Recent Posts in In the News! Category
| April 18, 2012 |
| Divorce and Family Law HORROR STORIES - How the System Is Broken! SHARE Yours With Us? |
| Posted By Thurman W. Arnold CFLS |
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Share Your Family Law Horror Story?
I want to thank all of you who write me about the difficult circumstances and horror stories surrounding your divorce and other family law matters, both in and out of divorce court. I receive dozens of emails each month from non-client readers, many who need help and so have questions, many who are merely venting, and many who have deep problems with how the government sponsored system for resolving family law disputes has unfolded and been applied for them, or misused.
I am not able to respond to every email, and for those who really want was is in effect a consultation with me (by seeking detailed answers to complex questions, for instance) I suggest you consider a phone or Skype conference with me or Mike Peterson at my office. I bill $350/hour for those consults and Mike bills at $250/hour.
However, for those who simply wish to have their often tragic stories heard I've decided to open up a portion of my website for posting them. Your experiences may be useful to others, and I imagine others similarly situated will read them with great interest. I think there should be a forum for people to communicate the good and bad of what they've been through.
Therefore, you must understand that I have a busy law practice along with a website that requires my constant attention and so am practically limited in my time and ability to respond or educate people about the law, your options, tactics you might try to change the course of your case or situation, and so on. I may not be able to enter into an ongoing dialogue with many of you, and don't want you to be offended if my responses are truncated, but if you wish to share your situations and experiences and if they are appropriately written, I will post them in a new section of my website that I am creating.
Your stories - if you'd like me to share them with the world for you - shouldn't simply be rants, but they certainly can express the poignancy of your situation. They need to be coherently (but not perfectly) written, not be abusive, respect other's rights to privacy, and provide enough information that a reader can follow them. I will create editorial guidelines as this concept develops. If you wish to have your story posted you will have to give me the rights to use it as I see fit.
Again, I will refine how this will work. For now I will watch to see whether creating such a forum is something the public really desires - both in terms of people sharing their experience as well as others caring to read about them. Hence, this concept is a work in progress.
If this makes sense to you and is something you wish to undertake, send me your stories at twarnold@verizon.net - don't use my on-line intake forms or blog comments because the length is limited in what I receive.
Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S. |
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| March 10, 2012 |
| RE-ELECT JUDGE JAMES COX - Best Riverside County Judges, 2012 Election |
| Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S. |
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Thurman Arnold Endorses Superior Court Judge James Cox
For Re-Election in 2012There are a number of candidates for several judicial positions that have opened up in Riverside County for the June, 2012 elections. One is Superior Court Judge James Cox, who seeks re-election. Judge Cox supervises the Probate Calendar for the Indio courts from his courtroom in Palm Springs. Judge Cox also, somewhat infrequently, covers family law and dissolution related matters - typically when our two Family Court bench officers in Indio are disqualified, or recuse themselves, from hearing matters otherwise assigned to them.
I endorse Judge Cox and urge our community to retain him in the upcoming election.
All judges, and applicants aspring to become judges, are not created equally. I have probably appeared in front of Judge Cox only a dozen times or so in the past five years, since my office doesn't generally handle probate matters and he gets only a small number of family law cases. While I've not always agreed with his rulings, I have always felt that he gave both parties in the matters he has decided a full and complete listen, and that he has an uncommon intelligence and ability to discern what the pivotal issues are and to apply the law in a fair and unbiased way. That is the essence, for me, of a good judge. Judge Cox is a particularly smart guy with a good understanding of family law, and the public interest is best served by retaining experienced jurists who've proven over time that they can do their jobs well.
Judge Cox is roundly endorsed by judges, lawyers, and members of the district attorney and public defender's offices.
I can tell you he is worth keeping. It is for that reason that I am speaking up in his support. Please consider voting for him.
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| December 30, 2011 |
| Attorney Michael C. Peterson Speaks About FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY (Before and Once Divorce Happens) |
| Posted By Michael C. Peterson |
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Advice for Couples in 2012, Including
How to Balance Power in Your Marriage!
One of the most common problems I see arising in (and sometimes leading to) any divorce action is a lack of financial transparency between the spouses or partners. Often, over time, and for various personal, practical and familial and historical reasons, one party has assumed a dominant or exclusive role in the management of community assets, including depository accounts, real estate, investments, and small businesses.That role effectively puts a managing spouse in a position to have vastly superior information about the family finances, and the power to act on such information in the context of divorce to the detriment of the non-managing spouse. This may wind up prejudicing one party if the relationship ends.
It has been my repeated experience that, in anticipation of a divorce action, an unethical or abusive spouse will take strategic steps to hide assets and obfuscate the methods used to hide them. The ramifications to the non-managing spouse can include not only an unfair disbursement of community assets upon resolution of the case, but also manifest into reduced calculations of temporary and permanent spousal support and child support.
California family law attempts to minimize the potential for financial fraud during the life of a divorce action. For example, it creates rules for mandatory disclosures of assets. It creates fiduciary duties for managing spouses. It creates methods for discovery of financial and asset information (but only in the context of a legal action, after the relationship has broken down). It creates pre-judgment and post-judgment penalties for non-disclosure.
In a perfect world such legal tools alone would fully prevent the potential for financial dishonestly between separating spouses. But the reality is that the law routinely fails to protect the financial interests of the non-managing spouse in this regard, and the root cause of that failure occurs because non-managing spouses don't take steps to equalize the playing field when it comes to information about family finances during the course of the marriage. Stated another way, individual non-managing spouses are often unable to utilize the tools that the law provides to ensure they receive a just and equitable share of the fruits of the community's efforts during the course of the marriage because they lack the information necessary to have their lawyer fully protect their interests. Too many non-managing spouses wait until the time of separation to learn about the family finances. By then, non-managing spouses and their attorney are playing catch up, and not always winning. As such, it is of paramount importance that a non-managing spouse be proactive in learning as much information about the family finances as possible, and do so not only on the eve of a divorce, but also during the entire course of the marriage itself. In this day and age, knowledge is the coin of the realm.
Economists recognize that one source of market failure (i.e. inefficient allocation of resources) is caused by a phenomenon called asymmetric information. Asymmetric information affects decisions in transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. In adverse selection models, the ignorant party lacks information while negotiating a contract to the transaction. Common examples of information asymmetry include 'insider' trading in the stock market, or buying a 'lemon' used car. Understanding and combating asymmetric information is crucial to economists because market failure leads to net losses for society as a whole. Understanding and combating asymmetric information should be equally important to the non-managing spouse and his/her attorney because of its strong potential to lead to inequitable settlements or trial results. In the economic sense, asymmetric information between spouses about the family finances is a form of market failure. To be sure, if you are contemplating or undergoing a divorce action, you will (in most cases) effectively be negotiating a transaction that will bind you and impact your financial future.
The best way overall way to combat a managing spouse 's tendency to commit acts of misfeasance or non-disclosure regarding financial interests is to equalize the flow of financial information from the very outset of the marriage, with information parity being a non-managing spouse's goal.
Hand-in-hand with the goal of information parity is a mindset that fosters such parity being present throughout the marriage. That mindset is, simply stated, one of equality and mutual appreciation. Two people will divide labor in a marriage so as to maximize their relative strengths and weaknesses, and in so doing the synergy benefits the martial community as a whole to a greater extent than either person could do individually. Economists refer to this phenomenon as comparative advantage, and recognize that such a situation is optimal in the context of maximizing social utility. So too is comparative advantage optimal for managing a household.
As a simple 'traditional' example, assume Chris and Pat are married. Chris has a greater income earning potential due to holding a doctorate degree and having a good network of people to whom Chris is favorably known in the locale. Pat has greater domestic abilities due to having a bachelors degree in nutrition a work background in home decor. Based on these comparative strengths, Chris and Pat decide that Chris will work full-time and Pat will take care of the home full-time. Pat's excellent meals keep Chris energized and in good health. Pat's superior aesthetic tastes keep Chris in style with cool cloths. Chris's boss comes over for dinner and is impressed by the feng shui of the domicile. Over time Chris gets promoted and raises. Chris uses the additional income to make financial investments, go on vacations with Pat, and purchase a better home. By Chris and Pat each doing what they are relatively strong at, they, both individually and as a whole, are made economically better off. But more to the point, it is their interdependence that necessarily caused the mutual gain. The law recognizes this fundamental principal in the context of divorce by creating the concept of community property; that regardless of whether it was Chris's paycheck that allowed for the growth of assets, Pat's contributions to Chris's earned income are equally important and therefore necessitate equal division should Pat and Chris's relationship end. So as to a non-managing spouse's mindset, I strongly encourage all such people who are contemplating marriage, married, contemplating divorce, or involved in a divorce have one that recognizes their contributions to the community and requires takes a role.
On the practical side of things, here is a list of information parity objectives that I believe healthy marital relationships should achieve:
- Spouses should store copies of written financial documents in a safe place and where the other spouse doesn't have access.
- Spouses should have all depository, investment, retirement, and debt account numbers written down in an asset ledger. Annual inventories of all assets with a value over $500.00 should be maintained and signed off on by spouses and kept in the asset ledger.
- Spouses should keep copies of income information, including payroll stubs and other documents showing income such as rental checks from investment property or brokerage statements from securities dealers.
- Spouses should copy and store all financial account information from banks savings and loans, credit unions, particularly monthly statements. Spouses should also copy and store other banking information such as passbooks, check registers, and deposit slips.
- Spouses should agreed to have all financial information statements should be sent to each spouse individually, directly from the applicable financial institution, and be received only at that spouses primary residential address (and not, for example, at a business). If one spouse insists on receiving their financial information from home or stops receiving financial information mail at the residence, it is often a red flag.
- Spouses should maintain copies of tax documents, including personal tax returns and business tax returns, and attached forms, for the preceding five years.
- Spouses should receive and keep business financial statements, including net worth and income statements, in the case of a small business.
- Spouses should keep copies of all wills and trusts, and attachments thereto (such as a grant deed that has been recorded in favor of a trust for the benefit of the spouses).
- Spouses should keep copies of all life insurance policies.
- Spouses should keep copies of all outstanding debts incurred during the marriage that are in either spouses name.
- Spouses should keep a list of all personal and real property owned prior to the marriage.
- Spouses should keep a list of all safe deposit boxes and their contents.
Other tips you should know about and red flags you should watch out for to protect you from an unscrupulous spouse:
- Don't wait until things are going badly in the relationship to achieve financial information parity. Work towards that goal from the outset.
- Conduct asset searches of your spouse's biographical information by professional third-parties on an annual basis.
- Be aware that there is a statistically higher incidence of spouses hiding money in their second, third, or later marriages.
- Its best to have only a certified public accountant prepare the spouses' tax returns (as opposed to 'bookkeepers' of other unlicensed persons acting as pseudo-accountants), as they are subject to professional conflict of interest rules. Do not sign any document seeking your informed consent to waive any conflict of interest rules with respect to accountants without consulting an attorney.
- Particularly in the case of a small business, become knowledgeable about the business's employees, its normal income, its normal expenses, and how it accounts for them. A small business in particular is breeding grounds for accounting tricks to make it appear less valuable. I have seen this occur by the managing spouse: favor/incentivize cash payments from customers, funnel personal expenses as payments from the business, creating and paying fake employees (including the spouses' own children) and then voiding the uncashed checks after the divorce is final, or delaying new long-term business opportunities (i.e. taking new customer orders, signing new clients, or receiving transfers from escrow-like accounts such as paypal.com). It's important to be familiar with the inner-workings of a small business so you can note when something is amiss. Carefully review and copy customer/client payment agreements and accounts where a small business operates on a largely cash basis.
- Review financial statements on a regular basis. It is easier to access and digest three months of recent transactions than five years of relatively distant transactions. Look out for large or out-of-the ordinary deposits or withdrawals, and try to trace the source/end-point of the transaction to the best of your ability.
- Be aware that municipal bonds and certain savings bonds, because they are tax-free, are not reported to the IRS and therefore can be a vehicle for asset hiding because they do not need to be disclosed on tax returns. Look out for large investments in these assets.
- Non-managing spouses should be careful about signing joint tax returns that claim large deductions for various expenses, particularly in the case where a small business is involved. Although it might mean a larger tax burden in a particular year, in the context of a divorce it often results in lower spousal support and a lower business valuation, with attestation proof presented to a judge in the form of your signature.
- Big changes to the administration of finances can be a red flag: applying for large new loans, the closing of a bank account or change to an investment portfolio, particularly without the input of the non-managing spouse, might give opportunity to hide money.
- Know your spouse's boss well, and make sure they like you. I have experienced collusion between employers and employee so as to show short-run decreases (bonus or raise deferral) to income agreed on increases after the divorce is complete. If you separate from your spouse, let your spouse's boss know that event has occurred in writing.
- Do not sign deeds or other papers concerning real estate papers without consulting an attorney.
- Watch out for bank accounts opened in the name of spouse's children, as they do not get listed on that spouse's tax statements they can be a method of hiding community assets.
- Also watch out for overpayments on taxes. A managing spouse may try to receive a tax return later after the divorce is final by overpayment now, or alternatively filing amended taxes.
- Avoid 'loans' to friends or family.
- Be a Missourian, i.e. don't take your spouse's word. Have the managing spouse show you with the documents that corroborate what they tell you about the family finances.
- Don't allow fear of ruining the relationship, cultural values, or laziness prevent your pro-activity in becoming astute in the family finances. Defensive responses to your inquiries and requirements for financial information parity by the managing spouse may indicate diversion of community assets.
- Always remember that the burden of proof rests on the accuser, not the accused, to prove diverted assets to a court. Take all actions to protect your interests with this rule in mind.
These are my thoughts at the end of 2011 - I wish each of you, and each of us, a Happy New Year in 2012, and I hope that we all strive to be transparent and ethical during the coming year!
Michael C. Peterson, Esq. - Indio and Coachella Valley Divorce Attorney |
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| December 26, 2011 |
| Attorney Michael C. Peterson JOINS the Law Firm of Thurman W. Arnold! |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Greetings All and Best Wishes for the Coming New Year!
I am so very pleased to announce that Michael C. Peterson joins the Law Firm of Thurman Arnold effective January 1, 2012. I cannot imagine having been blessed with a better equipped colleague to assist our firm with its many projects and increasing clientele.
As the visitors who regularly return to our site might agree, I have been passionate about offering you one of the best educational legal sites for family law, divorce, and mediations in the country (we had over 100,000 visitors in 2011). But that is an avocation. Our real energies are devoted to ethically and energetically representing the interests of parties contemplating or involved in all manner of family law cases, including divorce and domestic partnership dissolutions, and disputes concerning spousal support, child support, and simple and complex property division. One of our expectations in bringing Mike on board is also to make divorce affordable for those who need help but have significant budget limitations.
Mike brings to our practice a deep commitment to ethics, a heartfelt sensitivity to the struggles of people like you in these horrendous circumstances that you face, and an uncommon intelligence and creativity for solving problems and issues. His education and training was very much what I would describe an "old-school" educational values, meaning that he is a student of history, literature, and of psychology without being an 'arm-chair' intellectual. He holds the highest values, and his work ethic and commitment to excellence is on a level I (frankly) don't bump into too often. I look forward to his regular contributions to our Blog, but even more to the benefits and joys of sharing a professionalism and camaraderie that is often missing for sole practitioners. Two minds are always better than one!
Mike and I have also decided to expand our practice areas to include handling civil cases, and some types of criminal cases. We will keep you posted as to the specific areas where we might be of useful service to you!
Mike is licensed to practice law in the States of California and Washington.
To contact Michael Peterson directly, please click here.
Law Firm of Thurman W. Arnold, III
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| November 10, 2011 |
| Proposed 2012 REVISIONS to JUDICIAL COUNCIL FORMS; ATTORNEY FEE REQUESTS |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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Palm Springs Divorce and Family Law Attorney Mark D. Gershenson was kind enough to provide me the Family and Juvenile Law Advisory Committee Report to the Administrative Office of the Courts, Judicial Council of California submitted on October 28, 2011, to become effective on January 1, 2012. I want to share it with you.
Specifically these recommend the adoption of the following new Rules of Court and Judicial Council Forms that will be applied to and used in California family law proceedings:
- Rule 5.93 relating to attorney fee and cost applications, which identifies the steps for a litigant or court to take in requesting, responding to a request for, and awarding fees and costs based upon financial need;
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Approve optional form FL-157, Spousal or Partner Support Declaration Attachment,
for litigants to use, as an attachment to the
Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment
(form FL-319),
Declaration for Default or Uncontested Judgment
(form FL-170),
Application for Order
(form FL-310) and
Order to Show Cause
(form FL-300) or
Notice of Motion
(form FL-301) to request that the court award, modify a request, or deny a request for spousal or domestic partner support and to provide supporting facts that address the issuesidentified in Family Code section 4320, which are also required in a request for attorney's fees and costs;
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Approve optional form FL-158,
Supporting Declaration for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment
, for litigants to use, as an attachment to
Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment
(form FL-319) or
Responsive Declaration to Order to Show Cause or Notice of Motion
(form FL-320), to provide the court with additional background information either in support of or in opposition to a request for needs-based attorney's fees and costs, such as any history of child support, spousal or partner support, or family support orders;
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Approve optional form FL-319,
Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment,
for litigants to use, as an attachment to the
Application for Order
(form FL-310) and
Order to Show Cause
(form FL-300) or
Notice of Motion
(form FL-301), to request that the court award needs-based attorney's fees and costs;
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Approve optional form FL -346
Attorney's Fees and Costs Order Attachment
, for the court to use, as an attachment to
Findings and Order After Hearing
(form FL-340),
Judgment (form FL-180), or Judgment (Uniform Parentage-Custody and Support)
(form FL-250), to identify court findings and orders with respect to needs-based attorney's fees and costs; and
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Revise mandatory form FL-340,
Findings and Order After Hearing
, to improve organization and numbering, add clarifying language in item 1, add a reference to "parenting time" in item 2, add "Other" check boxes in items 2-6, add a check box for the court to attach new form FL-346 (see item 5 of this recommendation) in item 6, and add a check box for the court to order a continuance in item 9.
For your convenience I have uploaded the October 28, 2011, Report to the Judicial Council here. This includes the proposed forms. |
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| October 31, 2011 |
| GRANDPARENT RIGHTS: Recent RIVERSIDE Case Orders VISITATION To GP After DEATH OF PARENT |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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Hoag v. Diedjomahor (October 17, 2011), E050935
The Facts
The Fourth Appellate Division released a published opinion on October 17, 2011 in the case of
Hoag v. Diedjomahor, a case which was decided by recently retired Commissioner Michael McCoy in Indio, California, involving grandparent visitation rights upon the death of a parent per
Family Code section 3102. Commissioner McCoy's ruling in favor of the grandmother was upheld on appeal. Interestingly, the grandmother did not participate in the appellate level proceedings but nonetheless succeeded. Overturning a well reasoned trial court decision, where an abuse of discretion must first be shown, is always a difficult proposition.
Melville Diedjomahor (the father) and Kristen Hoag (the mother) were married in 2005. They lived with Kristen's mother, Shannon Hoag (the grandmother) in an apartment in La Habra. Kristen gave birth to their first daughter in 2006. Thereafter the parties separated. Melville moved to Desert Hot Springs, California, while Kristen and the minor remained with the maternal grandmother. Then the parties reconciled, and the family - including Shannon Hoag - moved into a residence together in DHS. In 2008 a second daughter was born.
Kristen filed for divorce in Indio in February, 2009. A month later she died unexpectedly as a result of previously undiagnosed epilepsy. Immediately following the death the children remained with the grandmother, and the father would come visit every few days.
Several months later the grandmother told the father she intended to file a guardianship proceeding. In reaction thereto, Melville demanded that she turn the children over to him. The proceeding was filed, alleging that the father was unfit because of injuries and also because he was in the country illegally and subject to deportation. Communications between the two rapidly deteriorated such that - according to grandma, he refused to give her any further visitation except that which was court-ordered; the father denied imposing this limitation to the trial court. In any event the GM was denied access to the children for some weeks after she filed her guardianship petition, until Commissioner McCoy entered visitation orders some three weeks later.
To complicate matters, grandmother was living together with Kristen's uncle, where the children and Kristen had also stayed for a time before her death, and - as we so regularly see if high conflict family law cases - father alleged that the uncle had improperly touched his niece, Kristen, years before when she was a minor. In 1993 grandmother's children had been removed from her custody because she had been using drugs. For these reasons grandmother should not have extended visitations, he argued.
Nonetheless, grandmother received visitation with the minors pending a trial. The guardianship proceedings were dismissed and continued within the family law action that Kristen had initiated. This visitation gave the grandmother three hours every Wednesday and 48 hours every other weekend, and she was allowed a daily phone call. This became her proposal for the final visitation order. It was based upon the mediator's recommendations.
Melville claimed at trial that he would permit grandmother to visit, but objected to any orders issuing for same and instead insisted it should be left to his discretion for day to day and moment to moment. He contended that overnights were not safe because the children might be exposed to the uncle (by this time the grandmother had moved into an apartment by herself, in the same complex as dad), that he wanted to study the kids on Wednesday, and he objected to daily calls because they interrupted what he was doing. He explained that once grandmother had filed court proceedings she had breached any trust that had previously existed between them. Hence, his final non-court order proposal was eight hours every other Saturday and one week during the summer with no sleep overs, and eight hours on grandmother's birthday.
Ultimately Commissioner McCoy found that while the father was in fact a fit parent, but that he had opposed grandmother's requests for what was in fact a reasonable visitation schedule. The Court specifically found that the father's testimony that he would allow non-court ordered visitation to occur to not be credible, and the trial court also dismissed the allegations regarding the uncle and the grandmother's past conduct (although noting that Commissioner McCoy had prohibited such contact in any event). It found that visitation was in the children's best interest, particularly so given the the years that grandmother had acted as a third parent for the children and the parties before the divorce was filed. Essentially, the trial Court ruled that a parent does not have unfettered discretion to impose visitation conditions at their whim where grandparents have played such an important historic role for children.
The Law Concerning Grandparent Visitation
This decision does an excellent job in reviewing and cleaning up California decisions about grandparent visitation in the wake of
Troxel v. Granville (2000) 530 U.S. 57, decided by the United States Supreme Court almost twelve years ago. Like
Troxel,
this case involves a grandparent, whose adult child has died, seeking visitation with that child's minor children over the objection of their surviving parent. As noted by Justice Richli, who wrote the opinion for our local Riverside County based appellate division, Troxel commands the courts to presume that the surviving parent's objection to grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the children. "However, this does not mean that the surviving parent is free to use the denial of visitation as Big Bertha in his or her personal war with the grandparent." Here, the trial court found that the surviving parent's claimed reasons for objecting to visitation were not reasonable and not credible; in essence, as he practically admitted on the stand, he objected to visitation mainly
to spite the grandparent. Moreover, he admitted that grandparent visitation would be in the best interest of the children. Thus, the presumption that he was acting in the best interest of his children was overcome, and the trial court constitutionally could and did grant the grandparent's visitation petition.
The trial court understood the law to be that it could constitutionally apply section 3102, including its best-interest test, provided the father was either (1) unfit, or (2) "opposed to occasional visitation." It expressly found that he was a fit parent. It concluded that "the issue really turns on whether dad is opposed to occasional visitation. If he is, then the court then addresses what visitation, if any, is in the children's best interest." It found that the father was "opposed [to] any . . . reasonable visitation involving the children and grandma." Thus, it proceeded to apply a standard best-interest test.
The father challenged this reasoning by arguing that the trial court erred by finding that he was opposed to meaningful visitation. Second, even assuming that he was opposed to meaningful visitation, he was still entitled to a presumption that his decision was in the best interest of the children.
The justices in this case stated:
"In Troxel, the surviving parent's willingness to allow visitation was just one of a number of factors that the Supreme Court took into account. Thus, the significance of this single factor, standing alone, is not at all clear. We have no way of knowing what the outcome would have been if the surviving parent had
not been willing to offer meaningful visitation.
On one hand, the Troxel plurality cited, with approval, various state statutes allowing courts to award visitation to a nonparent when a parent has denied visitation; it evidently viewed these as constitutional. (
Troxel,
supra, 530 U.S. at pp. 71-72 [plur. opn.].) On the other hand, it adopted a broad 'presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.' (
Id. at p. 68.) It would seem that this should apply not only to a decision to limit visitation, but also to a decision to deny visitation entirely.
In fact, Troxel's discussion of willingness to allow visitation puts the parent in a 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' position. If the parent voluntarily allows some visitation, that could be viewed as a concession that visitation is in the best interest of the child. Certainly it is a decision regarding the child's best interest, to which the court must {Slip Opn. Page 15} accord 'special weight.' If, however, the parent refuses to allow
any visitation voluntarily, that, too, weighs in
favor of court-ordered visitation. What is a parent who genuinely believes that visitation would be detrimental supposed to do?
Because this issue is fraught with difficulty, we choose to assume - solely for the sake of argument - that the trial court erred by ruling that it was free to apply a best-interest test solely because the father was not willing to offer meaningful visitation voluntarily. This would mean that it was still required to presume that the father's visitation determination was in the best interest of the children and to accord special weight to that determination.
The trial court's other findings, however, show that, even if it had applied this standard, it would still have allowed visitation. Most crucially, it found that the father's claimed reasons for objecting to visitation were not reasonable and not credible. This left, as his real reason, a desire to retaliate against the grandmother for her attempt to take the children away from him. Indeed, he testified that he was contesting visitation because she had breached his trust by trying to take the children away from him, and she had been 'disrespectful' to him. We hasten to add that this is a completely understandable reaction. Nevertheless, it is not based on the best interest of the children. To the contrary,
it punishes the children for the sins of the grandmother. [Emphasis added].
Moreover, in closing argument, the father's counsel conceded that visitation with the grandmother would be in the best interest of the children. He merely argued that
court-ordered visitation would be detrimental. Thus, the trial court did not simply disagree with the father concerning the best interest of his children. Moreover, it did not fail to give sufficient weight to his determination of their best interest. Rather, based on its findings (and his concession), the presumption that his visitation determinations were in the best interest of the children was thoroughly overcome.
Evidently the father's counsel was trying to achieve the same outcome as in Kyle O. The father there, too, admitted that visitation with the grandparents was in his daughter's best interest and claimed that he would allow visitation voluntarily. He testified, however, that
court-ordered visitation was detrimental because it increased the hostility between him and the grandparents. (
Kyle O. v. Donald R.,
supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at pp. 858-859, 863-864.) He also introduced evidence that court-ordered visitation had interfered with the child's opportunities to spend time with him and her paternal relatives and that it conflicted with her other activities. (
Id. at pp. 857-858.) The appellate court concluded that "his preference for a less structured and more normal and spontaneous manner of visitation must be given deference." (
Id. at p. 863.)
Kyle O. is distinguishable, however, because here, the father (and his counsel) never really explained
why he objected to court-ordered visitation, even though he was supposedly willing to allow visitation voluntarily. When asked, he simply raised objections to the existing temporary visitation
schedule. For example, he claimed that the Wednesday evening visit prevented him from "study[ing]" with the children.
This was not an objection to court-ordered visitation.
In this appeal, the father claims that it was reasonable for him to be opposed to court-ordered visitation, as opposed to voluntary visitation, because the grandmother had 'a pattern of hostility' toward him. He argues that, unlike voluntary visitation, court-ordered visitation would give her a stick to beat him with - any time he violated an order, she would undoubtedly seek sanctions against him.
The problem with this argument is that the father himself never testified, at trial, that this was
why he opposed court-ordered visitation. Thus, the trial court did not have to accept this theory.
The father also argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his concerns about whether the children would be safe with the grandmother. The trial court, however, specifically found that these concerns were neither reasonable nor credible. Substantial evidence supports this finding. The supposed molestation was remote; it had occurred when the uncle was about 12 and mother was about 5. It was described as 'improper[] touch[ing];' the grandmother characterized it as 'playing doctor.' The children had stayed at the uncle's house for over a month without being molested. In any event, by the time of trial, the grandmother was no longer living with the uncle. The trial court could and did order that the children not be left alone with him.
The grandmother's drug use was similarly remote. Her loss of custody, although due, in part, to her use of drugs, had been only temporary. It did not appear that she had ever used drugs again. Last, but not least, again, the father admitted that visitation was in the best interest of the children and claimed that he was willing to allow visitation voluntarily.
Next, the father argues that the trial court erroneously placed the burden on him to prove that his objections to visitation were in the best interest of the children. Not so. He does not cite any portion of the record to support his claim, and we have found none.
Finally, the father argues that even if the trial court did not err by allowing some visitation, it erred by adopting a more extensive visitation schedule than he was willing to offer. He does not support this argument, however, with any analysis or citation of authority. Accordingly, we deem it forfeited....
We do not mean to suggest that, if not forfeited, it would have merit. The trial court found that the father's objections to visitation did not arise out of a genuine concern for the best interest of the children. Thus, the constitutionally established presumption that he was acting in the best interest of the children was overcome. This not only allowed but affirmatively required the trial court to determine what visitation schedule was in the best interest of the children.
* * * The father argues that ... the trial court could not order visitation unless and until he had been given an opportunity to negotiate visitation voluntarily.
He had such an opportunity, however, in the course of the guardianship, as well as in this action. He even participated in mediation (which regrettably produced no agreement). According to the father, however, a grandparent must ask the surviving parent for a voluntary visitation arrangement before the grandparent can even file a visitation petition with the court. Thus, in his view, the fact that he had an opportunity to negotiate a voluntary visitation arrangement after this proceeding had already been filed is irrelevant. We find no authority for this in Troxel or
Punsly. Indeed,
Punsly is, if anything, to the contrary. It understood
Troxel to mean that "the parent must be given an opportunity to voluntarily negotiate a visitation plan," but it added that it was "irrelevant" when or why the parent did so.
(Punsly v. Ho,
supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1108.) Moreover, it held that, in the case before it, this requirement had been satisfied by the parent's agreement 'to voluntarily arrange visitation . . .
both before and after the [
grandparents]
petitioned the court for visitation.' (
Ibid., italics added.)
The father argues that it would be good public policy to make a request for voluntary visitation a precondition to filing a visitation petition. Even if so, this is an argument that must be made, if at all, to the Legislature. Section 3102 contains no such requirement, and the federal Constitution, as construed in Troxel, does not impose one."
Comments
Commissioner McCoy did an outstanding job in making a thorough and well-reasoned decision based upon the evidence. To resist visitation by a grandparent who has a close and substantial relationship with grandchildren, there needs to be real evidence in the record that the children's best interests in continuing, stable relationships with these third party nonparents, are not being ignored simply out of spite.
This case is a must read for all grandparents, or custodial parents, faced with a grandparent or other request for visitation rights by a non-parent. I will upload the opinion itself in a few weeks. It gives rich fodder for how to structure arguments on both sides in these often acrimonious, but always unfortunate, disputes.
However, as it turns out, this decision is not the final answer on the matter. I will discuss the more recent case of Rich v. Thatcher, out of Ventura County, shortly. But, this is not the Ventura "Thatchers", is it?
Please note that this decision is based upon Family Code section 3102, which only applies where one parent has died. The other grandparent visitation statutes are Family Code section 3103 and
FC section 3104. I would suspect, however, that this case will nonetheless generalize, to an extent that remains to be seen, to grandparent visitation where both parents are still living.
Thurman Arnold, III, CFLS
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| August 16, 2011 |
| Thurman Arnold Comments Featured in August, 2011, CALIFORNIA LAWYER MAGAZINE |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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We are pleased to announce that Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S. was interviewed for the August, 2011, publication of California Lawyer addressing the consequences of the Elkins changes to California family law - something that we have written about extensively on this website.
My hope for you is that you may avoid exactly the types of disastrous financial consequences that the Elkins Amendments may cause to divorce litigants, not to mention the usual (financial and emotional) cost of high-conflict divorce litigation to parties and their families and children!
Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.
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| May 29, 2011 |
| Announcing the Launch of LAFMS - DIVORCE and FAMILY LAW MEDIATION in Los Angeles and Beverly Hills! |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, Mediator |
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I Am Pleased to Announce the Launch of
LOS ANGELES FAMILY MEDIATION SERVICES
Mediators and Co-Mediators Serving the Greater Los Angeles Area
Some of you may know that within the Coachella Valley, I am a founding member of Desert Family Mediation Services (DFMS).
On May 26, 2011, the DFMS Team launched Los Angeles Family Mediation Services, a full-service mediation practice consisting of legal expert family law mediators and mental health professional co-mediators. LAFMS is located in Beverly Hills, but has offices in Los Angeles as well.
The principal team members working out of Los Angeles are:
- Retired Family Court Judge Gretchen W. Taylor
- Renowned Psychologist Dr. Jane Ellen Shatz
I am available to serve mediation parties in the Los Angeles area as well, for selected cases.
We are proud and pleased to come together as a team of highly trained and motivated professionals, with over 100 years of combined family law and therapeutic experience, in an effort to provide a positive alternative to traditional divorce warfare.
We believe we can be part of your solution!
Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S./Divorce Mediator
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| May 03, 2011 |
| San Diego Trial Court REVERSED (Again) in MOVE-AWAY Case |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, C.F.L.S. |
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Parental Relocations and Move-Away
In response to a recent article I posted about the case of F.T. vs. L.J., the mother of the Mother in
Mark T. vs. Jaime Z. submitted a comment about a new reversal of a case involving Judge Lisa C. Schall, in San Diego, on this Blog - for which I thanked her. I am grateful that family law litigants in these published appeals are increasingly airing their side of the experience here, and I invite you to as well!
The decision in her daughter's case was published on Friday, last week, so I now understand what the maternal grandmother, "Shelly," was referencing.
My sense is that appellate courts are expecting more out of trial judges, like never before, and lawyers too, to be sure, and therapists and court services personnel and litigants themselves! An interesting footnote is that the father's attorneys in this case were certified family law specialists, and (presumably) local San Diego heavyweights, and the mother represented herself and yet succeeded "against all odds." Is this an Elkins Aftermath, leveling the playing field for unrepresented parties against experienced adversaries?
Mark T. and Jamie Z. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1115
In
Mark T. v. Jamie Z.
certified for publication on April 28, 2011 by the Fourth Appellate District, a San Diego trial court was again reversed in a move-away case where she effectively refused to permit a custodial parent to move out of state without addressing what custody orders should issue if the parent did move. In F.T. vs. L.J. it was the Father who wanted to relocate - here it was the Mother but in both cases it was the same judicial officer.
Judge Lisa C. Schall doesn't like move-aways, it appears. These applications challenge the non-moving parent and can negatively impact a child's access to that parent, and disrupt parent-child bonding, if a holistic parenting plan under the move-away regime is not developed.
Judge Schall bears the indignity of being reversed twice now in less than 30 days in a reported appellate decision - quite a scolding. Family law is damned tough for judicial officers, who are doing their best to protect children and weigh in consistently with the cutting edge policies of current mental health science as well as their in-house (FCS) advisors. The problem at present is that the opinions of MHP's (mental health providers), and the wisdom of the reviewing courts, are in conflict. The science of move-away as it affects families from the MHP perspective is still developing, and it collides with certain cherished assumptions the law makes about the rights of Americans, and specifically parents in California under our current statutory scheme (
see Family Code section 7501 and the
Burgess case) to move freely.
In both cases Judge Schall accepted (mostly) the independent opinions of outside, court-appointed, mental health forensics and ignored the opinions of the Family Court Services mediator - here the very same Lynne Waldman who made recommendations in the F.T. case. FCS mediator Waldman's belief was that Jamie's move away request should be granted, noting that Jamie had been L.'s primary caretaker since his birth, that Jamie had been unable to find a job in San Diego and was "living in poverty," and that Jamie appeared "to have a clear plan for the move."
Judge Schall now has two strikes against her for using judicial body language to create a result that she felt was fair and appropriate, and her findings on the record illustrate her dilemma. I'm reminded of my early youth playing pool (not so much) and hoping if I twisted my body hard enough, the ball would fall in the pocket. Most of us are doing the best we can. Trial judges, however, have a script they must follow.
In effect, Judge Schall's mistake was to refuse to permit a move-away by a Mom with a 22 month old child who had indeed been the child's "primary caretaker since birth." By effectively coercing Mom not to move by denying her move-away request, and by ignoring the question of "in whose custody" the child's best interests were served" or what arrangement should be imposed were Mom to move, Judge Schall committed reversible error. The justices ruled:
"The court must decide de novo what physical custody arrangement would be in the child's best interests,
assuming that the requesting parent will relocate
." Therapist Dr. Lori Love (we can't invent this name stuff) was appointed to evaluate the family for the Court and opined that "[t]his examiner understands the importance of having extended family around for support however this cannot be justified as being in [L.'s] best interest[s] when it means removing him from a loving and capable father. Jamie stated that she did not have an active father in her life and very much wants that to happen for [L.] It would be virtually impossible for Mark to be an active father from across the country." Dr. Love urged the child was too young for the move and went on to recommend that Mom not "be permitted to move out of the County of San Diego. At the same time, this forensic therapist was unwilling to recommend a primary change in custody and assumed that the mother would in fact remain the primary caretaker in San Diego county. She made no recommendations about what custodial arrangement should become effective when or if the Mother moved.
The appellate justices ruled: "Where, as here, a parent who shares joint custody of a minor makes a request to relocate the child in the context of an initial custody determination, the trial court must decide de novo what physical custody arrangement would be in the child's best interests. In making its custody determination,
the court must proceed on the assumption that the parent who is making the request will relocate his or her own residence,
regardless of whether the court grants or denies the request. In this case, the court erroneously failed to conduct its best interests analysis based on the presumption that Jamie would be relocating to Minnesota."
The trial court adopted the recommendations of Dr. Love, even though Dr. Love failed to address what should happen if and when Jamie relocates out of state. "The very issue that Dr. Love was supposed to address is what parenting plan would be in L.'s best interests,
given that Jamie intended to move to Minnesota
....
The court misapplied the law in adopting Dr. Love's recommendations, because in making those recommendations, Dr. Love incorrectly assumed that preserving the status quo parenting arrangement was an option, even in the face of Jamie's expressed intent to move...."
At trial the Father's attorney asked Mother whether she would move if the court were to deny her request to relocate, and Mom's response showed she was tortured by the question. The appellate court ruled that this question by counsel was improper - courts cannot consider whether the primary parent might alter their plan of relocate depending upon how the court rules. As a trial lawyer this is interesting to me, because this question is often used to telegraph a message to the Court that implies it can deny the move because the moving parent evidently doesn't want to move 'badly enough.'
Apparently the trial court suspected Mother's motives for moving might include frustrating Father's access, but the court did not actually make such findings. "The court's comments regarding Jamie's reasons for moving to Minnesota appear to constitute second-guessing as to the wisdom of Jamie's decision to move (i.e., questioning the "necessity" of the relocation), as opposed to a finding that her decision to move was made 'simply to frustrate the noncustodial parent's contact with the minor child.'" There is no requirement that a parent who has the right to custody of a child establish the necessity of a proposed move. "[E]ven where the court finds that a move away request is being made in bad faith, the court must view this finding as only one potential factor in deciding whether to allow the child's residence to be moved; it does not permit the court to deny the move away request on the presumption that in denying the request, the court can assure that the requesting parent will not in fact move, and that the court can thereby maintain the status quo parenting arrangement. That one parent may have been motivated, in part, to relocate the child's residence by a desire to lessen the child's contact with the other parent does not mean that the court should apply any standard other than what would be in the best interests of the child."
The Bottom Line
If a parent with the right of custody seeks to relocate with a child and there is no final custody decree then in existence, the trial court must determine what the new custodial arrangement should be based upon the child's best interests under these new circumstances. The court cannot substitute its wisdom for that of the moving parent, or refuse a move simply because it disagrees with the parent's reasoning for leaving. Even if it finds the moving parent is moving to frustrate visitation with the other parent, that is but one factor among several affecting the child's best interest and it is not itself sufficient, without more, to change custody.
Judges cannot refuse to permit the child to move in the hopes of coercing the parent into staying locally instead. It is improper for judges and lawyers to ask moving parents whether they would still move if they lost custody, or to even consider this question. This means that it is similarly improper for outside evaluators to ask or consider the question either, or to report any such answer (or an opinion about what the answer might be) to the Court.
Most important, recommending therapists and family court services personnel must evaluate and render an opinion about what is in the child's best interest, and specifically what a parenting plan should look like, by taking it as granted that the parent who wants to move really will move. Otherwise, they've wasted everybody's time and money no matter how good their intentions or how firmly they feel about the current mental health literature, or their own clinical experience, concerning the negative effects of move-away.
The issue to be decided in move-aways is not whether a parent can move, but what the custody and visitation arrangement should be assuming the move will occur, once they announce that they intend to relocate.
There is something implicit here that suggests that once everybody agrees that the moving parent is the better prime time parent, the move must be approved (again, the real question is "who should have custody" not whether the move is to be "allowed") and the inquiry then shifts to what the remaining parent's visitation shall be.
Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S.
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| April 18, 2011 |
| Announcing Rattlesnake Season as Officially Open in Palm Springs!~ |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Greetings all -
For those of you who live in the desert cities of Southern California, including the Mojave Desert, I am pleased to announce that rattlesnake season has officially opened! Well, "pleased" might be an overstatement.
I live in a part of Palm Springs that fronts the San Jacinto Wilderness and San Gabriel mountains. Every year about this time I find those little slithery critters in my garage, on my porch, or am called to my neighbor's homes to help capture and relocate these little rep's, whom I hesitate to call invaders (I imagine that there is much discussion in rattlesnake warrens about the human invaders). They seem most active after five (cocktail hour?) or in the early mornings - hiker's and dogs beware (seriously, keep your dogs leashed - I know, I have a Jack Russell Terrorist)!
Why do my neighbors call me? They believe I won't get bitten (professional courtesy possibly?)
Truth be told, rattlesnakes are extremely passive creatures unless we are talking about the green mojave version, which is a rattlesnake on steroids. Fortunately the greens are not generally found in my locale. I've encountered them in Arizona (near Sedona) and was impressed by their aggressive behaviors. The local varieties just want to get along with us, but their timidity also makes them dangerous - it is easy not to spot one until you are upon it. Even then they will not go out of their way to strike. Many times I've been forced to wrangle one into a trash can or ice chest that is then carried a few hundred yards from the house and released, and rarely do they attempt to bite the pole that guides them into such receptacles.
I shouldn't need to state that killing them is not an option, and is an ignorant thing to do. However, much like the attack behaviors that people often reflexively engage in at the commencement of their divorce or partnership break-up, the limbic part of the brain does tend to go into reactive over-drive when surprised by one of these creatures.
If you cross paths with one, some recommendations are as follows:
- Secure your pets. Allowing your dog to watch you catch a snake will cause your animal to offer you unwanted assistance, and to encourage it to interact with the rattler the next time it finds one. Since snakes move slowly, many dogs will not notice them and so become deathly curious. However, if they learn that the scent of the snake means something to toy with then you've trained your dog to become a suicide bomber. This same point applies to children.
- Be alert this time of year. Scan the ground as you walk. If you are in the desert or on a trail, the obvious choice is to move on. If you are golfing, pay attention to the edges of the course where they front the desert. Do not poke at the snake, and do not toss stones or objects at it. Keep a healthy distance. Be attentive to insistent barks from your dog, as several years ago I heard Jake outside in the yard bark, bark, barking at something and after 5 or 10 minutes of this I finally got the message and found him several feet from a curled rattler. The first thing I did was grab my pup to carry him inside and closed off his ability to get back out until I'd carried the snake away outside of his view.
- Consider keeping your yard clear of debris or objects that make a good place for snakes to hide under or behind. I try to scan my yard visually as often as I can remember, and I want a clear view. I think one reason they like my garage, beside an easy entry under a door, is that rats and mice can sometimes be found there. Keep your ears open - rattlers are good at rattling. I've often heard them before seeing them, which is great if you like adrenaline rushes.
- If working in the yard, watch where you step and place your hands during this month window or so (and again in September/October). It is now breeding time, and the babies abound in the Fall. In the Palm Springs area the snakes tend to emerge with the first consistent hot weather usually beginning in late March and early April. I am on rattlesnake alert through May. They tend to become less frequently seen during the summer months, except in the early mornings or late evenings. I remember one camping trip in August to Organ Pipe in southern Arizona when I was taking pictures at dusk, only to suddenly notice there was a snake every fifteen feet or so (I slept outside on a cot that night, and awakened to observe a very large specimen 10 feet away crawling over a fallen saguaro - I was younger and more foolish then).
- If you find the snake some place where he is not only not welcome, but causes you a worry that unless he is transhipped elsewhere he will be lounging around, and assuming you are extremely cautious and not hyperventilating, capture him and carry him away if you are otherwise disposed to do so (i.e., not because I suggested this was a good idea). I use one of those extendable tree limb cutting poles with the large metal hook and the nearest deep container within reach - usually a trash can or ice chest with a lid, placed on its side as close to the snake as I can safely be (five feet). Rattlers want to get away from you and will wind their way into these, where they will coil at the bottom. With the pole I can hook the snake mid-body and drag it into the can. Better to avoid the snake altogether, but I'm not about to leave one in my garage or in the yard. At the same time, if you don't know what you are going to do and don't already have the tools to do it with, this may not be a good solution. Forget those nature shows where people capture rattlers and stick them in burlap bags. Never let your hands or feet closer than five feet or so (a rule I often break). Conventional wisdom says they can strike up to half their body length.
- Another option is to keep an eye on the critter and call someone for assistance.
- If you wrestle one into a container, resist the impulse to peer into it at close range.
- Now you have the problem of what to do with it. If you are in a residential area consider calling animal control. Don't put it on the back seat of your SUV for a trip to a safe unloading zone. In my case, I can walk a hundred yards or so and flip the box on its side and dump the snake out. I've yet to (knowingly) bump into the same snake again.
Now, rattlesnakes are really common in areas that are rocky or abut the desert. Around Palm Springs these areas include Chino Hills, the Mesa, Araby, and south Palm Springs around the Canyon Country Club. Expect to encounter one at almost anytime now in the Indian Canyons. You are not nearly as likely to see one in a highly residential area. But if you live on the edge of the desert, sooner or later you will meet one close up.
Here is yesterday's round-up (found inside my neighbor's house):
Okay, this little guy looks just like the granite rocks and yellow weeds
that dot the local landscape -
here's a closer look:
Yesterday (4/16/11)
Other Rattlers I've Met -
2010 Garage
Move-Away from Neighbor's House 2009
And Surrounding Environs 2007
And some I've not met,...
~ Be careful out there and protect your pets! (And bathe them too!) ~
Jake Arnold
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| March 14, 2011 |
| FAMILY LAW SANCTIONS and DUE PROCESS: Santa Barbara Trial Court Reversed in IRMO DURIS |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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Visitors to my websites know that I am biased in favor of mediation, believing that parties to litigation involving their family should opt to resolve their disputes themselves rather than undertake the perils of having a judge, or anyone else, decide their matters for them. This includes mediators (whose role is not to decide your issues for you but to facilitate you finding solutions). However, I admit that sometimes this doesn't seem possible. Too often one or both parties are reacting so deeply to their hurt or resentment and spinning with angry, busy minds that they perceive family court as the killing field for their unresolved conflict - a public forum for the spectacle of flogging the other side.
A recent reported decision illustrates the financial waste that occurs in high conflict family court battles, where there are no winners and only losers. My remarks are not intended to convince you to hire me, or to impugn judges whom I contend are struggling valiantly to protect children and mete out justice as best they can within a system that is not equipped to cope with the multi-dimensional challenges of emotional divorce and its aftermath: The trial judges are not broken, but the framework for government sponsored attempts to regulate the processes of divorce and domestic partnership dissolution is. Nor should it be read as an indictment of divorce lawyers or any particular barrister. An adversary model for resolving family disputes guarantees that the experience of everyone connected with these cases will be ... adversarial. Surprise!
In the meantime appellate justices are stepping forth to triage for the litigants, their attorneys, and the lower courts. But is it realistic to expect lawyers (in that small relative percentage of domestic cases where people can afford them) or judges to not be swept into the reactive thinking that the parties' disputes are personifying? I say "no". Our brains are hard-wired to respond to conflict in predictable ways. While we all ought to conduct our affairs in increasingly enlightened and ethical ways, and lawyers and judges surely benefit by incorporating the wisdom of the mental health sciences, a legal and cultural framework grounded in adversarial processes can never escape them. How could it be otherwise?
Marriage of Duris & Urbany
On March 14, 2011, the Second Appellate District (Division Six) reversed Santa Barbara trial judge Colleen K. Sterne's decision to discipline a self-represented litigant (an unemployed attorney) for, among other things, her earlier attorney's tactics in filing a motion to compel document production evidently without first attempting to resolve the disagreement informally. Discovery motions generate large fees and consume valuable judicial resources.
At the end of the hearing on Wife's original requests (the custody and support modification request she'd filed eight months earlier), the trial court imposed $10,000 in attorney fee sanctions against the Wife. Husband's attorney had evidently suggested that the Court do this somewhere in his Reply paperwork, and reiterated the request in his closing argument. The trial court took the bait. Its ruling was found to be an abuse of discretion.
According to the Husband, by the time of the hearing on original OSC to modify custody and support he had spent $25,000 for fees. Wife probably spent a similar but slightly lesser amount since she was in pro per for many months. Their fees and costs for the appeal probably were $20,000 more apiece (but Mr. Urbany handled his own appeal). Husband will get none of his money back, and Wife will recover only a portion of hers. Neither will achieve an emotionally satisfying resolution and their matter likely obsessed their lives over the year and a half. This case is "a pox on both your houses."
Wife's former attorney, Jacqueline Misho, was hired some six months into the proceedings, initiated when the Wife filed a motion for "100% physical and legal custody" of the parties' two children, plus more child support. Attorney Misho took an aggressive stance in advancing her client's claims and filed a discovery motion to compel production of documents. This was unsuccessful. The attorney was then let go. A week later the Wife's custody motion was heard. Although sanctions against her had not been requested by way of a noticed motion (possibly because there was little time in which to file one), Husband urged that she should pay his attorney fees. At hearing end when Judge Sterne announced her intent to hit Wife with $10,000 in sanctions as a share of the Husband's costs in part based upon the prior discovery motion filed by Misho, Wife complained "How am I being penalized for hiring [Misho]? How was I supposed to know? I thought she was the best there was." In my experience, "the best there [is]" often means the meanest and toughest. Many family law attorneys advertise themselves in such a fashion.
I have no personal knowledge about either party's attorney beyond what Google searches of their names retrieve and what a review of the California State Bar website discloses. Both are reputed to be tenacious divorce litigators. The problem with vociferous advocacy, irrespective whether it occurred in this case or not, is that it tends to generate a story of its own and so to increase the conflict noise volume - I confess I know this from my own past personal experiences. It can infect the process - there is something of a reciprocal feedback loop that occurs between high conflict litigants and their attorneys that is difficult to resist. Sometimes it seems to be the only choice, but usually that justification is borne of the tensions within the conflict itself and is not necessarily true.
Family law litigation becomes particularly nasty when attorneys for each side compete to inflame the trial judge with sound bite characterizations about the other. Some clients demand this from their counsel or become quite perturbed if their advocate doesn't respond in kind to these sorts of attacks. Lawyers who are being paid large sums are pressured to speak their client's minds (read: resentments) or risk a loss of confidence by their client. Of greater concern to the integrity of the legal professional generally, there are many family law attorneys whose entire strategy is geared around slandering the other litigant (or their attorney), often by exaggerating or misrepresenting the facts or history of the case solely as a means of confusing the judge or just plain pissing the court off in the hope of creating a favorable bias. Tit for tat then threatens to overwhelm the process. This sort of behavior can include ignoring the procedural rules for raising the issues to be decided, which is a form of ambush that can be effective exactly because the answering party is unable respond to an oncoming train if there is no forewarning.
I am not saying that this was either attorney's conduct in Duris as I lack sufficient details to make a full assessment; instead I am pointing out that adversary litigation programs lawyers and unrepresented parties to use whatever tactics that might work, and sometimes to try them all. This seems to be viewed as not only within the standard of care for zealous advocacy but to be required by that standard. I can comment that one irony of this case is that while the Wife's attorney allegedly failed to act in a cooperative manner in choosing to file a motion to compel without first attempting to solve the argument informally, Husband's attorney seized upon that misstep to buttress a request for sanctions that was never properly placed before the court. Sometimes these sound bites do stick; they did here, at least with Judge Sterne. Unfortunately, under these rules of engagement lawyers are thus encouraged to act as badly as the talking heads we see arguing on many 'news' programs, something that the American public views as a form of 'entertainment.'
This is one of the many dangers of adversarial litigation. Both sides feel righteously indignant, and attorneys tend to internalize their client's upset so that the boundaries between the client's experience and the attorney's own blurs. It is a recipe for disaster, but understandable given that emotional and angry ex-spouse pressure-cookers are letting out steam on both sides of the table all at once.
The appellate court's decision doesn't give us sufficient facts to discern whether the mother's initial application was well-merited, but Judge Sterne's decision suggests she did not view mom's motives (or her attorney's decision-making) to be in good faith. Wife's request for 100% custody looks to be retaliatory and frankly when this is true - and too often it is, even if not here (Judge Sterne referred to Wife's prior discovery motion as a "fee sink") - trial courts need to discourage such conduct in strong ways, especially when it generates unnecessary fees for the other party or damages children. Some people only respond to monetary slaps. I can merely speculate about these proceedings without reviewing the trial briefs and reporter's transcripts, and emphasize that reading 'between the lines' cannot give the whole picture.
Still this is a published decision of the 2nd Appellate District. Following on the heals of Marriage of Fong released for publication on March 3, 2011, these decisions, along with
Marriage of Tharp, should be read together to glean the larger message. Reviewing courts are holding everyone accountable - litigants, attorneys, and bench officers. Due process and fundamental fairness require every side to cross their own t's and dot their own i's. This is welcome instruction to the entire spectrum of family court members and participants.
Be Careful What You Ask For,
and Consider Asking for Something Different
However inappropriate Ms. Duris' conduct may have been (if at all), the appellate justices ruled that due process required that she be informed in advance that the court was considering sanctions in order to have an opportunity to muster and present evidence in opposition. Husband's request for relief should have been properly placed before the Court and not have been based upon offhand arguments buried somewhere in his reply pleadings or first presented in closing argument. This is a good thing. Last year's Elkins legislation spotlights the public policy goal of ensuring transparency for self-represented and represented family law contestants alike.
Now, eighteen months later the odyssey is not yet ended - the Sterne decision is sent back to the trial court (not likely to be Judge Sterne, who can be disqualified as the judge on the next go-round) "with instructions to conduct a new hearing with proper notice." In other words, to relitigate whether sanctions should be assessed against the Wife.
In the meantime, she is awarded her costs on appeal. No appellate case costs only $10,000, the amount in controversy that led to this appeal. Hence, Husband - who won a short-lived victory at the trial court level - will now likely end up footing not only the bill for his trial attorney, but the Wife's attorney fees on appeal as well (be careful what your attorney asks for!) The saga can be now rebooted. Might it end differently this go-around? I'd wager (and I hope) the parties have had enough and that will agree that Wife will forego her appellate costs while Husband will waive a second sanction's motion. But divorce trance is stubborn stuff.
There are only losers in Marriage of Duris. The children of these two warring parents seem utterly forgotten. The take away is that using California court judges to beat up the person you now find despicable (who then smacks back) may blow up in the face of each contestant; given that people often view justice from the lens of their own desires it is a small wonder that government regulated divorce hasn't found a way to respond to such expectations, and possibly never will until the entire system is jettisoned and recreated.
In the meantime try a different tact, if you wish it and if you can. Work together to resolve your disputes collaboratively or through mediation. Even if the other side seems incorrigible, you determine how you respond. Remember, litigation induces trance - seek equanimity and send your kids to college instead!
Here is a link to Marriage of Duris & Urbany.
Thurman W. Arnold, III, CFLS
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| March 05, 2011 |
| SANCTIONS For Failure to Complete the FINAL DECLARATION OF DISCLOSURE |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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The Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure
I've recently blogged the importance of complying with Family Code section 2103 and
section 2104, which obligate both parties to a pending dissolution, legal separation, or annulment proceeding to exchange a preliminary declaration of disclosure using Judicial Council Forms FL-140, FL-141 and FL-142 (please see our Form Library for the PDF's]. Its purpose is to ensure a "full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties may have an interest" and it is a prerequisite to successfully performing one's fiduciary obligations in the course of such proceedings. The exchange is supposed to occur "early on" in the proceedings, whatever that means.
No case can be settled and a marital termination agreement or stipulated judgment cannot be accepted by the court clerk for filing or transmittal to a judge for signature unless both parties have exchanged their PDD's. There is a single exception where the other party does not appear in the action (i.e., file a Response and pay the fees) and so the case is resolved by way of a "default judgment." Moreover, where both litigants have formally appeared and either wants to move the case to a trial status so that it can finally be resolved (where for instance agreement is not occurring), a settlement conference or trial date will not be set by the court unless both parties have each complied with the preliminary declaration exchange and have first filed proof of that with the court.
However, beyond simply concluding your case, there are other extremely important consequences for failing to do your half of the heavy lifting in terms of identifying and attempting to value all community and separate property assets by way of PDD. In my practice I find that many client's resent the work that completing these documents entails, and yet there is no way around it. Inadequate or inaccurate disclosure declarations can create grounds for the other party to attempt months or even years later to set aside a judgment or settlement agreement. They can form the basis for breach of fiduciary duty claims. They must be dealt with in good faith. They are critical documents that must not be treated casually.
The Final Declaration of Disclosure
However, there is an arguably greater obligation that is addressed by what is called the Final Declaration of Disclosure. This is a second and final disclosure that is required in all dissolution or similar proceedings, assuming it is not waived by both parties by agreement (not a good idea for reasons I will separately blog). Where the case winds its way to trial on any aspect of it, the Final Declaration cannot be waived and it must be served prior to trial. Family Code section 2105 governs what it must contain and when it can be avoided. It is even more burdensome to fill out and comply with because supporting documents must be attached and it has to bring current all of the information regarding community and separate property not just as of the date of separation or at the time the PDD was filed, but also up to the date that it is prepared.
Based upon an Second District appellate decision issued March 3, 2011 entitled Marriage of Fong, other consequences for disclosure noncompliance are now apparent. The Fongs are one of those unfortunate couples where one or both parties seem conflicted enough that they will litigate on for years that exceed the entire length of their marriage.
Family Code section 2107 authorizes courts to award monetary sanctions for failing to comply with the disclosure obligations. It is often used in conjunction with a request for attorney fee sanctions under
Family Code section 271.
In the Fong case the trial court hit the husband with $200,000 in non attorney fee sanctions under section 2107(c) for "breach of fiduciary duties" relating to nondisclosures in the property declarations, among other things, and heaped on an additional $100,000 in fees and costs per section 271 because it concluded that his side engaged in discovery gamesmanship. Wife had contended that Husband had failed to comply with his statutory disclosure obligations regarding his assets, that he failed to respond to formal discovery, and that at trial he surprised her with documents he'd failed to earlier provide despite requests for them. Husband's alleged behavior is not unusual in high conflict divorce litigation, and so it is important that an aggrieved party, possibly like the Wife in this case, have a meaningful remedy.
Unfortunately, Wife had waited three years from the date the action was filed to serve her Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure, and at the time of the trial that led to these sanctions against the Husband (seven years after the case began) she still had not prepared and served her Final Declaration of Disclosure. Lawyers for "out-spouses" sometimes delay completing the FDD because they fear that they lack sufficient information to do them properly and so are reluctant to have those documents completed and so held against their clients as "judicial admissions" (statements under oath in the pleading files) until later in the proceedings - after they've first gotten the disclosures from the "in-spouse" who probably controls all the information.
In the first reported California appellate decision squarely construing compliance with FC section 2105 together with 2107 sanction's requests, the Second District reversed the trial court's award under section 2107. I can only guess that Wife's efforts cost she and her attorneys between $500,000 and $1,000,000 in attorney fees.
The appellate court did uphold the sanctions award per Family Code section 271 for the $100,000. That part of the ruling is also important, but this blog will be way too long if I cover it here so I will write about it separately.
The Court determined that Wife's failure to have first served her Final Declaration of Disclosure before seeking sanctions by way of motion against the Husband, on the theory that he was himself out of compliance, deprived her of the right to complain. It interpreted section 2107(a) as permitting only a "complying party" to seek the sanction remedies. By the time of a trial on a motion for a sanctions for alleged disclosure misconduct, a party is not in compliance IF she has only served their PDD and therefore not entitled to maintain a sanctions' request.
This case reminds lawyers and parties that the California disclosure statutes mean what they say. It provides useful guidance to attorneys representing the disadvantaged spouse in terms of what they must do in getting their ducks in a row before going off half-cocked. IMHO. Both sides in a California family law case have equal burdens to meet their fiduciary duties. Please take them seriously.
Here is a link to Marriage of Fong.
Thurman W. Arnold, III, CFLS
www.PeacemakingDivorce.com
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| December 18, 2010 |
| Ontario, Canada Trial Court Finds PARENTAL ALIENATION - An Example of How Not To Behave! |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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A Cautionary Tale:
How Not to Run Your Separation and Custody Battle
Los Angeles Family Law Mediator Forrest S. Mosten recently shared this newsworthy trial court opinion with me, and it is making the rounds among listservs for Collaborative Lawyers who have an abiding desire to help others avoid exactly the sorts of behavior that certain high-conflict families generate, as are illustrated here to such a degree that a father has lost all contact with his daughter. I find that Christmas for some folks becomes a battling holiday, and I urge you to undertake a different path beginning today for your sake and those who depend upon you. This is a wonderful example of what to avoid at all costs.
On November 29, 2010, Judge J.W. Quinn issued a thoughtful and stinging rebuke of two parents behaving abominably in their dissolution and custody battle. This unfortunate family's case is entitled McQuat vs. McQuat. The court's ruling begins:
"Paging Dr. Freud. Paging Dr. Freud.
* * * This is yet another case that reveals the ineffectiveness of Family Court in a bitter custody/access dispute, where the parties require therapeutic intervention rather than legal attention. Here, a husband and wife have been marinating in a mutual hatred so intense as to surely amount to a personality disorder requiring treatment....
... [I]t is not surprising that Larry and Catherine are having problems, serious problems, regarding the custody of, and access to, their children. The source of the difficulties is hatred: a hardened, harmful, high-octane hatred. Larry and Catherine hate each other, as do Larry and Sam. This hatred has raged unabated since the date of separation. Consequently, the likelihood of an amicable resolution is laughable (hatred devours reason); and, a satisfactory legal solution is impossible (hatred has no legal remedy)."
The decision details allegations of multiple death threats between the parents, between the parents' relatives and the other parent, between the new spouses and the other parent, changed locks on the residence, assault by Van, interferences with visitation, interrogation of children about the other parent, threats of jail, and a stream of abusive texts and phone calls, arguments that the children should be separated and divided between the parents, alienating behaviors even after court mandated counseling sessions, and more.
The court found the mother's behavior to be the more problematic of the two - "Had [mother] fulfilled her dual parental duty to foster and encourage access between [dad] and [the child] and not to speak disparagingly of him in the presence of [the child], I am confident that this case would have unfolded differently." By the time of the trial the 13 year old daughter was so alienated from her father that the Court felt helpless to devise any remedy to repair the damage. It made the following findings:
"(1) The alienation was not present before Larry and Catherine separated; (2) This is not a case where Taylor [13 year old daughter] has weighed the good and bad attributes of her father and found him, on balance, to be parentally deficient: she sees Larry as all bad - there is no ambivalence to her feelings; she is not disguising her true feelings; (3) Larry, although well-intentioned, is an inept father, who has not taken steps to identify, and fix, his shortcomings as a parent; nevertheless, the utter rejection of him by Taylor is disproportionate, unfair and unwarranted; (4) . . . Taylor has aligned herself with Catherine whose hate for Larry is palpable; the battle lines are clearly drawn and Taylor knows the side that she wants to be on; (5) I am unable to think of anything that Larry can do to quickly repair the damage in his relationship with Taylor; and, if I could, I have doubts that he has the skill-sets to pull it off; (6) I did not hear evidence of a single instance of Taylor, since separation, expressing love or affection for Larry; (7) Although children are often required by their parents to do things that they do not want to do, obligating Taylor to visit her father or to engage in counseling is considerably more complicated than insisting that she do her homework or go to the dentist; (8) The history of the parties is such that there is no reason to think they would meaningfully take part in, or benefit from, therapy or counseling; (9) While it is Catherine's duty to encourage and support a relationship between Taylor and Larry, that duty has been breached too severely to be remedied by the court; (10) It is not realistic to expect that the parties have the incentive and finances to engage in the extensive therapy and counseling that are needed; (11) Depriving Catherine of custody (sometimes an appropriate way of dealing with an alienating parent) would not benefit Taylor at this point.
It is my view, sadly, that the alienation here is so severe that it is in the best interests of Taylor not to order or enforce access by Larry. If access happens, fine.
Without professional help, Larry is incapable of addressing the breakdown in his relationship with Taylor. Although, as I have said, well-intentioned, he is an ineffective parent and, without counseling and other assistance, he will remain ineffective. While Catherine, aided and abetted by Sam, initiated the alienation of father and daughter, Larry has not improved the situation. But, I emphasize the fundamental fact that Catherine's conduct is the sine qua non of the alienation.
Absent counseling, matters will worsen, not improve. No practical purpose would be served if the court were to decree a schedule of counseling for the parties and the children. The hate and psychological damage that now prevail would require years of comprehensive counseling to undo. The legal system does not have the resources to monitor a schedule of counseling (nor should it do so). The function of Family Court is not to change people, but to dispose of their disputes at a given point in time. I preside over a court, not a church.
Larry might consider some common-sense steps, such as cards, letters or gifts, to show that he is receptive to a relationship with Taylor should she have a change of heart. However, he would be wise to have those steps independently vetted by a responsible person (preferably, a professional in the child-psychology or family-counseling field)."
I often write about divorce insanity, and how reactivity and anger when relationships end sometimes disintegrates into a form of mutual trance that is humiliating to the parties and harmful to their children. It takes on a life of its own, and at its worse seems impossible to stop until it collides with the minimal standards that courts and governments impose upon families; even then that collision at best results in a court imposed outcome where much decision-making is stripped from the parents, and of course government cannot follow the parties home once they leave the courthouse. The conflict becomes a matter of public record, visible for all to see including strangers like us.
This case is a strong argument in favor of mediation or collaborative divorce, although the McQuats evidently were not likely candidates for such processes (ironically, they had a settlement agreement that called for mediation and yet both chose to ignore that promise).
I say "evidently" because I wonder whether their journey might have been redirected had they or someone intervened early on - their mediation provision offered that opportunity (although the husband challenged the entire agreement and the Court was first required to decide whether to set it aside before addressing whether mediation was enforceable). Judge Quinn pointedly found that "[t]he alienation was not present before Larry and Catherine separated." I see this is a clear statement that the parties' circumstances by the time of trial was a consequence of the post-separation and litigation experience, and not something that was otherwise inevitable had anyone considered de-escalating early on.
Their case is on the far end of the spectrum of dysfunction. Possibly you will read something here that will help you dial back similar conduct or impulses that the hurt part of you is considering, and to ring a bell for you that might cause you to consider an alternate route before your divorce begins to escalate. Perhaps you know someone in acute divorce crisis, and this cautionary tale will help motivate you to support them by encouraging them to behave differently than what their emotional upset drives them to do. Sadly for the McQuats, it appears their family members only served as boosters for their bad behavior. This family looks to be irretrievably broken, and while it is never too late there is a mountain to climb that was once merely a hill.
Thurman Arnold, CFLS
December 18, 2010
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| December 05, 2010 |
| ATTORNEY FEES In CUSTODY Cases: 2011 Family Code Amendments |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold III, CFLS |
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Along with other changes to the California Family Code brought about by the Elkins Committee's recommendations, Family Code section 3121 has been amended to make its language consistent with revised section 2030. Amended Family Code section 3121 is effective January 1, 2011.
Family Code section 3121 has always been more liberal than other attorney fees provisions in the California Family Code, but in my experience most lawyers, parties, and judges have acted like it did not exist. I have rarely seen an attorney argue for attorney fees under this section, probably because such arguments historically fell on deaf ears. That may be changing.
Section 3121 authorizes attorney fees in certain types of cases that are otherwise not mentioned in §2030, like paternity cases. It applies whenever custody is at issue.
An important difference between section 3121 and Family Code section 2030, besides the fact that 2030 deals with actions generally (dissolution, annulment, and legal separation) while 3121 is aimed at custody proceedings taking place in an OSC (Order to Show Cause) or NOM (Notice of Motion) format, is that attorney fee requests can be made "by an oral motion in open court" either at "the time of the hearing" or at any other time before entry of a judgment against a party whose default has been taken.
In other words, the request can be made without prior notice for the first time when the parties appear in court on a custody related application. However, I have never seen a Court willing to grant such an oral request, although clearly trial courts are directed to consider them. Possibly this will change, and certainly attorneys and parties seeking to get money to hire an attorney should be arguing the Elkins changes to stubborn judges. The likelihood that these judges will be reversed on appeal now for refusing to award fees to needy parties in appropriate cases is vastly improved beginning in 2011.
For more information about the grounds and procedures for seeking attorney fees in family law cases, please try my on-site search engine.
Thurman W. Arnold III, CFLS*
*State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization
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| December 03, 2010 |
| ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU! |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS |
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The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011.
It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners.
This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.
Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations. Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues. Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.
What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases." Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification:
"We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel. [Reference omitted]....
In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures. But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice. Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute. It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support....
Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function. If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."
Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented. Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions. Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants. Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court." Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.
The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011. Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217. It states:
"(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.
(b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.
(c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.
If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."
Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules. It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings. It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia.
It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully. The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere). There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at
www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true). Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court. Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise.
The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes. I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks. Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers.
December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.
T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization) |
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| October 20, 2010 |
| JAKE ARNOLD Turns SIX! |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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The Lost and the Found
[One Attorney's Path to Redemption]
__________
Unconditional love is something we humans yearn for,
but just endlessly.
The difficulties of relationship break up prove this to be true,
but only every time.
Animals, friends and family are not
merely a sanctuary
when we are all working well -
but a ready invitation for redemption
when we are not,
every, every day.
In this way
devotion
to special creatures,
like children,
animals
our inner child,
and you ...
teaches that not only can we carry on
- but how to.
Happy Birthday to Puppy Dog Jake
and to all the beings whom you hold dear....
and now Merry Christmas!
~T.W. Arnold~
Happy Christmas Time Holidays! |
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| October 18, 2010 |
| How Do I Get An Order for ATTORNEY FEES in a COMPLEX CASE? |
| Posted By Thurman Arnold |
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Q. My divorce seems like it has stalled. My wife operates our family business, we own several properties including a commercial building and she collects the rents, she isn't cooperating with me on custody on our kids, and I need money to pay my attorney. She is controlling this case, and I am getting nowhere. Any recommendations?
[Please note - this Blog is updated with a recent Blog Article detailing the 2011 Revisions to the California Family Code affecting attorney fee awards 12/9/10]
A. I frequently hear from people whose cases are "stalled" because they have no money to pay their attorney, and no money to hire forensic experts. It is a problem I face in my practice with certain clients. It takes money to develop your case, and if there is really none available it is difficult to get anyone to pay attention. Often there are assets that only one spouse controls. That spouse or RDP (registered domestic partner) usually claims those assets to be their "separate property" even when the claim is ridiculous (for instance, closely held stock issued as "their sole and separate property" when the vesting of title in their name alone during marriage was just their manipulation and you didn't agree to it).
When there are assets that exist there is much that you can do. These assets, whether they be allegedly separate or community, are available to be borrowed against, or sold, to raise money so you can pay your attorney and hire experts to do the work that must be done.
However, your attorney needs to understand how to accomplish this or find one who does. Specifically one method that works well is to have a referee appointed under Code of Civil Procedure section 639 to oversee a "case management plan" under the circumstances described in
Family Code section 2032(d).
Specifically, have your attorney ask the Court in a motion to make a finding that your case involves "complex or substantial issues of fact or law." These can be related to property rights, custody, visitation, and support and may include bifurcations of issues. If you don't have an attorney, this would still be a start to obtaining findings that will generate money to hire one.
Once the Court so designates your case, it will itself begin to implement a plan or assign someone else - like an outside lawyer whom the court recognizes as an expert, to make recommendations as a referee. While the Court is not obligated to follow the recommendations of these referees, they ususally do. And if they don't the court may find itself overturned on appeal as happened 10/1/10 in In Re Marriage of Tharp, a case I will be writing about in detail as time permits.
This is a major step in not only getting someone to look more closely at the attorney fees you need (judges, after all, have really limited time) but also a good way to jump start a stalled dissolution or other family law case.
BTW, under the new statutes that take effect in 2011 as a result of the Elkins Task Force recommendations, case management may become the norm in California in family law proceedings. TW Arnold 10/18/10 |
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