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Recent Posts in Imputed Income and Earning Capacity Category
| May 15, 2011 |
| RECURRING GIFTS From Parents May Be "INCOME" For Purposes of Determining Need for ATTORNEY FEES! |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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As I have been trumpeting now for months, the appellate courts are actively attempting to control and limit family law litigants, their lawyers, trial courts, and the rest of the professionals involved in these cases and to curb the excesses of high conflict divorce and custody disputes. Following on the heals of the momentous decision in Irmo Davenport,
another court has responded to an excessive attorney fee claim by a family court disputant. In
Davenport it is a party who was sanctioned for the aggressive tactics of her attorney; now in the
Kevin Q. opinion, it is the lawyer herself who is undone because it appears she will never be paid for hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees run up in the course of her representation.
I raised the question in my
Davenport blog whether we can expect
Family Code section 271 to be amended to impose sanctions against attorneys themselves for litigious conduct. While neither the attorney nor the client in
Kevin Q. was sanctioned (and apparently the conduct of the litigation did not rise to sanctionable levels), they were nonetheless denied any contribution to their fees from the other side. An attorney who handles cases "on the come" who finds herself not getting paid is pretty much equivalent a form of sanction.
Kevin Q. blew up in the face of the mother's attorney (although I applaud family lawyers who care enough to carry a case for a time, in appropriate settings). For those attorneys who tend to over-litigate cases, basic behaviorist principles of reward and punishment are likely to impact their decision-making. This is a message that I believe the appellate justices intend.
The Fourth Appellate District has taken the next predictable step for litigants who hope to force the other side to contribute to exorbitant attorney fees incurred in certain high conflict family law cases. In so doing the law as it relates to the "relative circumstances" of the parties has been expanded to require that trial courts treat recurrent monetary infusions made by family members as "income" for purposes of interpreting the larger picture as it relates to attorney fee requests. Previously that argument only existed within the realm of support obligations.
This is the first case that deals with what happens to attorney fees claims, in a situation family lawyers know is common where grandparents may be effectively encouraging (and often funding) a rancorous custody battle between their child and a now estranged former partner. Often in family court litigation there are not merely two individuals at war - their relatives have also been sucked into the trance. Many wealthier Americans are able to fund their child's litigation attorneys, or pay that child's household bills so that their need to find work is reduced. The parents of these children may feel forced to underwrite this status quo, effectively spending the family inheritance now. This may be the real subtext to the case.
Kevin Q. is a natural evolution of a doctrine which was recently stated in
Marriage of Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 718. In
Alter the trial court found gifts from the former husband's mother to be disguised as loans and imputed income to him for these gifts in deciding his ability to pay child and spousal support.
In Kevin Q. and Lauren W., published on May 13, 2011, the two parties incurred over $400,000 in lawyer's fees combined fighting over the paternity of a boy born outside of marriage. That these are warring high-conflict parents is made clear from the fact that this is their second published appeal (see
Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1119). Mother won the first appeal; Kevin prevailed here. Both sets of litigants have had the same attorneys throughout the proceedings. Kevin Q. is himself an attorney who practices family law in Orange County. As it turned out in the earlier case, Kevin is not the child's biological father but he alleged he was the child's psychological parent - the appellate ruling was that Kevin was not the boy's "legal" father. Unfortunately for the child, it sounds as though the man declared to be the legal father went "walkabout." I cannot tell whether Kevin continued to maintain any relationship with the child after he lost his paternity claim ('once a psychological parent, always a psychological parent?'). Perhaps the parties or their attorneys will weigh in this Blog so I can have the facts corrected.
The first decision is dated June 19, 2009. In December, 2009, Lauren moved the court to order that Kevin pay her outstanding attorney fees, including those from the earlier appeal. Kevin had contributed a total of $20,000 up to that point. Her attorney was Debra Opri of Opri & Associates; Kevin was represented by Marjorie G. Fuller and Marc S. Tovstein. Hence, all the litigation after the first decision appears to be over recovering attorney fees relating to it (but this is unclear). Fees upon fees?
In this round Attorney Opri filed a declaration stating that there was $55,754 due from the earlier work and that another $178,581 and costs of $6,589 was incurred thereafter. Hence, Lauren's total unpaid fees amounted to $227,746. Opri's hourly billing rate was $575 and her law clerk's was $225/hour. Of these fees, Attorney Opri had only received the $20,000 from Kevin plus $28,280, which included a payment of $15,600 from Lauren's father. Lauren urged that Opri had been effectively working for free. She owes her father "tens of thousands" and he was tapped out.
Kevin responded that Lauren's fees were unreasonable. She'd incurred $311,242 in fees for the entire case while his fees totaled $141,384. He complained that $4,200 in charges were for driving time for her attorney to travel from Beverly Hills to Orange County.
The matter was submitted for decision to the trial court, with the issue being identified as whether "attorney fees should be paid to [Lauren], based on need and ability to pay, as set forth in ... [Family Code] sections 2030, 2032, 7605, and 7640." Lauren urged that because the underlying dispute concerned paternity, Family Code section 7605 and
section 7640 governed and that these statutes required a different analysis than under
sections 2030 and
2032.
The court made the following findings: Kevin's average monthly income was $12,803. He had borrowed $50,000 from his relatives for attorney fees, which he was paying back at the rate of $150/month. He had monthly expenses of $13,320 leaving a deficit of $517.
Lauren had zero income from employment and had not worked since 2006, although she had a master's degree in psychology and is a certified chemical dependency counselor. She received $8,700 per month from "others." Her monthly expenses were $9,197, leaving a shortfall of $497.
Which Statutes Control Attorney Fee Requests in Paternity Actions?
The court concluded that it had to apply Family Code section 2032(b) and so "consider the practicality of the expense of litigation consistent with the parties['] overall financial resources." While it appreciated that Lauren's counsel had expended time and talent to the case without substantial payment in advance, "[o]nly the wealthiest of our citizens can afford to expend more than $500,000 on their family law disputes. The fact that an attorney voluntarily takes on the lower earner does not mean that the law gives him or her carte [blanche] to litigate the case without limitation regardless of the parties['] ability to pay."
The court noted that Family Code section 2032(d) provides a mechanism that offers the parties and their counsel to early on seek to implement a case management plan for the purpose of allocating fees in an amount and to the extent that circumstances allow - Lauren did not avail herself of that opportunity "and forged ahead, incurring attorney's fees far in excess of either party's reasonable ability to pay." (Notably the appellate court did not weigh in on this question). It concluded that "neither party ha[d] a substantially greater ability to pay the other's fees" and therefore denied Lauren's request that Kevin contribute to hers.
On appeal Lauren contended that the trial court failed to limit its inquiry to the language of Family Code sections 7605 and 7640, which she felt would result in a different analysis than that under 2030 and 2032. The chief difference between the wording of the two sets of statutes is that "[u]nder section 2032, '[t]he court may make an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 2030 . . . where the making of the award, and the amount of the award, are just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.' Section 2032 further provides: 'In determining what is just and reasonable under the relative circumstances, the court shall take into consideration the need for the award to enable each party, to the extent practical, to have sufficient financial resources to present the party's case adequately, taking into consideration, to the extent relevant, the circumstances of the respective parties described in Section 4320. The fact that the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs has resources from which the party could pay the party's own attorney's fees and costs is not itself a bar to an order that the other party pay part or all of the fees and costs requested. Financial resources are only one factor for the court to consider in determining how to apportion the overall cost of the litigation equitably between the parties under their relative circumstances.'"
Family code section 4320 is the key California spousal support statute. Of course, this was a paternity action and since the parties were never married no spousal support could have been awarded. Nonetheless, the Fourth Appellate District concluded that the legislature's reference to 4320 in section 2032 meant that the factors set forth in 4320 were relevant here. These included "the earning capacity of each party," "the obligations and assets of the parties," the "age and health of the parties," "the balance of hardships to the parties," and the "goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a reasonable period of time." Thus the appellate court concluded that "sections 2030, 2032 and (where relevant) 4320 form a statutory package" where fee awards must comply with all three provisions - at least in marital proceedings.
The Fourth District decided that the trial court did not error by taking into account the standards and circumstances pertinent under a section 2032 comparative analysis. "By dong so, the court was able to perform a more thorough evaluation of the parties' respective abilities to pay."
Loans vs. Gifts From Family Members
Lauren urged on appeal that the trial court erred by treating her father's payments to her as income, asserting these were loans and not gifts and that her father's financial support was not "an infinite obligation, regular or steady...." She argued that the trial court did not find the amount of her fees to be unreasonable.
The appellate court read the trial court decision as including a finding that Lauren's fees were in fact unreasonable. The court had stated that the law does not give either party carte blanche "to litigate the case without limitation." It noted the disparity in the amounts of fees charged by the two sets of attorneys. And the court had observed that Lauren's counsel had "forged ahead, incurring attorney's fees far in excess of either party's reasonable ability to pay."
The two seminal cases on imputing income derived from gifts from parties' parents are the Alter case, cited above, and
In re Marriage of Schulze (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 519. In
Schulze a noncustodial father challenged an order requiring him to pay spousal and child support. The trial court there ordered him to pay $7,500 immediately and in full for his former wife's attorney fees. The trial court had presumed he could get this money from his parents because they had previously lent him about $8,000 to pay his own fees. This part of the ruling was reversed with the now oft quoted holding that "Charity, once extended, is still not an entitlement." As the
Kevin Q. opinion notes "[b]ut that statement related to a loan made by the parents for a particular purpose, as opposed to regular, recurrent monetary gifts intended as support for living expenses." Lauren responded that the trial court ignored the $50,000 loaned by Kevin's parents, but these were not the same as "recurrent payments" made over a lengthy period of time to cover Kevin's living expenses. And, Kevin's attorneys were smart enough to produce evidence that Kevin was paying back those loans.
Alter similarly examined recurrent gifts to an adult child. "There, the appellate court stated that 'where a party receives recurring gifts of money, the trial court has discretion to consider that money has income for purposes' [of determining] child support. The former husband in
Alter, who sought reduction of an existing child support order, had received regular monthly payments from his mother for many years. He claimed the payments were loans, produced promissory notes as evidence, and averred his mother's loans to him 'would not continue.' The appellate court found substantial evidence the payments were gifts, noting that no evidence showed the former husband 'ever repaid any of the money.' The Court of Appeal then addressed whether these gifts may be characterized as income under the relevant child support statute. It concluded 'that nothing in the law prohibits considering gifts to be income for purposes of child support so long as the gifts bear a reasonable relationship to the traditional meaning of income as a recurrent monetary benefit.' In reaching this conclusion,
Alter found it 'irrelevant that there is no legal obligation on the part of the donor to continue making the gifts or that the flow of cash does not appear on the income tax return.'
'Few, if any, sources of income are certain to
continue unchanged year in and year out. People can lose their jobs, interest rates can fall, business conditions can wipe out profits and dividends.'
In sum, 'the question of whether gifts should be considered income for purposes of the child support calculation is one that must be left to the discretion of the trial court.'
Alter
concluded the trial court had not abused its discretion in considering the payments to be income because they were 'periodic and regular,' resulting in money available to the former husband for the support of his children."
Hence, the Kevin Q. court ruled that "the regular, recurrent monetary infusions made by Lauren's father to her over a lengthy period of time, which relieved her of the need to work outside the home, constituted support (and, impliedly, monetary gifts) to her. The court explains: 'While the Court recognizes that [Lauren's] receipts from 'others' are not income as defined in the Family Code, they are however funds on which [Lauren] relies in order to maintain her lifestyle. It is clear to the Court that these funds received are not loans, in that [Lauren] reports debt only in the amount of $26,000, all from institutional lenders. [Lauren] reports that she has not been gainfully employed since August of 2006. She discloses that she has a bachelor's degree in English, a master's degree in psychology and is a certified dependency counselor. [Lauren] does not report receiving or applying for any benefits for disability income from any state or federal agency or private insurance provider.
The weight of the evidence therefore supports the proposition that [Lauren] chooses to remain a 'homemaker and mother' and is able to do so as long as other persons contribut[e] to her support. That support, in this Court's mind, is relevant to the issue of [Lauren's] need and ability to pay attorney fees.'" [Emphasis added].
The court did not abuse its discretion by considering those gifts to be support (or income) for purposes of calculating Lauren's ability to pay her attorney fees. The gifts bore "a reasonable relationship to the traditional meaning of income as a recurrent monetary benefit."
The Take Away
Parties to family court litigation who don't work, or have limited access to resources, find themselves in a catch-22: If they look to their families for financial support which they then receive as recurrent gifts, or unpayable loans, this stream of money will increasingly be classified as "recurrent income." Here Lauren's parents regularly supported her, at a pretty high standard of living at $8,700/month. One can't but help feel sorry for her parents for bearing this burden. I suspect that as naturally tends to happen her parents bought into her victimhood and sided with her against the evil empire that Kevin represented. Often high conflict litigation isn't simply a war between two parties: It is a war between two families, which isn't a lawyer's fault - but is still always a shame.
(Mirroring conflict between two religious groups; or two political parties; or two races; or two countries; or human beings vs. the rest of the natural world. Does any of this sound familiar? But I digress.)
True loans from parents may remain different from "recurrent income" depending how and how often it is received. Kevin was wise to show some repayment, however meaningless ($150/month towards a $50,000 debt is minimal at best).
We now know that Family Code section 2032 provides the central standard of measuring how attorney fees may successfully be sought from the other side in probably any manner of case that can be filed under the California Family Law Act. It gives trial courts wide discretion to look at all the relative circumstances, no matter whether the case is between married persons, domestic partners, and paternity contestants. Arguably the same result should control when dealing with attorney fee requests in domestic violence cases (Family Code section 6344).
T.W. Arnold, CFLS
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| December 03, 2010 |
| ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU! |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011.
It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners.
This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.
Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations. Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues. Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.
What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases." Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification:
"We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel. [Reference omitted]....
In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures. But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice. Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute. It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support....
Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function. If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."
Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented. Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions. Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants. Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court." Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.
The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011. Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217. It states:
"(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.
(b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.
(c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.
If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."
Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules. It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings. It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia.
It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully. The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere). There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true). Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court. Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise.
The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes. I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks. Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers.
December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.
T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization) |
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| June 11, 2010 |
| What should I know if I want to LIMIT or TERMINATE SPOUSAL SUPPORT in the future? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. My wife and I were married for 14 years. We have two children, aged 11 and 13. We are both in our early 40's. My wife has a college degree, but quit working shortly before our first child was born. I am a doctor, and she was a nurse at the local hospital before she quit. Our divorce is not final. I think she should be able to support herself once she gets some updated training, although I don't object to supporting our children. She says she won't work until until our youngest child finishes high school. What should I ask the judge to do and what should I expect to limit my spousal support exposure?
A. There are a number of things you need to know.
First, you have a long term marriage within the meaning of Family Code section 4336. Start with the expectation that you will be paying alimony for at least half the length of the marriage.
Second, Family Code section 4320 sets forth the most important factors that a court is required to consider in issuing a spousal support award; it is also the decisive section for determining whether spousal support should be modified, reduced, or terminated in the future. As to later modifications, this means that whatever the court decides as to the 4320 factors (or depending upon what facts are recited in your Marital Termination Agreement) may have a huge impact on how much you pay and for how long. The 4320 factors only come into play when a final judgment enters: Although courts are supposed to consider them in dealing with temporary spousal support issues, they typically do not.
Third, it is essential that you convince the Court to give your former spouse a Gavron warning. I have separately blogged this concept. In essence its effect is to give a supported spouse something of a free pass to rehabilitate themselves and enter the work force until and unless they've been given advance notice of that expectation. If you settle your case without going to trial, as I sincerely hope you do, make sure that a Gavron Admonition is included in your settlement agreement. It starts the clock ticking on your former wife's obligation to become self-sufficient. However, you need to realize that her ability to do so will be impacted by her child rearing responsibilities to whatever extent they exist, and most courts will consider this. It becomes less relevant with older children. Given the length of your marriage (14 years) your youngest child will be finishing high school right about the time that you reach half the length of the marriage.
Fourth, consider trying to get what is called a Richmond Order. Essentially this is an order or an agreement to terminate spousal support jurisdiction on a specified date unless, prior to the fixed termination date, the supported spouse files a motion showing good cause to modify the amount of support or its duration. Unlike most orders which are open-ended, a Richmond Order discourages delay and supports the goal of California that an ex-spouse receive support only so long as is reasonably necessary to get back on their own two feet. They are generally not appropriate in extremely lengthy marriages, or in situations where health or age makes it unreasonable to believe the other party can become self-supporting.
Age is a factor in your case because there is still time for your Wife to develop financial independence.
The effect of the Richmond Order is to place the burden upon the supported spouse to justify continuing support because of unforseen future events. Most judges prefer Richmond orders, but you won't get it unless you request it. Attorneys representing supported spouses are less likely to agree to them in Marital Settlement Agreements at first blush. There may be good reasons, however, that be persuasive if you persevere.
Fifth, consider a request for step down spousal support orders where support is reduced in increments into the future; this may make perfect sense depending upon the length of marriage, whether there are children, and the supported spouse's age.
Sixth, consider a Family Code section 4331
Vocational Training Examination. Even if the Court concludes that it is not reasonable for your wife to work now, this may create an important benchmark which will be useful to you in the future. Downstream if she does not obtain employment she arguably might have, the Court may be convinced it should impute income to her that might have otherwise earned.
At this stage of the proceedings you are setting the stage for a future reduction. That requires smart advance preparation. Find a competent spousal support attorney in your area!
By the way, this is exactly why you should want mediation rather than a court judgment. IMHO. Mediation takes the future into consideration, and creates a safe container for the parties to talk about it!
Thurman Arnold
http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com
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| March 24, 2010 |
| I am remarried. How does my NEW MATE'S INCOME affect my SPOUSAL SUPPORT or CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. I remarried in August, 2009, and my new wife is a doctor. She has one child from her prior marriage and I have two. I am still paying my former wife alimony and child support even though the kids we have together live at our home 40% of the time. I have been hit hard by the economy and we largely depend upon my wife's medical income to make ends meet. Now my ex is threatening to take me back to court to increase my support based upon my new wife's income, while my own income is down from when the court last decided it. My new wife is upset at the idea that my ex can learn anything about the medical practice or income. What should I do?
A. If there has been a material decrease in your income since the time of your last order, you may safely file a support modification motion to lower your child support and to lower or possibly terminate your spousal support. Whether that is advisable based upon your numbers has nothing to do with your new mate's income, and should not cause you to hesitate - but again, it does depend on the actual respective numbers between you and Wife 1, which you did not provide me. You also need not worry about W1 filing a motion to increase (you can't stop her, but she will not win based on W2's earnings). Maybe you should give her this link so she will think twice.
California law is quite clear that new mate income cannot generally be considered against you in ordering or modifying child or spousal support. The controlling California Family statute is section 4057.5.
In the normal situation, Family Code section 4057.5 leaves the Court no discretion to consider your new wife's earnings, period. You do not need to report those earnings on your FL-150 (Income and Expense Declaration). This is a statement of California legislative policy effective in 1993 when this section was added to the Family Code. This is true for both spousal and child support.
However, section 4057.5 does contain an exception for the "extraordinary case" which the statute makes clear is intended to address situations where "where excluding that income would lead to extreme and severe hardship to any child subject to the child support award" or where "a parent ... voluntarily or intentionally quits work or reduces income, or who intentionally remains unemployed or underemployed and relies on a subsequent spouse's income." Even if the court were to find a severe hardship on the children of marriage number one, it would be required not to impose a severe hardship on your wife's child by reallocating her income to you for purposes of supporting your two children.
In practice, so far, Courts almost never find facts sufficient overcome this clear statutory prohibition. So far there is no published California appellate decision defining these extraordinary circumstances. No doubt one day someone will so abuse this protection and hide behind it that we will get a reported decision that fleshs out how bad someone needs to behave before the protection is lost. But "extraordinary" means really extraordinary. In the average case, your new Wife has nothing to be concerned about.
With regard to attorneys fee awards, however, there is authority for an argument that new mate income may be considered in granting or denying an attorney fee request, but the odds are against a judge doing that.
Incidentally, this section also applies to income from nonmarital partners as well as new spouses. In one reported case (IRMO Loh), a trial court was reversed for inceasing dad's child support obligation after the mother produced photos of the father's "lifetyle" to show imputed nontaxable income in the form of his new girlfriend's contributions to him, since she paid for all his toys.
The new mate question is a subset of the "imputed income" situations where a father or mother may quit work or reduce hours because they are relying on their new mate to contribute the difference. That is not likely going to be an extraordinary case, but W1 can separately seek to impute income to you on the basis that you have a higher earning capacity than you are exercising. Earning capacity and imputed income is a blog for another day. Also, I will mention here that another argument exists in favor of W1 that has nothing to do with the right to obtain the records or income of W2: Equalizing the lifestyle's of the two households where yours is rich and grandiose and W1 is impoverished (an extreme example) pursuant to FC section 4057(b)(4).
The tax returns are privileged as they relate to your new wife's medical practice. For instance, if she is a medical corporation (which I recommend be set up), she will almost never be forced to divulge those records. Even as to your joint returns, you may be entitled to redact the information concerning your new spouse or have the Court review them in camera (meaning they are not turned over to the other side). Your former mate is entitled to see your side of the tax returns, however, and they are not insulated from scrutiny simply because you filed joint with the Doctor Wife. If you don't file jointly, your former wife will almost certainly never get her hands on your new wife's Married Filing Separately (MFS) returns. Structuring things this way may or may not be advisable and you should consult a tax accountant.
An interesting twist here is that because you marry a higher, wealthy earner, your taxes actually increase because under federal IRS (and the California FTB), you are responsible for one-half of your new mate's income - and this is true even if you don't file jointly. One case (County of Tulare vs. Campbell) has held that this additional tax you become liable for can form the basis for a reduction in your support because you have less net income available for support after the tax hit is deducted. Hence, based on these tax consequences you may have an additional argument for decreased support - although a Court may try to deny you some discretionary offset to even the score since this feels a bit unfair to the spouse who is primarily supporting the children and so lessen the downward modification.
The take-away: So long as you are not playing games, have not intentionally reduced your income by relying upon your new mate's income, and there is no really extraordinary difference in the two households, your new wife's income is just not relevant and so it is protected. |
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| December 28, 2009 |
| How is TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT Determined in California? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. How is temporary spousal support calculated in California?
A. In order to be entitled to spousal support, parties must be married or be registered domestic partners. Spousal support (which is not usually referred to as "alimony" in California) is available in dissolution proceedings, actions for legal separation, and in connection with domestic violence applications.
Spousal support orders may be temporary, or they be what is called permanent. Different rules apply to how temporary support is figured than to permanent or long-term support. I address permanent spousal separately.
Temporary spousal support is designed to preserve the status quo pending a final judgment. Family Code section 3600 provides that during the pendency for dissolution of marriage or legal separation or in any proceeding where there is at issue the support of a minor child, the court may order the husband or wife to pay any amount that is necessary for the support of the husband and wife (subject to limitations contained in FC section 4320 and FC section 4325). Again, parties dissolving domestic partnerships may also be awarded support.
Temporary spousal support has nothing to do with the length of the marriage. Courts look at what the spending pattern was pre-separation and issues a spousal support award based upon need. If there isn't enough money on the basis of need, then an amount is ordered based upon the higher earner's ability to pay. A party seeking spousal support isn't deprived on the right to receive support even if they have income - the question is the relative income circumstances of the two parties.
Most California counties have formulas that determine temporary spousal support, but the two most important are Santa Clara and Alameda counties. Essentially the spousal support formula for Santa Clara County - which is the dominant one - is as follows: From any amount which is not allocated to child support, take 40% from the net income of the payor spouse, less 50% from the net income of the recipient spouse. The resulting number is the temporary spousal support. You do not need to have children to be entitled to receive spousal support.
As a practical matter, courts typically use one of two computer programs that generate these numbers: Either the Dissomaster or Xspouse. The Indio courts use Xspouse and the Santa Clara guidelines.
Into one of these programs are inputted the respective gross incomes of the parties. If there are children of the parties, the custodial timeshare in percentages is inputted (because only a party who has physical custody for more than 50% of the year can claim the tax benefits of HH/MLA or head of household status, the programs require one to be considered to have 51% even in true joint custody arrangements).
Only certain expenses matter for purposes of temporary support in California. What doesn't matter at all is most personal expenses (like mortgage payments, utilities, debt). This effectively ignores the entire debt structure of the parties at time of separation. Health insurance, union dues, and mandatory contributions to retirement (i.e., typically not IRA contributions), and obligations existing to other minor children living in one party's home, or as to which an actual court order requires they make support payments, are also entered. The support program 'tax effects' these numbers and figures out the net incomes of the parties. It renders a number that tells the Court how much the higher earning spouse must pay for purposes of a court order.
Since the court determines the support obligation some weeks after a request for support is made (by way of Motion for Order to Show Cause application), it typically makes the support order retroactive to the date of the filing for the request. Most courts order support payable one-half on the first and fifteenth of the month. For this reason, if you file for support on the 5th day of the month, the court will not make support retroactive to the 1st but will start of the obligation on the 15th day of the month.
This might sound like temporary spousal support is easy to fix and who needs a lawyer? This is not at all the case. The final support numbers depend upon how much income the Court is attributing to each party. Each is required to submit before the hearing an FL-150 Income and Expense Declaration.
For instance: A husband's (and wife's) income numbers are usually but not always based upon historical earnings, and the California judicial council form (FL-150) requires both to set forth there total gross for the past 12 months and also the past month. The legal assumption is that historical earnings are a reliable guide to future earnings, but this may not be at all true. Especially in today's economy, historical earnings may not be indicative of what the income stream will be going forward. This information needs to be credibly presented to the Court.
In cases where one party is a self-employed spouse, their net pre-tax earnings must be determined after deducting business expenses. This is a common and complex area of dispute, because what is deductible for purposes of Schedule C accompanying a tax return according to the federal government is in no way binding upon California courts for purposes of figuring support. If somebody works from home and charges part of the mortgage expense as a business deduction, that expense may be added back into the income stream as being available for support.
Another support battleground often involves imputed income. What if one party refuses to work, or insists on working at a lower paying job? Perhaps a support recipient believes they will get more money from their spouse if they have no job but if they tried to get one, they could? What if one party claims that they aren't working and that no jobs are available? Imputing income cuts both ways, and is extremely sophisticated. I will address another blog to it.
Incidentally, while only temporary alimony is calculated in this way, child support is always figured in this manner regardless whether there is a spousal support obligation.
http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawAttorney.com
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