a piece of cake to be cut in half. To avoid the argument over who gets the "bigger" half, it is agreed that one will cut the cake and the other gets to choose which piece he or she will receive. In the marital property context, one party makes up two lists of the property in question that he or she believes are equal, and the other party chooses which list of items she or he will take. (You may want to agree not to break up sets, e.g., a dining room set, a set of dishes, matching art works, etc.) The piece-of-cake method is particularly useful for dividing furniture and furnishing that usually have a real value to the parties far in excess of their fair market value. The method is also useful in short-term marriages for dividing wedding gifts.

    * One Values, the Other Chooses: One of you places a value on each item of community property in dispute and the other party chooses those items he or she will take at the stated value up to one-half the total value. Alternatively, the party choosing may choose any, all, or none of the items, with any items not chosen going at the stated value to the one who set the value. An equalization payment can be required. In dividing furniture and furnishings, an alternative to piece-by-piece choice is to list furniture and furnishings room-by-room, and each party chooses by room.

    * You Take It or I Will Take It: One party places a value on an asset at which that party is willing to let the other party be awarded the asset, or else the former will be awarded the asset at that value.

    * Appraisal and Alternate Selection: An appraiser is selected by stipulation to value each of the items in question. The parties then choose items alternately until all items are taken. The one to make the first choice can be designated by the flip of a coin. Another approach is to let one party go first and the other party then gets two selections, after which choices are made alternately. It is usually preferable to agree that sets not be broken up. It might be agreed that if a party takes a set it counts as that many choices, e.g., a dining room table and four matching chairs counts as five choices, and the other party then makes the next five choices.

    * Sale: The parties agree that the items in question be sold at a public sale or to a particular buyer with the proceeds divided equally, or in whatever other proportion is necessary to accomplish a satisfactory or equal division, considering the other marital assets or obligations each is receiving. For modest furniture or furnishings, the sale may be a garage sale.

    * Sealed Bid: Each of the parties submits a sealed bid on each item of property in dispute, using the same list. The bids are opened simultaneously and the one bidding the highest amount for an item gets that item valued at the figure he or she bid, with an equalizing payment to be made, if necessary. This method can also be used for disposition of the family home, other real property, or a family business that both parties have operated, where each seeks to have it awarded to him or her.

    * Interspousal Auction: This is a straight auction between the parties, usually with an agreed minimum incremental increase over the last bid being required. The high bidder gets the asset at the amount of his or her bid with an equalizing payment being made, if necessary. To the extent a major asset is involved such as a family business or real estate, the stipulation might provide that each of the parties have an advisor present during the bidding.

    * Arbitration: The valuation and division of the community property in question is determined by an arbitrator selected by the parties. The parties should understand that the arbitrator is not required to follow the law, and his or her decision, for all practical purposes, is final and not subject to appeal. Because arbitration usually takes much less time than a court trial, the parties might consider stipulating with your consent that you hear the case as an arbitrator.

    * Mediation: Mediation is greatly underutilized in family law cases. It can be a very effective and satisfying way for the parties to reach agreement on the value and division of their marital property.

    * Real Property: If both parties want community real property, one of the foregoing methods of resolution can be used. If neither wants it, it can be listed for sale with a broker stipulated to by the parties, at a listing price recommended by the broker. If one wants the property but the other feels that he or she is offering too little, the latter can list it for sale with a broker of his or her choosing. If the property does not sell within a specified period of time, the listing price will be periodically reduced until it reaches the figure where the net proceeds would be equal to what the other party offered. The property then goes to the offering party for the amount of the offer.

    * Combination: When more than one marital asset is in dispute, one of the foregoing methods might be used for one asset, while one or more other methods might be used for other assets.



 

Continue reading "My Husband and I Want to Informally DIVIDE OUR PROPERTY. What are some IDEAS for How We Go About It?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
July 16, 2010
  DISCOVERY in California Marital Proceedings - What Are Requests for Admission?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  How do I use Requests for Admission in my dissolution  proceeding?

A.  Requests for Admission ("RFA's") can be a useful discovery tool in family law proceedings because they allow parties in divorce and partnership litigation to resolve issues one way or another so that no evidence need be introduced at trial by asking the other party to admit or deny something.  This typically involves establishing that certain documents are genuine (i.e., a prenuptial agreement entered into before marriage or a transfer deed or promissory note or copies of documents where original are missing or destroyed).  Once this document is admitted as genuine, no further foundational evidence needs to be offered to admit the item into evidence.  Other uses include establishing that certain property belongs to the community estate, or that it is one party's separate property.  In such situations no further evidence need be offered on the subject issue at any later hearing in order for the Family Court to take what was admitted to be established fact.  Once something is established in this way, no contradicting evidence can be introduced to disprove it.

Requests for Admission are governed by California Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.010 and the statutes that follow with that code.  We have provided some of the more important ones on our Family Code Statutes page. 

You are entitled to ask a total of 35 RFA's as a matter of right.  But you can ask as many as you need, as long as they are requested for a proper purpose, relevant, not overly burdensome, and you also have executed and supplied the Declaration for Additional Discovery required by CCP § 2033.050.

There is a Judicial Council form that you can use for RFA's, but it is not required.  I will upload and link to that form shortly.  I also intend to provide my own form that you can modify for your use on our California Family Law Form Library page.

Another important use for Admission's Requests is that you can combine them with Civil Form Interrogatories, Number 17.1, which requires the responding party to state all facts and evidence that they know of, and other relevant information, for each RFA which they refuse to admit.  This can flesh out claims and defenses of the other party that you may be wondering about, and the evidence and witnesses which the other party claims will support them.  The answers to these form interrogatories may also establish that a denial of an otherwise undisputed fact, or genuine document, was not in good faith.

One of the chief benefits of RFA's beyond putting to rest matters that are really not issues (and hence saving the time and money to otherwise prove or disprove them), is that a failure to admit them in good faith gives the Court discretion to award the asking party their legal expenses and costs in producing evidence on those same issues if the Court later decides at trial that they were not reasonably in dispute.

As with some other types of discovery (interrogatories and production requests) the responding party has thirty days to answer (plus five more if you serve them by mail).  Make sure you always provide a proof of service signed by a nonparty with any type of discovery you serve.

If the other party fails to respond to your Requests for Admission, you are entitled to file a motion that the requests be deemed admitted.  Other sanctions might be available, like a court finding no evidence challenging the proposed undisputed items may be offered by the other side in later proceedings.

The subject of objections to discovery is a complicated one for another day.  Check our search engine to see if I 've written about it by the time you've landed here.

TWA


Continue reading "DISCOVERY in California Marital Proceedings - What Are Requests for Admission?" »

Permalink  | Comments(1)
 
June 12, 2010
  Does MOORE MARSDEN appy to IMPROVEMENTS we made to our RESIDENCE during marriage?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  I understand that Moore Marsden has something to do with reimbursing the community estate for the mortgage payments we made on the house my wife owned prior to our marriage, but we spent some the monies we saved during our marriage on improvements to the house.  Do I get any of this back?

A.  The Moore Marsden formula typically deals with what happens to the equity in property owned in the name of one spouse alone - in this case a house - where during marriage community property (i.e., either spouse's earnings) is used to make mortgage payments.  Where these mortgage payments are a combination of principal and interest, and not interest only, their net effect is to increase equity by reducing principal.  Over many years the amount of principal reduction can be substantial.  In effect the spouse who solely owns that residence is benefiting by the community's contribution.  This is potentially a kind of breach of fiduciary duty, giving rise to reimbursement rights.  Over time this right of reimbursement to the community grows, but it only applies to increases in equity.  There is no right to be reimbursed for interest, taxes and insurance payments.  I have given an example of how these Moore Marsden interests are calculated here.

Sometimes during marriage after a period of community payments on the separate property mortgage of one spouse, spouses or domestic partners transfer title to the property into joint names (often where there is a refinance and the lender requires it) so that now both spouses are on title to what was previously one spouse's separate property.  This is called a transmutation.  Under Family Code section 2581 the property is deemed "acquired" during marriage and so the house now presumptively becomes community property.  Use our search engine to find more information about transmutations.  Later, upon dissolution or legal separation these interests need to be separated out and accounted for.  In such cases several levels must be analyzed:

First, a transmutation (adding a spouse to title to what was previously separate property) must be free and voluntary, and there is a presumption that the spouse who comes onto title did so through some form of undue influence.  This may or may not at all be true, but it is the burden of the later titled spouse to establish the absence of undue influence.  If there was undue influence, then the title change can be set aside and the property remains separate.  If the title change is set aside, Moore Marsden applies because the property will be deemed to have always been the separate property of the first spouse but the community will still be entitled to a ratio of equity reimbursements. 

If there has been a valid transmutation, then the first spouse is still entitled to be reimbursed for the value of their separate property contribution to the community (absent an express written waiver of this right of reimbursement).  This is determined as of the date of the transmutation, and is governed by Family Code section 2640.  Moore Marsden may still apply to determining the amount of this 2640 reimbursement.  For example, say on the date of marriage Wife owned the property in her name and the mortgage owing is $100,000.  Assume at the date Husband is added to title the mortgage has been paid down to $80,000.   Also assume the value of the property remains the same at $200,000.  Here there has been an increase of $20,000 in equity and the community must be reimbursed. On the date Husband goes on title $100,000 of the equity is Wife's pure separate property - the house was worth $200,000 and the mortgage was then $100,000.  Wife is entitled to a 2640 reimbursement of $100,000.  However, both H and W have a community interest in that $20,000 of principal reduction.  Moore Marsden will be used to determine the value of each of their shares (often there has been a change of value between the two dates - assuming the house appreciated, then they also share in different proportions in the equity increase).  Wife's $100,000 2640 reimbursement will be increased by her share of the community increase.  If there has been appreciation, a ratio is determined that fixes the amount of community reimbursement due.

In contrast, if the mortgage had been interest only up to the date of the transfer (with no capital improvements), then as of the date of this transfer the community would have no Moore Marsden reimbursement and Wife's 2640 claim would be 100% of the home equity on that date.

Once both parties jointly own the property, Moore Marsden will not apply to the increases or contributions that occur thereafter (unless there is a future transmutation back to one party or the other alone) although it may later be used as illustrated above to determine 2640 credits on the date the other spouse goes on the deed.  This is because the formula is only used to value reimbursements to the community where community money improves or increases the value of one spouse's separate property - once parties are on title, the residence becomes community property subject to a separate property reimbursement instead of separate property subject to a community reimbursement.

A common situation occurs when one spouse holds property in their name alone but the spouses together, or the other spouse, contributes monies to remodels or improvements.  The value of those improvements may need to be reimbursed - either to the community (where the improvements were paid by both from earnings and accumulations during marriage) or to other spouse (where the untitled spouse pays for the improvements from their own separate property, i.e., premarital savings).

Whether or not there is an actual right of reimbursement to the community improvements depends first on whether those improvements actually increased the value of the home. If community funds are used to buy a solid gold toilet, that toilet may have little impact on the value of the home per se (the toilet is still worth whatever it is worth).  Some improvements don't increase value.  Another example might be an improvement that loses value over time, like new carpeting.  This is to be compared with adding more square footage by enlarging the house. Expert testimony may be required to prove the improvements increased value and to what extent.

But the reimbursement for capital improvements is not dollar for dollar.  Instead a modified Moore Marsden analysis must be performed which determines the community property interest in the equity appreciation during marriage, taking into consideration the extent to which the improvements increased value.

Incidentally, when there is a 2640 reimbursement to the first spouse, this comes off the top from any equity in the house - which means there is there no equity remaining after this reimbursement, there is not community equity left to reimburse.

Complicated?  You bet.  There are so many possible scenarios and it is hard to speak to these concepts except in generalities.  Often a forensic accountant with Moore Marsden experience will need to be engaged.  Since the fair market value of property may need to be determined at various points of time (for instance, the date of marriage, the date the new spouse comes on title, and the date of division), expert opinions of value of the real estate may also be required.  It may be problematic to value property as of some long ago date.

My hope is here is to introduce you to the concepts so that you may be somewhat conversant with them.  Find an experienced family lawyer to assist you!  They will know local experts who can help with the analysis.



Thurman Arnold
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
Continue reading "Does MOORE MARSDEN appy to IMPROVEMENTS we made to our RESIDENCE during marriage?" »

Permalink 
 
May 24, 2010
  What METHODS are used for VALUING BUSINESSES in divorce?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I own a business that I began shortly after marriage.  Now I am getting divorced.  Is this community property even though my partner never worked the business, and if it is what methods might be used to value it?


A.  With certain exceptions where, for instance, there has been a transmutation of a community property interest in a business to your separate property per Family Code section 852 (which requires a writing signed by the party adversely affect showing an intent change the character of property from community to separate), all property acquired during marriage through the time, skill and efforts of either spouse is community property.  Family Code section 760. 

A business begun by one spouse after the date of marriage and before physical separation will need to be divided in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding, and if you and your spouse cannot agree on its value it may need to be evaluated by an expert.  This is usually accomplished under the provisions of Evidence Code section 730.

There are a number of methods that can be used to value a business, and depending upon whether the business sells services or products different valuation methods may be more appropriate than others.  As a general overview, these include:
  • Evaluating sales proceeds
         When a business is actually being sold in an arm's length transaction to a third party, the price that a willing buyer will pay and a willing seller accept determines value.  This is rare in the case of business valuations, but more common with respect to real property.
  • Comparables

         The specific asset is valued based upon the actual sales of similar assets or properties with actual sales that can be tracked.  With professional practices, this is common with dental businesses which are commonly bought and sold, and so numbers from the sales of other dental practices may be persuasive to a court.  Whether this method is useful depends very much on the nature of the business - sometimes there is nothing comparable or little published information about comparable sales.   Comparables are also considering in setting the value of real estate. 

  • Liquidation value

Sometimes businesses will be cut up into parts that are sold separately.  Sometimes the business is valued in terms of what these parts would sell for.  It is rarely used except when the parties intend to actually liquidate the company.  Liquidation value does not generally include valuing goodwill (because the assumption is there will be no on-going concern).  Goodwill is the nightmare component to valuing businesses.  Many people in divorce who manage the business believe strongly this is how businesses should be valued (in part because in the absence of an actual sale, it is a fiction to say what a buyer might pay when no such buyers as a practical matter exist).

  • Book Value

This relies upon the company records to determine what 'retained value' is.  It is rarely used, because it is more a statement of how the company perceives itself, or structured (or even 'cooked') its books, than any objective indication of value.

  • Adjusted book value

This is performed through a forensic audit.  Usually it is performed on a cash basis, and accounts receivable and much more must be analyzed.

  • Going concern value

This describes a method that includes valuing the business as greater than the sum of its parts.  There are a number of factors that are used.

  • Capitalized earnings

This is the most common method for valuing businesses used in California because courts find it to be most reliable.  If you hope to use a different method, you will need to justify why that method is fairer to the out-spouse. This method requires expensive forensics. 



It is not uncommon to bifurcate the question of business valuations to try them separately because often this is the thorniest issue to be decided in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding.  



The law of business valuations is extremely complex and even contradictory.  The purpose of this blog is merely to introduce the concepts.  I will develop these themes in more detail in additional family law blogs. 




Thurman W. Arnold III 

http://www.ThurmanArnold.com

Continue reading "What METHODS are used for VALUING BUSINESSES in divorce?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
May 19, 2010
  When are ASSETS VALUED for purposes of DIVISION in a California DISSOLUTION?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  My wife and I separated two years ago and we have decided to file for divorce.  We don't agree on what date we should be setting the value of some of our property, like the residence where she has been living with the kids all this time.  She wants it valued today, since prices are down, but when I left we agreed that she would take it at its value then.  That value was substantially higher than today, and I don't think it is fair that I have suffer the decrease in real estate prices.  What might a Court do?


A.  First, it is always my hope that you and your spouse can agree on as many issues as possible, without court intervention.  One never knows for sure what a Court will do, and my experience is that people are far better off working through their disagreements by way of Mediation.  One reason why is to ensure you are in charge of your life, not a stranger.  It is possible to mediate parts of your divorce.

Still, valuing real property is not a difficult legal issue.  Family Code section 2552(a) directs the court to "value assets and liabilities as near as practicable to the time of trial."  Time of trial is also the equivalent of the time of settlement - in order words, if you cannot settle your divorce and you take it to a judge, that will be the time of trial so the same rule for the date of valuation should apply to your settlement negotiations.

Family Code section 2552(b), however, gives the court discretion to pick another date before trial for the valuation of property "for good cause" in order to "accomplish an equal division of the community estate ... in an equitable manner."  This concept is called an "alternate valuation date."  It is often applied in cases of business valuations, which is a complex topic I will separately address, but the basic reasons for the potential different treatment includes the fact that business values can be intentionally depressed by the spouse who controls the assets (and so it may not be fair to apply a lower value) or because the "in-spouse" has contributed substantial value to the company since separation and it is not necessarily fair that the other spouse share those benefits.

Here you might argue that you and your spouse reached a verbal agreement to divide all your assets two years ago if that is in fact what you did, in order to hold to those values.  But verbal agreements are difficult to prove if they are not admitted by the other party, absent witnesses and she will continue have various defenses where she was not independently advised before reaching agreement. 

Most courts are going to value passive assets like houses or investments or pensions at the time of trial.  That does not mean that post-separation increases in value, like increased equity by paying down principal on a mortgage, or contributions to a pension after the date of separation, will not be reimbursed to one or the other of you to compensate the separate property (post-separation) contributions. 

If you do seek an alternate valuation date, you need to file a Notice of Motion to Bifurcate the issue (FL-315), along with the accompanying declaration establishing why this is more fair and appropriate than the basic rule.  These forms appear in our Family Law Form Library.

A bifurcation is essentially a request of the court to carve off one or more issues in the divorce for separate trial or adjudication.  It is often used where a call needs to be made on one issue that, once decided, will assist in resolving other aspects of the case.



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.thurmanarnold.com
Continue reading "When are ASSETS VALUED for purposes of DIVISION in a California DISSOLUTION?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
May 17, 2010
  My husband was HOSPITALIZED after we SEPARATED; am I liable for the bill?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  After my husband and I separated, he was hospitalized and incurred $28,000 in medical bills.  The creditor is threatening to sue me.  Am I liable?  Is there anything I should do?


A.  In a recent appellate decision out of San Diego County (CMRE Financial Services, Inc. v. Parton), the wife called police after an incident of domestic violence and shortly thereafter filed for DV restraining orders.  A week later the parties separated, and the husband was admitted to Tri-City Medical Center for treatment for a severe emotional illness.  He incurred substantial medical bills.

The wife filed a dissolution action three months after that.  In her Schedule of Assets and Debts she listed the debt as owed by her husband.  A judgment for dissolution came to be entered several months later, and it did not assign the hospital obligation to the wife.  It appears to have been a default judgment against the husband.

CMRE, the assignee of Tri-City Hospital, sued both the husband and wife to collect the money for husband's treatment; by then husband had disappeared and was never served with the lawsuit.  Wife responded by denying liability, and with a cross-complaint that alleged that by sending her collection notices CMRE had violated the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Title 15, United States Code section 1692 et seq.), and that she should obtain damages against them. 

CMRE filed a motion to toss out the cross-complaint, relying on the language of Family Code section 914(a)(2), which states that spouses are liable for debts incurred by the other when separated if these are for "necessaries of life." 

The trial court agreed with CMRE, and the matter proceeded to a judgment against the wife for the full amount plus interest.  Wife appealed.

The appellate court ruled in favor of wife, and reversed the trial court.  Wife would have been liable for these medical costs IF a dissolution including property division had not been granted, or if the dissolution judgment had assigned the debt to her, or if she had agreed to support her estranged husband while they were separated.  For instance, if the parties had reconciled and if CMRE had sued the wife and obtained a money judgment against her, she would have been on the hook.  But once a dissolution judgment was entered that did not assign the debt to the wife she was protected.  Family Code section 916.

The appellate court also noted that an independent basis for holding wife free of the debt included Family Code section 4302 which states that a person is not liable for the support of their spouse when the person is living separate from the spouse by agreement, unless the agreement calls for support.  The court reasoned that while the starting point is that spouses are liable for the other's necessaries while living separately that rule will not apply where they are separated by agreement (apparently the agreement can be verbal or implied from conduct), unless the agreement includes a promise to support the other.

This appellate decision seems confusing because the language of the statutes themselves conflict.  The court continued by noting that the legislature has declared that one spouse's liability for the other spouse's post-separation necessaries is entirely derivative of the fact of marriage and not the same as a debt personally incurred by the supporting spouse.  This means that "the liability imposed by section 914 can be avoided by the simple expedient of entering into a separation agreement which does not provide for support."

The only exception might be where a creditor alleges a marital settlement agreement violates the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.  CMRE did not allege any fraud between these spouses.

This is landmark case because up to this point most lawyers and judges believed that spouses were liable for the necessaries of life of the other, even after separating, and that this was a special exception to the general rule that once spouses separate liability for debt ends.

Now we know that you have at least two ways to avoid this debt:  (1) Obtain a Judgment for Dissolution before the creditor obtains a civil judgment against you, but be sure that the debt is assigned to the other spouse; and (2) be sure that you don't have an agreement to support the other spouse in place, at least at the time the debt is incurred.  The judgment can be based upon a marital termination agreement.

If you pretend to separate, or separate just to avoid the debt, and if the creditor claims you did this fraudulently to avoid liability, the outcome might be different.

One additional point of information:  Under the circumstances of this case, CMRE was found to have in fact violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act just by sending threatening letters, and of course by filing suit.  Knowledge of this case can be used to back off creditors who are harassing you.



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.thurmanarnold.com






Continue reading "My husband was HOSPITALIZED after we SEPARATED; am I liable for the bill?" »

Permalink 
 
April 07, 2010
  When I get MARRIED, how do I avoid my husband's DEBT?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.     If I marry is it possible to avoid any of my fiance's debt liability?


 

A.  Yes.  First, your separate property doesn't become liable for a spouse's premarital debt simply by marrying.  But community property as it comes into being does. 

Secondly, to the extent you or your spouse will incur debt during marriage, prior to marriage both can agree to eliminate or restrict the creation of community property as between you. This is accomplished through a prenuptial or premarital agreement.  Essentially you agree to restrict or eliminate the creation of community property in the first instance, since that will remain liable for debts incurred prior to (with some exceptions) and during the marriage, and so you can ensure that your separate property remains protected. 

None of this applies to debts you jointly incur - the joint credit card, the jointly purchased car, or the jointly refinanced home.  This is why creditors try to insist that both spouses sign loans. 

But you can modify your behavior in order to protect yourself by not signing. It is possible to enter a post-nuptial agreement which achieves substantially the same thing, although it won't necessarily change the character of debt incurred prior to its signing but it may nonetheless eliminate future community debt by eliminating community property.  Remember, as between the two of you, you cannot affect third party's rights who are not parties to your post marital agreement, and to do so may be considered a fraud upon creditors which means the agreement may be set aside and voided.



Thurman W. Arnold III
Desert Cities Divorce
Continue reading "When I get MARRIED, how do I avoid my husband's DEBT?" »

Permalink 
 
April 07, 2010
  Am I LIABLE for my husband's NURSING HOME DEBT?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

liability for spouses caregiving expenses
Q.  Am I liable for my husband's nursing  home bills?


A.  Yes, under most circumstances.

Community and both spouse's separate property is liable for the other spouse's "necessaries of life" while the spouses are living together, and even when they are living separately - unless they are living separately by agreement within the meaning of Family Code section 4302.  If this occurs at a time when there is no community property but the other spouse does have separate property, there is a right of reimbursement for a period of time (i.e., if the other spouse dies there is a time limit on seeking reimbursement). 

Note that spouses each owe a duty to support the other out of their own separate property if there is no community property.  Family Code section 4301.

"Necessaries of life" include food, shelter, clothing, and the expenses of a final illness.



Thurman W.  Arnold III
Continue reading "Am I LIABLE for my husband's NURSING HOME DEBT?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
April 07, 2010
  Am I LIABLE for my husband's GAMBLING DEBTS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

divorce and gaming debts

Q.     My husband won't stop gambling. Am I liable for his gambling debts?


A.  The community property that the two of you own is liable as to satisfy his gambling obligations, assuming there is any left.   Whether you are liable to the Indian Casino or Las Vegas hotel beyond your share of the community depends upon whether you have an independent contractual relationship with them - i.e., a line of credit in your name. 

As between you and your husband, unless you consented to his gambling he may owe you (if your separate property is somehow attached to satisfy the debt) or to the community estate a reimbursement or indemnification right.   

If he is a professional gambler and this is his "work" the outcome would be different.  The outcome may also depend on whether the community benefited from the gambling, i.e., if winnings were used to support the community, then a court may deem it fair to share the obligation as to "losings".  

This right of reimbursement would similarly exist if he squandered money on drugs, or prostitutes, and so on - assuming you can prove it and trace the money!  The question is whether you consented and ripens when you can establish that his conduct violated fiduciary duties owing you.  One never knows, however, how a judge will treat this on a case by case basis but the law if moving towards greater accountability.

If his gambling does amount to a breach of fiduciary duties owing you as a result of your marriage or domestic partnership, you have substantial remedies.  Try our search at the top right of the page to learn about those topics.


Thurman W. Arnold III

Continue reading "Am I LIABLE for my husband's GAMBLING DEBTS?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
January 18, 2010
  Are my EARNINGS during marriage LIABLE for my spouse's PREMARRIAGE DEBTS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.     Are my earnings liable for my spouse's debts incurred before marriage?

A. Your earnings during marriage are not liable for your spouse's debt incurred before marriage so long as these earnings when received are held in a deposit account which is not also in your spouse's name, and as to which they have no right to withdraw funds.

Once these monies go into the common pot, however, they become available to satisfy debts incurred prior to marriage.  Family Code section 911.

You earnings are liable for debts the other spouse incurs after the date of marriage, because the earnings are community property and debts incurred during marriage are community debts. 

The only way to avoid this is by way a prenup or post-nup established before the debt is incurred (which agreement may limit or preclude the creation of community property).
Continue reading "Are my EARNINGS during marriage LIABLE for my spouse's PREMARRIAGE DEBTS?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
January 18, 2010
  Must I pay any of my husband's STUDENT LOAN if we DIVORCE?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.      If my Husband and I divorce, am I stuck with any of his student loan?

A.      Most likely not. 

Upon separation and dissolution of marriage, a spouse's separate loan is assigned pursuant to Family Code section 2627 and 2641.  Subject to certain exceptions, the general rule is "[a] loan incurred during marriage for the education or training or a party shall not be included among the liabilities of the community for the purposes of division but shall be assigned for payment by the party." 

The exception is the Court's power to divide the education debt differently if it would "unjust" not to, as where the community has "substantially benefited" from the education or the loan.  A presumption exists that no such benefit is derived if the is less than 10 years old at the time the divorce is filed but that the community has substantially benefited if the loan is more than 10 years!  

If the student loan money was really used to pay for groceries and rent, for instance, the court may equitably divide the it.
Continue reading "Must I pay any of my husband's STUDENT LOAN if we DIVORCE?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
January 18, 2010
  Am I LIABLE for my spouse's PREMARITAL DEBT?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.     Am I liable for myspouse's pre-marital debt?


A. Yes, and no. Whether you are liable for debts of your spouse depends on what kind of property exists and is available to satisfy a debt. Community property is liable and therefore available to pay a debt either spouse incurs before marriage and during marriage, regardless which spouse controls that property.  Family Code section 910. Community property is all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in California. Family Code section 760.

Your separate property is generally not liable for a debt incurred by the other spouse before or during the marriage (your separate property is always liable for your own debts, regardless when incurred).  Family Code section 913(b)(1).  Separate property is all property you own before marriage and all property you acquire during marriage by gift or inheritance.  Family Code section 770.  Separate property also includes the rents, profits, and issues from your separate property (i.e., passive separate property increases) and "earnings and accumulations" while you are living apart.  An exception to this rule limiting your separate property liability concerns "necessaries of life".  Your separate property is liable for these necessaries (food, clothing, shelter, medical) for your spouse even if you are living apart, unless you are living apart under a written agreement that includes a provision for support.  

It sometimes happens that a creditor manages to levy against the nondebtor spouse's separate property; if that occurs, the innocent spouse has a reimbursement claim against the community property estate, or, if there is no such estate then against the other spouse's separate property.  This reimbursement right must be asserted, as mentioned below, or it evaporates.  Also, if you consent to the payment from your separate property you may have made a gift of it for the benefit of the other spouse.  Consent would include writing or signing the check to pay the debt from your separate property account.  We are not talking here about using separate assets to acquire community property (as in making a mortgage payment); a difficult set of rules apply where property is being "acquired during marriage" which include reimbursement rights.

In order to be mostly protected you need to keep your separate property separate.  If you commingle it with the other party's separate property, or with the community, a creditor cannot be expected to know what is yours verses what is both of yours.  This separation of finances is always a good idea, and not just for debt purposes.  As between you and your spouse if you commingle monies then you may have a right of reimbursement if you can trace the flow of funds.
The rules and consequences differ depending on whether we are talking about you versus a creditor, or you versus the spouse.

Q.     Is there a time limit on exercising my reimbursement rights?

A. You have to seek reimbursement on the earlier date of (a) within 3 years of when you actually know your property was applied to satisfy the other spouse's debt or (b) during a pending dissolution or legal separation proceeding.  Family Code section 920(c).  Otherwise, reimbursement under these code sections is waived.  Depending upon the facts, you may still have a breach of fiduciary duty claim against your spouse that survives up to the point of the dissolution.

Divorce Attorney Thurman W. Arnold III

Continue reading "Am I LIABLE for my spouse's PREMARITAL DEBT?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
January 17, 2010
  Why is the date of PHYSICAL SEPARATION legally important?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.    Why is the idea of 'physical separation' important in California?

A.    The idea of "physical separation" is one of the most important concepts to California law.  If you think that the presumption that all property acquired during marriage is significant, the notion of physical separation is every bit if not more important.  This appears to be one of the best kept secrets of California family law.

Physical separation is the date that the marriage ends, for most practical purposes.  The date of physical separation is the date that community property ceases to accumulate.  Family Code section 771 states "The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."

Once spouses separate, all their earnings and everything that is acquired with those earnings are separate property of each spouse, respectively.

Similarly, upon separation each spouse is no longer liable for the debts of the other spouse.  The community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse "during marriage".  During marriage "does not include the period during which the spouses are living separate and apart before a judgment of dissolution ... or legal separation...."  FC section 910.  An exception exists as to "necessaries" except to the extent that the parties are living separate by agreement and whether or not support is stipulated by that agreement.  FC section 4302.

Separation is of critical importance to the expanding interpretation and growing field of the law of fiduciary duties. The duty of confidentiality that arises because of the marital relationship by legislative fiat ( Family Code section 721) and which gives rise to major exposure for the conduct of spouses with regard to property and money, ceases at separation - meaning spouses no longer have the expectation and right of relying upon one another as trusted partners.  Fiduciary duties continue pursuant to FC sections 1100 et seq. and sections 2100 et seq. as to assets that already exist, or can be considered marital opportunities arising after separation, until the time each asset in question is divided by agreement or court adjudication.  Fiduciary duties are land mines.  A good example of the consequences for breach of fiduciary duty is the Rossi case, where a wife who won the lottery and then filed for divorce the next day claiming she and her husband had already separated.  She fails to list the lottery winnings in her paperwork, and refused to disclose it to the husband later claiming, among other things, that she had been a victim of domestic violence.  Because the husband had no idea about the lottery winnings, he did not dispute the divorce or wife's asserted date of separation until much later when one day he received a letter intended for the wife by a company offering to buy out the winnings.  He called the State Lottery Board, and then filed a motion to set aside the divorce degree and for damages for wife's fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.  The court ordered the wife to disgorge all her winnings (100%) and pay them over to the husband.

The separation date is crucial to understanding reimbursement claims relating to payment on joint and separate debts, or in fixing rights to real property.  For instance, California law provides that the community has an interest in the appreciation of a residence which is owned, meaning title is held, in one spouse's name alone where principal on a mortgage is being paid down.  This is called the Moore-Marsden approach to equitable reimbursement.  If the house appreciates after separation, the titled spouse may want to argue that all that appreciation belongs to them.  Date of separation becomes important to the date of valuing the real estate and determining the relative principal loan amounts.

It is crucial where businesses are involved, regardless whether they are corporations, mom and pop shops, or sole proprietorships.  For instance, what happens when a spouse who controls or who is the business, which was established before or during the marriage, continues to derive income from it after the parties separate?  Maybe the business goes up in value.  Perhaps it goes down in value through market factors, or maybe even the spouse intentionally drives it into the ground in order to reduce the amount that will be ordered to buy out the other spouse's interest.  In all these situations a date of separation determination is crucial.

Another common area where it comes up in with regard to pensions, whether they be defined benefit plans or contributive benefit plans.  Whatever accrues to the spouse who holds the pension by way of his post-separation contributions belongs to them.

Date of separation is also critical to determining the length of the marriage for purposes of spousal support or alimony rights.  It is a snapshot in time with huge ramifications, including how long a spousal support obligation may continue and when it might be terminated.

It is critical that you hire an attorney who understands how to litigate and present the facts of physical separation.


Thurman W. Arnold III,
California Divorce Lawyer
Continue reading "Why is the date of PHYSICAL SEPARATION legally important?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
January 17, 2010
  What Is a LEGAL SEPARATION in California?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.   What is meant by separation in California?


A.    There are two contexts in which the word separation is used in divorce and family law in California:  (1) Legal Separation and (2) physical separation.  Both are important, but in practice the concept of physical separation has a far huger impact on people's lives.

A Decree of Legal Separation in California is identical for all purposes to a Decree of Dissolution of marriage, with one critical distinction:  A judgment for legal separation leaves the marriage (and the marital "bonds") intact.   The parties remain married, and so neither can remarry.  But for all other purposes, the marriage is effectively dissolved. 

There are religious and personal reasons why two people might want to do this, and there are some practical reasons involving most notably health insurance but sometimes job related benefits why two married persons might choose this over divorce. 

A decree of legal separation cuts off the creation of community property thereafter, which includes liability for community debts as well.  It is possible to divide all property between the parties, to fix all rights and entitlements to spousal support, and to deal with custody, visitation, and child support issues, and yet remain legally married.  It requires the consent of both parties, because if either party objects to a legal separation or seeks a dissolution instead, a Judgment of Legal Separation cannot be granted.  Even if the parties are in agreement concerning a legal separation, neither is precluded from later seeking to terminate marital status through a subsequent dissolution action.  If the parties have reached a legal separation agreement, or if the Court enters a Judgment of Legal Separation, a subsequent action does not undo any of that.

This is a fairly unusual outcome.  In my substantial experience, very few parties have been in agreement on this way of resolving their joint affairs and it doesn't usually make sense unless there are unique health, insurance, or religious or familial reasons for not dissolving the marriage.




TWA
Continue reading "What Is a LEGAL SEPARATION in California?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
January 17, 2010
  What are interspousal FIDUCIARY DUTIES?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.    I keep hearing the phrase "interspousal fiduciary duties".  What does it mean?

A.    Few areas of California divorce and family law is changing as rapidly, or is having as great an impact upon property division and support obligations, as is interspousal fiduciary duties

Until the mid-1970s  lesser "good faith" standards were imposed upon married persons which had consequences to usually only in extreme situations of self-dealing by one spouse or domestic partner.  These standards have since morphed into much higher level "confidential duty" and "fiduciary duty" standards. 

On January 1, 1994 Family Code section 721 became operative.  That was revolutionary, but widely not understand, for the next 10 years.  Section 721 has since been revised, extended, and expanded by statutory amendments and judicial decisions, and this continues. 

The penalties for violating a fiduciary duty can be severe.  Many attorneys, and some judges, are behind the curve in understanding the nuances of the obligations imposed by FC section 721 and related statutes.  This ignorance places clients at financial risk in the course of dissolution or legal separation litigation. Indeed, it opens the door to the litigation continuing or re-emerging long after Judgment if breaches of fiduciary duty are discovered or alleged downstream.  Having a lawyer who understands this developing area of the law will make or break some litigants, today and for years to come.  

Fiduciary duty rules help to balance economic power in marriage and divorce. One reason people roll our eyes when the topic of "divorce" comes up is who doesn't know someone who out cheated, or got cheated by the other spouse, in matters of support or property division?  There are lawyers who pander to clients who want to cheat their spouse or domestic partner. Americans share a cultural mythology that these attorneys charge the highest fees and if they can out-cheat the other spouse and their attorney, they deserve them.

The accountability that the law of fiduciary duties add to the dissolution mix is a useful tool for combating marriage fraud by the other spouse.  If society favors the party with more money or power over the weaker party, it will become increasingly unglued.   

Fiduciary Duties Described

In financial and property transactions with third parties and each other, spouses owe one another important statutory duties that create huge responsibilities and pitfalls.  As between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other.  "This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other."  Family Code section 721(b)

The essence of the "fiduciary relationship" is that the parties are treated under the law as though they do not deal with each other on equal terms because one person (typically the managing spouse) in whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts the trust and confidence is in a superior position to exert influence over the dependent party.  A presumption of undue influence arises whenever either party benefits from the transaction over the other, however innocuous the circumstances may seem.  Breach of fiduciary duty is to some extent a strict liability offense, meaning if it occurs consequences may be set in motion that run the course to an expensive end.

In 2002 Family Code section 721 was amended to expand this confidential fiduciary relationship and impose the same rights and duties as applies to nonmarital business partners under the California Corporations Code, and includes but is not limited to:
        
            (1)    Providing each spouse access at all times to any books kept regarding a transaction for the purposes of inspection and copying;        

            (2)    Rendering upon request true and full information of all things affecting any transaction which concerns the community property.     

            (3)    Accounting to the spouse, and holding as trustee, any benefit or profit derived from any transaction by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse which concerns the community property (i.e., all property acquired by a married person during the marriage).

While Section 721 does not mention Registered Domestic Partners, it applies to them as well.

One major consequence is that transactions which benefit only one spouse may be set aside by the other, either before or during a divorce proceedings.

As a practical matter for divorcing couples, this means:     

            a)    If one party has benefited over the other in a transaction involving money or property and thereby gained an advantage during the course of the marriage, the law presumes the advantage was gained through undue influence exerted on the part of the benefited party, and the transaction is presumed invalid and can be set-aside;     

            b)    The burden of convincing a Court that a set-aside should not occur then shifts to the advantaged spouse;     

            c)    All this can occur without regard to good or bad intent on the part of the advantaged spouse (i.e., actually intending to defraud as opposed to merely being sloppy).  Either way the law declares the transaction to be the result of "constructive fraud".   Once the Court finds constructive fraud the transactions can be set aside, the benefited party can be ordered to pay restitution to the other and to disgorge any profits they alone received, title may be reformed to include both parties' names, or the property may be held in trust for both on a present and go-forward basis rather than in the name of the one alone.  If there is an actual fraudulent intent, the remedies to the injured spouse are more severe.

The fact that parties have separated or that a dissolution or legal separation is pending does not end the parties' fiduciary responsibilities.  Family Code section 1100(e) continues those same duties "until such time as the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court." 

Remedies for breach of the fiduciary duty as described in Family Code section 721, and section 1100, include an amount equal to one-half of the value of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of fiduciary duty, plus attorneys fees.  This includes inadvertent or unintentional violations.  Family Code section 1101(g).  Where a court comes to believe a spouse acted intentionally to defraud the other spouse, the Court "shall" award 100% of the value of what should have been disclosed, or what should not have been transferred, to the innocent spouseFC section 1101(h).

If you have a business, or investments in real estate or simply a family residence, and certain transactions have occurred, you may have a problem.  If you are a dependent spouse, regardless whether the other party intended to cheat you, you may have important entitlements and remedies.

This is one of the most complicated, emerging areas of California family law.  Do not go it alone!  In every dissolution and legal separation case, regardless whether either party has an attorney, each party must exchange a Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure, and unless expressly waived, a Final Declaration of Disclosure.  If these documents contain errors, misinformation, or are incomplete the consequences can be financially devastating because an entire settlement or judgment may later be set aside.  These documents sit as leverage tools and landmines for years to come.




TWA
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
Continue reading "What are interspousal FIDUCIARY DUTIES?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
January 07, 2010
  My wife she used her INHERITANCE to buy our home. We are getting divorced.
Posted By Thurman Arnold, III

Q.  My wife and I separated in June 2009. When we purchased our home in March of 1998 (married December 1994), she used part of an inheritance from her grandmother to help with the down payment. I have been paying the mortgage since we bought it. Will she get her inheritance back in our divorce? What would I get?


A.     Because I need more information and the answer to some questions and then to follow up questions, I can only give you a generalized response. 

So long as your wife can trace the portion of her downpayment contribution to the inheritance, she is entitled to a Family Code section 2640 reimbursement in the amount that she proves by this tracing. She is not entitled to interest on grandma's gift to her, however, but only the principal. However, this assumes that the downpayment contribution always remained separate from any other money or bank assets that you had an interest in, or that the community had an interest in: If the inheritance monies were commingled with joint monies or your separate funds between the date she received them and the date they were used as part of the purchase price for the home, then a further tracing is required to establish that what money in the account at that time was her separate and what amount was something else. Here is Blog that discusses tracing principles in more detail.

You don't report whether you were on title to the residence when escrow closed or at any later time. Whether or not you were on title when the property was purchased, it is presumed to be community property UNLESS you (a) deeded off when escrow closed or deeded off since that time or (b) consented to or are deemed to have consented to your Wife being the sole record title holder if at the close of escrow title issued in her name.

If you were on title at close of escrow and to the present day, the answer is easy - your Wife gets her traced inheritance money first, off the top, from any equity in the home. She does not get interest on the money. The remaining net equity, without other facts, belongs to the community so that each of you is entitled to one-half of what remains.

If you were not on title when escrow closed, and if you cannot rebut by clear and convincing evidence the legal presumption set forth in Evidence Code section 662 (based upon form of taking title in her name alone) that you consented to that outcome, then (a) your Wife still gets her downpayment back and (b) the community estate is entitled to be reimbursed for carrying the mortgage all those years and reducing the principal balance due the mortgage holder. It doesn't matter who paid the mortgage, so long as it was paid from community earnings during the marriage.

There is a very important reimbursement concept under California Law known as Moore-Marsden apportionment. It applies to a common situation where a home is acquired before marriage (or during marriage as separate property), title is in the name of the acquiring spouse alone, and during the marriage and up to separation or divorce and there is or was a mortgage that was paid during the marriage.

Where this occurs the community estate acquires a legal, reimbursable, interest in what would be otherwise be entirely the separate property of the titled spouse IF community funds (earnings of either spouse, for instance, or both) are used to make the mortgage payments. The idea is that joint funds are being used to benefit a separate property interest, i.e., the separate property equity. Many legal scholars consider this to be a breach of fiduciary duty - that whenever one or the other spouse's separate property interests are increased with community funds, or community time, skill, and efforts of either spouse during the marriage, the community is disadvantaged and that this disadvantage violates the statutory duties of the parties that place the party's joint interests above their separate interests.

The formula for apportionment is that the community acquires a pro tanto (dollar for dollar) interest in the ratio that principal payments on the purchase price made with community property bear to payments made with separate property. Hence, any increase in value (appreciation) must be apportioned accordingly between the separate property and the community property estates upon separation or dissolution.

Note that this only applies to separate property owned prior to marriage with a mortgage that was paid during marriage where an equity position has been increased. For instance, if a mortgage exists but it is an interest only, payments during marriage do not reduce principal. Therefore, the separate interest of the owner spouse is not improved because the debt remains exactly the same. As a general rule, the amounts paid for interest, taxes, and insurance on the house are disregarded since that portion does not to contribute to the capital investment.

Also, it assumes that the mortgage was paid with joint (community) funds, or that the funds used were so commingled that the "separatizer" is unable to trace them to a separate property source (meaning they don't have records showing where each payment was made or are unable to provide a recapitalization of the source of the funds). If your husband reduced the mortgage throughout the marriage but he did it with an account that was his separate property then the community would not have this reimbursement right.

The Moore Marsden formula requires a number of bits of information at important points in time to be properly calculated. These include: a) what was the original purchase price; b) what was the original mortgage and downpayment; c) what was the property worth at the date of marriage (DOM); d) what was owed to the lender at that time; e) what was the property worth at the date of separation; f) what was owed at that time; g) what is the property worth on the date of the calculation (i.e., the trial date); h) and what is the principal pay-off at that time?

This is agood example of why family law and divorce cases can become quite expensive. Obtaining these records, particularly if you are the 'out spouse' can be difficult, and sometimes a forensic accountant is the best option for calculating these apportionments. Find a local CPA with family law experience to help you trace the funds. You need an experienced family law attorney for these types of matters as well.

In your case, with a lengthy marriage and little owing, you have significant Moore Marsden entitlements.



T.W. Arnold
Continue reading "My wife she used her INHERITANCE to buy our home. We are getting divorced." »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
January 06, 2010
  My Husband Is Receiving A PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT. Am I Entitled To Any of It?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  My Husband is receiving a large settlement for an auto accident he was in.  If we divorce, am I entitled to 1/2 of the settlement?

A.  Probably not, but maybe. 

Personal injury awards in California are community property if the injury occurs before separation no matter when the settlement comes in.  Family Code section 780.  However, Family Code section 2603 states: 

(a) "Community estate personal injury damages" as used in this section means all money or other property received or to be received by a person in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for the person's personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for the settlement or compromise of a claim for the damages, if the cause of action for the damages arose during the marriage but is not separate property as described in Section 781, unless the money or other property has been commingled with other assets of the community estate.

(b) Community estate personal injury damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries unless the court, after taking into account the economic condition and needs of each party, the time that has elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual of the cause of action, and all other facts of the case, determines that the interests of justice require another disposition. In such a case, the community estate personal injury damages shall be assigned to the respective parties in such proportions as the court determines to be just, except that at least one-half of the damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries.

Hence, the court has discretion to divide community personal injury damages by assigning it all to the injured party.  As a practical matter, this is usually what does happen.  Still, Family Code section 781 provides certain reimbursement rights to the community for payments made from the community. 

Lesson:  Don't avoid settling your case just because you think you should get 1/2 of what your spouse recovered.  You might get something, but the expense outweighs the risks.  Judges are inclined to award PI damages to the injured spouse.
  
By the way, if the other spouse (here, you) caused the injuries, a different outcome might result.  Also, different rules can apply to worker's compensation recoveries.

Continue reading "My Husband Is Receiving A PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT. Am I Entitled To Any of It?" »

Permalink 
 
December 29, 2009
  How Are SOCIAL SECURITY benefits Treated In DIVORCE?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  How are Social Securities Benefits Divided in Divorce?

A.  The Social Security Act of 1935, which as been amended numerous times over the years, is governed solely by the federal law.  States are powerless to effect changes in its rules and procedures.  Social Security benefits are not actually divided in divorce, and California courts do not divide social security rights.  They are not the subject of divorce settlements.  Social security benefits are considered the separate the property of the contributing spouse.  This is odd, since all other retirement plans are considered as part of the marital estate.  Government employees do not contribute to Social Security.  It is wasteful because, as discussed below, multiple former spouses can collect benefits on the same worker's history.  It is unfair because gays and lesbians who are domestic partners under state law gain no rights in the other's work history.

A spouse of a retired or disabled worker is entitled to derivative social security benefits IF the marriage was at least 10 years in duration.  This is defined as the period between the date of marriage and the date of termination of marital status.  It has nothing to do with periods of physical separation, and is not affected by a decree of legal separation.  It has nothing to do with the filing of a divorce itself.

The Social Security Act originally only covered certain job categories which reinforced traditional stereotyped views of family systems. Women generally qualified for insurance only through their husbands or children.  Amendments in 1939 added women, who became eligible to collect on their own earnings' record and became entitled to collect that or 50% of their husband's.  It was not until 1950 that benefits were extended to former spouses with children.  In 1965, former spouses without children were added but they had to have been married at least 20  years.  In 1977 this time period was reduced to 10 years.

Former spouses married for at least 10 years are now entitled to receive 50% of the Social Security beneficiary's benefits (as either derivative or dependent benefits) without reducing the worker's 100% benefit - in order words, in divorce the working spouse who contributed does not divide or share their retirement benefits and so the derivative benefits for former spouses do not cost either spouse.  They certainly, however, cost the taxpayers.  If the worker spouse dies, a former spouse(s) receives 100% of the benefits of the worker as a surviving former spouse.

This has many strange consequences.  One is that since spouses and state courts cannot divide the benefits, and it costs the working former spouse nothing to allow the other spouse to claim these benefits.  Imagine what hardship this might cause to a spouse whose marriage is terminated 9 years, 11 months, and 355 days after the date of marriage.  They would receive no derivative benefits, period.  It would cost the worker spouse nothing to delay dissolving the marriage one more day.  Many spouses who anticipate a future divorce strategically hold off filing until they are assured this time has passed or will pass, for good reason.  In California marital status cannot be terminated earlier than 6 months after the dissolution is filed and served.  I always alert clients to this area of the law, and have many times recommended patience; it would be attorney malpractice not to.  Sometimes raging working spouses want an earlier divorce just to deprive the other of this benefit.  This can be most unfortunate and downright ugly.  There is a procedure in California for dissolving marital status before a divorce case is completely finished (e.g., where property rights have not been determined) called bifurcation of marital status.  Sometimes a spouse wishes to get divorced immediately so that they can remarry, and this can interrupt the 10 years if the Court approves it.  Courts can order that the bifurcating party indemnify the other out of their own pocket for the loss of benefits, but as a practical matter there is no way for this indemnification to occur.  

Another consequence illustrates a major waste within the Social Security system.  Imagine that Fred marries Nancy the homemaker when they are 19.  After 10 years, they divorce. and Fred marries Jennifer.  After 10 years he moves on, dissolving that marriage and marrying Diane next.  He is now 49 years of age.  With his record, he still may have a couple of more marriages in him.  At this point, assuming that none of these three women have remarried or that they remarry after age 60 (a new marriage before age 60 terminates the right to derivative benefits), each of them are eligible to receive 50% of Fred's benefits while he continues to be entitled to 100%.  This means that 250% worth of benefits will be paid upon Fred's earning history alone.  Even better, if Fred dies before them, each ex-wife is thereupon entitled to receive Fred's 100% - which means 300% will be paid out and, since Fred is a serial monogamist, he will probably leave a widow (Tara) who likewise receives 100%.

Also, note the risks to the women.  If Nancy or Jennifer remarry before age 60 they lose any claims to the benefits generated by Fred and the count begins at zero with their new spouse and are based on the new spouse's earnings record with Social Security (assuming this person is not a government worker).  If their new marriage does not make the 10 year mark, they receive nothing from Social Security from either spouse.  This makes you want to reconsider a second marriage doesn't it - at least if you are a non wage earning wife!  Of course, few people ever think about this because they don't know about it; this is one goal of my website as an informational tool.

California has two state pension plans for government workers which exist outside of Social Security.  These are the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) and the California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS).  There are a number of city and county pension plans.  California teachers, state public safety officers (police and firefighters), and other workers who don't pay into the retirement portion of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), do not receive social security benefits once they retire. 

They only may be eligible for some SS benefits based upon their spouse's record or their own earnings from private sector jobs.  However, even these benefits may be reduced under the Windful Elimination Provision (WEP) or the Government Pension Offset (GPO).  These are complicated rules and formulas which are beyond the scope of this answer. 

Social Security rights divorce



http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com

Continue reading "How Are SOCIAL SECURITY benefits Treated In DIVORCE?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 
August 20, 2009
  Can you give me a MOORE MARSDEN Analysis on My SEPARATE PROPERTY HOME?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

 

Q.  Can you please help.  I understand a Moore-Marsden analysis needs to be performed on my house in my pending divorce, but I don't understand what it is my attorney is telling me. 

These are the facts.  On 1/1/02 I put my wife on the title to the property. This is what happened.

Purchase price 6/92 before marriage

 

$164,875

     

Date of Marriage 5/15/94 Market value

$190,000

Market Value 1/1/2002 when Wife goes on Title

$245,000

Market value 4/7/2008

 

$612,000

Initial 6/92 Down payment

 

$54,875

Principal Payment from separate prop. after separation

$6,836

FMV today (decreased since DOS)                 $500,000

Frederic, in San Dimas


Frederic:

Here is an illustration of how the calculation works. Please see my FAQ on Moore Marsden generally. As you can see, it is complicated. You will need a forensic accountant and you may want a real estate expert because fair market values need to be fixed at various dates. Your situation is even more complicated because you placed her on title. The simplest Moore-Marsden situation deals with a property owned in the name of one spouse throughout the marriage, where marital earnings are used to pay the mortgage down - the fundamental concept is that the community should get some reimbursement for this, which comes back as a share in the appreciation and reduced principal obligation. 
 
You will need to get:

  • the mortgage payoff balances on the date of marriage;
  • the mortgage payoff balance on date of the transmutation (when your wife went on title)
  • the payoff balance at date of separation
  • and you will need a mortgage balance near the date of your trial

I want to mention that all transmutations that favor one spouse and disadvantage the other, like putting her on the deed on 1/1/02, are subject to a claim that they should be set aside. This is because there is a presumption that your Wife exerted undue influence upon you - please research my fiduciary duty blog articles using the on-site search engine if this interests you.

Therefore, one scenario is:

Assuming                                                                $   54,875     dowppayment
and                                                                                6,836     (paydown before M) 
(you will need the mortgage statements)                        25,125     appreciation before M 
and                                                                             (20,197)    principal reduction  during M

then:                                                                           $54,875 [DP] PLUS $89,803
[SP Loan of $110,000 minus $20,197 CP payments] 
 = $144,678 DIVIDED BY $164,875 [purchase price]
= 's a 87.75 SP Interest

and                                                

$20,197 divided by $164,875 =' a 12.25% CP interest



NEXT                                                                  $    54,875 [DP]
                                                                                    6,836                                   
(plus post DOS loan payments which I don't
see broken out so assume zero here)                            61,711 PLUS                                                                         25,125  (premarital appreciation) PLUS                                                                       315,900     [87.75% of post-DOM appreciation to present assuming FMV $550,000 today
equals $550,000 less $164,875 less $25,125="$360,000]" - appreciation percentage of H's SP interest ='s $402,736 (H's SP share)

COMMUNITY INTEREST IS:  $20,197 plus 12.25% of 360,000=" $44,100"
plus 20,197="$64,297"
Wife' hare is this number divided by 2 ='s $32,148 equalization to W 

I recognize that this may seem imcomprehensible. I will endeavor to write some simpler blogs on this topic, because this is a very common area for questions. Yikes! 
 


Thurman W. Arnold
Continue reading "Can you give me a MOORE MARSDEN Analysis on My SEPARATE PROPERTY HOME?" »

Permalink  | Comments(0)
 

Palm Springs Family Attorneys  | Contact Thurman W. Arnold III | Site Map | Disclaimer

Professional Web Design The information on this website is for general information purposes only. Nothing on this site should be taken as legal advice for any individual case or situation. This information on this website is not intended to create, and receipt or viewing of this information does not constitute, an attorney-client relationship.

© 2010 by Thurman Arnold III Law Offices. All rights reserved.

Address: 225 South Civic Drive   Suite 1-3   Palm Springs, CA 92262                  Phone: (760) 320-7915

Administration