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Recent Posts in Fiduciary Duties in Divorce Category

December 30, 2011
  Attorney Michael C. Peterson Speaks About FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY (Before and Once Divorce Happens)
Posted By Michael C. Peterson

Advice for Couples in 2012, Including How to Balance Power in Your Marriage

One of the most common problems I see arising in (and sometimes leading to) any divorce action is a lack of financial transparency between the spouses or partners. Often, over time, and for various personal, practical and familial and historical reasons, one party has assumed a dominant or exclusive role in the management of community assets, including depository accounts, real estate, investments, and small businesses.That role effectively puts a managing spouse in a position to have vastly superior information about the family finances, and the power to act on such information in the context of divorce to the detriment of the non-managing spouse. This may wind up prejudicing one party if the relationship ends.

It has been my repeated experience that, in anticipation of a divorce action, an unethical or abusive spouse will take strategic steps to hide assets and obfuscate the methods used to hide them. The ramifications to the non-managing spouse can include not only an unfair disbursement of community assets upon resolution of the case, but also manifest into reduced calculations of temporary and permanent spousal support and child support. 

California family law attempts to minimize the potential for financial fraud during the life of a divorce action. For example, it creates rules for mandatory disclosures of assets. It creates fiduciary duties for managing spouses. It creates methods for discovery of financial and asset information (but only in the context of a legal action, after the relationship has broken down). It creates pre-judgment and post-judgment penalties for non-disclosure. 

In a perfect world such legal tools alone would fully prevent the potential for financial dishonestly between separating spouses. But the reality is that the law routinely fails to protect the financial interests of the non-managing spouse in this regard, and the root cause of that failure occurs because non-managing spouses don't take steps to equalize the playing field when it comes to information about family finances during the course of the marriage. Stated another way, individual non-managing spouses are often unable to utilize the tools that the law provides to ensure they receive a just and equitable share of the fruits of the community's efforts during the course of the marriage because they lack the information necessary to have their lawyer fully protect their interests.  Too many non-managing spouses wait until the time of separation to learn about the family finances.  By then, non-managing spouses and their attorney are playing catch up, and not always winning. As such, it is of paramount importance that a non-managing spouse be proactive in learning as much information about the family finances as possible, and do so not only on the eve of a divorce, but also during the entire course of the marriage itself.   In this day and age, knowledge is the coin of the realm.

Economists recognize that one source of market failure (i.e. inefficient allocation of resources) is caused by a phenomenon called asymmetric information. Asymmetric information affects decisions in transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. In adverse selection models, the ignorant party lacks information while negotiating a contract to the transaction. Common examples of information asymmetry include 'insider' trading in the stock market, or buying a 'lemon' used car. Understanding and combating asymmetric information is crucial to economists because market failure leads to net losses for society as a whole. Understanding and combating asymmetric information should be equally important to the non-managing spouse and his/her attorney because of its strong potential to lead to inequitable settlements or trial results.  In the economic sense, asymmetric information between spouses about the family finances is a form of market failure. To be sure, if you are contemplating or undergoing a divorce action, you will (in most cases) effectively be negotiating a transaction that will bind you and impact your financial future.

The best way overall way to combat a managing spouse 's tendency to commit acts of misfeasance or non-disclosure regarding financial interests is to equalize the flow of financial information from the very outset of the marriage, with information parity being a non-managing spouse's goal.

Hand-in-hand with the goal of information parity is a mindset that fosters such parity being present throughout the marriage. That mindset is, simply stated, one of equality and mutual appreciation. Two people will divide labor in a marriage so as to maximize their relative strengths and weaknesses, and in so doing the synergy benefits the martial community as a whole to a greater extent than either person could do individually. Economists refer to this phenomenon as comparative advantage, and recognize that such a situation is optimal in the context of maximizing social utility. So too is comparative advantage optimal for managing a household. 

As a simple 'traditional' example, assume Chris and Pat are married. Chris has a greater income earning potential due to holding a doctorate degree and having a good network of people to whom Chris is favorably known in the locale. Pat has greater domestic abilities due to having a bachelors degree in nutrition a work background in home decor. Based on these comparative strengths, Chris and Pat decide that Chris will work full-time and Pat will take care of the home full-time. Pat's excellent meals keep Chris energized and in good health.  Pat's superior aesthetic tastes keep Chris in style with cool cloths. Chris's boss comes over for dinner and is impressed by the feng shui of the domicile. Over time Chris gets promoted and raises. Chris uses the additional income to make financial investments, go on vacations with Pat, and purchase a better home. By Chris and Pat each doing what they are relatively strong at, they, both individually and as a whole, are made economically better off. But more to the point, it is their interdependence that necessarily caused the mutual gain. The law recognizes this fundamental principal in the context of divorce by creating the concept of community property; that regardless of whether it was Chris's paycheck that allowed for the growth of assets, Pat's contributions to Chris's earned income are equally important and therefore necessitate equal division should Pat and Chris's relationship end. So as to a non-managing spouse's mindset, I strongly encourage all such people who are contemplating marriage, married, contemplating divorce, or involved in a divorce have one that recognizes their contributions to the community and requires takes a role.

On the practical side of things, here is a list of information parity objectives that I believe healthy marital relationships should achieve:

  • Spouses should store copies of written financial documents in a safe place and where the other spouse doesn't have access.
  • Spouses should have all depository, investment, retirement, and debt account numbers written down in an asset ledger. Annual inventories of all assets with a value over $500.00 should be maintained and signed off on by spouses and kept in the asset ledger.
  • Spouses should keep copies of income information, including payroll stubs and other documents showing income such as rental checks from investment property or brokerage statements from securities dealers. 
  • Spouses should copy and store all financial account information from banks savings and loans, credit unions, particularly monthly statements. Spouses should also copy and store other banking information such as passbooks, check registers, and deposit slips. 
  • Spouses should agreed to have all financial information statements should be sent to each spouse individually, directly from the applicable financial institution, and be received only at that spouses primary residential address (and not, for example, at a business). If one spouse insists on receiving their financial information from home or stops receiving financial information mail at the residence, it is often a red flag. 
  • Spouses should maintain copies of tax documents, including personal tax returns and business tax returns, and attached forms, for the preceding five years.
  • Spouses should receive and keep business financial statements, including net worth and income statements, in the case of a small business.
  • Spouses should keep copies of all wills and trusts, and attachments thereto (such as a grant deed that has been recorded in favor of a trust for the benefit of the spouses).
  • Spouses should keep copies of all life insurance policies.
  • Spouses should keep copies of all outstanding debts incurred during the marriage that are in either spouses name.
  • Spouses should keep a list of all personal and real property owned prior to the marriage.
  • Spouses should keep a list of all safe deposit boxes and their contents.

Other tips you should know about and red flags you should watch out for to protect you from an unscrupulous spouse:

  • Don't wait until things are going badly in the relationship to achieve financial information parity. Work towards that goal from the outset.
  • Conduct asset searches of your spouse's biographical information by professional third-parties on an annual basis.
  • Be aware that there is a statistically higher incidence of spouses hiding money in their second, third, or later marriages.
  • Its best to have only a certified public accountant prepare the spouses' tax returns (as opposed to 'bookkeepers' of other unlicensed persons acting as pseudo-accountants), as they are subject to professional  conflict of interest rules. Do not sign any document seeking your informed consent to waive any conflict of interest rules with respect to accountants without consulting an attorney.   
  • Particularly in the case of a small business, become knowledgeable about the business's employees, its normal income, its normal expenses, and how it accounts for them. A small business in particular is breeding grounds for accounting tricks to make it appear less valuable. I have seen this occur by the managing spouse: favor/incentivize cash payments from customers, funnel personal expenses as payments from the business, creating and paying fake employees (including the spouses' own children) and then voiding the uncashed checks after the divorce is final, or delaying new long-term business opportunities (i.e. taking new customer orders, signing new clients, or receiving transfers from escrow-like accounts such as paypal.com). It's important to be familiar with the inner-workings of a small business so you can note when something is amiss. Carefully review and copy customer/client payment agreements and accounts where a small business operates on a largely cash basis.
  • Review financial statements on a regular basis. It is easier to access and digest three months of recent transactions than five years of relatively distant transactions. Look out for large or out-of-the ordinary deposits or withdrawals, and try to trace the source/end-point of the transaction to the best of your ability.
  • Be aware that municipal bonds and certain savings bonds, because they are tax-free, are not reported to the IRS and therefore can be a vehicle for asset hiding because they do not need to be disclosed on tax returns. Look out for large investments in these assets.
  • Non-managing spouses should be careful about signing joint tax returns that claim large deductions for various expenses, particularly in the case where a small business is involved. Although it might mean a larger tax burden in a particular year, in the context of a divorce it often results in lower spousal support and a lower business valuation, with attestation proof presented to a judge in the form of your signature.
  • Big changes to the administration of finances can be a red flag: applying for large new loans, the closing of a bank account or change to an investment portfolio, particularly without the input of the non-managing spouse, might give opportunity to hide money.
  • Know your spouse's boss well, and make sure they like you. I have experienced collusion between employers and employee so as to show short-run decreases (bonus or raise deferral) to income agreed on increases after the divorce is complete.  If you separate from your spouse, let your spouse's boss know that event has occurred in writing. 
  • Do not sign deeds or other papers concerning real estate papers without consulting an attorney.
  • Watch out for bank accounts opened in the name of spouse's children, as they do not get listed on that spouse's tax statements they can be a method of hiding community assets.
  • Also watch out for overpayments on taxes. A managing spouse may try to receive a tax return later after the divorce is final by overpayment now, or alternatively filing amended taxes.
  • Avoid 'loans' to friends or family.           
  • Be a Missourian, i.e. don't take your spouse's word. Have the managing spouse show you with the documents that corroborate what they tell you about the family finances. 
  • Don't allow fear of ruining the relationship, cultural values, or laziness prevent your pro-activity in becoming astute in the family finances. Defensive responses to your inquiries and requirements for financial information parity by the managing spouse may indicate diversion of community assets.  
  • Always remember that the burden of proof rests on the accuser, not the accused, to prove diverted assets to a court. Take all actions to protect your interests with this rule in mind.

These are my thoughts at the end of 2011 - I wish each of you, and each of us, a Happy New Year in 2012, and I hope that we all strive to be transparent and ethical during the coming year!



Michael C. Peterson, Esq. - Indio and Coachella Valley Divorce Attorney  
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August 16, 2011
  Marriage of MARGULIS - Fiduciary Duties of MANAGING SPOUSES
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Marriage of Margulis, Part 2 - Duties of Managing Spouses

Please see Part I of my evaluation of  IRMO Margulis as the launching point for understanding the appellate court's outline of interspousal fiduciary duties.

The Margulis rule states that once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets.

The rule is justified by examining the scope of fiduciary duties imposed by the California Family Code. Interestingly, the trial court had found that the Husband (Alan) had breached his fiduciary duties to Wife (Elaine) "to maintain proper records of all community assets which he had exclusive control and management over...." Yet, other than imposing $20,000 in sanctions and assessing $30,000 in attorney fees against Alan, the trial court did not believe Elaine had produced sufficient evidence to explain what had really happened to the deposit accounts that were at issue beyond Exhibit 18, 'the smoking gun'. $50,000 in sanctions was a cheap price to pay relative to the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It was reversed for applying too narrow a breach of fiduciary duty and applying the wrong remedy.

Since Margulis contains a great explanation of how statutory fiduciary duties operate I quote the decision as follows:

"Family Code provisions detailing the fiduciary obligations between spouses provide strong support for shifting the burden of proof to the managing spouse when determining the value and disposition of missing assets. The starting point is section 721, which provides that accountability for the management of community assets is a fundamental aspect of the fiduciary duties owed between spouses.

Section 721, subdivision (b), states, in relevant part: between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in Sections 16403, 16404, and 16503 of the Corporations Code, including, but not limited to, the following: ¶(1) Providing each spouse access at all times to any books kept regarding a transaction for the purposes of inspection and copying. ¶(2) Rendering upon request, true and full information of all things affecting any transaction which concerns the community property. Nothing in this section is intended to impose a duty for either spouse to keep detailed books and records of community property transactions. ¶(3) Accounting to the spouse, and holding as a trustee, any benefit or profit derived from any transaction by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse which concerns the community property.

Section 721's specific incorporation of the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in• section 16403 of the Corporations Code, makes clear that the duty to disclose relevant information concerning transactions affecting the community property is an affirmative and broad obligation. Corporations Code section 16403 requires each partner to furnish to a partner ... [¶] (1) Without demand, any information concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the partnership agreement or this chapter.... (Corp. Code, § 16403, subd. (c), italics added.)

Section 1100 further delineates the scope of a managing spouse's accountability. That statute not only prohibits a spouse from engaging in certain conduct, such as making a unilateral gift of community personal property or disposing of it for less than fair and reasonable value, without the written consent of the other spouse (§ 1100, subd. (b)), but it also requires each spouse to act as a fiduciary toward the other in the management of community assets in accordance with the general rules governing fiduciary relationships ... as specified in Section 721, until such time as the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court. This duty includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an interest.... (§ 1100, subd. (e).)

Importantly, section 1101 creates a right of action and specific remedies for the breach of fiduciary duty between spouses. Subdivision (a) of section 1101 gives each spouse a claim against the other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse's present undivided one-half interest in the community estate.... The statutory remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty, specifically including a breach of those [duties] set out in Sections 721 and 1100, include a mandatory award of 50 percent of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney's fees and court costs.... (§ 1101, subd. (g).)

If the nondisclosure or wrongful disposition of community property falls within the ambit of Civil Code section 3294 (punitive damages upon clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud or malice), the court must award to injured spouse the entire value of
the asset (§ 1101, subd. (h)).

Finally, section 2100 makes clear that these fiduciary obligations of disclosure and accounting continue to bind spouses after separation until final distribution of assets. Section 2100 states: [A] full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties.... Moreover, each party has a continuing duty to immediately, fully, and accurately update and augment that disclosure to the extent there have been any material changes so that at the time the parties enter into an agreement for the resolution of any of these issues, or at the time of trial on these issues, each party will have a full and complete knowledge of the relevant underlying facts. (§ 2100, subd. (c), italics added; see also § 2102, subd. (a)(1) [from date of separation to date community assets are distributed, spouses are subject to § 721's fiduciary duty to disclose assets and update material changes].)

Taken together, these statutes impose on a managing spouse affirmative, wide-ranging duties to disclose and account for the existence, valuation, and disposition of all community assets from the date of separation through final property division. Simply put, these statutes require the spouse to account for his or her management of the property. The managing spouse must reveal if the community property changes value, ceases to exist, or is transferred for less than its worth, thereby depriving the nonmanaging spouse of his or her half-interest. Because of the fiduciary relationship between spouses, the managing spouse must reveal any self-dealing or other conduct that impaired the value of the property and entitles the other spouse to compensation.

Applying these statutes to the facts of this case, a trial court could conclude Alan breached his fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting. A court could find he breached his duty to provide full and accurate disclosure of all community assets when in pretrial exchanges he failed to inform Elaine that $20,000 was in the Charles Schwab IRA's, asserting that the only existing community property was the Sycamore house. A trial court similarly could find Alan breached his duty to disclose immediately and fully any material changes in the community property (§ 2100, subd. (c)), by failing to tell Elaine until just before trial that all the community investment and checking accounts he had managed were virtually empty. Additionally, by refusing to provide Elaine with any documentary or other corroborating proof of what actually happened to the money that had once been in those accounts, Alan may have breached his duty to furnish to Elaine any information concerning the [community's] business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of [her] rights (Corp. Code, § 16403, subd. (c)(1); § 721, subd. (b)), which included her right to pursue a claim against Alan for impairment to [her] ... one-half interest in the community estate (§ 1101, subds. (a), (g) & (h)).

The trial court, however, found a single, narrow breach of duty by Alan: a breach of the duty to keep and provide adequate records. In so ruling, the trial court impliedly found Alan did not owe broader fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting. The trial court's erroneous finding on the scope of Alan's duties led it to apply the wrong remedy. Instead of awarding Elaine at least 50 percent of the value of undisclosed or wrongfully transferred assets (§ 1101, subds. (g) [50 percent], (h) [100 percent upon proof of oppression, fraud or malice]), the trial court ordered Alan to pay Elaine $20,000 as sanctions, plus attorney fees.

The trial court's failure to find Alan breached his broader fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting stemmed from the court's denial of Elaine's request to charge Alan with the exhibit 18 asset values unless he disproved those values or proved he properly disposed of those assets. Although the trial court found that Elaine had satisfied the requisite foundation to admit the exhibit, it accorded the document little or no weight because Elaine had not prepared it and had no evidence to support it. Consequently, according to the trial court, Elaine failed to carry her burden of proving the accounts itemized in exhibit 18 ever had the values listed in that document, and Alan could not be charged with wrongfully disposing of assets he never possessed. But, as discussed above, the trial court misapplied the burden of proof.

Elaine's introduction of exhibit 18, which Alan conceded he prepared, satisfied her initial burden. The statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting then effectively shifted the burden to Alan to rebut the presumption he should be charged with the assets listed on exhibit 18, a document that was prima facie evidence of the account values it stated."

Based upon the foregoing the case was reversed and remanded to the trial court. The sanctions award of $20,000 plus $30,000 was also reversed "so that the court may revisit the question of the appropriate remedy should the evidence establish Alan's breach of fiduciary duty" - in other words, the appellate court is directing the trial court to hit Alan harder than was amounted to a slap on the wrist. As Justice Aronson wryly directs:
 
"Alan's cross-appeal merits little discussion. His challenge to the trial court's finding that he breached his fiduciary duties to Elaine is meritless. Likewise, his additional challenges to the award against him for sanctions and attorney fees fails, given the clear statutory authorization for both awards in light of Alan's breach of duty.... Nevertheless, we reverse the attorney fees and sanctions award so the court may revisit the question of the appropriate remedy should the evidence established Alan's breach of duty." Elaine is to be awarded her attorney fees and costs for this appeal.

Margulis also contains an excellent discussion regarding Epstein credits, debt payment in lieu of support, and tracing issues. I will endeavor to blog that portion of the decision in Part III.




Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.
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August 15, 2011
  IRMO MARGULIS - Managing Spouse Has BURDEN OF PROOF To Explain MISSING ASSETS
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Marriage of Margulis (8/11/2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 277

Part One

I am always pleased to report cutting edge rulings by our appellate courts, and this is one of the most important decisions in recent years affecting who has the burden of proof to explain what happens to assets that disappear after marriage partners separate, and what the consequences are for managing "in-spouses" who cannot explain what happened to liquid (or other assets) that existed at separation but seem to have evaporated in the meantime. While upon reflection it is hard to imagine how this decision could be news because it makes such perfect sense, the Fourth Appellate District's pronouncements (by the Honorable J. Aronson) are indeed a new extension of existing law - which is why the trial court in this case was reversed.

Special kudos to Attorneys Stephen Temko and Dawn Gray on behalf of the Association of Certified Law Specialists (an organization serving the public interest that I am proud to be a member of) for weighing in with amicus curiae briefs that probably helped to inform the appellate justices in positive ways.

Because this case is important I am going to help it be digested in two gulps - this is Part I.

The root holding of IRMO Margulis is this: Once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets. It is now clear that managing spouses have the burden of proof to account for missing assets that they controlled. Family Code section 1100 states that "either spouse has the [right of] management and control of the community personal property, ..., as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse." 
 
But when parties separate the more empowered partner often grabs or already manages all the marbles, and then enjoys the advantage of continuing to carry those marbles around and even spending them down until the community property pot is ultimately divided. Without accountability this frequently led to abuses and misappropriations that - in the absence of this new rule - favored that party and facilitates their practical ability to defraud the community property estate, notwithstanding a legal duty per Family Code section 721(b) to account for what went where. Until now. The Margulis rule is necessary to protect the rights of an "out-spouse" as a matter of basic fiduciary protections.

The facts of the case as set forth in the appellate decision are these (and are reminiscent of the facts of the Davenport decision):  Alan and Elaine separated after 33 years of marriage in August, 1996. Alan moved out of the parties' Irvine home and moved to Chicago to start a  new job. Elaine remained in the family residence. They owned a home in Palm Desert, California.The marriage yielded two children who are now adults.

During the marriage Alan was the sole working spouse and exercised "complete control" of the couple's finances - sound familiar? This included retirement, bank, and investment account personal property assets. Although Alan moved out in 1996, Elaine did not file for divorce for another six years - in 2002. Five more years passed before Alan even filed a response in those proceedings. Throughout this period Alan paid Elaine just enough, evidently, for her to be satisfied with the financial status quo so that she undertook no steps to move the divorce towards a conclusion. I can only speculate what psychological and emotional dynamics were at play in these people's lives, but infer that Elaine trusted Alan enough that she did not perceive that she needed to take vigorous steps to protect herself. Which gave him free reign for a long, long time.

Once the case did begin to move forward, as often happens when there is a significant power imbalance in relationship, it began to move quickly and that pace certainly further advantaged the husband. Commonly it is the in-spouse who is rushing the case to trial while the out-spouse plays catch-up and the parties, or the in-spouse, play discovery games and hide and seek with assets, disclosures, and backup. Bank accounts are easily susceptible to this type of abuse because they are document intensive, and expensive to evaluate. In and out transactions (deposits in, transfers out) must each be traced in order for forensic experts and the court to know how to characterize and characterize transactions and the flow of cash. Here Alan filed his Response to Elaine's 2002 Petition on February 21, 2007, and the parties found themselves in a pre-trial Mandatory Settlement Conference only six months later. This means that Elaine's team had very little time to prepare since Alan knew where the marbles were but elected not to share their identity and location.

There was a single "smoking gun" in the case which consisted of what became at trial "Exhibit 18." This was a two-page document that was entitled "confidential personal financial statement" for "Alan/Elaine Margulis," dated February 1, 1999. It reflected total assets of $1,305,500. The liquid (i.e., cash) portion amounted to more than half of that number.

At trial Elaine testified that, as the nonmanaging spouse, she had no personal knowledge or records of the value of the accounts at any time. This was the sole extent of her evidence at trial about the status of the assets near the date of separation, and essentially Alan's attorneys argued that this proved nothing. Elaine's attorney responded insightfully that the effect of this document was to shift the burden of proof to Alan to explain and show that he had properly disposed of those assets, or that the stock holdings lost their value as a result of market conditions - as opposed to them having been withdrawn or mismanaged by him or for his sole benefit. But the trial judge disagreed, which set up this reversal in favor of Elaine. The trial court explained "I don't believe it supports, standing alone [that] your assets listed did, in fact, exist." Wife had no other evidence to prove that they did - hence, without the rule established by Justice Aronson in this case, she would be out of luck. Her proof would have failed on the contested issues, and it did fail at the trial court level. Before this decision the trial court's perspective was a bit shallow but not surprising. It takes bold judges with considerable family law experience to read the sub-text. 

Who has the burden of proof on a topic is often key to which party wins or loses on a given issue. This is why Marulis is important to control of asset cases.

Shifting the Burden of Proof

There are two common principles linked to the concept of the "burden of proof." One is the burden of persuasion and the other is the burden of producing evidence. Often if a party cannot produce evidence on a subject that the law imposes a burden upon them to produce in order to prevail, they lose. Irmo Margulis has implications beyond family law.

The Margulis decision observes: "the trial court concluded that Elaine, the nonmanaging spouse who lacked both personal knowledge and records concerning the assets listed on exhibit 18, failed to meet the difficult burden of proving these now missing assets had existed....

The trial court's failure to place the burden of the duty on Alan relieved him of the duty to account for his postseparation management of these assets. Thus, Alan did not have to prove the amounts that had been in these accounts or that he had properly disposed of those sums. This lack of accountability poses a risk of abuse and runs afoul of the statutory scheme imposing broad fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting on a managing spouse." [Emphasis added].

It continued: "Given that 'bedrock concerns' of 'policy and fairness' drive the analysis [citation omitted] , it is not surprising that a common trigger for burden-shifting is 'when the parties have unequal access to evidence necessary to prove a disputed issue. 'Where the evidence necessary to establish a fact essential to a claim lies peculiarly within the knowledge and competence of one of the parties, that party has the burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue although it is not the party asserting the claim.'....

Concerns over 'unequal access to evidence' [citations omitted]
are particularly pressing in the context of a marital dissolution where financial records can be crucial to ensuring the equal division of property required by Family Code section 2550.... Undoubtedly, in marriages and separations like the Margulis's where one spouse exercised exclusive control over community property, the parties will have vastly unequal access to evidence concerning the disposition of that property. When this occurs, fairness requires shifting to the managing spouse the burden of proof on missing assets. Moreover, ...,  the statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting owed between spouses further justify that result."

The Appellate Court goes on to explain why this result is fair in light of the fiduciary obligations between spouses that I have written about so much over the past few years. I will separately blog that portion of the decision.

But as I have been trumpeting now for many months, the appellate courts are working overtime to save the existing California scheme of family law to ensure transparency - it is my opinion long overdue but much appreciated!

For those in-spouses who do act in good faith after separation and the pendency of the marital proceedings, Margulis is a cautionary tale - managing spouses had better keep records of transactions affecting the community property estate and make all required disclosures or find themselves assuming the risk of loss or diminution of the value of those assets.

Please note that the appellate Court's initial decision of August 11, 2011, was modified on August 26 and September 9, 2011. The citation to the modified opinion is Marriage of Prentis-Margulis v. Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252. I have yet compare the differences in the two decisions. 




Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S.
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July 30, 2011
  Can I CONTINUE My DIVORCE TRIAL?
Posted By Thurman Arnold, C.F.L.S.
My divorce trial is scheduled for next month. I want to change attorneys - will the case be continued to give a new attorney enough time to prepare my case correctly?

T.T.J.

A. Trial continuances are disfavored under the law. Any application to continue a family law trial must be made pursuant to Cal.Rules of Court, Rule 3.1332. It allows for "ex parte" requests to continue trials as well as such applications on noticed motions upon a showing of good cause and in the interests of justice, and lists some examples of what a trial court might properly consider to be "good cause." Subsection (c)(4) includes substitution of trial counsel as a ground "but only where there is an affirmative showing that the substitution is required in the interests of justice." Courts are highly unlikely to permit more than one continuance without a really good reason, so I hope this is your first request.

Usually when you file this kind of ex parte you should also ask the court, "in the alternative", for "an order shortening time" (OST) for the hearing on the motion" since judges are feeling pressured from the "Elkins" changes in the law and are stretched in their abilities to read ex parte paperwork (usually received by the court the day before or the morning of) at the last moment. Indeed, ex parte applications on all matters except the direst emergencies are being increasingly denied - and they irritate judges. In fact, some judges may sanction a party or their attorney for a clearly improper one.

Whether you seek an OST also depends upon where you are in the procedural timeline - for instance, if the discovery cut-off (including the exchange of any designation of experts per the Code) has not yet occurred but would toll between the date of an ex parte hearing and the date of a hearing on shortened notice per your applicable local rules or by statute, then be sure in your ex parte to include a request that the discovery clock be switched off until the court issues its ruling on the continuance. Otherwise you or your new attorney will need to file a motion to reopen discovery once the case is continued - assuming that important things remained undone - usually the case when parties are switching attorneys on the eve of trial.

In fact, I have seen cases where parties want to change attorneys because the offer that is on the table is at a substantial discount for how much or what agreements the case should reasonably be settled for, but because the weaker party's attorneys messed up the case that party is now at such a disadvantage that they must seriously consider taking the offer or doing worse at trial. Strong, aggressive counsel for a powerful party (usually the "in-spouse") will vigorously try to push the case to its conclusion before you, the "out-spouse," can catch your balance. This is a recipe for disaster. By the way, having good competent divorce counsel from the beginning greatly enhances the likelihood that your case will be fairly settled and that it will not go to trial - that is the goal for any sensible person.

Here are my suggestions:
  • See whether the side has done everything the law requires of them in formulating your grounds for "good cause" under Rule 3.1332. If they have and your attorney failed to also comply, this is not good. If neither side did what is required to avoid irregularities, then that is better. If your side did comply but the side did not, that is best and you should point this out in your papers and in oral argument.
  • Did the other side comply with all applicable Local Rules regarding trial? For instance, in Riverside County we have local Rule 5.0053 which mandates that a Trial Readiness Conference be set before trial, and at least in Indio that you (or your attorney) sign a form that you understood and will comply with what those rules require. Here is a link to Title 5 of the Riverside County Local Rules for Family Law cases. There may be similar rules in your jurisdiction. Rule 5.0065 discusses ex parte procedures in Riverside County, which generally includes the family law divisions in downtown Riverside, Hemet, Indio and Blythe.
  • Draft a declaration that establishes good cause for your request - one that speaks to both justice and procedural issues. Anticipate what prejudice the other side will claim in opposition to your continuance request. Offer to ameliorate it if you can, in advance of the hearing on the ex parte.
  • Rule 3.1332(d)(10) permits the court to impose "conditions" if it grants a continuance. These need to be reasonable of course. A frequent condition "no more continuances." Unreasonable requests may be that you are asked to waive a fundamental right that is a key issue in the case itself, i.e., a waiver of spousal support or an agreement that the court will have retroactive jurisdiction at the trial when it does occur to reach back and modify support to the first trial date. Offering to contribute to the other side's attorney fees incurred surrounding the rescheduling may be appropriate under certain facts.
  • Before you file your ex parte, be sure to attempt to "meet and confer" with the other side in an effort to obtain a stipulation to continue instead, and in order to discuss how you might minimize their inconvenience and prejudice and to discuss possible reasonable conditions in advance of the hearing that would address those issues. Attach any confirming letters as an exhibit.
  • Make your motion as short as possible and author it to read fast - not more than 10 pages including declarations, points and authorities, and exhibits. Judges have no time to read long winded stories.
  • Be sure to notice all the parties for the ex parte. For instance, if there has been a Borson motion by either side that attorney (the former, Borson attorney) must also get notice of the hearing and the paperwork at the time you set the hearing.
  • Hire your new attorney first and have them make the motion (which is costly in terms of the amount of the retainer they will reasonably require, since if the motion is denied that attorney knows he may be going into a trial that will take immediate emergency hours to come up to speed on).
  • If  you haven't retained counsel yet and just want to continue a trial "to get counsel," you have a problem. While this excuse might work at the first hearing on an OSC or regular motion, it is unlikely to convince a judge who is managing his trial calender. 

Good luck with your new attorney!



Thurman W. Arnold, III, CFLS

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May 23, 2011
  FORM OF TITLE Trumps COMMUNITY PROPERTY PRESUMPTION Where Life Insurance Is An Asset in DIVORCE
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS



Marriage of Valli, B222435

PLEASE NOTE - The California Supreme Court granted review of this decision on 8/24/11 and as a result the opinion reviewed below has been vacated.

8/26/11
TWA


The California Second Appellate District issued its ruling in Marriage of Valli on May 18, 2011, reversing a Los Angeles trial court that had found that a $3.75 million insurance policy purchased during marriage was the parties' community property. Instead Justice Stanley Mosk declared that the 'super-presumption' contained in Evidence Code section 662 trumps the more general presumption per Family Code section 760 that property acquired during marriage is jointly owned. Interestingly, this was true even in the absence of direct evidence of the title to the policy itself; it was sufficient that the insurance agent who sold the policy testified the policy was issued in the name of the Wife and that he'd been told it was being purchased for the protection of the family.

At issue was who owned a 'blended universal life insurance contract' on Husband's life (this is THE singer Frankie Valli) bought some eighteen months before separation that had a cash surrender value of $365,032 by time of trial. Husband argued that since the policy was acquired during marriage and paid for with community funds, it belonged to the community and each party was therefore entitled to one-half. Wife contended that Husband had told her from the inception of the policy that she was to be the owner of the policy and its sole beneficiary, and this was not disputed. She introduced testimonial evidence that the policy listed her as its owner. The trial court sided with the Husband. The decision turns on legal and not factual issues, and I think it deserves mentioning that this appears to be a case that was ethically litigated - Mr. Valli was wholesomely honest and resisted the temptation to assert a version of what happened that included allegations of "pillowtalk" or other reassurances, for instance, from Wife that she had admitted the policy was joint because these did not occur (nor would they have been helpful) - something that is otherwise common in the "liar's contests" that many dissolutions devolve into.

Family Code section 2550 assigns trial courts a mandatory duty to value and divide equally the parties' community property estate. But what is community property? Generally, factors determinative of whether property is separate or community are the time of acquisition; operation of various presumptions, particularly those concerning the form of title; and whether the spouses have transmuted or converted the property from separate to community or vice versa ...." (In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 291).

Family Code section 760 states "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property." This is the "time of acquisition" rule, and it creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of the creation of CP. That presumption can be overcome by a "preponderance of the evidence" - that is by evidence that shows by a 51% likelihood that it is separate property. FC section 760 is the starting point for any analysis of assets and debts acquired during marriage for purposes of defining the marital balance sheet.

Evidence Code section 662 is an evidentiary presumption, found outside the California Family Code. It states "[t]he owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title. This presumption may be rebutted only by clear and convincing proof." The "clear and convincing" standard of proof is considered to be a "super-presumption" exactly because of what it takes to overcome it. The public policy basis for this evidentiary presumption is to ensure the stability of titles to property and within the insurance context it is important that insurance companies have the ability to rely on their information of who holds title to a policy in paying out death benefits, and in not exposing themselves to multiple claims (and paying the wrong person or heir) upon death.

Hence, under some circumstances, when the general CP presumption and the form of title presumptions collide the form of title presumption trumps the more general presumption.

Here the evidence at trial was largely undisputed. A year before the parties separated crooner Valli was experiencing medical problems and told Wife that he wanted to buy a policy on his own life to make sure he took care of his family in the event he might die. He wanted to ensure the kids could go to college and that "there would be enough money for everybody." At that time the parties had no plans to split up.

Accordingly, he bought the policy from his insurance agent. Husband's business manager told Wife that they intended to make her the owner, and Husband himself testified that he "put everything in [Wife's] name, figuring she would take care and give to the kids what they might having coming." His insurance agent testified at trial the policy was issued in Wife's name. Of interest, however, the policy itself was never introduced into evidence.

Hence, on appeal Wife urged that "the act of taking title to property in the name of one spouse during marriage with the consent of the other spouse effectively removes that property from the general community property presumption. In that situation, the property is presumably the separate property of the spouse in whose name title is taken." Since Husband had failed to introduce "clear and convincing" proof that overcame the title presumption, the equity in the policy belonged to her. Nothing required that proof of the form of title be through documentary evidence where there was sufficient indirect testimony that the policy was titled in Wife's name.

The Second Appellate District Court agreed. "Frankie did not present evidence of an agreement or understanding with Randy [the Wife] that when the policy was placed solely in Randys name as owner, they intended title to the policy to be other than Randy's separate property. (In re Marriage of Brooks, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 189.) Likewise, Frankie did not present evidence that he was unaware that title to the policy was taken solely in Randys name. That Frankie knew the policy was taken solely in Randy's name is supported by substantial evidence. Frankie testified that he put everything in Randy's name, and Randy testified that Frankie and Siegel told her that they were going to make [her] the owner' of the policy."

Husband also unsuccessfully argued that Family Code section 721 creates an additional presumption of undue influence where one party by taking title in their name solely gains an advantage over the other, and that given that presumption the EC section 662 super-presumption could not come into play. However, 721 applies in interspousal transactions and this was not a transaction between the two married persons but between one of them and the insurance agent. "Randy could not have owed a fiduciary duty to Frankie in a transaction in which she did not participate." Moreover, even if the presumption of undue influence did arise there was sufficient proof rebutting Husband's clear intention to make Wife the owner; Wife had no role in the transaction whatever.

Moreover, the justices noted that there was no evidence that the cash surrender value of the life insurance policy was intended to be a "savings device." Instead, Husband's intent at the policy inception was clear that it was for the benefit of the Wife.

Finally, they dismissed Husband's argument that there had not been a valid transmutation of the policy from community to Wife's separate property. "A 'transmutation' is an interspousal transaction or agreement that works to change the character of property the parties already own. By contrast, the initial acquisition of property from a third person does not constitute a transmutation and thus is not subject to the [Family Code section 852, subdivision (a)] transmutation requirements." Keep in mind that Husband had purchased the policy only 18 months before the parties separated. They had had a 20 year marriage. In order to amass $365,032 in policy equity over such a short period, the community had to have made quite substantial premium payments to fund it. Mr. Valli was 69 when he acquired the coverage, and the cost of the policy had to be exorbitant.

Normally one might reasonably think that the claim that the cash surrender value was now Wife's separate property would require proof of a transmutation from the community to separate property - this is what the trial court assumed to be the case when it found in favor of the Husband. However, Wife's counsel never claimed a transmutation, a wise strategic move.

While this outcome might, at least for Husband, seem unfair it illustrates that in the realm of community verses separate property, when form of title presumptions come into play, as a matter of public policy favoring the stability of financial transactions with third parties (and not just between the spouses alone), the manner in which title is taken controls unless rebutted by extremely compelling evidence. This is not intuitively or even rationally obvious. In California matrimonial law certain fictions may dictate the outcome. This decision is important for any lawyer or self-represented party where one asset acquired during marriage is a life insurance policy. Common sense, and even the expectations of people who are married until the day of separation comes, would seem to militate in favor of a different result.

In remanding the case to the trial court (i.e., sending it back with instructions to enter a new decision consistent with the appellate court's reasoning), the Valli opinion does "leave to the trial court any reallocation of assets or award of reimbursement in light of our holding." Presumably that reimbursement applies to premiums paid by Husband after the date of separation that increased the cash value of the life insurance policy, but does not form a basis for reimbursing what was paid before. Since the policy was acquired in 2003 but trial occurred five years later, this reimbursement is not insubstantial. Of course, Frankie is too old now to be able to acquire a new $3.75 million dollar policy and Wife will receive this money upon his passing if the policy remains in force.

Wife was represented by the divorce powerhouse Los Angeles law firm of Jaffe and Clemens and Husband's appellate team included the highly notable legal scholar Garrett C. Dailey.



Thurman W. Arnold, CFLS

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May 06, 2011
  Marriage of Davenport: Trial Court SANCTIONS Wife Under FC Section 271 for Her ATTORNEYS' "UNBRIDLED AGGRESSION" In Family Court Proceedings!
Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.

A Shifting Judicial Response to Overzealous Advocacy:
Excessively Exuberant and Inflammatory Litigation Tactics
Will Not Be Tolerated in California


Justice Richman of the First Appellate District for Sonoma County, California, issued this week a momentous opinion that signals that courts will no longer passively allow attorneys who embark on rampaging attacks in high conflict divorce, or elsewhere, to do so without meaningful reprisals. Clients who encourage or permit their lawyers to manage their cases in this style may find their purses and wallets pried open. 

While my review of the case may seem harsh, I believe that it reflects the frustration of the appellate court. I have endeavored to quote the decision itself as much as possible for readability. The trend in recent reported appellate decisions suggests that the pendulum is swinging against litigants who get sucked into divorce trance and its insane warfare. Marriage of Davenport excoriates not only one lawyer and his client but also the Santa Rosa law firm for which the attorney worked.

Mediators, collaborative attorneys, ethical divorce practitioners, and holistic lawyers will appreciate that a major California appellate decision has outed the adversarial elephant in the courtroom for the destructive creature that it is, affirming consequences for litigious behavior that are necessary and overdue. Courts are not merely imposing monetary punishments, they are publicly shaming those professionals (attorneys, mental health professionals, and even trial court judges) who fail to act within the bounds of due process, fiduciary duty obligations, and the rules of civility. Indeed, last month the Second Appellate District in Ventura County upheld a sanctions award against a self-represented attorney in a family law proceeding, and reported him to the California State Bar as well.

Still, Davenport raises some important questions. These include: 
  • What level of vitriol and sarcastic behavior is permissible in the trenches of high-conflict divorce proceedings? When does zealous advocacy so exceed the bounds of civility that the behavior of litigants or their attorneys receives as much attention as the underlying property division and support issues in the case?
  • Is it possible to remain a civil advocate without sacrificing the zeal that is required and expected of lawyer warriors?
  • If attorneys, or the clients in their stead, are to be held accountable for conduct that increases the adversarial tone of the proceedings might this have a chilling effect upon strong and courageous advocacy, making less empowered parties more vulnerable to exploitative litigation tactics employed by the other side?
  • Should the California legislature amend Family Code section 271 to authorize trial courts to sanction family law attorneys directly for abuses they themselves commit? Good arguments exist for and against (another day, another blog).  


Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507

Marriage of Davenport was published May 4, 2011. It may be the most important annunciation in years by California jurists that some litigants and lawyers are stubbornly out of control, recognizing that the survival of our current family court legal scheme requires that the judiciary manage the worst behavior of such participants. Davenport will be cited as a textbook illustration of what to overcome and avoid. Click here for the full opinion.

Jill and Ken Davenport married in 1948 and separated in 1990, amassing an estate worth near 57 million dollars. Ken was a talented car salesman and real estate investor. It wasn't until March 1, 2006 that Jill filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. During that 16 years "there was agreement and cooperation, including their participation in joint estate planning favorable to Jill, and agreement to sell off many of the [community properties]." Jill was then 75 years of age, and Ken was 78.

This cooperation ended on February, 3 2006 when something set Jill onto the road to calamity. She fired a first salvo in the form of a letter to Ken which accused him of having "stepped over the line," having "lied to me," warning he being taken advantage of by others (sweet irony?), and demanding money and property. Although the parties had  co-existed peaceably for almost 16 years, the status quo exploded with this letter. 

What had changed for Jill? That month or before she'd retained the law firm of O'Brien Watters and Davis to protect and advance her interests. When her Petition was filed, senior attorney Michael Watters was named as her attorney of record. However, in November 2005 Andrew Watters (Michael's nephew), passed the California Bar and joined the law firm effective February, 2006. He was introduced to Jill three days later and became her gladiator, so beginning an odyssey that would continue unabated for more than five years. According to Andrew, thereafter he "personally handled or [was] personally involved in each and every transaction between the parties ..., as well as each and every discovery request, discovery event, court proceeding, and other substantive matter." As the First Appellate District court dryly notes, "[i]n short, Andrew Watters became the lead lawyer for Jill in what would necessarily be a complex family law litigation." "Early on, a young and inexperienced attorney at that firm [Andrew] became Jill's primary attorney, and interacted with Ken's attorneys for the next two years, interactions that would generate a 35-page register of actions and 19 volumes of court files."

Out of the gate Andrew Watters pursued a campaign of attack against Ken and his attorneys that seemed ill-fated. Five months into the proceedings, he filed a motion to compel further answers to Form Interrogatories after making negligible efforts to resolve the discovery dispute informally. California has long required that before litigants file motions to compel discovery, the record must show that they made reasonable and sincere efforts to resolve the argument informally. Proof of this is contained in what are called "meet and confer" letters. Unfortunately, these letters are often authored with a threatening tone, reflect posturing and grandstanding, and sometimes hope to set up the other side for sanctions when a motion to compel is heard. In this case, Andrew wrote a single letter, failed to respond to Ken's attorney's reply, and he didn't attempt to discuss the issues with Ken's attorneys directly before filing his motion. The trial court declared these efforts to be "unreasonable" and "admonished [counsel for both parties] to change their meet and confer practices so that meeting and conferring is meaningful and not just a token gesture."

Over the next two years Wife's side would file eight discovery motions. The court file came to consist of 19 volumes, something that the experienced trial judge, Judge Cerena Wong, would later describe as "outrageous" for a family law case. Wife filed three OSC re Contempts against the Husband, including one in which the Court in August, 2006, ordered the parties to meet and confer in a 4-way, as to which Ken "refused to meet and confer if attorney Andrew G. Watters was present in the room." Oh boy. Unfortunately, this reaction is not uncommon but risks forming a vacuum where the business of cooperatively resolving the case stalls.


The FC §271 Sanctions' Requests

On May 23, 2008, attorney Watters filed two motions that ultimately blew up in Jill's face, led to this appeal, but now provides a roadmap for how not to behave when representing parties to matrimonial proceedings. One motion requested Family Code section 271 sanctions and attorney fees.

Wife's initial motion paperwork was "blank", evidently designed to reserve hearing dates on the court's calendar. The appellate court notes that "Andrew Waters did not consult with [Ken's attorney] on the date, nor even advise him of the filings, causing him to complain about the timing of the motions, including that they were filed late in the afternoon of May 23, 2008, the Friday before the Memorial Day weekend, and at the last possible moment." 

Family Code section 271(a) reads in pertinent part:

"the court may base an award of attorney's fees and costs on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney's fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction.... In order to obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs is not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award...."

Jill sought legal fees of $600,861 and costs of $332,933. Her attorney filed a 52-page declaration which attached 1250 pages of exhibits. Much of Watters' declaration was "inappropriate, asserting hearsay, argument, opinion, and conclusion, and was improper on several bases. An early passage ... illustrates some of this, where Andrew Watters purports to describe Jill's description of Ken's 'negotiating tactics, habits, and personality traits,' which he labeled 'Deal in the pocket,' 'Poor mouth,' and 'Artificial crisis,'...." This sort of sarcasm doesn't warm the hearts of judges.

Although the record is not clear, it appears that Watters requested that Ken's attorneys also be sanctioned. If so, personalizing sanctions between attorneys is always a dangerous mistake.

Watters' tone was reportedly sarcastic, deprecatory, improperly personal, and lacked objectivity (see several paragraphs below for the juicier stuff). Effectively he was "testifying" on behalf of his client. His declaration included assertions that:

  • "I've seen first hand that Ken can be a very persuasive person, and that Ken seems to use all of his abilities and skill to get the best deals for himself. Unfortunately we've learned that Ken has also used this great skill and ability to take care of his wife."
  • "I was skeptical ... that someone could really use these tactics effectively outside of a car dealership.... However, throughout our dealings with Ken in this matter, I have personally observed Ken use each of the aforementioned tactics."
  • "During the pendency of this proceedings,...., the 'inconvenient truth' here is that Ken has used his unusually strong business skill and acumen against his spouse despite his fiduciary duties..."

Wife's attorney asserted several breaches of fiduciary duty including that Ken (1) omitted two assets worth $3.1 million on his schedule of assets and debts; (2) produced a written statement of the parties' net worth to be $30.5 million, when several months earlier he gave a financial statement to a loan officer showing the net worth to be twice that; (3) that his schedule of assets and debts failed to state values for many of the listed items; and (4) engaged in various discovery abuses, including stalling the taking of his deposition for ten months.

Watters' motion included Points and Authorities citing but one case: In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470. Feldman is the most important fiduciary duty case of the last decade. It upheld $250,000 in sanctions against a Husband who clearly was frustrating the resolution of that case, and who was secreting assets from the Wife. "Feldman" has become the rallying cry behind many well-intentioned efforts by California Family Law attorneys to force the other side to comply with their fiduciary duties.

Many divorce attorneys have "Feldman letters" loaded and cocked on their computers, to fire off where the other side is 'hiding the ball.' Several years ago these were widely circulated within the family law community with a certain amount of glee. Some attorneys use these letters as an intimidation tactic. Feldman sanctions' threats are indeed sometimes required to remind the other side they are straying from their obligations to be transparent - but misconduct must be egregious in order to succeed on a Feldman claim.  Feldman is important authority for curbing and remedying abusive and dishonest conduct in divorce proceedings, but like all things it can be over-used, blunting its utility. 

Watters urged: "'Here, the Davenport matter might as well be called In re Marriage of Feldman - The Sequel. If ever a dissolution of marriage action in Sonoma County warranted the imposition of sanctions on a party, this is the case.... indeed, 'this case is worse than what happened in Feldman.'" The decision asserts  "F eldman would become Jill's short-hand description of all that was claimed to be wrong with Ken's conduct,..." "Feldman, Feldman, Feldman, Jill repeated below,..." The appellate justices noted that "Jill remains relentless ...."  

For those who have been on the receiving end of nasty Feldman letters, this is the first reported decision that provides an antidote. However, at the same time, Feldman is important authority to assist under-empowered spouses in family law litigation.

Ken naturally opposed Jill's Feldman motion, and gave notice that he would seek too would seek Section 271 sanctions. Jill's Reply argued Ken's motion was technically defective and filed on the wrong forms, and that Ken's requested fees "have little or no connection with the alleged 'sanctionable' conduct of Jill" as opposed to that of Jill's attorney. It is not clear that they challenged the amount of these fees.

The trial of these dueling Feldman claims took place over five days in October and November, 2008. Wife's attorney filed detailed evidentiary objections to the declarations and exhibits that Ken submitted, including motions to strike portions of his pleadings, and Judge Wong essentially ignored these objections making "it abundantly clear that she could separate the wheat from the chaff."  Davenport deals a blow to the common practice of using evidentiary objection briefs to attack declarations from the opposing side that contain improper matter (the function of these is to emphasize to the Court the lack of admissible evidentiary support for statements contains in these declarations, and to strike some of the contents of these pleadings from the record). Judge Wong stated "as far as I'm concerned, fighting over comments or statements made as to whether or not they're relevant or whether or not they're objectionable, you know, this is not a jury trial for heaven's sake. I'm a judge. You know, I can sift through this stuff. I might have some comment about what I think to be more lawyerly conduct and lawyerly language . . . . You should be able to rely on the court being able to read what it reads and eliminate what's not relevant." 

Well, maybe.... Judges are as human as the rest of us. Exactly what argument or "evidence" a court is relying upon in reaching its conclusions is of rightful concern to litigants and their attorneys. Short-circuiting a proper record that makes effective appellate review possible carries a danger of giving trial courts too much power and discretion.

Judge Wong issued a statement of decision that found that:

  • Jill's counsel's failure to meet and confer before filing her motion, and during the proceedings, is sanctionable conduct.
  • The facts Jill alleged "do not rise to the level [of Feldman]."
  • No valid evidence or support was presented that justified an expedited hearing (normally Feldman motions are heard at the conclusion of a dissolution action, when the Court has the larger picture before it, but Attorney Watters had urged that an immediate hearing was required here to deter what he claimed was continuing sanctionable conduct by Ken and his attorneys.
  • Jill's counsel's hostile and disrespectful correspondence is sanctionable.
  • Jill's attorney repeatedly made references to what was said and presented in a mediation that the parties had undertaken, in violation of Evidence Code section 1119.
  • Watters' surreptitious conduct with computer consultants in relation to extracting computer data on a computer in his possession that was believed to include privileged material was inappropriate and sanctionable (in connection with retrieving data stored on a computer that Wife controlled, Watters switched the computer experts, replacing the agreed upon forensic with an IT person whom he'd met at a karaoke Bar where he claimed such "nerds" are known to hang out).
  • All fees relating to Wife's motions could have been avoided by Wife's counsel. Had he done any of the following, it was likely the costly motions and hearings relating thereto could have been avoided: (1) Met and conferred with counsel; (2) been more respectful and cooperative; (3) used the assigned case manager; (4) accepted Husband's counsel's offers to agree to a neutral forensic accountant.
  • Watters' insistence on a expedited Feldman trial in the middle of the case rather than at its conclusion was unnecessary and unreasonably expensive to the parties, and wasted the Court's limited resources.

Judge Wong denied Jill's motions. "There has been a failure of proof sufficient to penalize husband and his attorneys Merrill, Arnone, Benoit or Johnson." She granted Ken's request that the Court find that the Petitioner, through her attorneys, engaged in a course of conduct that was sanctionable. Judge Wong observed:

"'The Court questions the wisdom of such a large firm as O'Brien, Watters to choose to 'educate' a newly admitted lawyer with a case that involved millions of dollars of varied assets in California and other states, with a long term marriage and complicated trust holdings. With no background in either civil or family law litigation, Mr. Andrew Watters admitted to the Court that he was taught to litigate this case with unbridled aggression. These uncooperative and uncivil courses of action have caused Mrs. Davenport unnecessary delays and unnecessary attorney fees and costs.'" [Italics and emphasis added].

I don't know if this last reference is a typographical mistake , but if not Judge Wong's message that Jill's gladiators poorly served her is remarkable. It also spells "malpractice."  

The court also criticized Ken, who had early on stated he would not engage in a court-ordered 4-way if Attorney Watters "was in the room." Judge Wong saw this position as "inexcusably rude and uncalled for. Respondent's arrogance must have hit a sensitive nerve in counsel because Petitioner's case became a case that rapidly deteriorated into unprofessionally rude conduct and speech after that."


What Divorce Lawyers Might Avoid

The appellate court found that "Andrew Watters' demeaning comments to opposing counsel were contrary to the California Attorney Guidelines of Civility and Professionalism promulgated by the State Bar in 2007 (Guidelines). These guidelines reflect that "attorneys have an obligation to be professional with . . . other parties and counsel, [and] the courts," which obligation "includes civility, professional integrity, . . . candor . . . and cooperation, all of which are essential to the fair administration of justice and conflict resolution." (Guidelines, supra, Introduction, p. 3.) Section 4 of the Guidelines further counsels that "An attorney should avoid, hostile, demeaning or humiliating words," further providing in relevant part that: "An attorneys communications about the legal system should at all times reflect civility, professional integrity, personal dignity, and respect for the legal system. An attorney should not engage in conduct that is unbecoming a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. For example, in communications . . . with adversaries: [¶] . . . [¶] c. An attorney should not disparage the intelligence, integrity, ethics, morals or behavior of the court or other counsel, parties or participants when those characteristics are not at issue. [¶] . . . [¶] f. An attorney should avoid hostile, demeaning or humiliating words." (Guidelines, supra, § 4, pp. 4-5.)"

Justice Richman continued "there is abundant evidence of Andrew Watters treatment - more accurately, mistreatment - of his opposing counsel in his correspondence with them. Bad enough that such correspondence occurs in any litigation. It is utterly inconsistent with a fundamental aspect of proper family law practice. "Family law cases are not supposed to be conducted as adversarial proceedings. Quite the contrary, the goal is to reduce acrimony and adversarial approaches common to general civil litigation and, instead, to foster cooperation between the parties and their counsel with a view toward settlement short of full-blown litigation. [See Fam. C. §§ 2100 (b), § 271(a) (sanctions for uncooperative conduct in family law cases); see also Cal. Atty. Guidelines of Civility & Professionalism § 19-in family law proceedings an attorney should seek to reduce emotional tension and trauma and encourage the parties and attorneys to interact in a cooperative atmosphere, and keep the best interest of the children in mind']."

"The record is replete with correspondence from Andrew Watters to Ken's attorneys that contained abusive, rude, hostile, and/or disrespectful language, correspondence that Andrew Watters himself acknowledged was substantial evidence, when in the course of his closing argument he stated that '[p]erhaps some unpleasant letters that could offend someone did substantially increase the cost of litigation.' Perhaps it did indeed. A few illustrations should suffice:

  • his November 22, 2006 letter to Mr. Merrill referring to Ken's nonappearance for deposition, which letter provided in pertinent part as follows: 'Regarding your client's failure to appear once again for his continued deposition, we too regret that your client chose not to appear. As you know, we duly noticed his continued deposition for 11/20/06-11/22/06. Once again, you offer the same tired, old, and shopworn excuse. Your continued blustering about mutually agreeable dates, efficiency and promptness, and convenience is pathetic when your client's actions negate any semblance of cooperation. Talk is cheap. Actions speak louder than words. Your credibility is at stake here.'
  • his March 13, 2007 letter to Mr. Benoit included remarks that were rude, including 'Enough already with the delays.' Worse, his letter indicated that he did not believe Mr. Benoit-the person he described as "the dean of the Family Law Bar"-telling him: 'We don't accept your implication that you didn't already have [the Request to Inspect] . . . . Perhaps you didn't look hard enough, because we filed a Motion to Compel . . . in which I attached RTI Set one to my Declaration. Or you weren't counting that copy.' And the letter ends with utter disrespect, with observations such as: 'this seems like a case of the pot calling the kettle black'; 'In your last paragraph, your first suggestion is illusory. . . ."; and, "Your last paragraph rings hollow.'
  • his September 11, 2008 letter to Mr. Johnson which, bad enough, insinuated untruthfulness: 'We've noticed that, in the past, you have had some trouble keeping things straight. We also noticed that you tend to stretch things somewhat too far in the name of appearances.' Worse, it accused Mr. Johnson of unethical conduct: 'It's no surprise, then, that your letter of 8/7/08 appears to be an attempt to create a false and misleading exhibit for use at a later law and motion hearing so that your client can sit in court with a halo over his head, and so you can say look how many times Ken offered to settle! That wouldn't surprise us at all, given your practice of attaching a large pile of exhibits to your declarations without any testimony from you concerning their truth.'

Later confronted with such correspondence, Andrew's response was not apologetic. He indicated at one point it might have been "unfortunate," but that was it. In his words, 'So I should note if I caused undue emotional pain on the other side in terms of writing unpleasant letters, if I offended anyone, then that's unfortunate and certainly a learning process for me, but the fact is I am not on trial here. And, in any event, the attorneys on the other side-I'm sure they can handle it. Mr. Mike Merrill, I think, is a 35 year attorney, former Marine officer in Vietnam, has seen it all. Mr. Benoit is a 35- or 40 year family law lawyer. He's seen it all. Mr. Johnson was in the Navy, I believe. These are not attorneys not able to do lawyering because of unpleasant letters from a baby lawyer on the other side.' [Italics added].

The appellate justices observed that Jill's position on appeal was equally unrepentant where, referring to "the tone of some of [Andrew Watters'] written communications," she describes it as "the expressions (sometimes intemperate) of a young lawyer frustrated that Ken was systematically obstructing the search for the truth by his actions in resisting routine discovery, which is supposed to be self-executing. Ken and his attorneys then created a smokescreen that prevented the trial court from seeing the substance of the communications in context."

Strong, strong language. An important caveat for the lawyers who will inevitably attempt to use Davenport to support sanctions' motions for uncivil conduct by opposing counsel is that just accusing the other side of behaving like Mr. Watters may itself seem abusive to a trial court. While the justices' opinion does not appear "overstated" given a record so rich in illustrations of what not to do, I think we need to be careful not to ourselves overstate it, or to try to fit conduct we don't like into a Davenport box where that conduct fails to speak for itself. That is a species of risk that has blunted the edge of Feldman claims since that decision was rendered, making it a less viable tool for under-empowered litigants. The corollary is that "trance begets trance." We don't want to make the same mistakes and so seem as aggressive as our opponents.


 The Adversarial Tone Continued On Appeal

Accordingly, Jill was ordered to pay $100,000 in sanctions plus $304,387 in attorney fees to Ken. Unfortunately for her, Wife's attorneys' strategies on appeal remained obdurate. By this point Andrew Watters had gone "walkabout" and left the firm (following the trial court decision). O'Brien, Watters continued with the same verve as it had at the trial court level. For example, their briefs targeted Judge Cerena Wong with a number of  arguments that one (including the appellate justices) might find to be offensive. The appellate court stated "[i]n sum, Jill manifests a treatment of the record that disregards the most fundamental rules of appellate review."

For instance, in addition to being highly histrionic, Jill's appellate arguments scolded the judge, accusing her of relying on inadmissible evidence while ignoring admissible evidence. Jill's brief posed the question: "Imagine if a high school civics class had been on a field trip to the court that day. How would the teacher be able to explain to his/her students that the judge said she would not follow the rules?" It is mind-boggling that seasoned attorneys would argue that high school students would see that the judge was not following the rules when the judge herself could not. Of course, the appellate justices concluded that just the reverse was true, and that all of Judge Wong's conclusions were well supported by the record and the law but that Jill and her "team" lacked a comprehension of the rules of evidence and basic propriety. 

Frankly, Wife's team had reasons to be concerned about Judge Wong's treatment of the evidentiary objections, but is it possible that in assailing the trial court with the tone that they apparently used that this triggered a defensive reaction in the appellate justices which ultimately took center stage over the legal issues?

Jill argued that whatever the appropriateness of the statements made by attorney Andrew Watters, such communications were covered all by the "litigation privilege" set forth in California Civil Code section 47 and hence could not properly generate a sanctions' award. Similarly, Jill on appeal argued that Andrew Watters' communications were protected by the bounds of free speech and zealous advocacy. Not so ruled the Court. Family law is not the Wild West, nor is it a frontier where "anything goes".


What Went Wrong
(Or, 'Should People Living in Glass Houses Throw Stones')

We family court lawyers are not entirely to blame for getting lost in the dark woods of adversarial divorce to such an extent that some misplace their ethics or, as here, lose control of our emotions - our clients' experiences of divorce are devastating, and lawyers respond to the felt needs of the consuming public like any other industry. Some clients entice us with a willingness to pay "whatever it takes" to personify their angst in formulating our strategies for them - and it is extremely difficult not to become enmeshed in their emotional struggles to an extent that blur the boundaries between their experiences and perspectives and our own.

Particularly as a younger lawyer I confess at times I was deluded into buying my clients' attitudes and personalizing the pain within the stories, and sometimes adopted an arrogance and one-sidedness in accepting their views as the entire picture. This remains a struggle for me at times today. Caring, which I suspect all the members of the O'Brien law firm share, is what is honorable about "zealous advocacy." Unfortunately, relationship wars tend to challenge us all beyond our capacity to stay mindful - within depth of caring lies a trap. We can care too much, and strong emotions in any direction are a potent drug. I for one need to constantly reground myself, and to release the ferocity that accumulates from the frustrations of interacting with high conflict litigants and attorneys. And since this is so for me, it must be so for the others - a realization that can offer some balance and even crack a door to forgiveness.

The Mission Statement of O'Brien, Watters & Davis LLP as published on their website identifies their aspirations as follows: "To render quality legal services and maintain the highest ethical standards; to provide excellent service to clients; to use our best efforts to have our clients succeed and achieve results; to make a reasonable and fair profit; to maintain an excellent reputation in the community and within the legal profession; to be actively involved in and give service to the community; and to have mutual respect and support for one another." I trust that they mean this. Something strikes me as odd, however, about it. I sense a wisp of a sentiment that implies that rendering quality legal services might be inconsistent with maintaining the highest ethical standards; that excellent service is only measured by achieving results, which in traditional lawyer-speak means winning (and not necessarily settling) cases; and that achieving reasonable and fair profits is dependent on strategies for winning adversarially. I guess it is hard to not interpret their advertisement outside the light of what went on in Davenport

O'Brien Waters, me the writer of this Blog, and you the reader are given the invitation and opportunity to reflect upon, re-evaluate, and close the gaps between our intention and actions, every day. Which is always a good reason to be grateful, since we can dust ourselves off and start out anew.  

Marriage of Davenport is a wake up call. Andrew Watters is no demon, but this case contains a concentrated dose of the pitfalls of the adversarial paradigm. Is anybody listening?

Save yourself unnecessary grief and expense, and live a longer life. Seek out family law specialists who have the genuine desire and interest to help you set (and reset as required) a tone that might free you from this mess, rather than binding you more tightly within it!



I believe that the law firm that assisted Ken in this case deserve recognition and naming for their role in this landmark case: Perry, Johnson, Anderson, Miller & Moskowitz by John E. Johnson and Deborah S. Bull. Congratulations!


Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.

Continue reading "Marriage of Davenport: Trial Court SANCTIONS Wife Under FC Section 271 for Her ATTORNEYS' "UNBRIDLED AGGRESSION" In Family Court Proceedings!" »

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March 08, 2011
  More on Marriage of FONG: Obtaining SANCTIONS for UNCOOPERATIVE CONDUCT IN DIVORCE LITIGATION
Posted By Thurman Arnold
The March 3, 2011 Second Appellate Court decision of Marriage of Fong is so far the most important fiduciary duty case of 2011.

See my other blog on this site as it pertains to Final Declarations of Disclosure, and here is a link to an article I've written concerning its impact on Family Code section 271 sanctions.

Here is a link to Marriage of Fong.


Marriage of Fong
T.W. Arnold, CFLS
Continue reading "More on Marriage of FONG: Obtaining SANCTIONS for UNCOOPERATIVE CONDUCT IN DIVORCE LITIGATION" »

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March 05, 2011
  SANCTIONS For Failure to Complete the FINAL DECLARATION OF DISCLOSURE
Posted By Thurman Arnold

The Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure


I've recently blogged the importance of complying with Family Code section 2103 and section 2104, which obligate both parties to a pending dissolution, legal separation, or annulment proceeding to exchange a preliminary declaration of disclosure using Judicial Council Forms  FL-140, FL-141 and FL-142 (please see our Form Library for the PDF's]. Its purpose is to ensure a "full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties may have an interest" and it is a prerequisite to successfully performing one's fiduciary obligations in the course of such proceedings. The exchange is supposed to occur "early on" in the proceedings, whatever that means.

No case can be settled and a marital termination agreement or stipulated judgment cannot be accepted by the court clerk for filing or transmittal to a judge for signature unless both parties have exchanged their PDD's. There is a single exception where the other party does not appear in the action (i.e., file a Response and pay the fees) and so the case is resolved by way of a "default judgment." Moreover, where both litigants have formally appeared and either wants to move the case to a trial status so that it can finally be resolved (where for instance agreement is not occurring), a settlement conference or trial date will not be set by the court unless both parties have each complied with the preliminary declaration exchange and have first filed proof of that with the court.

However, beyond simply concluding your case, there are other extremely important consequences for failing to do your half of the heavy lifting in terms of identifying and attempting to value all community and separate property assets by way of PDD. In my practice I find that many client's resent the work that completing these documents entails, and yet there is no way around it. Inadequate or inaccurate disclosure declarations can create grounds for the other party to attempt months or even years later to set aside a judgment or settlement agreement. They can form the basis for breach of fiduciary duty claims. They must be dealt with in good faith. They are critical documents that must not be treated casually.

The Final Declaration of Disclosure

However, there is an arguably greater obligation that is addressed by what is called the Final Declaration of Disclosure. This is a second and final disclosure that is required in all dissolution or similar proceedings, assuming it is not waived by both parties by agreement (not a good idea for reasons I will separately blog). Where the case winds its way to trial on any aspect of it, the Final Declaration cannot be waived and it must be served prior to trial. Family Code section 2105 governs what it must contain and when it can be avoided. It is even more burdensome to fill out and comply with because supporting documents must be attached and it has to bring current all of the information regarding community and separate property not just as of the date of separation or at the time the PDD was filed, but also up to the date that it is prepared.

Based upon an Second District appellate decision issued March 3, 2011 entitled Marriage of Fong, other consequences for disclosure noncompliance are now apparent. The Fongs are one of those unfortunate couples where one or both parties seem conflicted enough that they will litigate on for years that exceed the entire length of their marriage.

Family Code section 2107 authorizes courts to award monetary sanctions for failing to comply with the disclosure obligations. It is often used in conjunction with a request for attorney fee sanctions under Family Code section 271

In the Fong case the trial court hit the husband with $200,000 in non attorney fee sanctions under section 2107(c) for "breach of fiduciary duties" relating to nondisclosures in the property declarations, among other things, and heaped on an additional $100,000 in fees and costs per section 271 because it concluded that his side engaged in discovery gamesmanship. Wife had contended that Husband had failed to comply with his statutory disclosure obligations regarding his assets, that he failed to respond to formal discovery, and that at trial he surprised her with documents he'd failed to earlier provide despite requests for them. Husband's alleged behavior is not unusual in high conflict divorce litigation, and so it is important that an aggrieved party, possibly like the Wife in this case, have a meaningful remedy.

Unfortunately, Wife had waited three years from the date the action was filed to serve her Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure, and at the time of the trial that led to these sanctions against the Husband (seven years after the case began) she still had not prepared and served her Final Declaration of Disclosure. Lawyers for "out-spouses" sometimes delay completing the FDD because they fear that they lack sufficient information to do them properly and so are reluctant to have those documents completed and so held against their clients as "judicial admissions" (statements under oath in the pleading files) until later in the proceedings - after they've first gotten the disclosures from the "in-spouse" who probably controls all the information. 

In the first reported California appellate decision squarely construing compliance with FC section 2105 together with 2107 sanction's requests, the Second District reversed the trial court's award under section 2107. I can only guess that Wife's efforts cost she and her attorneys between $500,000 and $1,000,000 in attorney fees.

The appellate court did uphold the sanctions award per Family Code section 271 for the $100,000. That part of the ruling is also important, but this blog will be way too long if I cover it here so I will write about it separately.

The Court determined that Wife's failure to have first served her Final Declaration of Disclosure before seeking sanctions by way of motion against the Husband, on the theory that he was himself out of compliance, deprived her of the right to complain. It interpreted section 2107(a) as permitting only a "complying party" to seek the sanction remedies. By the time of a trial on a motion for a sanctions for alleged disclosure misconduct, a party is not in compliance IF she has only served their PDD and therefore not entitled to maintain a sanctions' request.

This case reminds lawyers and parties that the California disclosure statutes mean what they say. It provides useful guidance to attorneys representing the disadvantaged spouse in terms of what they must do in getting their ducks in a row before going off half-cocked. IMHO. Both sides in a California family law case have equal burdens to meet their fiduciary duties. Please take them seriously.

Here is a link to Marriage of Fong.


Thurman W. Arnold, III, CFLS
www.PeacemakingDivorce.com

Continue reading "SANCTIONS For Failure to Complete the FINAL DECLARATION OF DISCLOSURE" »

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December 03, 2010
  ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Elkins Task Force


The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011. 

It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners. 

This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.

Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations.  Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues.  Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.

What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases."  Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification: 

        "We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel.  [Reference omitted].... 

        In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures.  But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice.  Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute.  It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support.... 

         Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function.  If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."

Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented.  Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions.  Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants.  Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court."   Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.

The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011.  Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217.  It states:

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 


December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.


T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization)

Continue reading "ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!" »

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September 24, 2010
  My Ex Has Been EXCLUSIVELY USING Our RESIDENCE - Is There an EPSTEIN CREDIT For This?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I have been occupying the home after my wife left over a year ago.  I pay all the interest only mortgage, property taxes, and insurance with no help from her.  Does she owe me half of any of this?

A.  You may be owed you something, but not necessarily one-half of what you have paid out.

This situation involves at least three potential legal issues:
  • Epstein Credits
  • Watts Credits
  • Jeffries Credits

This particular Blog addresses your question in terms of Epsteins - the next blog deals specificially with Watts and Jeffries credits. 

Epstein Credits

I have described Epstein Reimbursements in another Blog.  "Epstein credits" is a doctrine derived from the case of Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85.  It holds that as a general rule, courts must reimburse one spouse out of the community property who uses earnings or other separate funds after separation to pay pre-existing community obligations.  This commonly occurs with credit cards where there was a balance remaining when the parties separated that one or the other pays after that date.  Epsteins only apply to payments on the portion of a debt that existed at date of separation, and not new debt on an old card that was incurred afterwards.  The rule is not limited to credit cards but can apply to almost any class of debts.

Courts are required not to order this reimbursement if under the circumstances it would be unreasonable for the paying spouse to have expected reimbursement.  If there was an agreement that a party would not be reimbursed, if the paying spouse intended the payment as a gift, or when the payment is made on account of a debt for an asset that the paying spouse was or is using and the amount was not substantially in excess of the value of the use, the Court may decline to order reimbursement.  This idea of the value of use of some property acquired through debt that continues to exist after separation underlies the concepts of Watts credits and Jeffries credits, and is obviously implicated in your question since you occupy the house for which you seek credits and reimbursements.

So, Epsteins are almost always granted as to post-separation payments for expenses, or goods and services, that didn't leave a tangible asset behind that is now being exclusively enjoyed by only one of the two spouses. 

As an example of how this works if there is $15,000 owing Visa for that trip to Hawaii, some groceries, and a child's school tuition at the time of separation and one party pays it off or makes monthly installments on the debt with their earnings or other separate property after that date, a benefit has been conferred upon the community because a joint obligation has been extinguished or reduced.  That benefit must be equalized by a payment to the payor of one-half the amount paid or a credit or set-off against other property that gets divided.  One-half is paid because the paying spouse owed their half anyway.  Any portion paid before the DOS (date of separation) ordinarily will not be reimbursed. 

This is generally true even if only one of the parties actually took the trip to Hawaii, unless that trip was in breach of a marital or fiduciary duty (if the husband snuck off with his paramour to Hawaii, an argument exists that he should not be reimbursed for paying that portion of the debt over the wife's objection).  Family Code section 2625 directs courts to award a debt incurred by one spouse to them alone if debt was not "incurred for the benefit of the community."  Family Code section 2602 empowers courts to "award ... the amount the court determines to have been deliberately misappropriated by the party to the exclusion of the interest to any other party in the community estate."  FC section 2625 is a powerful and much underused statute (many attorneys seem to be unaware of it or try to bluff as though it didn't exist).

Compare this with a situation where a credit card was used to buy a dishwasher that the paying spouse possesses or receives in the divorce - since they are retaining a tangible asset it may not be fair to allow them to both keep the asset and get reimbursed for one-half its costs.  Applying Epsteins can become fairly fact specific.

In situations involving use of a family residence or other tangible assets that continue to exist after separation and which are used and enjoyed by only one of the spouses, an Epstein analysis provides only a part of the answer to the reimbursement question.  In effect first the amount of the Epstein reimbursements are determined, and then the question requires a Watts analysis to determine under equitable principles whether it is fair to actually order reimbursement and, if so, in what amount.

Hence, to resolve your issue you would begin by adding up the costs of everything related to the house that is spent to preserve or protect the asset.  Property taxes are included, but utilities are not.  The utilities you used after the physical separation are your obligation anyway, because they were not incurred during 'the marriage.'  (Please see the Blog Category "Physical Separation.")  Mortgage payments and insurance are considered, and probably the poolman or gardner as well.

Please continue on to the next blog for detailed infomation concerning Watts credits.


Epstein Credits and Fiduciary Duty Issues

Sometimes a spouse or domestic partner will raid the credit cards and take cash advances or buy a new wardrobe, or fix a car, during the weeks prior to separating.  If it later appears that their intention was to stick the other spouse for one-half of this expense, the presumption that this is a community debt (because incurred during marriage) may be overcome and so it may be assigned to the one spouse alone.  It is not fair to hold both parties responsible for debts incurred in anticipation of separation.

However, when one partner incurs a debt frivolously as opposed to recklessly before separation, in a situation not amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty - even over the prior objection of the other spouse - it is likely to be equally divided and Epstein reimbursements ordered.  Both spouses have, under California law, equal rights of management and control of the community property and community credit.

Courts in my experience are reluctant to find breaches of fiduciary duty in Esptein situations unless the behavior was fairly eggregious.  Charging 10 pairs of shoes at Macy's a month before separation may not be viewed as a big deal.  If the debt was incurred in pursuit of an illegal activity like supporting a drug habit or sex addiction, many judges are less reluctant to declare a breach. 

To illustrate another twist, if the credit card was used to pay the spouse's tuition expense instead a child's schooling as in my example above, it may also be unfair to charge the non-schooled parent with one-half the tuition portion of the credit card balance.  A court is likely to look at whether this schooling benefited the community in some way before splitting that debt betwen the parties - i.e., because of the schooling did the student spouse earn more money which was then contributed to the community standard of living and so confer a benefit on both?  Pure student loans are usually awarded to the party who incurred the debt as their separate property obligation. 



T. W. Arnold III
http://www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com
Continue reading "My Ex Has Been EXCLUSIVELY USING Our RESIDENCE - Is There an EPSTEIN CREDIT For This?" »

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September 08, 2010
  What do I do if my spouse or domestic partner does not complete their DECLARATION OF DISCLOSURE?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  What do I do if the other party to a divorce or dissolution of domestic partnership proceeding refuses to file their Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure?

A.   Declarations of Disclosure must be exchanged in all California proceedings for dissolution of marriage or domestic partnership, for legal separations, and for annulments.  They do not need to be served in any other form of family law proceeding. 

There are two forms of Declarations of Disclosure:  Preliminary Declarations of Disclosure (PDD's) and Final Declarations of Disclosure (FDD's).  PDD's are governed by Family Code section 2103 and FC section 2104.  FDD's are governed by Family Code section 2105.  While parties to a dissolution or legal separation action can waive the exchange of the FDD in writing (although it is not a good idea to do so for reasons discussed in my blogs about fiduciary duties), they cannot waive exchanging the Preliminary Declarations with one exception:  Where a dissolution or legal separation judgment is obtained by default, the defaulting party need not provide the PDD to the other party.  Family Code section 2110.

Note that I used the words "exchange" and "serve."  This is because the forms themselves are not required to be filed with the Court itself - instead, the proof of service upon the other party to the proceeding is what is to be filed.  Judicial Council Form FL-141 is what you file with the clerk's office.  In practice many people do file the actual schedules with the clerk, which can be a good idea because whether these forms were really exchanged and their contents can have a big impact on future set aside motions.

Here is the California Judicial Council Form FL-140 cover sheet that accompanies the PDD or the FDD.  As you can see, it is the same form but different boxes are checked for each.  A form FL-150 Income and Expense Declaration must accompany both, in addition to the FL-142 Schedule of Assets and Debts and the FL-160 Property Declaration.

The FDD is supposed to have much more detailed information, including supporting attachments, then is expected in the PDD.

Where the proceedings do not conclude by way of a default Judgment, the problem you have where the other party fails or refuses to exchange at least their PDD and thereupon to file the FL-141 proof of service is that the clerk cannot (a) set the matter for trial or (b) cannot accept for submittal to a judge and later filing a Stipulated Judgment or Marital Termination Agreement.  This can make it impossible to conclude a case even by way of settlement where both parties are in perfect agreement, or to obtain a trial date where they are not.  One party can hold up the entire process, and it is true that this often happens intentionally.

There is no set time for when parties must complete and exchange their preliminary declarations.  Family Code section 2104 states in part that "after or concurrently with service of the petition for dissolution or nullity of marriage or legal separation of the parties, each party shall serve on the other party a preliminary declaration of disclosure...."  The problem with this language is the word "after."  The expectation is that this will be done within a reasonable time not usually exceeding 60 days from the date a party appears in the action by filing a Petition or a Response, but the statute does not explicitly say that.

The only remedy you have is file a notice of motion (or OSC application) pursuant to Family Code section 2107 asking that the court order the other party to serve their PDD and file the proof of service within a given number of days, not usually exceeding thirty.  That motion should request an order that the other party's Petition or Response be stricken if they then fail to do so in a timely manner, so that your matter may effectively proceed by default hearing. 

Expect the Court to give the other side one or two opportunities to get themselves into compliance with their fiduciary obligations to provide this exchange. 

Thurman W. Arnold III 

http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com






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May 11, 2010
  What are EPSTEIN REIMBURSEMENTS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold


Q.  My soon to be ex wife and I are getting our divorce with the assistance of a paralegal.  That person has prepared a Marital Settlement Agreement.  The paralegal says she cannot give us legal advice.  There is a phrase in the agreement that says something about each of us waiving Epstein reimbursements.  I have no idea what this means.


A.  "Epstein reimbursements" deal with the question:  "How do we divide debts that we incurred during the marriage, where one of us made payments after we separated and up to the time of divorce?"  

A common situation is that parties have credit card debt that needs to be divided in the divorce.  Say there was a balance of $10,000 owing to American Express on December 31st, the day before your wife drank too much at the office New Year's celebration and had an unfortunate tryst with her boss - this isn't the first time this has happened, and your New Year's resolution is to move out (sorry, I am just trying to be colorful), and so you do move out the next day.  Her reaction is to file for divorce, because her boss looks way more interesting to her than you do these days.

Under this example January 1 is your date of separation.  From the date of separation on, the earnings of either spouse are no longer community property, or joint earnings, but instead these earnings belong to each of you separately.  Family Code § 771.

Often where a credit card is in the name of one person alone, the other spouse or domestic partner doesn't contribute to the payments after separation - sometimes because they won't and sometimes because they can't.  But as between the two of you, the $10,000 is jointly owed to American Express, even if the other spouse did not sign the credit card application or is not named on the card, or on the statement.  This is also true whether or not both parties directly benefitted from the use of the credit card - for instance, maybe the $10,000 was charged by your wife to buy shoes over the course of the past year to help make herself feel better about the fact that you never have intimate conversations with her any more (or for any other reason), or perhaps you charged the card to add more chrome to your Harley Davidson FatBoy because your hairline is receding.

If the card is not paid, American Express can pursue collection either against the spouse who is the account holder, or against the community property of both spouses.  Family Code § 910.  If the credit card is in your name alone, it will be your credit that might be ruined if the monthly installments are missed.  

Now again, as between you and your wife, the general rule is that each of you owe one-half of the credit card debt which means that all other things being equal, in a property settlement or if a Judge is forced to divide your property and estate, if one party is assigned 100% of the debt the other owes a reimbursement of $5,000.  Lawyers and Judges speak of assigning the debt to one party or the other on the "marital balance sheet" which implies a corresponding credit or right of setoff against the division of some other item of property.  

epstein reimbursements and gambling There are, of course, exceptions.  These exceptions frequently include (a) situations where a debt was incurred in breach of a fiduciary obligation owing the community estate or to the other spouse and (b) where one party retains the benefit of the property that the credit card was used to acquire (believe it or not, I am frequently asked about breast augmentations or other cosmetic surgeries - except in extreme cases, courts do not charge one party for these).  For example, if when you learned of your wife's affair your reaction included flying to Las Vegas and having a wild weekend and you recklessly charged the $10,000 at the casino, this might be considered a breach of fiduciary duty and result in the entire $10,000 being your responsibility even though the two of you had yet to physically separate.  Or, if instead you spent the $10,000 buying more chrome for your Harley and you expect to keep it in the divorce, then even though the $10,000 was otherwise a community obligation equitable considerations may result in the debt being assigned to you.  If in the divorce the two of you decide to sell the Harley but the chrome you spent $10,000 buying adds only $2,000 in value to the sale's price, in that case the $10,000 remains a joint obligation because you neither breached a fiduciary duty nor retained a sufficient benefit that the law would charge you for it and the asset is being divided.  Another common situation is where one spouse retains the furniture or refrigerator charged at Lowes - in that case more of the debt may be assigned to that party. 

Assuming you continue to make monthly payments of principal and interest on the credit card up to the point of dividing the debt in a marital settlement agreement (MSA), or if a judge makes the call for you both after a trial, as a general proposition your wife owes you one-half of all those payments.  These are called Epstein credits or Epstein reimbursements in California, and many other community property states have similar rules.  These are also called equitable reimbursements, meaning that the right to be reimbursed is not absolute and certain but that the court has wide discretion to grant the reimbursement or not depending upon fairness.  Typically California family law courts do grant the reimbursement so long as the parties benefited equally (or the money was equally wasted). 

The principle in California was first set forth in the case of Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76.  It is to be distinguished from the rule that the debt itself, if community, must be divided equally between parties in divorce.  Family Code § 2550.  It covers reimbursements rights that accrue between physical separation and the date of ultimate division of the liability.

So, the agreement the paralegal has prepared includes an agreement each of you is giving up any right to be reimbursed for debt related payments made after separation.  You are not being asked to waive your credit for $5,000 if the $10,000 debt is assigned to you (unless there is a separate provision assigning the credit card balance to you completely).  You are being asked to waive all the debt maintenance up to this point.  It is not an unusual clause in an MSA, but it may or may not be in your best interests to agree to it.

Epstein credits take a variety of forms, and are not limited to credit card debt.  The Epstein case itself involved a husband who voluntarily made the mortgage, insurance, and tax payments on the family residence during the separation period.  Wife and their son occupied the home.  Up to that point the law was that if one party used separate property (earnings after separation) to pay community debt (the mortgage, etc., on the residence), there was a presumption that this was intended to be a gift to the community unless an agreement could be proved that it was not to be a gift.

Each party may have separate Epstein claims as to different items of debt.  

Upon separating, it is a smart idea to get and keep copies of credit card statements and statements for all liability accounts as of the date of separation.  From an accounting point of view, the date of separation is a critical snapshot of a point in time.  It is essential that the parties maintain these records as proof of what the numbers were, and of what payments were made afterwards.

Whether or not you should waive the Epstein reimbursements that might be owing you is part of the give and take of negotiating a divorce settlement.  These are usually simple accounting issues, but not always.   

If your Wife gets an attorney that attorney might try to convince you to waive the Espteins, or hope that you don't understand the concept or have it independently explained to you.  In my experience where we are speaking in terms of vanilla debt (meaning there is no questionable conduct and the charges were incurred in the normal course), your wife's lawyer would also agree that you are entitled to these reimbursements without a fight if you know enough to insist.

There is an important flip side and hybrid of the Epstein reimbursement concept - that of Watts charges and credits.  The deal generally with who pays for the beneficial use of community property (i.e., the home) during the separation period, once the divorce is finalized.

I will address those separately. 



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
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April 07, 2010
  Am I LIABLE for my husband's GAMBLING DEBTS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

divorce and gaming debts

Q.     My husband won't stop gambling. Am I liable for his gambling debts?


A.  The community property that the two of you own is liable as to satisfy his gambling obligations, assuming there is any left.   Whether you are liable to the Indian Casino or Las Vegas hotel beyond your share of the community depends upon whether you have an independent contractual relationship with them - i.e., a line of credit in your name. 

As between you and your husband, unless you consented to his gambling he may owe you (if your separate property is somehow attached to satisfy the debt) or to the community estate a reimbursement or indemnification right.   

If he is a professional gambler and this is his "work" the outcome would be different.  The outcome may also depend on whether the community benefited from the gambling, i.e., if winnings were used to support the community, then a court may deem it fair to share the obligation as to "losings".  

This right of reimbursement would similarly exist if he squandered money on drugs, or prostitutes, and so on - assuming you can prove it and trace the money!  The question is whether you consented and ripens when you can establish that his conduct violated fiduciary duties owing you.  One never knows, however, how a judge will treat this on a case by case basis but the law if moving towards greater accountability.

If his gambling does amount to a breach of fiduciary duties owing you as a result of your marriage or domestic partnership, you have substantial remedies.  Try our search at the top right of the page to learn about those topics.


Thurman W. Arnold III

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February 08, 2010
  PRELIMINARY DECLARATION OF DISCLOSURE in California (PDD's)
Posted By Thurman Arnold

California Family Law Disclosure Forms

Whether you are representing yourself in your divorce, or a pro per family law litigant, you need to know about and understand the Declarations of Disclosure that are required in California before a Judgment of Dissolution may be entered.   Getting it wrong can have serious consequences.   In my experience, paralegal firms or non-lawyer mediators do not know how to properly assist clients in meeting these obligations, and even seasoned divorce attorneys get these disclosure forms wrong.   You need to understand that these disclosure forms are not simply another document that needs to be prepared in a sloppy fashion in order to complete your divorce, but rather they are the proof that you have complied with important spousal fiduciary duties after your physical separation.   

You can’t get even a default divorce and marital termination agreement past the family court clerk without a least a Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure (PDD) and when the other side has appeared in the action, you cannot obtain a Divorce Judgment without both parties have exchanged for waived the Final Declaration of Disclosure (FDD).   Even if the documents have been exchanged, if they are incomplete or inaccurate the other party may be able to set all or parts of your divorce judgment or divorce settlement for up to several years after a judgment is filed.   These rules and requirements apply equally to domestic partnerships, annulments, and legal separations.

This article covers the Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure.

California Family Code sections 2100 to 2113 cover declarations of disclosure for California divorces.  FC section 2100(a) declares it is the policy of the State of California to “(1) marshal, preserve, and protect community, and quasi-community assets and liabilities that exist at the date of separation so as to avoid dissipation of the community estate before distribution, (2) to ensure fair and sufficient child and spousal support awards, and (3) to achieve a division of community and quasi-community assets and liabilities on the dissolution or nullity of marriage or legal separation of the parties as provided by California law.”

FC section 2100(c) states that in order to promote this policy “a full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, regardless of the characterization as community or separate, together with a disclosure of all income and expenses of the parties.”

This bears emphasis:

  • There must be a full disclosure
  • It must be accurate
  • It includes all assets
  • It includes all liabilities
  • It applies to assets or liabilities one has or may have
  • The disclosure must be made early on in the proceedings, although there is no specific time rule
  • It doesn’t matter whether you think the asset or debt is a separate property item, you still must disclose
  • You must also fully and accurately disclose all income and expenses
  • Although the statute doesn’t say it, you may see why these are forms that you do not want to lose – since, as mentioned below, the disclosures themselves are not filed with the court.

FC section 2100(c) does not, however, stop there.   The statute continues “Moreover, each party has a continuing duty to immediately, fully, and accurately update and augment that disclosure to the extent that there have been any material changes so that at the time the parties enter into an agreement for the resolution of any of these issues, or at the time of trial on these issues, each party will have a full and complete knowledge of the underlying facts.”

Family Code section 2102 sets forth the rules governing interspousal fiduciary duties, including the operation and management of community or part community businesses.   I will discuss this section elsewhere and link back to it when that article is finished.

Family Code section 2104 describes the Preliminary declaration of disclosure.   It must be completed as set forth in this Judicial Council Form.   It does not get filed with the Court, but a declaration stating it has been exchanged must be filed with the Court.  

If, as commonly occurs where parties have negotiated and signed an agreement and the Dissolution Judgment proceeds by default with a Marital Settlement Agreement signed by both being submitted, no final disclosure needs to be exchanged between the parties but the Petitioner still must himself or herself complete and serve the Preliminary declaration; the defaulting Respondent is relieved of that obligation.

Family Code sections 2120 to 2129 describe when a judgment for dissolution, or a property settlement or a support settlement, may be set aside for defects in the Preliminary declaration of disclosure and for other reasons.  

You can find the actual California Judicial Council forms here.

Again, I will write an article about that and link back once it is completed so please check back with us.

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January 17, 2010
  Why is the date of PHYSICAL SEPARATION legally important?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.    Why is the idea of 'physical separation' important in California?

A.    The idea of "physical separation" is one of the most important concepts to California law.  If you think that the presumption that all property acquired during marriage is significant, the notion of physical separation is every bit if not more important.  This appears to be one of the best kept secrets of California family law.

Physical separation is the date that the marriage ends, for most practical purposes.  The date of physical separation is the date that community property ceases to accumulate.  Family Code section 771 states "The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."

Once spouses separate, all their earnings and everything that is acquired with those earnings are separate property of each spouse, respectively.

Similarly, upon separation each spouse is no longer liable for the debts of the other spouse.  The community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse "during marriage".  During marriage "does not include the period during which the spouses are living separate and apart before a judgment of dissolution ... or legal separation...."  FC section 910.  An exception exists as to "necessaries" except to the extent that the parties are living separate by agreement and whether or not support is stipulated by that agreement.  FC section 4302.

Separation is of critical importance to the expanding interpretation and growing field of the law of fiduciary duties. The duty of confidentiality that arises because of the marital relationship by legislative fiat ( Family Code section 721) and which gives rise to major exposure for the conduct of spouses with regard to property and money, ceases at separation - meaning spouses no longer have the expectation and right of relying upon one another as trusted partners.  Fiduciary duties continue pursuant to FC sections 1100 et seq. and sections 2100 et seq. as to assets that already exist, or can be considered marital opportunities arising after separation, until the time each asset in question is divided by agreement or court adjudication.  Fiduciary duties are land mines.  A good example of the consequences for breach of fiduciary duty is the Rossi case, where a wife who won the lottery and then filed for divorce the next day claiming she and her husband had already separated.  She fails to list the lottery winnings in her paperwork, and refused to disclose it to the husband later claiming, among other things, that she had been a victim of domestic violence.  Because the husband had no idea about the lottery winnings, he did not dispute the divorce or wife's asserted date of separation until much later when one day he received a letter intended for the wife by a company offering to buy out the winnings.  He called the State Lottery Board, and then filed a motion to set aside the divorce degree and for damages for wife's fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.  The court ordered the wife to disgorge all her winnings (100%) and pay them over to the husband.

The separation date is crucial to understanding reimbursement claims relating to payment on joint and separate debts, or in fixing rights to real property.  For instance, California law provides that the community has an interest in the appreciation of a residence which is owned, meaning title is held, in one spouse's name alone where principal on a mortgage is being paid down.  This is called the Moore-Marsden approach to equitable reimbursement.  If the house appreciates after separation, the titled spouse may want to argue that all that appreciation belongs to them.  Date of separation becomes important to the date of valuing the real estate and determining the relative principal loan amounts.

It is crucial where businesses are involved, regardless whether they are corporations, mom and pop shops, or sole proprietorships.  For instance, what happens when a spouse who controls or who is the business, which was established before or during the marriage, continues to derive income from it after the parties separate?  Maybe the business goes up in value.  Perhaps it goes down in value through market factors, or maybe even the spouse intentionally drives it into the ground in order to reduce the amount that will be ordered to buy out the other spouse's interest.  In all these situations a date of separation determination is crucial.

Another common area where it comes up in with regard to pensions, whether they be defined benefit plans or contributive benefit plans.  Whatever accrues to the spouse who holds the pension by way of his post-separation contributions belongs to them.

Date of separation is also critical to determining the length of the marriage for purposes of spousal support or alimony rights.  It is a snapshot in time with huge ramifications, including how long a spousal support obligation may continue and when it might be terminated.

It is critical that you hire an attorney who understands how to litigate and present the facts of physical separation.


Thurman W. Arnold III,
California Divorce Lawyer
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January 17, 2010
  What are interspousal FIDUCIARY DUTIES?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.    I keep hearing the phrase "interspousal fiduciary duties".  What does it mean?

A.    Few areas of California divorce and family law is changing as rapidly, or is having as great an impact upon property division and support obligations, as is interspousal fiduciary duties

Until the mid-1970s  lesser "good faith" standards were imposed upon married persons which had consequences to usually only in extreme situations of self-dealing by one spouse or domestic partner.  These standards have since morphed into much higher level "confidential duty" and "fiduciary duty" standards. 

On January 1, 1994 Family Code section 721 became operative.  That was revolutionary, but widely not understand, for the next 10 years.  Section 721 has since been revised, extended, and expanded by statutory amendments and judicial decisions, and this continues. 

The penalties for violating a fiduciary duty can be severe.  Many attorneys, and some judges, are behind the curve in understanding the nuances of the obligations imposed by FC section 721 and related statutes.  This ignorance places clients at financial risk in the course of dissolution or legal separation litigation. Indeed, it opens the door to the litigation continuing or re-emerging long after Judgment if breaches of fiduciary duty are discovered or alleged downstream.  Having a lawyer who understands this developing area of the law will make or break some litigants, today and for years to come.  

Fiduciary duty rules help to balance economic power in marriage and divorce. One reason people roll our eyes when the topic of "divorce" comes up is who doesn't know someone who out cheated, or got cheated by the other spouse, in matters of support or property division?  There are lawyers who pander to clients who want to cheat their spouse or domestic partner. Americans share a cultural mythology that these attorneys charge the highest fees and if they can out-cheat the other spouse and their attorney, they deserve them.

The accountability that the law of fiduciary duties add to the dissolution mix is a useful tool for combating marriage fraud by the other spouse.  If society favors the party with more money or power over the weaker party, it will become increasingly unglued.   

Fiduciary Duties Described

In financial and property transactions with third parties and each other, spouses owe one another important statutory duties that create huge responsibilities and pitfalls.  As between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other.  "This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other."  Family Code section 721(b)

The essence of the "fiduciary relationship" is that the parties are treated under the law as though they do not deal with each other on equal terms because one person (typically the managing spouse) in whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts the trust and confidence is in a superior position to exert influence over the dependent party.  A presumption of undue influence arises whenever either party benefits from the transaction over the other, however innocuous the circumstances may seem.  Breach of fiduciary duty is to some extent a strict liability offense, meaning if it occurs consequences may be set in motion that run the course to an expensive end.

In 2002 Family Code section 721 was amended to expand this confidential fiduciary relationship and impose the same rights and duties as applies to nonmarital business partners under the California Corporations Code, and includes but is not limited to:
        
            (1)    Providing each spouse access at all times to any books kept regarding a transaction for the purposes of inspection and copying;        

            (2)    Rendering upon request true and full information of all things affecting any transaction which concerns the community property.     

            (3)    Accounting to the spouse, and holding as trustee, any benefit or profit derived from any transaction by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse which concerns the community property (i.e., all property acquired by a married person during the marriage).

While Section 721 does not mention Registered Domestic Partners, it applies to them as well.

One major consequence is that transactions which benefit only one spouse may be set aside by the other, either before or during a divorce proceedings.

As a practical matter for divorcing couples, this means:     

            a)    If one party has benefited over the other in a transaction involving money or property and thereby gained an advantage during the course of the marriage, the law presumes the advantage was gained through undue influence exerted on the part of the benefited party, and the transaction is presumed invalid and can be set-aside;     

            b)    The burden of convincing a Court that a set-aside should not occur then shifts to the advantaged spouse;     

            c)    All this can occur without regard to good or bad intent on the part of the advantaged spouse (i.e., actually intending to defraud as opposed to merely being sloppy).  Either way the law declares the transaction to be the result of "constructive fraud".   Once the Court finds constructive fraud the transactions can be set aside, the benefited party can be ordered to pay restitution to the other and to disgorge any profits they alone received, title may be reformed to include both parties' names, or the property may be held in trust for both on a present and go-forward basis rather than in the name of the one alone.  If there is an actual fraudulent intent, the remedies to the injured spouse are more severe.

The fact that parties have separated or that a dissolution or legal separation is pending does not end the parties' fiduciary responsibilities.  Family Code section 1100(e) continues those same duties "until such time as the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court." 

Remedies for breach of the fiduciary duty as described in Family Code section 721, and section 1100, include an amount equal to one-half of the value of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of fiduciary duty, plus attorneys fees.  This includes inadvertent or unintentional violations.  Family Code section 1101(g).  Where a court comes to believe a spouse acted intentionally to defraud the other spouse, the Court "shall" award 100% of the value of what should have been disclosed, or what should not have been transferred, to the innocent spouseFC section 1101(h).

If you have a business, or investments in real estate or simply a family residence, and certain transactions have occurred, you may have a problem.  If you are a dependent spouse, regardless whether the other party intended to cheat you, you may have important entitlements and remedies.

This is one of the most complicated, emerging areas of California family law.  Do not go it alone!  In every dissolution and legal separation case, regardless whether either party has an attorney, each party must exchange a Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure, and unless expressly waived, a Final Declaration of Disclosure.  If these documents contain errors, misinformation, or are incomplete the consequences can be financially devastating because an entire settlement or judgment may later be set aside.  These documents sit as leverage tools and landmines for years to come.




TWA
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
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