Recent Posts in Complex Cases/High Assets Category
| April 01, 2012 |
| Do California Courts "ADD BACK" DEPRECIATION In Determining Child and Spousal Support? |
| Posted By Thurman W. Arnold CFLS |
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Q. How do California Family Courts deal with depreciation in setting child and spousal support? Does depreciation reduce the paying spouse's income available for support and so lessen the amount that must be paid?
A. There are very few reported appellate decisions in California giving direct guidance to family courts about how to assess, and what to do with, depreciation deductions when ordering child support, or temporary or judgment spousal support. Commentators have noted that many courts tend to add back all depreciation in all circumstances, and some have criticized this approach. One question that arises is, is this phantom income or a phantom expense and how does it practically affect a payor's cash flow (depreciation add backs can also bite support payees)?
Another question is whether depreciation should be treated differently if we are talking about child support verses spousal support orders. If so, then trial courts dealing with guideline temporary spousal support awards should possibly be running two different analyzes in every case where depreciation is an issue and both alimony and child support may be due, denying the add back in child support settings but possibly allowing it when determining spousal support.
"Income" is not defined in any California family law statute for purposes of determining spousal support. "Gross" and "net" "income" are defined for purposes of awarding child support, in
Family Code section 4058 and
Family Code section 4059.
The two primary statutes addressing spousal support are Family Code sections 3600 and
Family Code section 4320. When alimony is awarded prior to the division of the community property estate, whether by way of a marital settlement agreement/stipulated judgment or trial court decision, it is termed "temporary spousal support." FC § 3600 provides that "the court may order ... the husband or wife to pay any amount that is necessary for the support of the wife or husband, consistent with the requirements of subdivisions (i) and (m) of Section 4320 and Section 4325...." Subsections (i) and (m) concern incidents of domestic violence, as does
§ 4325. Hence, as one court has recently ruled, except for cases involving DV, Family Code section 4320 does not otherwise apply to temporary spousal support determinations.
Tong v. Samson (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 23. Instead, trial courts traditionally employ the child support guideline formula (in the form of the Xspouse or Dissomaster) without considering the other 4320 factors - beyond considering each party's need for support and the other's ability to pay.
The only reported decision directly approving a depreciation add back is Asfaw v. Woldberhan (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1407.
Asfaw is a child support case. The trial court accepted husband's argument that he should receive $57,000 worth of depreciation, which would reduce his income available for support in a corresponding amount. Its findings were reversed as a matter of law (meaning that it was not simply an abuse of discretion). The appellate court ruled that depreciation is not properly deductible under Family Code sections 4058 and 4059. However, it is noted that different public policy considerations, and legislative histories, apply to child support as opposed to spousal support statutes, and therefore while this ruling lends support for arguments that depreciation should be added back when dealing with the latter it is not direct authority for that proposition.
Asfaw addressed depreciation for rental properties only, and the facts did not involve other forms of depreciation that typically apply to small businesses - like the acquisition of equipment or vehicles. Nonetheless, most Family Courts will add all forms of depreciation back and rarely exercise discretion in deciding whether business expenses were reasonably necessary and should therefore not be added into the payor's income.
Marriage of Blazer (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438 is a spousal support case that lends support for the idea that accounting and business decisions made by support obligors may be upheld, and business related expenses may not be charged to the payor for purposes of assessing income available to pay spousal support, where the trial court after hearing all the evidence concludes that the expenses are rationally related to the conduct of the business. Scott Blazer was paying temporary spousal support of $57,000/month, and operated an agricultural business that involved the sale of strawberries, among others. He and his expert testified that in order to compete and stay in business, investment of capital was needed to "diversify the company's work" and that funds spent for that purpose were accordingly "reasonable expenses" properly chargeable to the business, and not to the husband. The trial court agreed, and was affirmed on appeal. Clearly trial courts will rarely be reversed in issuing support findings and awards at the "permanent" (trial) support phase of the proceedings, where the record shows that the court considered all the evidence and the relevant 4320 factors, and therefore exercised an informed discretion in reaching a decision. In
Blazer Scott's position made some sense, and the trial court was free to accept it.
Hence, one can argue by extension that Blazer supports trial court discretion NOT to add back depreciation under appropriate circumstances - if the support obligor demonstrates a sound business reason for the expense, as with a car rental business replacing its fleet of vehicles, they may not be charged with those monies expended as though they should have, could have, used it to maintain their former spouse.
This becomes more difficult if the issue at bench is child support, at least if one gives Asfaw a wholesale application.
Clearly, one can argue that Asfaw should be limited to child support settings because that Court expressed its view that child support and spousal support serve different masters, so to speak, and this observation about public policy is correct.
On the other hand, depreciation that does not relate to business enterprises would seem to be likely to find little traction with family court judges and commissioners.
I guarantee the forensic accountants will vigorously differ on this point based upon business accounting principles and the historical IRS treatment of depreciation. I will discuss what I understand to be their reasoning in a future Blog.
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| March 23, 2012 |
| MARITAL BALANCE SHEET Programs and Free Divorce Calculators |
| Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, III |
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Free Divorce Calculators for
Property Division, Support, and Taxes
I recently had the opportunity to meet with Donna Smalldon, who is a collaborative law financial neutral and co-mediator based out of Portland, Oregon. Donna regularly trains legal professionals in beginning and advanced conflict resolution techniques as applied to divorce and family law matters and proceedings. She serves as a collaborative law neutral and divorce mediator both in Oregon and in Palm Springs, California.
You can learn more about her at Applied Divorce Solutions.
Donna introduced me to something that I want to share with you: Family Law Software by Dan Caine. Dan has developed programs for use in determining income and tax calculators, property division calculators, alimony "buy-out" calculators, sale of home calculators, and much more. Some of these can be used for free to test different scenarios as you begin to evaluate and plan for your life during and after divorce. These invaluable tools can be accessed at
FamilyLawSoftware.com.
The property division calculator is a must-use for those who are evaluating an equitable division of property within the economic divorce. For those who are considering a spousal support buy-out, Family Law Software provides a solid foundation for figuring out a current value for a lump sum payment instead of payments over time.
Understandably, the price for using the free program materials that Family Law Software provides is that they will email you your answer - you are exchanging your contact information for some free help, probably a fair trade.
I hope you find this useful! |
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| March 04, 2012 |
| How Do I PROTECT Monies Loaned By MY FAMILY For LOANS I Use For ATTORNEY FEES? |
| Posted By Thurman W. Arnold III, C.F.L.S. |
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Loans From Family and Friends to Pay
Attorney Fees For Your DivorceUnfortunately for those who love or care about you, often the only source of funds to hire or keep a family law attorney involved in your case are friends, co-workers, significant others, and parents or other family members. It is exquisitely painful and humiliating to be forced to borrow from these folks. Yet without their financial aid you may be lost.
Often these cash advances can be recovered from the other spouse by one of the mechanisms described here, and so they will be repaid without jeopardizing your ability to conclude your family law matter.
However, there are a few tips you should know:
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Have your helpers pay the attorney directly
- whether by credit card or check. Whenever someone loans or gives you money to help with fees or living expenses, if you deposit those monies directly into your bank account even if you next write a check to your lawyer, the other party will argue that you have undisclosed income or resources and may wave your bank statements in front of the court. This forces you to explain the transactions and the source of these funds. You always want to be in a position of needing to explain as little as possible.
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Ask them to keep a record of those payments
-- in the form of canceled checks or the credit card statement. You may want to introduce these as evidence later. Take control of evidence you might need now.
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Sign a promissory note at the time you receive the money
-- and keep a copy; better yet, have it sent to the other party's attorney as a "sua sponte" (spontaneous) augmentation of your Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure - no one will later challenge it, and you've just proven you take your fiduciary duties to update your circumstances to the other party seriously. Frequently parents of children in divorce are pre-distributing your inheritance to you in the sense that if they never ask for the money back, they nonetheless are poorer for what they gave you. There is always a suspicion that these "loans" are disguised gifts. If a Court believes that your parents are funding your side of the litigation, it may affect the Court's willingness to order the other party to contribute. The attitude of most lawyers and judges is that a loan is not a loan unless some written agreement memorializes it as such.
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Make repayment on these loans
-- even if it is interest-only or small amounts. Not only do most people fail to sign a promissory note, they rarely think to create a record that these funds were being repaid. Obviously you cannot repay it all until you receive an attorney fee award or your case resolves - but demonstrating some effort to treat the insider loan as you would any other creditor is persuasive evidence that the monies you received were in fact loans and not gifts. Regular gifts begin to smell like income.
For more information about how to pay your attorney for services they render in your divorce, please visit us here!
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| March 02, 2012 |
| How Are BUSINESSES Owned Before Marriage DIVIDED In Divorce? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, III, C.F.L.S. |
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Q. My Wife is a personal injury lawyer with a good practice which she started six years before we married. We have been separated for nine months, after nine years together. She just sent me a settlement agreement. It says the law practice is ordered to her, but it says nothing about me receiving any money for that. She says that since I am not a lawyer and can't practice law, and I get no share of its value. Is she right?
A. No, assuming it has a value that is greater than its value on the date you married!
The fact that you are not a lawyer has nothing to do with whether the "community estate" (the two of you as an economic unit) has an interest in the business that must be reimbursed. This would be true if she or you were a doctor, married to a person who isn't, and so who must have a license to practice their trade. Obviously the law practice must be awarded to her in your dissolution, but that doesn't mean she won't be forced to buy you out as though you were a licensed "silent partner."
When people marry or become domestic partners, they commonly already own assets like businesses or professional practices. This is especially likely for those who've been previously married.
During marriage a professional-trade spouse may increase the worth of a business they manage, whether as a sole proprietorship or as a shareholder of a professional corporation. Per Family Code section 760, all economic value that is created during marriage is presumed to belong to both parties. Value in this sense is measured by a benchmark date, and these dates vary according to circumstances and scenarios. This is called the "date of valuation", but there may be more than one. What gives rise to the community property interest is either spouse's contribution of time, skill, and efforts (TS&E) to - pretty much whatever - from the period from the DOM (date of marriage) to DOS (date of separation).
By the way, a prenuptial (or post-nuptial) agreement may waive a legal interest derived from these TS&E increases, meaning that the community estate acquires no interest in the separate property of the business-owner spouse. I assume you didn't sign one.
Unless you've waived the community property interest in your wife's separate property, it is a breach of interspousal fiduciary duties to deprive the community estate - of which you own one-half - of increases to a party's separate property resulting from TS&E. This means that the community (and separate) interests must be priced in terms of recent or present values. Always a controversial area. Once you physically separate, all your wife's TS&E belongs once again to her alone.
After separation a business or professional practice may likewise increase in value through continuing TS&E type contributions. These may be reimbursable to the separate property estate of the managing spouse and so backed out of the community interest, because it is likewise unfair that the community should benefit from separate property efforts.
There are three time periods relating to the value of your wife's practice that matter here: (1) the value of the law practice as of the date you married, (2) the increase in value (if any) that occurred during marriage that existed as of the date of separation, and (3) at the time of trial. Indeed, California law presumes that the property date for valuing an asset is at trial. Family Code section 2552.
Legal professionals refer to this manner of calculating the community property interest as an "apportionment" or "equitable apportionment."
There are two basic apportionment "formulas" that California judges are trained to apply in these situations:
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Fair return on investment
. This is called the
Pereira approach to apportionment, after
Pereira v. Pereira (1909) 156 Cal. 1, 103 P. 488, which involved a husband saloon owner. It apportions a "fair return" on the owning spouse's separate property investment in the business as separate property, then apportions any excess to the community property as arising from that spouse's efforts during marriage.

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Reasonable compensation
. This is the
Van Camp apportionment method, which derives from
Van Camp v. Van Camp (1921) 53 Cal.App. 17, 199 P. 885 (yes, seafood in Long Beach), which apportions the reasonable value of the spouse's services during marriage as community property, then treats the balance as separate property attributable to the normal earnings of the separate estate. Reasonable compensation is typically the analysis used in small business valuation cases, and is often found by looking at what other people in the same field performing the same functions tend to earn.

Either analysis (and there are hybrids and others) may be performed to determine the value of the premarital interest in separate property and in deriving the community interest in what began as separate property.
These methods deal with the first half of your question - valuing the law practice as of the date of separation. They may have to be applied in reverse to back out the separate property contributions after the date of separation when a business is valued at time of trial.
Trial courts can pick the approach that they reasonably conclude makes the best sense given the facts of each case. In achieving the apportionment between separate and community property the Court has discretion to decide which formula will achieve 'substantial justice' between the parties.
The Pereira formula is commonly used when business profits are principally attributed to the community efforts (i.e., during marriage).
Van Camp is applied when the community efforts are more than minimally involved in a separate business, but the business profits that accrued are attributed to the character of the separate asset (Mr. Van Camp was turning out cans of tuna before marriage).
I'll write more on this fascinating subject. |
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| February 27, 2012 |
| What Does the Term "Marital Standard of Living (MSL)" Mean? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, III, C.F.L.S. |
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Q. What is meant by the words "marital standard of living" in dissolution actions?
A. In California lawyers in high earner dissolution cases often speak of Marital Standard of Living (MSOL or MSL). This is often the case for our clients in Palm Springs, Indian Wells, and Palm Desert. It is a very important element to determining spousal support/alimony obligations and entitlements. It works to place both a floor and a ceiling on the range of potential alimony awards.
When a court orders permanent spousal support in favor of an unemployed, home-making, or lower earner spouse or domestic partner it must base its decision in part upon the standard of living achieved during the marriage or partnership. This legislative admonition is referenced in California Family Code section 4330 and
section 4320. The MSL is not the final factor, but it is the starting
point. It references the general station in life the parties enjoyed during their marriage, along with all surrounding circumstances including vacations and other quality of life indicators. The court must also consider all the other factors set forth in Family Code section 4320 as well. These are discussed in my various websites, and you might want to try our search engine at the upper right because it includes all my writings on any subject I have written about and you can peruse my other articles easily.
The MSOL is not a mathematical formula, but must be determined for each couple. It can be determined based upon the parties' average income over time - and also from what they spent. But it can include any factor specific to any couple's living history.
Courts have broad discretion to award spousal support in greater or lesser sums than what the supported spouse requires to maintain the marital standard of living - which is why it is really important to hire a competent matrimonial lawyer. Endless variations are possible, but only if your attorney really understands how to describe them, and also understands how to utilize the other 4320 factors and present them to the court - sometimes with expert testimony or evidence. Frankly this is not likely to happen without an attorney who exclusively practices family law and has been at it for a substantial while.
A spouse or domestic partner's high income will be considered in terms of their ability to pay support, but the need of the supported spouse will also be evaluated. Issues arise when people live beyond their means - for instance, where a high earner is able to live a higher standard of living than the marital standard of living.
It is often the case with older couples that the family's standard of living was low when compared to the income stream that passed through during the marriage - perhaps the parties did not spend, but saved.
In such cases the court may set spousal support at an amount higher than the parties' actual standard of living. If the parties saved and invested and developed assets during the marriage, but spent little on living expenses, the supported spouse may be entitled to continue that savings by being supplemented with alimony.
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| February 23, 2012 |
| What Happens In Divorce When One Spouse Owned A Residence At the Date of Marriage? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. I am not on title to a home my husband owned before we married but we paid the mortgage for 7 years. If we divorce, do I have any interest in it?
A. There is an important concept under California Law involving what is generally known as "Moore-Marsden apportionment." It applies to a common situation where a home is acquired before marriage, title is in the name of the acquiring spouse alone, and during the marriage and up to separation or divorce filing the mortgage is paid down with community funds. Please note - this concept applies whether you went on title or not after the marriage, but may be your only remedy if you did not.
Where this occurs the community estate acquires a legal, reimbursable, interest in what would be otherwise be entirely the separate property of the titled spouse IF community funds (earnings of either spouse, for instance, or both) are used to make the mortgage payments.The idea is that joint funds are being used to benefit a separate property interest, i.e., the separate property equity. Many legal scholars (and the courts) consider this to be a breach of fiduciary duty - that whenever one or the other spouse's separate property interests are increased with community funds, or community time, skill, and efforts of either spouse during the marriage, the community is disadvantaged and that this disadvantage violates the statutory duties of the parties that place the party's joint interests above their separate interests.
The formula for apportionment is that the community acquires a pro tanto (dollar for dollar) interest in the ratio that principal payments on the purchase price made with community property bear to payments made with separate property. Hence, any increase in value (appreciation) must be apportioned between the separate property and the community property estates upon separation or dissolution.
Note that this only applies to separate property owned prior to marriage with a mortgage that was paid during marriage where an equity position has been increased. For instance, if a mortgage exists but it is an interest only mortgage, payments during marriage do not reduce principal. Therefore, the separate interest of the owner spouse is not improved because the debt remains exactly the same. As a general rule, the amounts paid for interest, taxes, and insurance on the house are disregarded since that portion does not to contribute to the capital investment.
Also, it assumes that the mortgage was paid with joint (community) funds, or that the funds used were so commingled that the "separatizer" is unable to trace them to a separate property source (meaning they don't have records showing where each payment was made or are unable to provide a recapitalization of the source of the funds). If your husband reduced the mortgage throughout the marriage but he did it with an account that was his separate property then the community would not have this reimbursement right.
The Moore Marsden formula requires a number of bits of information at important points in time to be properly calculated. These include:
- what was the original purchase price
- what was the original mortgage and downpayment
- what was the property worth at the date of marriage (DOM)
- what was owed to the lender at that time
- what was the property worth at the date of separation
- what was owed at that time
- what is the property worth on the date of the calculation (i.e., the trial date) and
- what is the principal pay-off at that time?
This is an example of why family law and divorce cases can become complicated and expensive. Obtaining these records, particularly if you are the 'out spouse' can be difficult, and sometimes a forensic accountant is the best option for calculating these apportionments. You need an experienced family law attorney for these types of matters.
In your case, with a lengthy marriage, you have significant Moore-Marsden entitlements. However, these may be adversely affected by the crash in the real estate market since so much equity has evaporated. In any event, we need the numbers outlined above in order to calculate the reimbursement due to the community.
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| January 21, 2012 |
| Court Upholds PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT Where Wife Alleged Husband Falsely Stated Net Worth |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, C.F.L.S. |
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While prenuptial agreements were once viewed with suspicion by trial courts, a recent decision reflects the current trend to uphold them particularly when the complaining party has competent legal representation and practical access to all relevant information concerning the other person's finances - whether they took advantage of that opportunity or not. One lesson is that people need to take the waivers set forth in these agreements quite seriously, because there is high likelihood you will become stuck with them.
One of the useful aspects to the Second Appellate District's decision in In Re Marriage of Hill and Dittmer is that the justices kindly include an Appendix setting forth selected portions of the prenup which were upheld as fully enforceable, providing family law practitioners who draft premarital agreements a useful partial template for language that will likely pass muster.
The opinion also demonstrates how important it is for the parties, and their attorneys, to maintain a complete file of the negotiations leading to the execution of such agreements including maintaining copies of the succession of drafts that come to be altered as discussions evolve, as potential evidence when the agreement is (inevitably?) attacked. Whether premarriage agreements will be enforced years later is a highly fact specific inquiry. Many lawyers are reluctant to be involved in drafting them, because they are seen to be potential malpractice traps. Those that do often charge significant fees as a result, in order to justify the risks of subsequently being sued by their own former clients. This case is interesting because the wife, who came to challenge the agreement some seven years after she signed it, ultimately had her own attorney be the primary drafter of the agreement. That attorney evidently did a good job in helping to create an agreement that would be, and turned out to be, binding - which is not what the wife wanted to have happen years later, after the fact. Where one party later perceives that they will be better off if their premarital agreement can be set aside, the first thing their (new) lawyer will do is to try to find a "hook" for attacking its enforceability. This case represents a creative attempt by wife's attorneys to create such a hook by contending that the husband had misrepresented his net worth when it was signed, but their efforts failed.
Parties' Circumstancs
Sandra Hill and Thomas Dittmer married in April, 2001. Some six months prior to the wedding, Dittmer insisted that before he would marry, they needed to execute a premarital agreement. At that time, Hill agreed. Each was wealthy and business savvy by any standard. Hill had a net worth of at least $10 million, and Dittmer possessed at least $40 million. Each had "high-pressure jobs which required deadlines to be met and contracts reviewed, edited, and signed." Hill had been a magazine editor and published author, and had her own television production company; Dittmer was the founder of a major commodities trading company.
Hill hired Santa Barbara family law attorney Jamie Raney to represent her, and they first met to discuss it three months before the marriage. While Dittmer's attorney prepared an initial draft, Raney decided that it would be better for her client if Raney drafted the agreement and Dittmer agreed to allow this to occur. Numerous versions were created and exchanged as the agreement took shape, and evidently these drafts were maintained in the attorneys' files over the ensuing years and so came to be admitted into evidence in the subsequent trial. The more drafts that are generated, as they agreements are being formed, the greater the inference that both parties are actively engaged in an arm's length transaction to create a contract that they both intend to be binding and which they both fully understand. Hence, when one soon to be spouse is favored over the other, or gains benefits they view as important, that spouse's counsel very much wants the other party's attorney to actively input into changes to the agreement. For instance, when I draft them on behalf of the person with greater income or assets, the last thing I hope for is that the other side will just accept my version. Indeed, some lawyers intentionally leave mistakes in a draft (misidentifying parties, misspellings, provisions they know aren't acceptable) exactly so there is a record that these were corrected or changed.
The agreement came to be signed on the day of the wedding, before the ceremony. It included a waiver of spousal support and precluded the creation of community property during the marriage by reason of the contributions of time, skill, and efforts of each party, that would otherwise have belonged to them jointly but for the prenup.
As is often the case where the enforceability of a premarital agreement is in issue, the trial court bifurcated the proceedings and permitted an early trial of that issue alone since if the agreement was upheld, the overall case would be severely truncated and shortened.
Hill's best argument to challenge her agreement was evidently that Dittmer had failed in the agreement to actually disclose the nature and extent of his income and assets beyond a generalized representation that his net worth amounted to $40 million. To prove this assertion Hill attempted to obtain discovery of Dittmer's net worth when the agreement was signed, which would likely have consisted in the information she could have obtained but did not then obtain. Dittmer resisted this discovery as largely irrelevant, but the trial court allowed some limited inquiry by Hill but not to the degree that she had wanted.
Dittmer's attorney had smartly insisted a provision be added to the agreement that acknowledged that Dittmer had provided Hill's legal counsel with full and complete access to Dittmer's financial information, including an opportunity to consult with Dittmer's attorney and his accountants and other representatives "as to the nature, value and cash flow from any of his assets and the nature and extent of his liabilities." This turned out to be Hill's undoing - Hill never availed herself of this invitation, and conducted no inquiry. This effectively waived her right to contest the agreement on this basis later, notwithstanding the fact that the first draft that Raney circulated was presented on March 23, 2011, and that the revision with this acknowledge came "a week later" and therefore on or about April 1. Raney faxed Dittmer's attorney the final draft of the agreement on April 11, 2001, three days before the wedding day, when it came to be signed. Hence, evidently the "opportunity" to inspect Dittmer's net worth representations, including what would certainly have been questions about a complex financial estate, was open for just the two weeks leading up to the marriage. As a practical matter relating to how we humans are hard-wired, I find it difficult to imagine how Hill could have undertaken any kind of real investigation within that time period (without, for instance, canceling or moving the wedding date). Nonetheless, she had the chance to do so and her decision not to deprived her of a legal basis to claim fraud for nondisclosure, or inadequate disclosure, of Dittmer's holdings and income as of that time.
Apparently the terms that the parties came to agree upon had little to do with specifics relating to their assets - one can speculate that if Hill cared enough then about what she claimed to care about now, had her inquiry resulted in the discovery that Dittmer was worth $50 million rather than merely $40 million, her attorney might have been motivated to negotiate a better deal or request some additional provisions. Of course, what is unsaid but implied in the decision is that Hill loses because her theory of the case is simply a technical ruse to invalidate what she doesn't like today - something that evidently didn't matter then. How the Court Ruled
The court's opinion states:
"The contention that the Agreement is tainted by fraudulent and inadequate disclosures is refuted by evidence that Hill, both in the Agreement itself and in her conduct during the three-month period of negotiation, waived this claim. The Agreement states in part: 'Each party waives the provisions of California Probate Code Section 143 and California Family Code Section 1615 relating to financial disclosures. . . . The absence of disclosures shall not create any legal right in favor of either party, nor any legal remedy by either party against the other including, but not limited to, challenging the validity or enforceability of this Agreement. Based upon each party's knowledge of the other's income and assets and their access to same, and in consideration of the prospective marriage, each party acknowledges that this Agreement is fair and equitable at the time of its execution. The foregoing waivers of disclosure are voluntary and express and shall be deemed conclusive for the purposes of Section 1615 (a)(2)(8) of the California Family Code and for all other purposes.'
The circumstances surrounding the execution of the premarital Agreement provide substantial evidence that Hill entered into the Agreement voluntarily. She had the advice of two attorneys specializing in family law and estate planning during the nine months the Agreement was being discussed and negotiated. Hill's lawyer drafted the Agreement and revised drafts of the Agreement in consultation with Dittmer and his attorney. These facts, coupled with Hill's professional background and evident skills are strong evidence that she entered into the Agreement voluntarily.
There is no evidence that Hill took any steps to obtain financial disclosures from Dittmer during the negotiation period, although she was invited to do so by Dittmer's attorney. Dittmer's attorney sent a memorandum to Rainey in this regard as follows: 'Article IV (perhaps in Section 4.4) should acknowledge that the financial information provided by Tom includes his Trust and that 'Tom has provided Sandy's legal counsel and representatives with full and complete access to the books and records of Tom and his Trust, with the opportunity to consult with him, and any of his accountants, agents and representatives as to the nature, value and cash flow from any of his assets and the nature and extent of his liabilities.' This provision was contained, in substance, in the Agreement.
Hill's additional argument, that she did not see the final draft of the Agreement until the date of the wedding and that the agreement she signed was incomplete, is not persuasive. As the trial court found, the record shows that the provisions upon which Hill bases her claims of invalidity had been in prior drafts of the Agreement. Hill's assertions that she was too busy with wedding preparations to read or understand the Agreement ring hollow in light of her education and her extensive business experience. In this regard, the trial court said: 'The Court further finds that the prenuptial agreement signed by [Hill] was full and complete and contained page 14. Even if the version that [Hill] signed was missing that page, the Court finds that the failure to include it was a clerical error by [Hill's] attorney and not a surprise to [Hill] and was included in prior drafts of the prenuptial agreement provided to [Hill]. It was a provision that had been agreed to by the parties prior to the execution of the agreement.' Moreover, any failure on her part in this regard is not a sufficient basis for invalidating a contract. (See, e.g., Wal-Noon Corp. v. Hill (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 605, 615 ['[f]ailure to make reasonable inquiry to ascertain or effort to understand the meaning and content of the contract . . . constitutes neglect of a legal duty such as will preclude recovery for unilateral mistake of fact'].)
The trial court found as a fact that Hill had adequate opportunity to review the various drafts of the agreement and that she was aware of and understood its contents. Substantial evidence supports this finding. Furthermore, even if it were true that she was unaware of portions of the final Agreement, her failure to take reasonable steps to become aware of the contents of the Agreement, particularly given her business background, her awareness of earlier drafts, and her access to counsel, precludes a finding of that she entered into the Agreement involuntarily. (See, e.g., Bauer v. Jackson (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 358, 370 ['[o]rdinarily, when a person with capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, he may not, in the absence of fraud, imposition, or excusable neglect, avoid its terms on the ground he failed to read it before signing it'].)"
Hill also contended that the changes to Family Code section 1615 that became effective a year later, in 2002, should be retroactively applied to the question of the agreement's validity and that if they were a different result would have occurred. Specifically, current section 1615(c)(2) creates a presumption that a prenup is not executed voluntarily unless the court makes a finding that the party against whom enforcement is sought had at least seven calendar days between the date he or she was "first presented" with the agreement and advised to seek independent counsel, and the time he or she signed the agreement.
Hence, the amended provisions that are no effective presumes a premarital agreement is unenforceable when the party who is challenging it did not receive it at least seven days before it was signed - Hill argued that the final version was only given her the day of the wedding. The decision ignores the question whether the "final, final" draft needs to be presented more than seven days before, because the Court (and an earlier decision) have found that the 2002 revisions to the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act are not to be applied retroactively to agreements entered into prior to January 1, 2002.
The language that Dittmer's attorney requested will likely become the standard for future agreements like this one, and will create a method of by which actual disclosure of assets and debts in the prenup can be avoided - which, the standard of professional care now suggests based on this decision should become the rule and not the exception. Why now ever give a detailed financial disclosure, whether by way of exhibits or statements made in the agreement itself, when that can be waived? Giving detailed facts in an agreement would appear to be unwise, since the party who is attacking enforceability then has something specific to challenge. A 'multitude of sins' can be shielded if the opportunity to investigate is extended, but not undertaken.
It bears repeating that the provisions attached in the Appendix, including a form of spousal support waiver, are a very good starting point for drafting the language for your own agreements.
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| January 14, 2012 |
| What Is the MARITAL PRIVILEGE in California Family Law and When Does It Apply to Testimony? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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Marital Privileges Not To Testify Against Spouse or Domestic Partner
Sometimes married persons who are in litigation with third parties (i.e., former spouses and co-parents) are asked to reveal communications in deposition, through written discovery, or at trial between them that are protected from disclosure. It may help you to know when to assert an objection to such inquiries, and how to avoid answering such questions altogether.
California recognizes both a "testimonial privilege" and a privilege protecting "confidential marital communications". These privileges are codified in Evidence Code section 970,
Evidence Code section 971 and
Evidence Code section 980. They are distinct privileges, and the one that most often applies to family law are sections 970 and 980, where one's current spouse is embroiled, for instance, in litigation with a former spouse (or in paternity cases, the other parent). These privileges apply equally to registered domestic partners pursuant to the general application of
Family Code section 297.5. Limitations on the marital privilege are generally found at
Evidence Code section 972.
These privileges serve two important public policy goals: 1) to preserve and promote marital harmony and 2) to encourage and preserve confidences between husband and wife. Essentially, the assumption is that society has more to lose from the disruption of the marital relationship that might be caused by encouraging spouses to testify against one another, or to disclose secrets, than it has to gain by learning what was said. This makes sense - however, unrepresented parties often lack an understanding about their rights and privileges, which can be waived if not properly asserted. Hence today's Blog.
The testimonial and confidential marital communication privileges require the existence of a valid marriage or domestic partnership. Keep in mind that they do not apply between you and the spouse or domestic partner whom you are litigating against - these privileges cease to exist as between parties to a dissolution or related family law proceeding. In addition, where no valid marriage existed (i.e., a marriage that was void at its inception (bigamous, incestuous, lack of proper solemnization and the like)), the privileges never arise. In contrast, where a marriage is voidable (minority, fraud, physical incapacity) the privilege exists unless and until a final judgment of annulment has issued.
Testimonial Privilege
Here are some rules and exceptions that should be kept in mind. They relate to the "testimonial privilege" only.
- The privilege applies only during existence of valid marriage or domestic partnership
- A married person has a privilege not to testify against his or her spouse in any proceeding. Evidence Code § 970.
- A married person, whose spouse is a party to a proceeding has a privilege not to be called as a witness by an adverse party without the witness spouse's prior express consent. Evidence Code § 971.
- Both testimonial privileges belong to the witness spouse.
- The 970 privilege permits a spouse to refuse to answer questions requiring testimony about the other spouse, whether or not they are a party to a proceeding.
- The 971 privilege only permits a spouse to refuse to answer (or be called) in proceedings where the other spouse is a party.
- The 970 privilege belongs only to the spouse who has been called as a witness - in such cases (i.e., where the other spouse is not a party) the other spouse has no standing to prevent their spouse from voluntarily testifying.
- The 971 privilege belongs to both spouses. Thus, even if spouse B is willing to answer questions about spouse A in pending proceedings involving spouse A, spouse A can assert the privilege to bar the testimony that otherwise might have been obtained.
- Once the marriage is terminated by Final Judgment (for instance, even a "status termination" on bifurcated proceedings where other issues remain reserved and therefore open - like property division or custody), the privilege evaporates (but see the confidential marital communications privilege below).
- The privileges do not apply to proceedings brought by one spouse against the other.
- They do not apply to certain types of hearing, including competency or commitment/conservatorship proceedings (since alleged mental or physical condition may be in issue).
- These privileges do not apply to juvenile court proceedings. [EC section 972(d)].
- Trial courts are not required to inform spouses of their rights not to testify - being uninformed and then giving testimony that could have been avoided does not operate to permit the testimony to be stricken.
- There are critical exceptions to the privilege that apply in family court proceedings [EC section 972(g)]. These include:
- A married person cannot claim the testimonial privilege to refuse to answer questions about issues relating to income, expenses, assets, debt and employment of either spouse.
- An action brought against the spouse by a former spouse to establish, modify or enforce a child, family or spousal support obligation arising from the marriage to the former spouse.
- An action brought against a spouse by the other parent to establish, modify or enforce a child support obligation for a child of a nonmarital relationship between the parties.
- In proceedings brought by a guardian of a child against a spouse relating to a child support obligation.
- Note that the testimonial privilege in the exceptions above (disclosure of income and assets, etc.) remains intact if other information is sought beyond the scope of these finance related exceptions, as to the requested disclosure of such other information.
- There are two exceptions in which a spouse may be deemed to have waived their marital privilege to refuse to testify or be called as a witness:
- Unless erroneously compelled to do so, a married person who testifies in a proceeding to which his or her spouse is a party, or who testifies against the spouse in any such proceeding, waives their section 970 and 971 privileges in those proceedings for all purposes. 'Erroneously compelled' means under circumstances indicating "irresistible force", for instance where a judge orders the spouse to answer the question.
- A married person cannot assert these privileges in a civil proceeding which they themselves have brought, or are defending, for the "immediate benefit" of his or her spouse, or both jointly. In such cases the privileges are effectively waived. [Evidence Code § 973(b)]. A common example would include an action for personal injury damages against a third party.
Confidential Marital Communications' Privilege
Absent a waiver or an exception, a married person, whether or not they are a party to proceedings, has a privilege to refuse to disclose confidential communications between the married person or their spouse made while they were married or domestic partners. Evidence Code section 980.
Here are some general points to understand as to the limitations of this privilege:
- There must be a valid marriage or RDP at the time of the communication.
- This privilege survives the dissolution of the marriage itself.
- Each spouse or former spouse holds and can assert the privilege.
- Only "confidential communications" are exempted from disclosure. A "communication" means a written or oral statement or act intended to convey a message.
- As to the existence of assets and debts, it doesn't prevent disclosure of the fact of the existence of same - it only protects communications about those subjects.
- The communication must have been made in a setting that reasonably implies a confidence. There is a presumption that communications between spouses were made in confidence, but that presumption can be overcome upon a proper showing.
- If a third person was present, then there may not be a presumption that the communication was intended to be "confidential" or the presumption may be rebutted.
- The privilege will not exist where the party asserting it is abusing the "mantle of confidentiality", for instance where it is part of an assault by one spouse upon the other.
- It cannot be asserted where its application would serve to enable or aid a crime or fraud that is being attempted (although the privileges under EC sections 970 and 971 may apply).
- It does not apply to proceedings against the spouses themselves, and there are other limited exceptions (juvenile court proceedings, for instance).
As with all my Blogs, this is intended to be informational only. Specific questions, or circumstances, may well require a more detailed analysis. My purpose here is merely to introduce you to the protections that the privileges may afford, so there is no inadvertent waiver on your part.
Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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| December 30, 2011 |
| Attorney Michael C. Peterson Speaks About FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY (Before and Once Divorce Happens) |
| Posted By Michael C. Peterson |
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Advice for Couples in 2012, Including
How to Balance Power in Your Marriage!
One of the most common problems I see arising in (and sometimes leading to) any divorce action is a lack of financial transparency between the spouses or partners. Often, over time, and for various personal, practical and familial and historical reasons, one party has assumed a dominant or exclusive role in the management of community assets, including depository accounts, real estate, investments, and small businesses.That role effectively puts a managing spouse in a position to have vastly superior information about the family finances, and the power to act on such information in the context of divorce to the detriment of the non-managing spouse. This may wind up prejudicing one party if the relationship ends.
It has been my repeated experience that, in anticipation of a divorce action, an unethical or abusive spouse will take strategic steps to hide assets and obfuscate the methods used to hide them. The ramifications to the non-managing spouse can include not only an unfair disbursement of community assets upon resolution of the case, but also manifest into reduced calculations of temporary and permanent spousal support and child support.
California family law attempts to minimize the potential for financial fraud during the life of a divorce action. For example, it creates rules for mandatory disclosures of assets. It creates fiduciary duties for managing spouses. It creates methods for discovery of financial and asset information (but only in the context of a legal action, after the relationship has broken down). It creates pre-judgment and post-judgment penalties for non-disclosure.
In a perfect world such legal tools alone would fully prevent the potential for financial dishonestly between separating spouses. But the reality is that the law routinely fails to protect the financial interests of the non-managing spouse in this regard, and the root cause of that failure occurs because non-managing spouses don't take steps to equalize the playing field when it comes to information about family finances during the course of the marriage. Stated another way, individual non-managing spouses are often unable to utilize the tools that the law provides to ensure they receive a just and equitable share of the fruits of the community's efforts during the course of the marriage because they lack the information necessary to have their lawyer fully protect their interests. Too many non-managing spouses wait until the time of separation to learn about the family finances. By then, non-managing spouses and their attorney are playing catch up, and not always winning. As such, it is of paramount importance that a non-managing spouse be proactive in learning as much information about the family finances as possible, and do so not only on the eve of a divorce, but also during the entire course of the marriage itself. In this day and age, knowledge is the coin of the realm.
Economists recognize that one source of market failure (i.e. inefficient allocation of resources) is caused by a phenomenon called asymmetric information. Asymmetric information affects decisions in transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. In adverse selection models, the ignorant party lacks information while negotiating a contract to the transaction. Common examples of information asymmetry include 'insider' trading in the stock market, or buying a 'lemon' used car. Understanding and combating asymmetric information is crucial to economists because market failure leads to net losses for society as a whole. Understanding and combating asymmetric information should be equally important to the non-managing spouse and his/her attorney because of its strong potential to lead to inequitable settlements or trial results. In the economic sense, asymmetric information between spouses about the family finances is a form of market failure. To be sure, if you are contemplating or undergoing a divorce action, you will (in most cases) effectively be negotiating a transaction that will bind you and impact your financial future.
The best way overall way to combat a managing spouse 's tendency to commit acts of misfeasance or non-disclosure regarding financial interests is to equalize the flow of financial information from the very outset of the marriage, with information parity being a non-managing spouse's goal.
Hand-in-hand with the goal of information parity is a mindset that fosters such parity being present throughout the marriage. That mindset is, simply stated, one of equality and mutual appreciation. Two people will divide labor in a marriage so as to maximize their relative strengths and weaknesses, and in so doing the synergy benefits the martial community as a whole to a greater extent than either person could do individually. Economists refer to this phenomenon as comparative advantage, and recognize that such a situation is optimal in the context of maximizing social utility. So too is comparative advantage optimal for managing a household.
As a simple 'traditional' example, assume Chris and Pat are married. Chris has a greater income earning potential due to holding a doctorate degree and having a good network of people to whom Chris is favorably known in the locale. Pat has greater domestic abilities due to having a bachelors degree in nutrition a work background in home decor. Based on these comparative strengths, Chris and Pat decide that Chris will work full-time and Pat will take care of the home full-time. Pat's excellent meals keep Chris energized and in good health. Pat's superior aesthetic tastes keep Chris in style with cool cloths. Chris's boss comes over for dinner and is impressed by the feng shui of the domicile. Over time Chris gets promoted and raises. Chris uses the additional income to make financial investments, go on vacations with Pat, and purchase a better home. By Chris and Pat each doing what they are relatively strong at, they, both individually and as a whole, are made economically better off. But more to the point, it is their interdependence that necessarily caused the mutual gain. The law recognizes this fundamental principal in the context of divorce by creating the concept of community property; that regardless of whether it was Chris's paycheck that allowed for the growth of assets, Pat's contributions to Chris's earned income are equally important and therefore necessitate equal division should Pat and Chris's relationship end. So as to a non-managing spouse's mindset, I strongly encourage all such people who are contemplating marriage, married, contemplating divorce, or involved in a divorce have one that recognizes their contributions to the community and requires takes a role.
On the practical side of things, here is a list of information parity objectives that I believe healthy marital relationships should achieve:
- Spouses should store copies of written financial documents in a safe place and where the other spouse doesn't have access.
- Spouses should have all depository, investment, retirement, and debt account numbers written down in an asset ledger. Annual inventories of all assets with a value over $500.00 should be maintained and signed off on by spouses and kept in the asset ledger.
- Spouses should keep copies of income information, including payroll stubs and other documents showing income such as rental checks from investment property or brokerage statements from securities dealers.
- Spouses should copy and store all financial account information from banks savings and loans, credit unions, particularly monthly statements. Spouses should also copy and store other banking information such as passbooks, check registers, and deposit slips.
- Spouses should agreed to have all financial information statements should be sent to each spouse individually, directly from the applicable financial institution, and be received only at that spouses primary residential address (and not, for example, at a business). If one spouse insists on receiving their financial information from home or stops receiving financial information mail at the residence, it is often a red flag.
- Spouses should maintain copies of tax documents, including personal tax returns and business tax returns, and attached forms, for the preceding five years.
- Spouses should receive and keep business financial statements, including net worth and income statements, in the case of a small business.
- Spouses should keep copies of all wills and trusts, and attachments thereto (such as a grant deed that has been recorded in favor of a trust for the benefit of the spouses).
- Spouses should keep copies of all life insurance policies.
- Spouses should keep copies of all outstanding debts incurred during the marriage that are in either spouses name.
- Spouses should keep a list of all personal and real property owned prior to the marriage.
- Spouses should keep a list of all safe deposit boxes and their contents.
Other tips you should know about and red flags you should watch out for to protect you from an unscrupulous spouse:
- Don't wait until things are going badly in the relationship to achieve financial information parity. Work towards that goal from the outset.
- Conduct asset searches of your spouse's biographical information by professional third-parties on an annual basis.
- Be aware that there is a statistically higher incidence of spouses hiding money in their second, third, or later marriages.
- Its best to have only a certified public accountant prepare the spouses' tax returns (as opposed to 'bookkeepers' of other unlicensed persons acting as pseudo-accountants), as they are subject to professional conflict of interest rules. Do not sign any document seeking your informed consent to waive any conflict of interest rules with respect to accountants without consulting an attorney.
- Particularly in the case of a small business, become knowledgeable about the business's employees, its normal income, its normal expenses, and how it accounts for them. A small business in particular is breeding grounds for accounting tricks to make it appear less valuable. I have seen this occur by the managing spouse: favor/incentivize cash payments from customers, funnel personal expenses as payments from the business, creating and paying fake employees (including the spouses' own children) and then voiding the uncashed checks after the divorce is final, or delaying new long-term business opportunities (i.e. taking new customer orders, signing new clients, or receiving transfers from escrow-like accounts such as paypal.com). It's important to be familiar with the inner-workings of a small business so you can note when something is amiss. Carefully review and copy customer/client payment agreements and accounts where a small business operates on a largely cash basis.
- Review financial statements on a regular basis. It is easier to access and digest three months of recent transactions than five years of relatively distant transactions. Look out for large or out-of-the ordinary deposits or withdrawals, and try to trace the source/end-point of the transaction to the best of your ability.
- Be aware that municipal bonds and certain savings bonds, because they are tax-free, are not reported to the IRS and therefore can be a vehicle for asset hiding because they do not need to be disclosed on tax returns. Look out for large investments in these assets.
- Non-managing spouses should be careful about signing joint tax returns that claim large deductions for various expenses, particularly in the case where a small business is involved. Although it might mean a larger tax burden in a particular year, in the context of a divorce it often results in lower spousal support and a lower business valuation, with attestation proof presented to a judge in the form of your signature.
- Big changes to the administration of finances can be a red flag: applying for large new loans, the closing of a bank account or change to an investment portfolio, particularly without the input of the non-managing spouse, might give opportunity to hide money.
- Know your spouse's boss well, and make sure they like you. I have experienced collusion between employers and employee so as to show short-run decreases (bonus or raise deferral) to income agreed on increases after the divorce is complete. If you separate from your spouse, let your spouse's boss know that event has occurred in writing.
- Do not sign deeds or other papers concerning real estate papers without consulting an attorney.
- Watch out for bank accounts opened in the name of spouse's children, as they do not get listed on that spouse's tax statements they can be a method of hiding community assets.
- Also watch out for overpayments on taxes. A managing spouse may try to receive a tax return later after the divorce is final by overpayment now, or alternatively filing amended taxes.
- Avoid 'loans' to friends or family.
- Be a Missourian, i.e. don't take your spouse's word. Have the managing spouse show you with the documents that corroborate what they tell you about the family finances.
- Don't allow fear of ruining the relationship, cultural values, or laziness prevent your pro-activity in becoming astute in the family finances. Defensive responses to your inquiries and requirements for financial information parity by the managing spouse may indicate diversion of community assets.
- Always remember that the burden of proof rests on the accuser, not the accused, to prove diverted assets to a court. Take all actions to protect your interests with this rule in mind.
These are my thoughts at the end of 2011 - I wish each of you, and each of us, a Happy New Year in 2012, and I hope that we all strive to be transparent and ethical during the coming year!
Michael C. Peterson, Esq. - Indio and Coachella Valley Divorce Attorney |
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| December 26, 2011 |
| Attorney Michael C. Peterson JOINS the Law Firm of Thurman W. Arnold! |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Greetings All and Best Wishes for the Coming New Year!
I am so very pleased to announce that Michael C. Peterson joins the Law Firm of Thurman Arnold effective January 1, 2012. I cannot imagine having been blessed with a better equipped colleague to assist our firm with its many projects and increasing clientele.
As the visitors who regularly return to our site might agree, I have been passionate about offering you one of the best educational legal sites for family law, divorce, and mediations in the country (we had over 100,000 visitors in 2011). But that is an avocation. Our real energies are devoted to ethically and energetically representing the interests of parties contemplating or involved in all manner of family law cases, including divorce and domestic partnership dissolutions, and disputes concerning spousal support, child support, and simple and complex property division. One of our expectations in bringing Mike on board is also to make divorce affordable for those who need help but have significant budget limitations.
Mike brings to our practice a deep commitment to ethics, a heartfelt sensitivity to the struggles of people like you in these horrendous circumstances that you face, and an uncommon intelligence and creativity for solving problems and issues. His education and training was very much what I would describe an "old-school" educational values, meaning that he is a student of history, literature, and of psychology without being an 'arm-chair' intellectual. He holds the highest values, and his work ethic and commitment to excellence is on a level I (frankly) don't bump into too often. I look forward to his regular contributions to our Blog, but even more to the benefits and joys of sharing a professionalism and camaraderie that is often missing for sole practitioners. Two minds are always better than one!
Mike and I have also decided to expand our practice areas to include handling civil cases, and some types of criminal cases. We will keep you posted as to the specific areas where we might be of useful service to you!
Mike is licensed to practice law in the States of California and Washington.
To contact Michael Peterson directly, please click here.
Law Firm of Thurman W. Arnold, III
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| August 16, 2011 |
| Marriage of MARGULIS - Fiduciary Duties of MANAGING SPOUSES |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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Marriage of Margulis, Part 2 - Duties of Managing Spouses
Please see Part I of my evaluation of
IRMO Margulis as the launching point for understanding the appellate court's outline of interspousal fiduciary duties.
The Margulis rule states that once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets.
The rule is justified by examining the scope of fiduciary duties imposed by the California Family Code. Interestingly, the trial court had found that the Husband (Alan) had breached his fiduciary duties to Wife (Elaine) "to maintain proper records of all community assets which he had exclusive control and management over...." Yet, other than imposing $20,000 in sanctions and assessing $30,000 in attorney fees against Alan, the trial court did not believe Elaine had produced sufficient evidence to explain what had really happened to the deposit accounts that were at issue beyond Exhibit 18, 'the smoking gun'. $50,000 in sanctions was a cheap price to pay relative to the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It was reversed for applying too narrow a breach of fiduciary duty and applying the wrong remedy.
Since Margulis contains a great explanation of how statutory fiduciary duties operate I quote the decision as follows:
"Family Code provisions detailing the fiduciary obligations between spouses provide strong support for shifting the burden of proof to the managing spouse when determining the value and disposition of missing assets. The starting point is section 721, which provides that accountability for the management of community assets is a fundamental aspect of the fiduciary duties owed between spouses.
Section 721, subdivision (b), states, in relevant part: between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in Sections 16403, 16404, and 16503 of the Corporations Code, including, but not limited to, the following: ¶(1) Providing each spouse access at all times to any books kept regarding a transaction for the purposes of inspection and copying. ¶(2) Rendering upon request, true and full information of all things affecting any transaction which concerns the community property. Nothing in this section is intended to impose a duty for either spouse to keep detailed books and records of community property transactions. ¶(3) Accounting to the spouse, and holding as a trustee, any benefit or profit derived from any transaction by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse which concerns the community property.
Section 721's specific incorporation of the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in• section 16403 of the Corporations Code, makes clear that the duty to disclose relevant information concerning transactions affecting the community property is an affirmative and broad obligation. Corporations Code section 16403 requires each partner to furnish to a partner ... [¶] (1) Without demand, any information concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the partnership agreement or this chapter.... (Corp. Code, § 16403, subd. (c), italics added.)
Section 1100 further delineates the scope of a managing spouse's accountability. That statute not only prohibits a spouse from engaging in certain conduct, such as making a unilateral gift of community personal property or disposing of it for less than fair and reasonable value, without the written consent of the other spouse (§ 1100, subd. (b)), but it also requires each spouse to act as a fiduciary toward the other in the management of community assets in accordance with the general rules governing fiduciary relationships ... as specified in Section 721, until such time as the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court. This duty includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an interest.... (§ 1100, subd. (e).)
Importantly, section 1101 creates a right of action and specific remedies for the breach of fiduciary duty between spouses. Subdivision (a) of section 1101 gives each spouse a claim against the other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse's present undivided one-half interest in the community estate.... The statutory remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty, specifically including a breach of those [duties] set out in Sections 721 and 1100, include a mandatory award of 50 percent of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney's fees and court costs.... (§ 1101, subd. (g).)
If the nondisclosure or wrongful disposition of community property falls within the ambit of Civil Code section 3294 (punitive damages upon clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud or malice), the court must award to injured spouse the entire value of
the asset (§ 1101, subd. (h)).
Finally, section 2100 makes clear that these fiduciary obligations of disclosure and accounting continue to bind spouses after separation until final distribution of assets. Section 2100 states: [A] full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties.... Moreover, each party has a continuing duty to immediately, fully, and accurately update and augment that disclosure to the extent there have been any material changes so that at the time the parties enter into an agreement for the resolution of any of these issues, or at the time of trial on these issues, each party will have a full and complete knowledge of the relevant underlying facts. (§ 2100, subd. (c), italics added; see also § 2102, subd. (a)(1) [from date of separation to date community assets are distributed, spouses are subject to § 721's fiduciary duty to disclose assets and update material changes].)
Taken together, these statutes impose on a managing spouse affirmative, wide-ranging duties to disclose and account for the existence, valuation, and disposition of all community assets from the date of separation through final property division. Simply put, these statutes require the spouse to account for his or her management of the property. The managing spouse must reveal if the community property changes value, ceases to exist, or is transferred for less than its worth, thereby depriving the nonmanaging spouse of his or her half-interest. Because of the fiduciary relationship between spouses, the managing spouse must reveal any self-dealing or other conduct that impaired the value of the property and entitles the other spouse to compensation.
Applying these statutes to the facts of this case, a trial court could conclude Alan breached his fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting. A court could find he breached his duty to provide full and accurate disclosure of all community assets when in pretrial exchanges he failed to inform Elaine that $20,000 was in the Charles Schwab IRA's, asserting that the only existing community property was the Sycamore house. A trial court similarly could find Alan breached his duty to disclose immediately and fully any material changes in the community property (§ 2100, subd. (c)), by failing to tell Elaine until just before trial that all the community investment and checking accounts he had managed were virtually empty. Additionally, by refusing to provide Elaine with any documentary or other corroborating proof of what actually happened to the money that had once been in those accounts, Alan may have breached his duty to furnish to Elaine any information concerning the [community's] business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of [her] rights (Corp. Code, § 16403, subd. (c)(1); § 721, subd. (b)), which included her right to pursue a claim against Alan for impairment to [her] ... one-half interest in the community estate (§ 1101, subds. (a), (g) & (h)).
The trial court, however, found a single, narrow breach of duty by Alan: a breach of the duty to keep and provide adequate records. In so ruling, the trial court impliedly found Alan did not owe broader fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting. The trial court's erroneous finding on the scope of Alan's duties led it to apply the wrong remedy. Instead of awarding Elaine at least 50 percent of the value of undisclosed or wrongfully transferred assets (§ 1101, subds. (g) [50 percent], (h) [100 percent upon proof of oppression, fraud or malice]), the trial court ordered Alan to pay Elaine $20,000 as sanctions, plus attorney fees.
The trial court's failure to find Alan breached his broader fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting stemmed from the court's denial of Elaine's request to charge Alan with the exhibit 18 asset values unless he disproved those values or proved he properly disposed of those assets. Although the trial court found that Elaine had satisfied the requisite foundation to admit the exhibit, it accorded the document little or no weight because Elaine had not prepared it and had no evidence to support it. Consequently, according to the trial court, Elaine failed to carry her burden of proving the accounts itemized in exhibit 18 ever had the values listed in that document, and Alan could not be charged with wrongfully disposing of assets he never possessed. But, as discussed above, the trial court misapplied the burden of proof.
Elaine's introduction of exhibit 18, which Alan conceded he prepared, satisfied her initial burden. The statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting then effectively shifted the burden to Alan to rebut the presumption he should be charged with the assets listed on exhibit 18, a document that was prima facie evidence of the account values it stated."
Based upon the foregoing the case was reversed and remanded to the trial court. The sanctions award of $20,000 plus $30,000 was also reversed "so that the court may revisit the question of the appropriate remedy should the evidence establish Alan's breach of fiduciary duty" - in other words, the appellate court is directing the trial court to hit Alan harder than was amounted to a slap on the wrist. As Justice Aronson wryly directs:
"Alan's cross-appeal merits little discussion. His challenge to the trial court's finding that he breached his fiduciary duties to Elaine is meritless. Likewise, his additional challenges to the award against him for sanctions and attorney fees fails, given the clear statutory authorization for both awards in light of Alan's breach of duty.... Nevertheless, we reverse the attorney fees and sanctions award so the court may revisit the question of the appropriate remedy should the evidence established Alan's breach of duty." Elaine is to be awarded her attorney fees and costs for this appeal.
Margulis also contains an excellent discussion regarding Epstein credits, debt payment in lieu of support, and tracing issues. I will endeavor to blog that portion of the decision in Part III.
Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S. |
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| August 15, 2011 |
| IRMO MARGULIS - Managing Spouse Has BURDEN OF PROOF To Explain MISSING ASSETS |
| Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S. |
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Marriage of Margulis (8/11/2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 277
Part One
I am always pleased to report cutting edge rulings by our appellate courts, and this is one of the most important decisions in recent years affecting who has the burden of proof to explain what happens to assets that disappear after marriage partners separate, and what the consequences are for managing "in-spouses" who cannot explain what happened to liquid (or other assets) that existed at separation but seem to have evaporated in the meantime. While upon reflection it is hard to imagine how this decision could be news because it makes such perfect sense, the Fourth Appellate District's pronouncements (by the Honorable J. Aronson) are indeed a new extension of existing law - which is why the trial court in this case was reversed.
Special kudos to Attorneys Stephen Temko and Dawn Gray on behalf of the Association of Certified Law Specialists (an organization serving the public interest that I am proud to be a member of) for weighing in with amicus curiae briefs that probably helped to inform the appellate justices in positive ways.
Because this case is important I am going to help it be digested in two gulps - this is Part I.
The root holding of IRMO Margulis is this: Once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets. It is now clear that managing spouses have the burden of proof to account for missing assets that they controlled.
Family Code section 1100 states that "either spouse has the [right of] management and control of the community personal property, ..., as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse."
But when parties separate the more empowered partner often grabs or already manages all the marbles, and then enjoys the advantage of continuing to carry those marbles around and even spending them down until the community property pot is ultimately divided. Without accountability this frequently led to abuses and misappropriations that - in the absence of this new rule - favored that party and facilitates their practical ability to defraud the community property estate, notwithstanding a legal duty per Family Code section 721(b) to account for what went where. Until now. The
Margulis rule is necessary to protect the rights of an "out-spouse" as a matter of basic fiduciary protections.
The facts of the case as set forth in the appellate decision are these (and are reminiscent of the facts of the Davenport decision): Alan and Elaine separated after 33 years of marriage in August, 1996. Alan moved out of the parties' Irvine home and moved to Chicago to start a new job. Elaine remained in the family residence. They owned a home in Palm Desert, California.The marriage yielded two children who are now adults.
During the marriage Alan was the sole working spouse and exercised "complete control" of the couple's finances - sound familiar? This included retirement, bank, and investment account personal property assets. Although Alan moved out in 1996, Elaine did not file for divorce for another six years - in 2002. Five more years passed before Alan even filed a response in those proceedings. Throughout this period Alan paid Elaine just enough, evidently, for her to be satisfied with the financial status quo so that she undertook no steps to move the divorce towards a conclusion. I can only speculate what psychological and emotional dynamics were at play in these people's lives, but infer that Elaine trusted Alan enough that she did not perceive that she needed to take vigorous steps to protect herself. Which gave him free reign for a long, long time.
Once the case did begin to move forward, as often happens when there is a significant power imbalance in relationship, it began to move quickly and that pace certainly further advantaged the husband. Commonly it is the in-spouse who is rushing the case to trial while the out-spouse plays catch-up and the parties, or the in-spouse, play discovery games and hide and seek with assets, disclosures, and backup. Bank accounts are easily susceptible to this type of abuse because they are document intensive, and expensive to evaluate. In and out transactions (deposits in, transfers out) must each be traced in order for forensic experts and the court to know how to characterize and characterize transactions and the flow of cash. Here Alan filed his Response to Elaine's 2002 Petition on February 21, 2007, and the parties found themselves in a pre-trial Mandatory Settlement Conference only six months later. This means that Elaine's team had very little time to prepare since Alan knew where the marbles were but elected not to share their identity and location.
There was a single "smoking gun" in the case which consisted of what became at trial "Exhibit 18." This was a two-page document that was entitled "confidential personal financial statement" for "Alan/Elaine Margulis," dated February 1, 1999. It reflected total assets of $1,305,500. The liquid (i.e., cash) portion amounted to more than half of that number.
At trial Elaine testified that, as the nonmanaging spouse, she had no personal knowledge or records of the value of the accounts at any time. This was the sole extent of her evidence at trial about the status of the assets near the date of separation, and essentially Alan's attorneys argued that this proved nothing. Elaine's attorney responded insightfully that the effect of this document was to shift the burden of proof to Alan to explain and show that he had properly disposed of those assets, or that the stock holdings lost their value as a result of market conditions - as opposed to them having been withdrawn or mismanaged by him or for his sole benefit. But the trial judge disagreed, which set up this reversal in favor of Elaine.
The trial court explained "I don't believe it supports, standing alone [that] your assets listed did, in fact, exist." Wife had no other evidence to prove that they did - hence, without the rule established by Justice Aronson in this case, she would be out of luck. Her proof would have failed on the contested issues, and it did fail at the trial court level. Before this decision the trial court's perspective was a bit shallow but not surprising. It takes bold judges with considerable family law experience to read the sub-text.
Who has the burden of proof on a topic is often key to which party wins or loses on a given issue. This is why Marulis is important to control of asset cases.
Shifting the Burden of Proof
There are two common principles linked to the concept of the "burden of proof." One is the burden of persuasion and the other is the burden of producing evidence. Often if a party cannot produce evidence on a subject that the law imposes a burden upon them to produce in order to prevail, they lose. Irmo Margulis has implications beyond family law.
The Margulis decision observes: "the trial court concluded that Elaine, the nonmanaging spouse who lacked both personal knowledge and records concerning the assets listed on exhibit 18, failed to meet the difficult burden of proving these now missing assets had existed....
The trial court's failure to place the burden of the duty on Alan relieved him of the duty to account for his postseparation management of these assets. Thus, Alan did not have to prove the
amounts
that had been in these accounts or that he had properly disposed of those sums. This lack of accountability poses a risk of abuse and runs afoul of the statutory scheme imposing broad fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting on a managing spouse." [Emphasis added].
It continued: "Given that 'bedrock concerns' of 'policy and fairness' drive the analysis [citation omitted]
, it is not surprising that a common trigger for burden-shifting is 'when the parties have unequal access to evidence necessary to prove a disputed issue. 'Where the evidence necessary to establish a fact essential to a claim lies peculiarly within the knowledge and competence of one of the parties, that party has the burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue although it is not the party asserting the claim.'....
Concerns over 'unequal access to evidence' [citations omitted]
are particularly pressing in the context of a marital dissolution where financial records can be crucial to ensuring the equal division of property required by Family Code section 2550.... Undoubtedly, in marriages and separations like the Margulis's where one spouse exercised exclusive control over community property, the parties will have vastly
unequal
access to evidence concerning the disposition of that property. When this occurs, fairness requires shifting to the managing spouse the burden of proof on missing assets. Moreover, ..., the statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting owed between spouses further justify that result."
The Appellate Court goes on to explain why this result is fair in light of the fiduciary obligations between spouses that I have written about so much over the past few years. I will separately blog that portion of the decision.
But as I have been trumpeting now for many months, the appellate courts are working overtime to save the existing California scheme of family law to ensure transparency - it is my opinion long overdue but much appreciated!
For those in-spouses who do act in good faith after separation and the pendency of the marital proceedings, Margulis is a cautionary tale - managing spouses had better keep records of transactions affecting the community property estate and make all required disclosures or find themselves assuming the risk of loss or diminution of the value of those assets.
Please note that the appellate Court's initial decision of August 11, 2011, was modified on August 26 and September 9, 2011. The citation to the modified opinion is Marriage of Prentis-Margulis v. Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252. I have yet compare the differences in the two decisions.
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| May 23, 2011 |
| FORM OF TITLE Trumps COMMUNITY PROPERTY PRESUMPTION Where Life Insurance Is An Asset in DIVORCE |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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Marriage of Valli, B222435
PLEASE NOTE - The California Supreme Court granted review of this decision on 8/24/11 and as a result the opinion reviewed below has been vacated.
8/26/11
TWA
The California Second Appellate District issued its ruling in Marriage of Valli on May 18, 2011, reversing a Los Angeles trial court that had found that a $3.75 million insurance policy purchased during marriage was the parties' community property. Instead Justice Stanley Mosk declared that the 'super-presumption' contained in Evidence Code section 662 trumps the more general presumption per
Family Code section 760 that property acquired during marriage is jointly owned. Interestingly, this was true even in the absence of direct evidence of the title to the policy itself; it was sufficient that the insurance agent who sold the policy testified the policy was issued in the name of the Wife and that he'd been told it was being purchased for the protection of the family.
At issue was who owned a 'blended universal life insurance contract' on Husband's life (this is THE singer Frankie Valli) bought some eighteen months before separation that had a cash surrender value of $365,032 by time of trial. Husband argued that since the policy was acquired during marriage and paid for with community funds, it belonged to the community and each party was therefore entitled to one-half. Wife contended that Husband had told her from the inception of the policy that she was to be the owner of the policy and its sole beneficiary, and this was not disputed. She introduced testimonial evidence that the policy listed her as its owner. The trial court sided with the Husband. The decision turns on legal and not factual issues, and I think it deserves mentioning that this appears to be a case that was ethically litigated - Mr. Valli was wholesomely honest and resisted the temptation to assert a version of what happened that included allegations of "pillowtalk" or other reassurances, for instance, from Wife that she had admitted the policy was joint because these did not occur (nor would they have been helpful) - something that is otherwise common in the "liar's contests" that many dissolutions devolve into.
Family Code section 2550 assigns trial courts a mandatory duty to value and divide equally the parties' community property estate. But what is community property? Generally, factors determinative of whether property is separate or community are the time of acquisition; operation of various presumptions, particularly those concerning the form of title; and whether the spouses have transmuted or converted the property from separate to community or vice versa ...." (In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 291).
Family Code section 760 states "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property." This is the "time of acquisition" rule, and it creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of the creation of CP. That presumption can be overcome by a "preponderance of the evidence" - that is by evidence that shows by a 51% likelihood that it is separate property. FC section 760 is the starting point for any analysis of assets and debts acquired during marriage for purposes of defining the marital balance sheet.
Evidence Code section 662 is an evidentiary presumption, found outside the California Family Code. It states "[t]he owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof." The "clear and convincing" standard of proof is considered to be a "super-presumption" exactly because of what it takes to overcome it. The public policy basis for this evidentiary presumption is to ensure the stability of titles to property and within the insurance context it is important that insurance companies have the ability to rely on their information of who holds title to a policy in paying out death benefits, and in not exposing themselves to multiple claims (and paying the wrong person or heir) upon death.
Hence, under some circumstances, when the general CP presumption and the form of title presumptions collide the form of title presumption trumps the more general presumption.
Here the evidence at trial was largely undisputed. A year before the parties separated crooner Valli was experiencing medical problems and told Wife that he wanted to buy a policy on his own life to make sure he took care of his family in the event he might die. He wanted to ensure the kids could go to college and that "there would be enough money for everybody." At that time the parties had no plans to split up.
Accordingly, he bought the policy from his insurance agent. Husband's business manager told Wife that they intended to make her the owner, and Husband himself testified that he "put everything in [Wife's] name, figuring she would take care and give to the kids what they might having coming." His insurance agent testified at trial the policy was issued in Wife's name. Of interest, however, the policy itself was never introduced into evidence.
Hence, on appeal Wife urged that "the act of taking title to property in the name of one spouse during marriage with the consent of the other spouse effectively removes that property from the general community property presumption. In that situation, the property is presumably the separate property of the spouse in whose name title is taken." Since Husband had failed to introduce "clear and convincing" proof that overcame the title presumption, the equity in the policy belonged to her. Nothing required that proof of the form of title be through documentary evidence where there was sufficient indirect testimony that the policy was titled in Wife's name.
The Second Appellate District Court agreed. "Frankie did not present evidence of an agreement or understanding with Randy [the Wife] that when the policy was placed solely in Randys name as owner, they intended title to the policy to be other than Randy's separate property. (In re Marriage of Brooks, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.) Likewise, Frankie did not present evidence that he was unaware that title to the policy was taken solely in Randys name. That Frankie knew the policy was taken solely in Randy's name is supported by substantial evidence. Frankie testified that he
put everything in Randy's name, and Randy testified that Frankie and Siegel told her that
they were going to make [her] the owner' of the policy."
Husband also unsuccessfully argued that Family Code section 721 creates an additional presumption of undue influence where one party by taking title in their name solely gains an advantage over the other, and that given that presumption the EC section 662 super-presumption could not come into play. However, 721 applies in interspousal transactions and this was not a transaction between the two married persons but between one of them and the insurance agent. "Randy could not have owed a fiduciary duty to Frankie in a transaction in which she did not participate." Moreover, even if the presumption of undue influence did arise there was sufficient proof rebutting Husband's clear intention to make Wife the owner; Wife had no role in the transaction whatever.
Moreover, the justices noted that there was no evidence that the cash surrender value of the life insurance policy was intended to be a "savings device." Instead, Husband's intent at the policy inception was clear that it was for the benefit of the Wife.
Finally, they dismissed Husband's argument that there had not been a valid transmutation of the policy from community to Wife's separate property. "A 'transmutation' is an interspousal transaction or agreement that works to change the character of property the parties already own. By contrast, the initial acquisition of property from a third person does not constitute a transmutation and thus is not subject to the [Family Code section 852, subdivision (a)] transmutation requirements." Keep in mind that Husband had purchased the policy only 18 months before the parties separated. They had had a 20 year marriage. In order to amass $365,032 in policy equity over such a short period, the community had to have made quite substantial premium payments to fund it. Mr. Valli was 69 when he acquired the coverage, and the cost of the policy had to be exorbitant.
Normally one might reasonably think that the claim that the cash surrender value was now Wife's separate property would require proof of a transmutation from the community to separate property - this is what the trial court assumed to be the case when it found in favor of the Husband. However, Wife's counsel never claimed a transmutation, a wise strategic move.
While this outcome might, at least for Husband, seem unfair it illustrates that in the realm of community verses separate property, when form of title presumptions come into play, as a matter of public policy favoring the stability of financial transactions with third parties (and not just between the spouses alone), the manner in which title is taken controls unless rebutted by extremely compelling evidence. This is not intuitively or even rationally obvious. In California matrimonial law certain fictions may dictate the outcome. This decision is important for any lawyer or self-represented party where one asset acquired during marriage is a life insurance policy. Common sense, and even the expectations of people who are married until the day of separation comes, would seem to militate in favor of a different result.
In remanding the case to the trial court (i.e., sending it back with instructions to enter a new decision consistent with the appellate court's reasoning), the Valli opinion does "leave to the trial court any reallocation of assets or award of reimbursement in light of our holding." Presumably that reimbursement applies to premiums paid by Husband after the date of separation that increased the cash value of the life insurance policy, but does not form a basis for reimbursing what was paid before. Since the policy was acquired in 2003 but trial occurred five years later, this reimbursement is not insubstantial. Of course, Frankie is too old now to be able to acquire a new $3.75 million dollar policy and Wife will receive this money upon his passing if the policy remains in force.
Wife was represented by the divorce powerhouse Los Angeles law firm of Jaffe and Clemens and Husband's appellate team included the highly notable legal scholar Garrett C. Dailey.
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| May 06, 2011 |
| Marriage of Davenport: Trial Court SANCTIONS Wife Under FC Section 271 for Her ATTORNEYS' "UNBRIDLED AGGRESSION" In Family Court Proceedings! |
| Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S. |
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A Shifting Judicial Response to Overzealous Advocacy:
Excessively Exuberant and Inflammatory Litigation Tactics
Will Not Be Tolerated in California
Justice Richman of the First Appellate District for Sonoma County, California, issued this week a momentous opinion that signals that courts will no longer passively allow attorneys who embark on rampaging attacks in high conflict divorce, or elsewhere, to do so without meaningful reprisals. Clients who encourage or permit their lawyers to manage their cases in this style may find their purses and wallets pried open.
While my review of the case may seem harsh, I believe that it reflects the frustration of the appellate court. I have endeavored to quote the decision itself as much as possible for readability. The trend in recent reported appellate decisions suggests that the pendulum is swinging against litigants who get sucked into divorce trance and its insane warfare. Marriage of Davenport excoriates not only one lawyer and his client but also the Santa Rosa law firm for which the attorney worked.
Mediators, collaborative attorneys, ethical divorce practitioners, and holistic lawyers will appreciate that a major California appellate decision has outed the adversarial elephant in the courtroom for the destructive creature that it is, affirming consequences for litigious behavior that are necessary and overdue. Courts are not merely imposing monetary punishments, they are publicly shaming those professionals (attorneys, mental health professionals, and even trial court judges) who fail to act within the bounds of due process, fiduciary duty obligations, and the rules of civility. Indeed, last month the Second Appellate District in Ventura County upheld a sanctions award against a self-represented attorney in a family law proceeding, and reported him to the California State Bar as well.
Still, Davenport raises some important questions. These include:
- What level of vitriol and sarcastic behavior is permissible in the trenches of high-conflict divorce proceedings? When does zealous advocacy so exceed the bounds of civility that the behavior of litigants or their attorneys receives as much attention as the underlying property division and support issues in the case?
- Is it possible to remain a civil advocate without sacrificing the zeal that is required and expected of lawyer warriors?
- If attorneys, or the clients in their stead, are to be held accountable for conduct that increases the adversarial tone of the proceedings might this have a chilling effect upon strong and courageous advocacy, making less empowered parties more vulnerable to exploitative litigation tactics employed by the other side?
- Should the California legislature amend Family Code section 271 to authorize trial courts to sanction family law attorneys directly for abuses they themselves commit? Good arguments exist for and against (another day, another blog).
Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507
Marriage of Davenport was published May 4, 2011. It may be the most important annunciation in years by California jurists that some litigants and lawyers are stubbornly out of control, recognizing that the survival of our current family court legal scheme requires that the judiciary manage the worst behavior of such participants.
Davenport will be cited as a textbook illustration of what to overcome and avoid.
Click here for the full opinion.
Jill and Ken Davenport married in 1948 and separated in 1990, amassing an estate worth near 57 million dollars. Ken was a talented car salesman and real estate investor. It wasn't until March 1, 2006 that Jill filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. During that 16 years "there was agreement and cooperation, including their participation in joint estate planning favorable to Jill, and agreement to sell off many of the [community properties]." Jill was then 75 years of age, and Ken was 78.
This cooperation ended on February, 3 2006 when something set Jill onto the road to calamity. She fired a first salvo in the form of a letter to Ken which accused him of having "stepped over the line," having "lied to me," warning he being taken advantage of by others (sweet irony?), and demanding money and property. Although the parties had co-existed peaceably for almost 16 years, the status quo exploded with this letter.
What had changed for Jill? That month or before she'd retained the law firm of O'Brien Watters and Davis to protect and advance her interests. When her Petition was filed, senior attorney Michael Watters was named as her attorney of record. However, in November 2005 Andrew Watters (Michael's nephew), passed the California Bar and joined the law firm effective February, 2006. He was introduced to Jill three days later and became her gladiator, so beginning an odyssey that would continue unabated for more than five years. According to Andrew, thereafter he "personally handled or [was] personally involved in each and every transaction between the parties ..., as well as each and every discovery request, discovery event, court proceeding, and other substantive matter." As the First Appellate District court dryly notes, "[i]n short, Andrew Watters became the lead lawyer for Jill in what would necessarily be a complex family law litigation." "Early on, a young and inexperienced attorney at that firm [Andrew] became Jill's primary attorney, and interacted with Ken's attorneys for the next two years, interactions that would generate a 35-page register of actions and 19 volumes of court files."
Out of the gate Andrew Watters pursued a campaign of attack against Ken and his attorneys that seemed ill-fated. Five months into the proceedings, he filed a motion to compel further answers to Form Interrogatories after making negligible efforts to resolve the discovery dispute informally. California has long required that before litigants file motions to compel discovery, the record must show that they made reasonable and sincere efforts to resolve the argument informally. Proof of this is contained in what are called "meet and confer" letters. Unfortunately, these letters are often authored with a threatening tone, reflect posturing and grandstanding, and sometimes hope to set up the other side for sanctions when a motion to compel is heard. In this case, Andrew wrote a single letter, failed to respond to Ken's attorney's reply, and he didn't attempt to discuss the issues with Ken's attorneys directly before filing his motion. The trial court declared these efforts to be "unreasonable" and "admonished [counsel for both parties] to change their meet and confer practices so that meeting and conferring is meaningful and not just a token gesture."
Over the next two years Wife's side would file eight discovery motions. The court file came to consist of 19 volumes, something that the experienced trial judge, Judge Cerena Wong, would later describe as "outrageous" for a family law case. Wife filed three OSC re Contempts against the Husband, including one in which the Court in August, 2006, ordered the parties to meet and confer in a 4-way, as to which Ken "refused to meet and confer if attorney Andrew G. Watters was present in the room." Oh boy. Unfortunately, this reaction is not uncommon but risks forming a vacuum where the business of cooperatively resolving the case stalls.
The FC §271 Sanctions' Requests
On May 23, 2008, attorney Watters filed two motions that ultimately blew up in Jill's face, led to this appeal, but now provides a roadmap for how not to behave when representing parties to matrimonial proceedings. One motion requested Family Code section 271 sanctions and attorney fees.
Wife's initial motion paperwork was "blank", evidently designed to reserve hearing dates on the court's calendar. The appellate court notes that "Andrew Waters did not consult with [Ken's attorney] on the date, nor even advise him of the filings, causing him to complain about the timing of the motions, including that they were filed late in the afternoon of May 23, 2008, the Friday before the Memorial Day weekend, and at the last possible moment."
Family Code section 271(a) reads in pertinent part:
"the court may base an award of attorney's fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction.... In order to obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award...."
Jill sought legal fees of $600,861 and costs of $332,933. Her attorney filed a 52-page declaration which attached 1250 pages of exhibits. Much of Watters' declaration was "inappropriate, asserting hearsay, argument, opinion, and conclusion, and was improper on several bases. An early passage ... illustrates some of this, where Andrew Watters purports to describe Jill's description of Ken's 'negotiating tactics, habits, and personality traits,' which he labeled 'Deal in the pocket,' 'Poor mouth,' and 'Artificial crisis,'...." This sort of sarcasm doesn't warm the hearts of judges.
Although the record is not clear, it appears that Watters requested that Ken's attorneys also be sanctioned. If so, personalizing sanctions between attorneys is always a dangerous mistake.
Watters' tone was reportedly sarcastic, deprecatory, improperly personal, and lacked objectivity (see several paragraphs below for the juicier stuff). Effectively he was "testifying" on behalf of his client. His declaration included assertions that:
- "I've seen first hand that Ken can be a very persuasive person, and that Ken seems to use all of his abilities and skill to get the best deals for himself. Unfortunately we've learned that Ken has also used this great skill and ability to take care of his wife."
- "I was skeptical ... that someone could really use these tactics effectively outside of a car dealership.... However, throughout our dealings with Ken in this matter, I have personally observed Ken use each of the aforementioned tactics."
- "During the pendency of this proceedings,...., the 'inconvenient truth' here is that Ken has used his unusually strong business skill and acumen against his spouse despite his fiduciary duties..."
Wife's attorney asserted several breaches of fiduciary duty including that Ken (1) omitted two assets worth $3.1 million on his schedule of assets and debts; (2) produced a written statement of the parties' net worth to be $30.5 million, when several months earlier he gave a financial statement to a loan officer showing the net worth to be twice that; (3) that his schedule of assets and debts failed to state values for many of the listed items; and (4) engaged in various discovery abuses, including stalling the taking of his deposition for ten months.
Watters' motion included Points and Authorities citing but one case: In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470.
Feldman is the most important fiduciary duty case of the last decade. It upheld $250,000 in sanctions against a Husband who clearly was frustrating the resolution of that case, and who was secreting assets from the Wife. "Feldman" has become the rallying cry behind many well-intentioned efforts by California Family Law attorneys to force the other side to comply with their fiduciary duties.
Many divorce attorneys have "Feldman letters" loaded and cocked on their computers, to fire off where the other side is 'hiding the ball.' Several years ago these were widely circulated within the family law community with a certain amount of glee. Some attorneys use these letters as an intimidation tactic.
Feldman sanctions' threats are indeed sometimes required to remind the other side they are straying from their obligations to be transparent - but misconduct must be egregious in order to succeed on a
Feldman claim.
Feldman is important authority for curbing and remedying abusive and dishonest conduct in divorce proceedings, but like all things it can be over-used, blunting its utility.
Watters urged: "'Here, the Davenport matter might as well be called
In re Marriage of Feldman - The Sequel. If ever a dissolution of marriage action in Sonoma County warranted the imposition of sanctions on a party, this is the case.... indeed, 'this case is
worse than what happened in
Feldman.'" The decision asserts
"F
eldman would become Jill's short-hand description of all that was claimed to be wrong with Ken's conduct,..."
"Feldman, Feldman, Feldman, Jill repeated below,..." The appellate justices noted that "Jill remains relentless ...."
For those who have been on the receiving end of nasty Feldman letters, this is the first reported decision that provides an antidote. However, at the same time,
Feldman is important authority to assist under-empowered spouses in family law litigation.
Ken naturally opposed Jill's Feldman motion, and gave notice that he would seek too would seek Section 271 sanctions. Jill's Reply argued Ken's motion was technically defective and filed on the wrong forms, and that Ken's requested fees "have little or no connection with the alleged 'sanctionable' conduct of Jill"
as opposed to that of Jill's attorney. It is not clear that they challenged the
amount of these fees.
The trial of these dueling Feldman claims took place over five days in October and November, 2008. Wife's attorney filed detailed evidentiary objections to the declarations and exhibits that Ken submitted, including motions to strike portions of his pleadings, and Judge Wong essentially ignored these objections making "it abundantly clear that she could separate the wheat from the chaff."
Davenport deals a blow to the common practice of using evidentiary objection briefs to attack declarations from the opposing side that contain improper matter (the function of these is to emphasize to the Court the lack of
admissible evidentiary support for statements contains in these declarations, and to strike some of the contents of these pleadings from the record). Judge Wong stated "as far as I'm concerned, fighting over comments or statements made as to whether or not they're relevant or whether or not they're objectionable, you know, this is not a jury trial for heaven's sake. I'm a judge. You know, I can sift through this stuff. I might have some comment about what I think to be more lawyerly conduct and lawyerly language . . . . You should be able to rely on the court being able to read what it reads and eliminate what's not relevant."
Well, maybe.... Judges are as human as the rest of us. Exactly what argument or "evidence" a court is relying upon in reaching its conclusions is of rightful concern to litigants and their attorneys. Short-circuiting a proper record that makes effective appellate review possible carries a danger of giving trial courts too much power and discretion.
Judge Wong issued a statement of decision that found that:
- Jill's counsel's failure to meet and confer before filing her motion, and during the proceedings, is sanctionable conduct.
- The facts Jill alleged "do not rise to the level [of Feldman]."
- No valid evidence or support was presented that justified an expedited hearing (normally Feldman motions are heard at the conclusion of a dissolution action, when the Court has the larger picture before it, but Attorney Watters had urged that an immediate hearing was required here to deter what he claimed was continuing sanctionable conduct by Ken and his attorneys.
- Jill's counsel's hostile and disrespectful correspondence is sanctionable.
- Jill's attorney repeatedly made references to what was said and presented in a mediation that the parties had undertaken, in violation of Evidence Code section 1119.
- Watters' surreptitious conduct with computer consultants in relation to extracting computer data on a computer in his possession that was believed to include privileged material was inappropriate and sanctionable (in connection with retrieving data stored on a computer that Wife controlled, Watters switched the computer experts, replacing the agreed upon forensic with an IT person whom he'd met at a karaoke Bar where he claimed such "nerds" are known to hang out).
- All fees relating to Wife's motions could have been avoided by Wife's counsel. Had he done any of the following, it was likely the costly motions and hearings relating thereto could have been avoided: (1) Met and conferred with counsel; (2) been more respectful and cooperative; (3) used the assigned case manager; (4) accepted Husband's counsel's offers to agree to a neutral forensic accountant.
- Watters' insistence on a expedited Feldman trial in the middle of the case rather than at its conclusion was unnecessary and unreasonably expensive to the parties, and wasted the Court's limited resources.
Judge Wong denied Jill's motions. "There has been a failure of proof sufficient to penalize husband and his attorneys Merrill, Arnone, Benoit or Johnson." She granted Ken's request that the Court find that the Petitioner, through her attorneys, engaged in a course of conduct that was sanctionable. Judge Wong observed:
"'The Court questions the wisdom of such a large firm as O'Brien, Watters to choose to 'educate' a newly admitted lawyer with a case that involved millions of dollars of varied assets in California and other states, with a long term marriage and complicated trust holdings. With no background in either civil or family law litigation, Mr. Andrew Watters admitted to the Court that he was taught to litigate this case with unbridled aggression. These uncooperative and uncivil courses of action have caused
Mrs. Davenport unnecessary delays and unnecessary attorney fees and costs.'" [Italics and emphasis added].
I don't know if this last reference is a typographical mistake , but if not Judge Wong's message that Jill's gladiators poorly served her is remarkable. It also spells "malpractice."
The court also criticized Ken, who had early on stated he would not engage in a court-ordered 4-way if Attorney Watters "was in the room." Judge Wong saw this position as "inexcusably rude and uncalled for. Respondent's arrogance must have hit a sensitive nerve in counsel because Petitioner's case became a case that rapidly deteriorated into unprofessionally rude conduct and speech after that."
What Divorce Lawyers Might Avoid
The appellate court found that "Andrew Watters' demeaning comments to opposing counsel were contrary to the California Attorney Guidelines of Civility and Professionalism promulgated by the State Bar in 2007 (Guidelines). These guidelines reflect that "attorneys have an obligation to be professional with . . . other parties and counsel, [and] the courts," which obligation "includes civility, professional integrity, . . . candor . . . and cooperation, all of which are essential to the fair administration of justice and conflict resolution." (Guidelines, supra, Introduction, p. 3.) Section 4 of the Guidelines further counsels that "An attorney should avoid, hostile, demeaning or humiliating words," further providing in relevant part that: "An attorneys communications about the legal system should at all times reflect civility, professional integrity, personal dignity, and respect for the legal system. An attorney should not engage in conduct that is unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. For example, in communications . . . with adversaries: [¶] . . . [¶] c. An attorney should not disparage the intelligence, integrity, ethics, morals or behavior of the court or other counsel, parties or participants when those characteristics are not at issue. [¶] . . . [¶] f. An attorney should avoid hostile, demeaning or humiliating words." (Guidelines, supra, § 4, pp. 4-5.)"
Justice Richman continued "there is abundant evidence of Andrew Watters treatment - more accurately, mistreatment - of his opposing counsel in his correspondence with them. Bad enough that such correspondence occurs in any litigation. It is utterly inconsistent with a fundamental aspect of proper family law practice. "Family law cases are not supposed to be conducted as adversarial proceedings. Quite the contrary, the goal is to reduce acrimony and adversarial approaches common to general civil litigation and, instead, to foster cooperation between the parties and their counsel with a view toward settlement short of full-blown litigation. [See Fam. C. §§ 2100 (b), § 271(a) (sanctions for uncooperative conduct in family law cases); see also Cal. Atty. Guidelines of Civility & Professionalism § 19-in family law proceedings an attorney should seek to reduce emotional tension and trauma and encourage the parties and attorneys to interact in a cooperative atmosphere, and keep the best interest of the children in mind']."
"The record is replete with correspondence from Andrew Watters to Ken's attorneys that contained abusive, rude, hostile, and/or disrespectful language, correspondence that Andrew Watters himself acknowledged was substantial evidence, when in the course of his closing argument he stated that '[p]erhaps some unpleasant letters that could offend someone did substantially increase the cost of litigation.' Perhaps it did indeed. A few illustrations should suffice:
- his November 22, 2006 letter to Mr. Merrill referring to Ken's nonappearance for deposition, which letter provided in pertinent part as follows: 'Regarding your client's failure to appear once again for his continued deposition, we too regret that your client chose not to appear. As you know, we duly noticed his continued deposition for 11/20/06-11/22/06. Once again, you offer the same tired, old, and shopworn excuse. Your continued blustering about mutually agreeable dates, efficiency and promptness, and convenience is pathetic when your client's actions negate any semblance of cooperation. Talk is cheap. Actions speak louder than words. Your credibility is at stake here.'
- his March 13, 2007 letter to Mr. Benoit included remarks that were rude, including 'Enough already with the delays.' Worse, his letter indicated that he did not believe Mr. Benoit-the person he described as "the dean of the Family Law Bar"-telling him: 'We don't accept your implication that you didn't already have [the Request to Inspect] . . . . Perhaps you didn't look hard enough, because we filed a Motion to Compel . . . in which I attached RTI Set one to my Declaration. Or you weren't counting that copy.' And the letter ends with utter disrespect, with observations such as: 'this seems like a case of the pot calling the kettle black'; 'In your last paragraph, your first suggestion is illusory. . . ."; and, "Your last paragraph rings hollow.'
- his September 11, 2008 letter to Mr. Johnson which, bad enough, insinuated untruthfulness: 'We've noticed that, in the past, you have had some trouble keeping things straight. We also noticed that you tend to stretch things somewhat too far in the name of appearances.' Worse, it accused Mr. Johnson of unethical conduct: 'It's no surprise, then, that your letter of 8/7/08 appears to be an attempt to create a false and misleading exhibit for use at a later law and motion hearing so that your client can sit in court with a halo over his head, and so you can say look how many times Ken offered to settle! That wouldn't surprise us at all, given your practice of attaching a large pile of exhibits to your declarations without any testimony from you concerning their truth.'
Later confronted with such correspondence, Andrew's response was not apologetic. He indicated at one point it might have been "unfortunate," but that was it. In his words, 'So I should note if I caused undue emotional pain on the other side in terms of writing unpleasant letters, if I offended anyone, then that's unfortunate and certainly a learning process for me, but the fact is I am not on trial here. And, in any event, the attorneys on the other side-I'm sure they can handle it. Mr. Mike Merrill, I think, is a 35 year attorney, former Marine officer in Vietnam, has seen it all. Mr. Benoit is a 35- or 40 year family law lawyer. He's seen it all. Mr. Johnson was in the Navy, I believe. These are not attorneys not able to do lawyering because of unpleasant letters from a
baby lawyer on the other side.' [Italics added].
The appellate justices observed that Jill's position on appeal was equally unrepentant where, referring to "the tone of some of [Andrew Watters'] written communications," she describes it as "the expressions (sometimes intemperate) of a young lawyer frustrated that Ken was systematically obstructing the search for the truth by his actions in resisting routine discovery, which is supposed to be self-executing. Ken and his attorneys then created a smokescreen that prevented the trial court from seeing the substance of the communications in context."
Strong, strong language. An important caveat for the lawyers who will inevitably attempt to use Davenport to support sanctions' motions for uncivil conduct by opposing counsel is that just accusing the other side of behaving like Mr. Watters may itself seem abusive to a trial court. While the justices' opinion does not appear "overstated" given a record so rich in illustrations of what not to do, I think we need to be careful not to ourselves overstate it, or to try to fit conduct we don't like into a
Davenport box where that conduct fails to speak for itself. That is a species of risk that has blunted the edge of
Feldman claims since that decision was rendered, making it a less viable tool for under-empowered litigants. The corollary is that "trance begets trance." We don't want to make the same mistakes and so seem as aggressive as our opponents.
The Adversarial Tone Continued On Appeal
Accordingly, Jill was ordered to pay $100,000 in sanctions plus $304,387 in attorney fees to Ken. Unfortunately for her, Wife's attorneys' strategies on appeal remained obdurate. By this point Andrew Watters had gone "walkabout" and left the firm (following the trial court decision). O'Brien, Watters continued with the same verve as it had at the trial court level. For example, their briefs targeted Judge Cerena Wong with a number of arguments that one (including the appellate justices) might find to be offensive. The appellate court stated "[i]n sum, Jill manifests a treatment of the record that disregards the most fundamental rules of appellate review."
For instance, in addition to being highly histrionic, Jill's appellate arguments scolded the judge, accusing her of relying on inadmissible evidence while ignoring admissible evidence. Jill's brief posed the question: "Imagine if a high school civics class had been on a field trip to the court that day. How would the teacher be able to explain to his/her students that the judge said she would not follow the rules?" It is mind-boggling that seasoned attorneys would argue that high school students would see that the judge was not following the rules when the judge herself could not. Of course, the appellate justices concluded that just the reverse was true, and that all of Judge Wong's conclusions were well supported by the record and the law but that Jill and her "team" lacked a comprehension of the rules of evidence and basic propriety.
Frankly, Wife's team had reasons to be concerned about Judge Wong's treatment of the evidentiary objections, but is it possible that in assailing the trial court with the tone that they apparently used that this triggered a defensive reaction in the appellate justices which ultimately took center stage over the legal issues?
Jill argued that whatever the appropriateness of the statements made by attorney Andrew Watters, such communications were covered all by the "litigation privilege" set forth in California Civil Code section 47 and hence could not properly generate a sanctions' award. Similarly, Jill on appeal argued that Andrew Watters' communications were protected by the bounds of free speech and zealous advocacy. Not so ruled the Court. Family law is not the Wild West, nor is it a frontier where "anything goes".
What Went Wrong
(Or, 'Should People Living in Glass Houses Throw Stones')?
We family court lawyers are not entirely to blame for getting lost in the dark woods of adversarial divorce to such an extent that some misplace their ethics or, as here, lose control of our emotions - our clients' experiences of divorce are devastating, and lawyers respond to the felt needs of the consuming public like any other industry. Some clients entice us with a willingness to pay "whatever it takes" to personify their angst in formulating our strategies for them - and it is extremely difficult not to become enmeshed in their emotional struggles to an extent that blur the boundaries between their experiences and perspectives and our own.
Particularly as a younger lawyer I confess at times I was deluded into buying my clients' attitudes and personalizing the pain within the stories, and sometimes adopted an arrogance and one-sidedness in accepting their views as the entire picture. This remains a struggle for me at times today. Caring, which I suspect all the members of the O'Brien law firm share, is what is honorable about "zealous advocacy." Unfortunately, relationship wars tend to challenge us all beyond our capacity to stay mindful - within depth of caring lies a trap. We can care too much, and strong emotions in any direction are a potent drug. I for one need to constantly reground myself, and to release the ferocity that accumulates from the frustrations of interacting with high conflict litigants and attorneys. And since this is so for me, it must be so for the others - a realization that can offer some balance and even crack a door to forgiveness.
The Mission Statement of O'Brien, Watters & Davis LLP as published on their website identifies their aspirations as follows: "To render quality legal services and maintain the highest ethical standards; to provide excellent service to clients; to use our best efforts to have our clients succeed and achieve results; to make a reasonable and fair profit; to maintain an excellent reputation in the community and within the legal profession; to be actively involved in and give service to the community; and to have mutual respect and support for one another." I trust that they mean this. Something strikes me as odd, however, about it. I sense a wisp of a sentiment that implies that rendering quality legal services might be inconsistent with maintaining the highest ethical standards; that excellent service is only measured by achieving results, which in traditional lawyer-speak means winning (and not necessarily settling) cases; and that achieving reasonable and fair profits is dependent on strategies for winning adversarially. I guess it is hard to not interpret their advertisement outside the light of what went on in Davenport.
O'Brien Waters, me the writer of this Blog, and you the reader are given the invitation and opportunity to reflect upon, re-evaluate, and close the gaps between our intention and actions, every day. Which is always a good reason to be grateful, since we can dust ourselves off and start out anew.
Marriage of Davenport is a wake up call. Andrew Watters is no demon, but this case contains a concentrated dose of the pitfalls of the adversarial paradigm. Is anybody listening?
Save yourself unnecessary grief and expense, and live a longer life. Seek out family law specialists who have the genuine desire and interest to help you set (and reset as required) a tone that might free you from this mess, rather than binding you more tightly within it!
I believe that the law firm that assisted Ken in this case deserve recognition and naming for their role in this landmark case: Perry, Johnson, Anderson, Miller & Moskowitz by John E. Johnson and Deborah S. Bull. Congratulations!
Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.
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| March 14, 2011 |
| FAMILY LAW SANCTIONS and DUE PROCESS: Santa Barbara Trial Court Reversed in IRMO DURIS |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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Visitors to my websites know that I am biased in favor of mediation, believing that parties to litigation involving their family should opt to resolve their disputes themselves rather than undertake the perils of having a judge, or anyone else, decide their matters for them. This includes mediators (whose role is not to decide your issues for you but to facilitate you finding solutions). However, I admit that sometimes this doesn't seem possible. Too often one or both parties are reacting so deeply to their hurt or resentment and spinning with angry, busy minds that they perceive family court as the killing field for their unresolved conflict - a public forum for the spectacle of flogging the other side.
A recent reported decision illustrates the financial waste that occurs in high conflict family court battles, where there are no winners and only losers. My remarks are not intended to convince you to hire me, or to impugn judges whom I contend are struggling valiantly to protect children and mete out justice as best they can within a system that is not equipped to cope with the multi-dimensional challenges of emotional divorce and its aftermath: The trial judges are not broken, but the framework for government sponsored attempts to regulate the processes of divorce and domestic partnership dissolution is. Nor should it be read as an indictment of divorce lawyers or any particular barrister. An adversary model for resolving family disputes guarantees that the experience of everyone connected with these cases will be ... adversarial. Surprise!
In the meantime appellate justices are stepping forth to triage for the litigants, their attorneys, and the lower courts. But is it realistic to expect lawyers (in that small relative percentage of domestic cases where people can afford them) or judges to not be swept into the reactive thinking that the parties' disputes are personifying? I say "no". Our brains are hard-wired to respond to conflict in predictable ways. While we all ought to conduct our affairs in increasingly enlightened and ethical ways, and lawyers and judges surely benefit by incorporating the wisdom of the mental health sciences, a legal and cultural framework grounded in adversarial processes can never escape them. How could it be otherwise?
Marriage of Duris & Urbany
On March 14, 2011, the Second Appellate District (Division Six) reversed Santa Barbara trial judge Colleen K. Sterne's decision to discipline a self-represented litigant (an unemployed attorney) for, among other things, her earlier attorney's tactics in filing a motion to compel document production evidently without first attempting to resolve the disagreement informally. Discovery motions generate large fees and consume valuable judicial resources.
At the end of the hearing on Wife's original requests (the custody and support modification request she'd filed eight months earlier), the trial court imposed $10,000 in attorney fee sanctions against the Wife. Husband's attorney had evidently suggested that the Court do this somewhere in his Reply paperwork, and reiterated the request in his closing argument. The trial court took the bait. Its ruling was found to be an abuse of discretion.
According to the Husband, by the time of the hearing on original OSC to modify custody and support he had spent $25,000 for fees. Wife probably spent a similar but slightly lesser amount since she was in pro per for many months. Their fees and costs for the appeal probably were $20,000 more apiece (but Mr. Urbany handled his own appeal). Husband will get none of his money back, and Wife will recover only a portion of hers. Neither will achieve an emotionally satisfying resolution and their matter likely obsessed their lives over the year and a half. This case is "a pox on both your houses."
Wife's former attorney, Jacqueline Misho, was hired some six months into the proceedings, initiated when the Wife filed a motion for "100% physical and legal custody" of the parties' two children, plus more child support. Attorney Misho took an aggressive stance in advancing her client's claims and filed a discovery motion to compel production of documents. This was unsuccessful. The attorney was then let go. A week later the Wife's custody motion was heard. Although sanctions against her had not been requested by way of a noticed motion (possibly because there was little time in which to file one), Husband urged that she should pay his attorney fees. At hearing end when Judge Sterne announced her intent to hit Wife with $10,000 in sanctions as a share of the Husband's costs in part based upon the prior discovery motion filed by Misho, Wife complained "How am I being penalized for hiring [Misho]? How was I supposed to know? I thought she was the best there was." In my experience, "the best there [is]" often means the meanest and toughest. Many family law attorneys advertise themselves in such a fashion.
I have no personal knowledge about either party's attorney beyond what Google searches of their names retrieve and what a review of the California State Bar website discloses. Both are reputed to be tenacious divorce litigators. The problem with vociferous advocacy, irrespective whether it occurred in this case or not, is that it tends to generate a story of its own and so to increase the conflict noise volume - I confess I know this from my own past personal experiences. It can infect the process - there is something of a reciprocal feedback loop that occurs between high conflict litigants and their attorneys that is difficult to resist. Sometimes it seems to be the only choice, but usually that justification is borne of the tensions within the conflict itself and is not necessarily true.
Family law litigation becomes particularly nasty when attorneys for each side compete to inflame the trial judge with sound bite characterizations about the other. Some clients demand this from their counsel or become quite perturbed if their advocate doesn't respond in kind to these sorts of attacks. Lawyers who are being paid large sums are pressured to speak their client's minds (read: resentments) or risk a loss of confidence by their client. Of greater concern to the integrity of the legal professional generally, there are many family law attorneys whose entire strategy is geared around slandering the other litigant (or their attorney), often by exaggerating or misrepresenting the facts or history of the case solely as a means of confusing the judge or just plain pissing the court off in the hope of creating a favorable bias. Tit for tat then threatens to overwhelm the process. This sort of behavior can include ignoring the procedural rules for raising the issues to be decided, which is a form of ambush that can be effective exactly because the answering party is unable respond to an oncoming train if there is no forewarning.
I am not saying that this was either attorney's conduct in Duris as I lack sufficient details to make a full assessment; instead I am pointing out that adversary litigation programs lawyers and unrepresented parties to use whatever tactics that might work, and sometimes to try them all. This seems to be viewed as not only within the standard of care for zealous advocacy but to be required by that standard. I can comment that one irony of this case is that while the Wife's attorney allegedly failed to act in a cooperative manner in choosing to file a motion to compel without first attempting to solve the argument informally, Husband's attorney seized upon that misstep to buttress a request for sanctions that was never properly placed before the court. Sometimes these sound bites do stick; they did here, at least with Judge Sterne. Unfortunately, under these rules of engagement lawyers are thus encouraged to act as badly as the talking heads we see arguing on many 'news' programs, something that the American public views as a form of 'entertainment.'
This is one of the many dangers of adversarial litigation. Both sides feel righteously indignant, and attorneys tend to internalize their client's upset so that the boundaries between the client's experience and the attorney's own blurs. It is a recipe for disaster, but understandable given that emotional and angry ex-spouse pressure-cookers are letting out steam on both sides of the table all at once.
The appellate court's decision doesn't give us sufficient facts to discern whether the mother's initial application was well-merited, but Judge Sterne's decision suggests she did not view mom's motives (or her attorney's decision-making) to be in good faith. Wife's request for 100% custody looks to be retaliatory and frankly when this is true - and too often it is, even if not here (Judge Sterne referred to Wife's prior discovery motion as a "fee sink") - trial courts need to discourage such conduct in strong ways, especially when it generates unnecessary fees for the other party or damages children. Some people only respond to monetary slaps. I can merely speculate about these proceedings without reviewing the trial briefs and reporter's transcripts, and emphasize that reading 'between the lines' cannot give the whole picture.
Still this is a published decision of the 2nd Appellate District. Following on the heals of Marriage of Fong released for publication on March 3, 2011, these decisions, along with
Marriage of Tharp, should be read together to glean the larger message. Reviewing courts are holding everyone accountable - litigants, attorneys, and bench officers. Due process and fundamental fairness require every side to cross their own t's and dot their own i's. This is welcome instruction to the entire spectrum of family court members and participants.
Be Careful What You Ask For,
and Consider Asking for Something Different
However inappropriate Ms. Duris' conduct may have been (if at all), the appellate justices ruled that due process required that she be informed in advance that the court was considering sanctions in order to have an opportunity to muster and present evidence in opposition. Husband's request for relief should have been properly placed before the Court and not have been based upon offhand arguments buried somewhere in his reply pleadings or first presented in closing argument. This is a good thing. Last year's Elkins legislation spotlights the public policy goal of ensuring transparency for self-represented and represented family law contestants alike.
Now, eighteen months later the odyssey is not yet ended - the Sterne decision is sent back to the trial court (not likely to be Judge Sterne, who can be disqualified as the judge on the next go-round) "with instructions to conduct a new hearing with proper notice." In other words, to relitigate whether sanctions should be assessed against the Wife.
In the meantime, she is awarded her costs on appeal. No appellate case costs only $10,000, the amount in controversy that led to this appeal. Hence, Husband - who won a short-lived victory at the trial court level - will now likely end up footing not only the bill for his trial attorney, but the Wife's attorney fees on appeal as well (be careful what your attorney asks for!) The saga can be now rebooted. Might it end differently this go-around? I'd wager (and I hope) the parties have had enough and that will agree that Wife will forego her appellate costs while Husband will waive a second sanction's motion. But divorce trance is stubborn stuff.
There are only losers in Marriage of Duris. The children of these two warring parents seem utterly forgotten. The take away is that using California court judges to beat up the person you now find despicable (who then smacks back) may blow up in the face of each contestant; given that people often view justice from the lens of their own desires it is a small wonder that government regulated divorce hasn't found a way to respond to such expectations, and possibly never will until the entire system is jettisoned and recreated.
In the meantime try a different tact, if you wish it and if you can. Work together to resolve your disputes collaboratively or through mediation. Even if the other side seems incorrigible, you determine how you respond. Remember, litigation induces trance - seek equanimity and send your kids to college instead!
Here is a link to Marriage of Duris & Urbany.
Thurman W. Arnold, III, CFLS
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| March 08, 2011 |
| More on Marriage of FONG: Obtaining SANCTIONS for UNCOOPERATIVE CONDUCT IN DIVORCE LITIGATION |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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The March 3, 2011 Second Appellate Court decision of Marriage of Fong is so far the most important fiduciary duty case of 2011.
See my other blog on this site as it pertains to Final Declarations of Disclosure, and here is a link to an article I've written concerning its impact on Family Code section 271 sanctions.
Here is the appellate court's decision in Marriage of Fong. |
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| March 07, 2011 |
| Making DIVORCE JUDGES ACCOUNTABLE - What Is A STATEMENT OF DECISION? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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Given the 2011 changes to the California Family Code brought about by the recommendations of the Elkins Task Force, you need to know about something called a "statement of decision". This is because many family law cases involving temporary or interim orders now require an evidentiary hearing - or a trial or 'mini-trial' - on matters that used to be decided as motions based only upon declarations and argument of the parties or counsel. California Code of Civil Procedure §632 governs this device, and it is not available in straight law and motion proceedings. It is available only on matters where there has been a trial of factual issues.
Newly enacted Family Code §217 directs family court judges and commissioners to hold hearings with live testimony unless the parties stipulate otherwise, or unless the trial court finds good cause to dispense with such hearings. I've written about the Elkins changes extensively elsewhere on this Blog, so please try the search engine at the top of each page for more information about them.
A statement of decision requires the family law trial court to state, on the record, or in a subsequent written opinion, why it ruled the way it did on any questioned fact. It is essentially the same thing as a statement of the court's findings and its conclusions on any controverted issue. Judge's don't necessarily appreciate such requests, however, because they force the bench officer to expend additional time to explain at least some of the aspects of their reasoning, and some feel that it is provocative to ask them to explain their reasoning; the conventional wisdom for lawyers therefore is "don't ask unless you fear you are going to lose."
Statements of decision in family law cases, as with hearings on OSC requests and certainly bifurcated or full on trials, are most important as a tool for a potential appeal. Without them the record on appeal may be quite unclear since the appellate court will have a difficult time determining the fact basis for the trial court's reasoning. Effectively, absent a SOD, this means that the appellate court will only reverse the trial court ruling for errors at law - the reviewing court will presume that the trial court made every factual finding necessary to support its decision. This is one of the problems of asking for them - you are saying to the judge "I think you may rule against me and so I am doing this to protect the record on appeal."
There are important rules about when to request a statement of decision. Where a trial is completed in one calendar day or less (or less than eight total hours over several days), a request for a statement of decision must be made before the court issues its ruling (i.e., before the matter is submitted for decision). This means, before you hear the judge's ruling, not after! There are technical rules about how to add up these hours. This will be the typical family law OSC or Notice of Motion situation where testimony may last from 30 minutes to several hours under FC section 217. Until January 1, 2011, these situations typically included only domestic violence hearings since evidentiary hearings were already required in those cases.
The procedures for statements of decision are to be contrasted with certain statutory requirements that courts make and express their findings on the record in certain statutorily enumerated situations, whether or not these are specifically requested. I will identify those sections in the future.
Check back for further Blogs and pointers on these subjects. If you have a contested hearing with testimony, and you get the sense the judge views things differently then you do, ask for a statement of decision before you hear the decision!
Thurman W. Arnold, III
Certified Family Law Specialist
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| December 19, 2010 |
| What Are TRACINGS In California DIVORCE Proceedings? Tossed Salad and Mixed Vegetables! |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. My attorney has used the word "tracings" several times, and I really don't understand how this works. Can you give me a simple explanation?
A. Unlikely (sorry!).
Tracings may be required by California law in a number of settings in order to find out what each spouse's share of the community property is. They generally show up in several recurring situations, but unfortunately for simplicity's sake there are numerous permutations of where tracings come into play. Chief among them is where cash or assets that was used to purchase property was "commingled" (think tossed salad with separate property lettuce leaves and community property mixed vegetables) at the time it was contributed. Please use the search engine at the upper right to see my Blog Articles for the definitions of community and separate property.
These include:
- Determining the community verses separate property attributes of an asset that was acquired with funds contributed during marriage that were a combination of each (CP and SP). This is called "characterization" - does the asset belong in whole or in part to the community estate, or to one party's separate estate, or both in different degrees? The community component is sometimes earnings that were used to pay down secured debt each month when, for instance, a mortgage principal payment is made for a separate property asset (a Moore-Marsden situation). It can include one time downpayments from joint bank accounts that contain community income or earnings (or separate property accounts that may have been commingled with joint funds or not or community property accounts that include separate property components) further complicated in the case of a refinance, and more.
- It is extremely common that a community property asset (acquired during marriage, possibly but not necessarily in joint names), or improvements to it, traces partly or 100% to a separate property source. Many parents 'gift' their child part or all of the downpayment for the couple's first home. Or, a separate property asset (acquired during marriage but titled in one spouse's name alone - usually seen with real estate) may be purchased using joint funds. In either event there is a tracing right of reimbursement per Family Code section 2640 to the respective community or separate property interests that bought it, in the event of a dissolution or legal separation. FC §2640 is in the top five of all California property division statutes and is critical for an understanding of what your legal interests are if either spouse has any colorable claims to separate property used during marriage. Many middle income and high asset property division cases are a puzzle map of assets that are not what they seem at first glance.
- There are a number of situations where reimbursement claims arise from the payment of joint or separate debts using money that the other spouse had an interest in (whether community funds or separate). Under limited situations there may be a right for the community, or the other spouse's separate property, to be reimbursed, but you will be required to trace these funds to claim them.
- Often intended or unintended transmutations have occurred. Family Code section 852 is the chief transmutation statute, and another of the top five California dissolution property statutes. Transmutations involve a change in the character of property, from community to separate or from separate to community or separate to the other party's separate property. These commonly require tracings in order to establish the FC § 2640 interest. For instance, husband and wife own a residence together in joint names. It was purchased during marriage. But there is need for a refinance, and one spouse's credit is bad. The parties agree that husband will borrow the money, and the lender requires that wife sign a quitclaim deed before escrow can close. Husband assures wife 'not to worry.' Wife signs the transfer deed and doesn't seek legal advice. She has unwittingly transmuted her community interest to husband's separate property. Years later the property has appreciated. What is Wife's interest? (Breach of fiduciary duty questions have to be the subject of a separate Blog but, again, please try our search engine for more information!)
Did I say I would give a simple answer? No? Good!
In order to unwind transactions during marriage where monies and property with separate and community property attributes have been mixed together, the "separatizer" (the party seeking to establish their separate property contributions to the community or separate property of the other spouse or partner) has the burden of proof to present reliable tracing evidence to the Court. In order to settle even mildly complex dissolutions as between the parties without going to trial, this information must be provided and laid out in a concrete manner to convince the other side that you have the ability to meet your burden.
Here are some of the rules that apply the mechanics of tracings in dissolution actions and legal separations.
If the commingled funds are used to purchase property, the party who deposited the separate funds may attempt to trace the source of the funds used to purchase the property to establish that it is separate because separate funds were used to purchase it. This may overcome the presumption that property acquired during marriage is community. Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604.
If separate and community property or funds are commingled in such a manner that it is impossible to trace the source of the property or funds, the whole must be treated as community property. Marriage of Mix, supra.
If the title to the property was taken jointly, tracing cannot be used to overcome the presumption from the form of title. Marriage of Lucas (1980) 27 Cal.3d 808, 813-814.
Direct tracing and tracing through family expenses are two independent methods of tracing to establish that property purchased with commingled funds is separate property.
Direct Tracing
Separate funds do not lose their separate character when commingled with community funds in a bank account so long as the amount of separate funds can be ascertained and at no time period were the funds spent down below the balance of SP claimed unless replenished with SP instead of CP. Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604.
If money is withdrawn to purchase specific property, questions of fact that must be determined include (Marriage of Mix, supra):
The party seeking to establish a separate interest in presumptive community property must keep adequate records. The party must show the exact amount of money allocable to separate property and the exact amount of money allocable to community property before it can be said that the money allocable to separate property is not so commingled that all funds in the account are community property. Marriage of Frick (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 997. If the payments claimed to be separate were made periodically, each payment must have been made when separate property funds were in the account and must have been accompanied by an intent to use those funds rather than community funds.
Marriage of Higinbotham (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 322, 329.
Tracing Through Family Expenses
The second method of tracing to establish that property purchased with commingled funds is separate property requires a consideration of family expenses. This tracing method is based on the presumption that family expenses are paid from community funds.
If at the time the property is acquired it can be shown that all community cash and income in a commingled account was exhausted by family expenses, then all funds remaining in the account at the time the property was purchased were necessarily separate funds. Marriage of Mix, supra.
This method can be used only when, through no fault of the spouse claiming separate property, it is not possible to ascertain the balance of income and expenditures at the time property was acquired. See v See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 778, 784.
The spouse claiming separate property must keep adequate records to overcome the presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property. See v See, supra. Most people don't.
The take-away: If you are contemplating a divorce and have tracing issues, protect your records now so that they do not 'disappear.' It can be very expensive to obtain bank statements and canceled checks dating back years, and with all of the bank failures and mergers today these records may become impossible to obtain. If you cannot meet your tracing burden of proof, you lose on the particular reimbursement issue.
As you probably have guessed, tracings are quite expensive and typically involve the assistance of a forensic accountant. Moreover, not just any attorney will know what to do with this information! |
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| December 03, 2010 |
| ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU! |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011.
It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners.
This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.
Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations. Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues. Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.
What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases." Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification:
"We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel. [Reference omitted]....
In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures. But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice. Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute. It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support....
Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function. If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."
Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented. Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions. Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants. Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court." Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.
The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011. Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217. It states:
"(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.
(b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.
(c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.
If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."
Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules. It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings. It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia.
It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully. The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere). There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at
www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true). Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court. Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise.
The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes. I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks. Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers.
December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.
T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization) |
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| October 22, 2010 |
| Are STOCK OPTIONS COMMUNITY PROPERTY? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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Q. How are stock options treated if I decide to dissolve my domestic partnership?
A. Stock options are commonly used to attract or retain key employees with incentives outside the basic salary structure. Whether you are dissolving a marriage or a RDP (registered domestic partnership), valuing and dividing stock options can be tricky.
The simplest situation is where the stock options were earned before separation. In such cases they are clearly CP. But often there is a question of when these benefits were in fact "earned" because employee services that generate them are sometimes contributed over long periods. These may include a pre-marriage period (when time, skill, and efforts of either party are always SP) and they may extend for some time past the date of physical separation (and so be SP). The question when stock options were earned becomes quite fact specific and depends a lot on what the employer intended and what kind of options they are. In re Marriage of Hug (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676.
Stock options that are earned during the marriage, but vest afterwards, generally belong to the community. They are treated as deferred compensation, like certain types of pensions. Usually an employee is granted the right to buy stock, now or in the future, at a fixed price. They may be forced to sell that stock back to the company if they leave. What controls whether the options are characterized as community or separate is when they are granted and when they vest. If they do not vest at all, as where a minimum number of years of service by the employee are required which is not met (even where the employee-spouse quits after separation and so blows them up), they are neither separate or community property - instead, they are not viewed as a property interest at all. In those cases they were a "mere expectancy" that never matured.
In cases where an employee must work for the company for a fixed number of years to be eligible, but the spouses or RDP's separate before those years have been served, the options have both community and SP attributes. To the extent that they result from post-separation efforts too, they must be apportioned between CP and SP. As with how interests in pensions are commonly evaluated, courts tend to follow a "time-rule". The time rule looks like this:
DOG to DOS
__________ X # of Shares Exercisable = C/P shares
DOG to DOV
DOG = Date of Grant
DOS = Date of Separation
DOV = Date of Vesting
Stock options that are granted after the DOS are usually treated as the separate property of the recipient, even where some of the employee's contributions occurred before. This is because of the importance of what the employer intended to the analysis.
This Blog is intended just to give you some sense of the law over these potentially complex questions. As with everything, different facts can lead to different outcomes and stock options are complicated financial devices.
Also, stock option disputes sometimes involve claims of fraud - as where a small closely held company or family business tries to funnel or manipulate how when the options are granted or vest in an effort to favor one spouse over another.
Perhaps the only practical way that a former spouse or partner may learn that stock options exist or when they vest or are exercised is by the self-disclosure of the employee. The law is clear that spouses and domestic partners are required by their fiduciary obligations to make these disclosures. Refusals to disclose can have severe consequences under Family Code section 1101.
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| October 18, 2010 |
| How Do I Get An Order for ATTORNEY FEES in a COMPLEX CASE? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. My divorce seems like it has stalled. My wife operates our family business, we own several properties including a commercial building and she collects the rents, she isn't cooperating with me on custody on our kids, and I need money to pay my attorney. She is controlling this case, and I am getting nowhere. Any recommendations?
[Please note - this Blog is updated with a recent Blog Article detailing the 2011 Revisions to the California Family Code affecting attorney fee awards 12/9/10]
A. I frequently hear from people whose cases are "stalled" because they have no money to pay their attorney, and no money to hire forensic experts. It is a problem I face in my practice with certain clients. It takes money to develop your case, and if there is really none available it is difficult to get anyone to pay attention. Often there are assets that only one spouse controls. That spouse or RDP (registered domestic partner) usually claims those assets to be their "separate property" even when the claim is ridiculous (for instance, closely held stock issued as "their sole and separate property" when the vesting of title in their name alone during marriage was just their manipulation and you didn't agree to it).
When there are assets that exist there is much that you can do. These assets, whether they be allegedly separate or community, are available to be borrowed against, or sold, to raise money so you can pay your attorney and hire experts to do the work that must be done.
However, your attorney needs to understand how to accomplish this or find one who does. Specifically one method that works well is to have a referee appointed under Code of Civil Procedure section 639 to oversee a "case management plan" under the circumstances described in
Family Code section 2032(d).
Specifically, have your attorney ask the Court in a motion to make a finding that your case involves "complex or substantial issues of fact or law." These can be related to property rights, custody, visitation, and support and may include bifurcations of issues. If you don't have an attorney, this would still be a start to obtaining findings that will generate money to hire one.
Once the Court so designates your case, it will itself begin to implement a plan or assign someone else - like an outside lawyer whom the court recognizes as an expert, to make recommendations as a referee. While the Court is not obligated to follow the recommendations of these referees, they ususally do. And if they don't the court may find itself overturned on appeal as happened 10/1/10 in In Re Marriage of Tharp, a case I will be writing about in detail as time permits.
This is a major step in not only getting someone to look more closely at the attorney fees you need (judges, after all, have really limited time) but also a good way to jump start a stalled dissolution or other family law case.
BTW, under the new statutes that take effect in 2011 as a result of the Elkins Task Force recommendations, case management may become the norm in California in family law proceedings. TW Arnold 10/18/10 |
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| August 20, 2009 |
| Can you give me a MOORE MARSDEN Analysis on My SEPARATE PROPERTY HOME? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. Can you please help. I understand a Moore-Marsden analysis needs to be performed on my house in my pending divorce, but I don't understand what it is my attorney is telling me. These are the facts. On 1/1/02 I put my wife on the title to the property. This is what happened.
Purchase price 6/92 before marriage |
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$164,875 |
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Date of Marriage 5/15/94 Market value |
$190,000 |
Market Value 1/1/2002 when Wife goes on Title |
$245,000 |
Market value 4/7/2008 |
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$612,000 |
Initial 6/92 Down payment |
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$54,875 |
Principal Payment from separate prop. after separation |
$6,836 |
| FMV today (decreased since DOS) |
$500,000 |
Frederic, in San Dimas
Frederic:
Here is an illustration of how the calculation works. Please see my FAQ on Moore Marsden generally. As you can see, it is complicated. You will need a forensic accountant and you may want a real estate expert because fair market values need to be fixed at various dates. Your situation is even more complicated because you placed her on title. The simplest Moore-Marsden situation deals with a property owned in the name of one spouse throughout the marriage, where marital earnings are used to pay the mortgage down - the fundamental concept is that the community should get some reimbursement for this, which comes back as a share in the appreciation and reduced principal obligation.
You will need to get:
- the mortgage payoff balances on the date of marriage;
- the mortgage payoff balance on date of the transmutation (when your wife went on title)
- the payoff balance at date of separation
- and you will need a mortgage balance near the date of your trial
I want to mention that all transmutations that favor one spouse and disadvantage the other, like putting her on the deed on 1/1/02, are subject to a claim that they should be set aside. This is because there is a presumption that your Wife exerted undue influence upon you - please research my fiduciary duty blog articles using the on-site search engine if this interests you.
Therefore, one scenario is:
Assuming $ 54,875 dowppayment
and 6,836 (paydown before M)
(you will need the mortgage statements) 25,125 appreciation before M
and (20,197) principal reduction during M
then: $54,875 [DP] PLUS $89,803
[SP Loan of $110,000 minus $20,197 CP payments]
= $144,678 DIVIDED BY $164,875 [purchase price]
= 's a 87.75 SP Interest
and
$20,197 divided by $164,875 =' a 12.25% CP interest
NEXT $ 54,875 [DP]
6,836
(plus post DOS loan payments which I don't
see broken out so assume zero here) 61,711 PLUS 25,125 (premarital appreciation) PLUS 315,900 [87.75% of post-DOM appreciation to present assuming FMV $550,000 today
equals $550,000 less $164,875 less $25,125="$360,000]" - appreciation percentage of H's SP interest ='s $402,736 (H's SP share)
COMMUNITY INTEREST IS: $20,197 plus 12.25% of 360,000=" $44,100"
plus 20,197="$64,297"
Wife' hare is this number divided by 2 ='s $32,148 equalization to W
I recognize that this may seem imcomprehensible. I will endeavor to write some simpler blogs on this topic, because this is a very common area for questions. Yikes!
Thurman W. Arnold |
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