Recent Posts in Divorce and Dissolution Category

Marital Privileges Not To Testify Against Spouse or Domestic Partner

Sometimes married persons who are in litigation with third parties (i.e., former spouses and co-parents) are asked to reveal communications in deposition, through written discovery, or at trial between them that are protected from disclosure. It may help you to know when to assert an objection to such inquiries, and how to avoid answering such questions altogether.

California recognizes both a "testimonial privilege" and a privilege protecting "confidential marital communications". These privileges are codified in Evidence Code section 970, Evidence Code section 971 and Evidence Code section 980. They are distinct privileges, and the one that most often applies to family law are sections 970 and 980, where one's current spouse is embroiled, for instance, in litigation with a former spouse (or in paternity cases, the other parent). These privileges apply equally to registered domestic partners pursuant to the general application of Family Code section 297.5. Limitations on the marital privilege are generally found at Evidence Code section 972. 

These privileges serve two important public policy goals: 1) to preserve and promote marital harmony and 2) to encourage and preserve confidences between husband and wife. Essentially, the assumption is that society has more to lose from the disruption of the marital relationship that might be caused by encouraging spouses to testify against one another, or to disclose secrets, than it has to gain by learning what was said. This makes sense - however, unrepresented parties often lack an understanding about their rights and privileges, which can be waived if not properly asserted. Hence today's Blog.

The testimonial and confidential marital communication privileges require the existence of a valid marriage or domestic partnership. Keep in mind that they do not apply between you and the spouse or domestic partner whom you are litigating against - these privileges cease to exist as between parties to a dissolution or related family law proceeding. In addition, where no valid marriage existed (i.e., a marriage that was void at its inception (bigamous, incestuous, lack of proper solemnization and the like)), the privileges never arise. In contrast, where a marriage is voidable (minority, fraud, physical incapacity) the privilege exists unless and until a final judgment of annulment has issued.

Testimonial Privilege

• The privilege applies only during existence of valid marriage or domestic partnership
• A married person has a privilege not to testify against his or her spouse in any proceeding. Evidence Code § 970.
• A married person, whose spouse is a party to a proceeding has a privilege not to be called as a witness by an adverse party without the witness spouse's prior express consent. Evidence Code § 971.
• Both testimonial privileges belong to the witness spouse.
• The 970 privilege permits a spouse to refuse to answer questions requiring testimony about the other spouse, whether or not they are a party to a proceeding.
• The 971 privilege only permits a spouse to refuse to answer (or be called) in proceedings where the other spouse is a party.
• The 970 privilege belongs only to the spouse who has been called as a witness - in such cases (i.e., where the other spouse is not a party) the other spouse has no standing to prevent their spouse from voluntarily testifying.
• The 971 privilege belongs to both spouses. Thus, even if spouse B is willing to answer questions about spouse A in pending proceedings involving spouse A, spouse A can assert the privilege to bar the testimony that otherwise might have been obtained.
• Once the marriage is terminated by Final Judgment (for instance, even a "status termination" on bifurcated proceedings where other issues remain reserved and therefore open - like property division or custody), the privilege evaporates (but see the confidential marital communications privilege below).
• The privileges do not apply to proceedings brought by one spouse against the other.
• They do not apply to certain types of hearing, including competency or commitment/conservatorship proceedings (since alleged mental or physical condition may be in issue).
• These privileges do not apply to juvenile court proceedings. [EC section 972(d)].
• Trial courts are not required to inform spouses of their rights not to testify - being uninformed and then giving testimony that could have been avoided does not operate to permit the testimony to be stricken.
• There are critical exceptions to the privilege that apply in family court proceedings [EC section 972(g)]. These include:
  • A married person cannot claim the testimonial privilege to refuse to answer questions about issues relating to income, expenses, assets, debt and employment of either spouse.
  • An action brought against the spouse by a former spouse to establish, modify or enforce a child, family or spousal support obligation arising from the marriage to the former spouse.
  • An action brought against a spouse by the other parent to establish, modify or enforce a child support obligation for a child of a nonmarital relationship between the parties.
  • In proceedings brought by a guardian of a child against a spouse relating to a child support obligation.
• Note that the testimonial privilege in the exceptions above (disclosure of income and assets, etc.) remains intact if other information is sought beyond the scope of these finance related exceptions, as to the requested disclosure of such other information.
• There are two exceptions in which a spouse may be deemed to have waived their marital privilege to refuse to testify or be called as a witness:
  • Unless erroneously compelled to do so, a married person who testifies in a proceeding to which his or her spouse is a party, or who testifies against the spouse in any such proceeding, waives their section 970 and 971 privileges in those proceedings for all purposes. 'Erroneously compelled' means under circumstances indicating "irresistible force", for instance where a judge orders the spouse to answer the question.
  • A married person cannot assert these privileges in a civil proceeding which they themselves have brought, or are defending, for the "immediate benefit" of his or her spouse, or both jointly. In such cases the privileges are effectively waived. [Evidence Code § 973(b)]. A common example would include an action for personal injury damages against a third party.

Confidential Marital Communications' Privilege

Absent a waiver or an exception, a married person, whether or not they are a party to proceedings, has a privilege to refuse to disclose confidential communications between the married person or their spouse made while they were married or domestic partners. Evidence Code section 980. 

Here are some general points to understand as to the limitations of this privilege:

• There must be a valid marriage or RDP at the time of the communication.
• This privilege survives the dissolution of the marriage itself.
• Each spouse or former spouse holds and can assert the privilege.
• Only "confidential communications" are exempted from disclosure. A "communication" means a written or oral statement or act intended to convey a message.
• As to the existence of assets and debts, it doesn't prevent disclosure of the fact of the existence of same - it only protects communications about those subjects.
• The communication must have been made in a setting that reasonably implies a confidence. There is a presumption that communications between spouses were made in confidence, but that presumption can be overcome upon a proper showing.
• If a third person was present, then there may not be a presumption that the communication was intended to be "confidential" or the presumption may be rebutted.
• The privilege will not exist where the party asserting it is abusing the "mantle of confidentiality", for instance where it is part of an assault by one spouse upon the other.
• It cannot be asserted where its application would serve to enable or aid a crime or fraud that is being attempted (although the privileges under EC sections 970 and 971 may apply).
• It does not apply to proceedings against the spouses themselves, and there are other limited exceptions (juvenile court proceedings, for instance).

Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Part One

I Am Pleased to Announce the Launch of
LOS ANGELES FAMILY MEDIATION SERVICES
Mediators and Co-Mediators Serving the Greater Los Angeles Area

• Retired Family Court Judge Gretchen W. Taylor

• Renowned Psychologist Dr. Jane Ellen Shatz

• David Hayes, M.F.T.

• Karen Horwitz, M.F.T.

I am available to serve mediation parties in the Los Angeles area as well, for selected cases.

We are proud and pleased to come together as a team of highly trained and motivated professionals, with over 100 years of combined family law and therapeutic experience, in an effort to provide a positive alternative to traditional divorce warfare.

We believe we can be part of your solution!

Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S./Mediator

Some of you know that my hope for people with family law crises is that they mediate their disputes, rather than litigate them. This is why I am a co-founder of Desert Family Mediation Services (DFMS), serving the southern California inland and desert cites.

At DFMS we are sometimes reminded that people in relationship breakup who hope to employ mediation to resolve their disputes have a broad range of needs and expectations that involve emotional dynamics in widely differing degrees. Often this occurs when one or both parties expresses deep anger or hurt. It is not uncommon that these dynamics include feelings and judgments between the parties and others that are not immediately evident, but which spill into the mediation at some stage. There is no 'one size' that predicts every couple's circumstance or mediation experience, but it is to be expected that strong feelings about many things may be triggered during the process. If this occurs it can be useful in assisting the parties to facilitate their looking at these feelings, and the raw pain that often underlies them.

Otherwise, when for instance people become stuck in angry exchanges or refuse to consider that what is important to the other person may actually be relevant to both since no agreement can be reached without joint assent, the parties risk impasses that may imperil the mediation's success. We like to say that each party holds the key to unlocking the best resolution for both of them. Looking at emotional dynamics and the feeling and reactivity that they engender may be an essential component to the process, but this is quite different from suggesting that people's minds about what the hold to be true will necessary change or dissolve into a cloud of blissful forgiveness: We just find that positions loosen and dialogue is possible when we look at the judgments that relationship wounds accumulate.

Which is not to recognize that in every case it is necessary or even appropriate to review what the parties' feelings were or have become. Some people wishing to mediate have simply realized their marriage or domestic partnership is no longer working and can amicably admit it, and really just want nothing more than reliable help with the legal mechanics of dissolution. In those cases mediators tend to act more as scriveners - that is, the mediator's role is to formalize the party's agreement rather than to guide the parties by helping to resolve conflict. But even in these seemingly simple situations, there is no guarantee that powerful unforeseen or unacknowledged feelings will not come up in ways that cause a party or both parties pain and so make what seemed simple into something much more textured and complex.

It is often not uncommon that when ask the parties whether they feel it may be or become prudent to discuss emotional issues during mediation one participant, but not always both, report that emotional hurts are not seen as something that will likely arise in mediation. This seems to be true especially where one party has checked out of the relationship some time before the decision is made to break up or is openly expressed to the other person. Psychologists call this "decoupling," and decoupling usually results not only in wide differences in each person's experience of the emotional breakup since one party may have what amounts to a 'head-start'. There are those whose views of "fairness" and "equity" are extensively colored by how the relationship ended or personal hurts or violated expectations that were suffered or inflicted along the way. Such situations also frequently include incidents of 'affairs' or other secretive behaviors that can be devastating to the person who is making a late discovery. Not surprisingly this can result in much anger and resentment, something that fuels conflict and disputes and makes unwinding them more challenging.

All cases are underpinned by important feelings about any number of possible subjects, and each contains its own hooks where people can find themselves getting stuck in an instant. When anger gets linked with concepts of "legal rights," it may be near impossible to work through the parties' interests within mediation without addressing these emotions in some meaningful way. This is one reason why Family Court exists, and why it remains the forum of choice for most people for ending relationships no matter how destructive and expensive it can become. People locked in conflict fueled by anger just may not be able to stop the cycle of reactivity.

A mediator early on is rarely able to foresee whether emotional triggers may threaten to derail the process at any point or stage. This is why we raise this issue for your consideration. But agreeing that emotional dynamics, including underlying anger or judgments, should be discussed at all may not be something both parties will easily agree to. There can be considerable fear about this topic. Perhaps understandably, many people already feel they have suffered enough from their own emotions or from the other's. However, since mediating your case is always a voluntary process for each of you (and the mediator too) it can be imperative that both parties be or become willing early on in order to entertain such a dialogue. This is not something that can be forced or imposed upon either.

Moreover, emotional dynamics and what underlies them challenge mediators equally as much as the parties. Mediators are susceptible to making judgments or being pulled into a relationship dynamic, and this can perpetuate the conflict rather than serve to assist in overcoming it.

Partly because of this recognition, together with Retired Judge Gretchen Taylor, I spent a week in early February, 2011, training with a small group of professional mediators and collaborative attorneys, including several from Europe, under the supervision of Gary F. Friedman, Jack Himmelstein, and Norman Fischer in a program entitled "Self-Reflection in Action: Using Our Inner Selves to Help People In Conflict". These gentlemen comprise the "The Center for Understanding in Conflict & The Center for Mediation in Law", based in Mill Valley. Gary is a mediation trainer, lawyer, and mediator based in Northern California; Jack is a former law professor at Columbia University Law School; and Norman is an author and former Zen abbot and practicing monk. We believe this group is at the cutting edge of developing a meaningful strategy for helping people to become unstuck in mediation.

All of the conflict professionals attending this course work regularly with families who are experiencing varying degrees of relationship crisis. Of particular focus was the high conflict divorce, where strong emotional reactions tend to have a major influence on how mediations unfold and upon their potential successes and failures. Often the parties' emotions can strike chords within the mediators themselves based upon their own life experiences, and so our goal in undertaking this work is to better understand not only your emotions but our own so that together we can navigate and move through conflict together successfully. Judgments, which are often unconscious, frequently impede the ability to move from the problem to the solution unless these judgments are investigated to some degree. Feelings always surround judgments, and are usually a reliable indicator that these judgments which are not evident are nonetheless in operation. By investigating these judgments and what lies beneath them to some extent in their own responses to the parties' expressions of conflict, mediators may be successful in moving parties forward when they otherwise appear to be stuck in impasses that threaten to end the process.

Mediation is not therapy. Even if you choose to mediate, or co-mediate, with one our DFMS mental health professionals (or divorce coaches in the case of Collaborative Mediations), the role of these experts is not intended to include therapy.

The process may nonetheless be therapeutic but only always as you invite and allow.

Understanding-based mediation is not intended to pry or force the parties' boundaries open beyond what they may be capable of or ready for. By this Blog I just want to acknowledge a possible role for de-escalating emotional dynamics within mediation by examining emotions and the judgments and pain that underlie them. I hope to introduce the idea that possibly addressing in some fashion the emotions and judgments that are an 'elephant in the room' anyway, and which can overwhelm the mediation process in important ways if not seen, is something that might better be faced head on.

At the commencement of our mediations, or at any other time, whether the dynamics of emotions that may affect your mediation is something that you want to discuss to some extent, are willing to share, or feel safe expressing or hearing about, is something for you each to decide as something of a set of ground rules that is not static but changes and the mediation unfolds. These rules require consent of all parties and the mediator. As your mediators we cannot and will not force it; moreover, such issues are not what mediation is intended or designed to overcome or transform.

But if there are strong dynamics that will impact the nuts and bolts resolution of your matter as we cover your list of values and interests in the hope of settling your matters, an availability towards these this subject is something you might want to ask us at DFMS about when we meet to begin the process.

• Facilitating access to counsel by parties early on in the proceedings should be encouraged, and attorney fee awards help to accomplish this.  This is because cases are more likely to settle when people begin with a parity of access to resources, and settlement is always the ultimate goal.  FC §2030(a). 

• Courts must now make findings on whether an award for attorney fees and costs is appropriate, including based upon the question whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for the legal representation of both parties.  FC §2030(b).  This revision directs trial courts to apply a variation of the disparity of earnings analysis that was first expressed in Marriage of Hatch (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1213, an appellate decision that some trial courts had ignored.  Relative access measured in terms of such disparity is now key.  "Disparity" implies 'a great distance or gap.'

• The California Judicial Council is directed, by January 1, 2012, to promulgate and adopt state-wide court rules in order to implement this directive in terms of what information is to be submitted to court's to support attorney fee requests.

From an experienced family lawyer's point of view, my take on this revision is that its greatest value is in telling family court judges that attorney fee awards in appropriate cases are to be the standard and not the exception.  I suspect, however, that judges and commissioners will remain overly conservative.

From a family sciences point of view I believe it is a significant improvement in the law if we are to equalize power between spouses and, frankly, genders.  More often than not women have been on the losing side of the attorney fee question in the sense that they have not controlled community or other resources to the same extent, and in the same manner, as many of their husbands.  I think that it will advance woman's rights in family law litigation.  

I do not want to overstate the power of this revision.  It is a move in the right direction, but nonetheless something of a baby step.  We will await appellate court pronouncements as to what standards family courts should apply as trial courts are reversed for being too timid or parsimonious, or even too generous.  The California Judicial Council is given to 2012 to propose state wide guidelines that will give direction to courts, and that may help to foster uniformity between different venues, in coming years.

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 

• Evaluating sales proceeds

• Comparables

         The specific asset is valued based upon the actual sales of similar assets or properties with actual sales that can be tracked.  With professional practices, this is common with dental businesses which are commonly bought and sold, and so numbers from the sales of other dental practices may be persuasive to a court.  Whether this method is useful depends very much on the nature of the business - sometimes there is nothing comparable or little published information about comparable sales.   Comparables are also considering in setting the value of real estate. 

• Liquidation value

Sometimes businesses will be cut up into parts that are sold separately.  Sometimes the business is valued in terms of what these parts would sell for.  It is rarely used except when the parties intend to actually liquidate the company.  Liquidation value does not generally include valuing goodwill (because the assumption is there will be no on-going concern).  Goodwill is the nightmare component to valuing businesses.  Many people in divorce who manage the business believe strongly this is how businesses should be valued (in part because in the absence of an actual sale, it is a fiction to say what a buyer might pay when no such buyers as a practical matter exist).

• Book Value

This relies upon the company records to determine what 'retained value' is.  It is rarely used, because it is more a statement of how the company perceives itself, or structured (or even 'cooked') its books, than any objective indication of value.

• Adjusted book value

This is performed through a forensic audit.  Usually it is performed on a cash basis, and accounts receivable and much more must be analyzed.

• Going concern value

This describes a method that includes valuing the business as greater than the sum of its parts.  There are a number of factors that are used.

• Capitalized earnings

This is the most common method for valuing businesses used in California because courts find it to be most reliable.  If you hope to use a different method, you will need to justify why that method is fairer to the out-spouse. This method requires expensive forensics. 



It is not uncommon to bifurcate the question of business valuations to try them separately because often this is the thorniest issue to be decided in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding.  



The law of business valuations is extremely complex and even contradictory.  The purpose of this blog is merely to introduce the concepts.  I will develop these themes in more detail in additional family law blogs. 


Thurman W. Arnold III 

http://www.ThurmanArnold.com

Q.     Who is liable for debts that we assign between us in our divorce settlement?

A. After property is divided incident to divorce or legal separation it is no longer community property; it is the separate property of the recipient. This separate property always remains liable to pay your own debts no matter when they were incurred. Even if that debt is assigned to the other spouse in the divorce division, you remain liable on the debt as between you and the creditor.  Family Code section 916(a)(1).

Your separate property and what you receive at the time of the division is not liable for the other spouse's debts, whether incurred before or during marriage, and you are not liable for those debts unless the debt was assigned to you in the settlement.

If your property is nonetheless applied to satisfy your spouse's debts by a creditor, you have a further right of reimbursement against your former spouse, plus interest and possibly attorney fees.

Q.      If my Husband and I divorce, am I stuck with any of his student loan?

Q.     Am I liable for myspouse's pre-marital debt?

Q.     Is there a time limit on exercising my reimbursement rights?

Q.   What is meant by separation in California?

Q.    I keep hearing the phrase "interspousal fiduciary duties".  What does it mean?

Fiduciary Duties Described

Q.  How are Social Securities Benefits Divided in Divorce?

A.  The Social Security Act of 1935, which as been amended numerous times over the years, is governed solely by the federal law.  States are powerless to effect changes in its rules and procedures.  Social Security benefits are not actually divided in divorce, and California courts do not divide social security rights.  They are not the subject of divorce settlements.  Social security benefits are considered the separate the property of the contributing spouse.  This is odd, since all other retirement plans are considered as part of the marital estate.  Government employees do not contribute to Social Security.  It is wasteful because, as discussed below, multiple former spouses can collect benefits on the same worker's history.  It is unfair because gays and lesbians who are domestic partners under state law gain no rights in the other's work history.

A spouse of a retired or disabled worker is entitled to derivative social security benefits IF the marriage was at least 10 years in duration.  This is defined as the period between the date of marriage and the date of termination of marital status.  It has nothing to do with periods of physical separation, and is not affected by a decree of legal separation.  It has nothing to do with the filing of a divorce itself.

The Social Security Act originally only covered certain job categories which reinforced traditional stereotyped views of family systems. Women generally qualified for insurance only through their husbands or children.  Amendments in 1939 added women, who became eligible to collect on their own earnings' record and became entitled to collect that or 50% of their husband's.  It was not until 1950 that benefits were extended to former spouses with children.  In 1965, former spouses without children were added but they had to have been married at least 20  years.  In 1977 this time period was reduced to 10 years.

Former spouses married for at least 10 years are now entitled to receive 50% of the Social Security beneficiary's benefits (as either derivative or dependent benefits) without reducing the worker's 100% benefit - in order words, in divorce the working spouse who contributed does not divide or share their retirement benefits and so the derivative benefits for former spouses do not cost either spouse.  They certainly, however, cost the taxpayers.  If the worker spouse dies, a former spouse(s) receives 100% of the benefits of the worker as a surviving former spouse.

This has many strange consequences.  One is that since spouses and state courts cannot divide the benefits, and it costs the working former spouse nothing to allow the other spouse to claim these benefits.  Imagine what hardship this might cause to a spouse whose marriage is terminated 9 years, 11 months, and 355 days after the date of marriage.  They would receive no derivative benefits, period.  It would cost the worker spouse nothing to delay dissolving the marriage one more day.  Many spouses who anticipate a future divorce strategically hold off filing until they are assured this time has passed or will pass, for good reason.  In California marital status cannot be terminated earlier than 6 months after the dissolution is filed and served.  I always alert clients to this area of the law, and have many times recommended patience; it would be attorney malpractice not to.  Sometimes raging working spouses want an earlier divorce just to deprive the other of this benefit.  This can be most unfortunate and downright ugly.  There is a procedure in California for dissolving marital status before a divorce case is completely finished (e.g., where property rights have not been determined) called bifurcation of marital status.  Sometimes a spouse wishes to get divorced immediately so that they can remarry, and this can interrupt the 10 years if the Court approves it.  Courts can order that the bifurcating party indemnify the other out of their own pocket for the loss of benefits, but as a practical matter there is no way for this indemnification to occur.  

Another consequence illustrates a major waste within the Social Security system.  Imagine that Fred marries Nancy the homemaker when they are 19.  After 10 years, they divorce. and Fred marries Jennifer.  After 10 years he moves on, dissolving that marriage and marrying Diane next.  He is now 49 years of age.  With his record, he still may have a couple of more marriages in him.  At this point, assuming that none of these three women have remarried or that they remarry after age 60 (a new marriage before age 60 terminates the right to derivative benefits), each of them are eligible to receive 50% of Fred's benefits while he continues to be entitled to 100%.  This means that 250% worth of benefits will be paid upon Fred's earning history alone.  Even better, if Fred dies before them, each ex-wife is thereupon entitled to receive Fred's 100% - which means 300% will be paid out and, since Fred is a serial monogamist, he will probably leave a widow (Tara) who likewise receives 100%.

Also, note the risks to the women.  If Nancy or Jennifer remarry before age 60 they lose any claims to the benefits generated by Fred and the count begins at zero with their new spouse and are based on the new spouse's earnings record with Social Security (assuming this person is not a government worker).  If their new marriage does not make the 10 year mark, they receive nothing from Social Security from either spouse.  This makes you want to reconsider a second marriage doesn't it - at least if you are a non wage earning wife!  Of course, few people ever think about this because they don't know about it; this is one goal of my website as an informational tool.

California has two state pension plans for government workers which exist outside of Social Security.  These are the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) and the California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS).  There are a number of city and county pension plans.  California teachers, state public safety officers (police and firefighters), and other workers who don't pay into the retirement portion of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), do not receive social security benefits once they retire. 

They only may be eligible for some SS benefits based upon their spouse's record or their own earnings from private sector jobs.  However, even these benefits may be reduced under the Windful Elimination Provision (WEP) or the Government Pension Offset (GPO).  These are complicated rules and formulas which are beyond the scope of this answer. 

Q.  What rights do I have to permanent spousal support?

A.  Permanent spousal support is not usually "permanent," although it can be in cases of very long marriages.  Lawyers and judges also refer to it as post-judgment spousal support, alimony, judgment spousal support, or long term support.

Unlike temporary spousal support, long term spousal support is only issued after a final judgment of Dissolution of Marriage or Legal Separation.  It is equally available to domestic partners.  Also unlike temporary support, it is not based on any computer formula or state or county guideline, but must be determined and fixed depending on the facts of every individual case.  If long term support is important to your future wellbeing, you are going to need an experienced support attorney.

There are several very important rules to keep in mind.  First, a marriage in California which lasts more than 10 years (defined as the time between date of marriage and physical separation), is "long term" marriage.  The general rule is that in marriages which are not long term, spousal support should not be payable for more than one-half the length of marriage - or to put in differently, the law presumes that the recipient spouse should be rehabilitated and so become self-supporting in a period equal to 1/2 the marriage.  However, this presumption becomes less important in cases involving older couples, especially where people can not be realistically expected to re-enter the work force, in cases where there children who remain minors, or where the party asking for support has a debilitating disease or disability.

There is no magic ratio for how long a former spouse might be ordered to pay long term support.  Each case depends upon its own facts, the quality of your attorney, and the attitudes of the family court judge.  Even in cases of long term marriages, the support obligation typically will end at some point in time.  However, if usually will not end on its own - meaning that when a trial court orders long term support it will reserve jurisdiction to continue to extent it, until some time when a party petitions the court to terminate support and a judge finally says "enough is a enough." 

Imputed income is often an important argument in long term support marriages, where one party convinces the court that the other party is shirking or failing to genuinely try to become self-supporting.  It is sometimes necessary to have the supported spouse evaluated by a vocational rehabilitation expert. 

There are four components to an award of of permanent support:  1) Amount; 2) duration; 3) substantive increases or decreases over time; and 4) jurisdictional step downs and ultimately a termination date.

Second, Family Code section 4320 is a critical support statute.  I have provided a link and uploaded it so that you may read it.  Essentially it sets forth all the factors that the court must consider in setting post-judgment support, and you will see that it is not an exhaustive list and the court can consider anything else it deems important to the decision.  Support factors include the extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the marital standard of living established during the marriage, considering:  a) the marketable skills of the supported party, the job market for those skills, the time and expense required to train that party including education and b) the extent to which the supported party's present or future income earning ability is impaired by periods of unemployment or were incurred during the marriage to permit that party to devote time to domestic duties.

Another factor is whether the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, license, career, or position by the supporting party. 

Another factor is the ability of the supporting party to pay, taking in account that person's earning capacity, income, and assets and standard of living.

Another very important support consideration is the needs of each party - including both. 

Another factor is the obligations and assets of each spouse, including the separate property which each has or gained upon the dissolution.

Another is the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the needs of dependent children in their custody.

The age and health of the parties is critical in some cases.  65 years of age is the presumed retirement age for adults today, and courts cannot order a person to continue to be employed beyond that age - but, if they make that choice, their income can be considered.

A documented history of domestic violence can affect the right to receive support or the obligation to pay it.

The tax consequences between the parties must be considered.

And, basically, as I said, any other specific facts that trend one way or another.

The three most common factors are the marital standard of living (MSOL), need and ability to pay, and the assets the parties end up with upon divorcing.

Courts cannot order lump sums for support.  Spousal support is generally taxable to the recipient and deductible to the payor, but there are very specific IRS requirements that must be met for this to actually be so.

Courts are required to state their findings on each relevant issue in writing.  In practice though, most people settle their divorce cases by way of settlement agreements.  Unfortunately, lawyers often leave out these findings so that when a court is asked, down the road, by the payor to terminate or decrease support, or by the payee to increase it, there is no map for the court to use to base its modification findings on.

If support is an issue for you either way, please hire a competent lawyer.  There are many attorneys moving into family law from civil practices who are clueless about these things.  Caveat emptor!