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Recent Posts in New Legislation and Statutes Category

November 10, 2011
  Proposed 2012 REVISIONS to JUDICIAL COUNCIL FORMS; ATTORNEY FEE REQUESTS
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Palm Springs Divorce and Family Law Attorney Mark D. Gershenson was kind enough to provide me the Family and Juvenile Law Advisory Committee Report to the Administrative Office of the Courts, Judicial Council of California submitted on October 28, 2011, to become effective on January 1, 2012. I want to share it with you.

Specifically these recommend the adoption of the following new Rules of Court and Judicial Council Forms that will be applied to and used in California family law proceedings:    
  • Rule 5.93 relating to attorney fee and cost applications, which identifies the steps for a litigant or court to take in requesting, responding to a request for, and awarding fees and costs based upon financial need;
  • Approve optional form FL-157, Spousal or Partner Support Declaration Attachment, for litigants to use, as an attachment to the Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment (form FL-319), Declaration for Default or Uncontested Judgment (form FL-170), Application for Order (form FL-310) and Order to Show Cause (form FL-300) or Notice of Motion (form FL-301) to request that the court award, modify a request, or deny a request for spousal or domestic partner support and to provide supporting facts that address the issuesidentified in Family Code section 4320, which are also required in a request for attorney's fees and costs;
  • Approve optional form FL-158, Supporting Declaration for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment , for litigants to use, as an attachment to Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment (form FL-319) or Responsive Declaration to Order to Show Cause or Notice of Motion (form FL-320), to provide the court with additional background information either in support of or in opposition to a request for needs-based attorney's fees and costs, such as any history of child support, spousal or partner support, or family support orders;
  • Approve optional form FL-319, Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment, for litigants to use, as an attachment to the Application for Order (form FL-310) and Order to Show Cause (form FL-300) or Notice of Motion (form FL-301), to request that the court award needs-based attorney's fees and costs;
  • Approve optional form FL -346 Attorney's Fees and Costs Order Attachment , for the court to use, as an attachment to Findings and Order After Hearing (form FL-340), Judgment (form FL-180), or Judgment (Uniform Parentage-Custody and Support) (form FL-250), to identify court findings and orders with respect to needs-based attorney's fees and costs; and
  • Revise mandatory form FL-340, Findings and Order After Hearing , to improve organization and numbering, add clarifying language in item 1, add a reference to "parenting time" in item 2, add "Other" check boxes in items 2-6, add a check box for the court to attach new form FL-346 (see item 5 of this recommendation) in item 6, and add a check box for the court to order a continuance in item 9.
For your convenience I have uploaded the October 28, 2011, Report to the Judicial Council here. This includes the proposed forms.
Continue reading "Proposed 2012 REVISIONS to JUDICIAL COUNCIL FORMS; ATTORNEY FEE REQUESTS" »

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December 05, 2010
  ATTORNEY FEES In CUSTODY Cases: 2011 Family Code Amendments
Posted By Thurman Arnold III, CFLS

Along with other changes to the California Family Code brought about by the Elkins Committee's recommendations, Family Code section 3121 has been amended to make its language consistent with revised section 2030.  Amended Family Code section 3121 is effective January 1, 2011.

Family Code section 3121 has always been more liberal than other attorney fees provisions in the California Family Code, but in my experience most lawyers, parties, and judges have acted like it did not exist.  I have rarely seen an attorney argue for attorney fees under this section, probably because such arguments historically fell on deaf ears.  That may be changing.  

Section 3121 authorizes attorney fees in certain types of cases that are otherwise not mentioned in §2030, like paternity cases.  It applies whenever custody is at issue.

An important difference between section 3121 and Family Code section 2030, besides the fact that 2030 deals with actions generally (dissolution, annulment, and legal separation) while 3121 is aimed at custody proceedings taking place in an OSC (Order to Show Cause) or NOM (Notice of Motion) format, is that attorney fee requests can be made "by an oral motion in open court" either at "the time of the hearing" or at any other time before entry of a judgment against a party whose default has been taken. 

In other words, the request can be made without prior notice for the first time when the parties appear in court on a custody related application.  However, I have never seen a Court willing to grant such an oral request, although clearly trial courts are directed to consider them.  Possibly this will change, and certainly attorneys and parties seeking to get money to hire an attorney should be arguing the Elkins changes to stubborn judges.  The likelihood that these judges will be reversed on appeal now for refusing to award fees to needy parties in appropriate cases is vastly improved beginning in 2011.

For more information about the grounds and procedures for seeking attorney fees in family law cases, please try my on-site search engine.



Thurman W. Arnold III, CFLS*
*State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization
Continue reading "ATTORNEY FEES In CUSTODY Cases: 2011 Family Code Amendments" »

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December 04, 2010
  Making Attorneys Accessible to Family Law Litigants: 2011 ATTORNEY FEE REVISIONS TO THE FAMILY CODE
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CLFS
December is new legislation month at the California Family Law Blog presented by southern California Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in your family law matters and hopefully to help you to reach results that are fairer for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.

Effective January 1, 2011, a very important change to the rules that family courts must apply in deciding whether and when to award attorney fees to spouses (and domestic partners) who may have a relative inability to access the funds necessary to secure justice becomes effective. 

This is revised Family Code section 2030.  It is a welcome and much needed change in the California law impacting attorney fee awards in proceedings that take place in Family Courts.  It is intended to assist parties who historically have been the "out spouse" or "out partner" in marriages and domestic partnerships, by reason of the fact that they may lack independent wealth or assets, or may not during the relationship have managed the community property, or who are otherwise marginalized in terms of access to such funds as are required to conduct litigation and protect their interests because one spouse acted first and grabbed all the funds. 

Without money people cannot hire competent matrimonial law attorneys.  This effectively created an imbalance of power that family court judges were too often not redressing (otherwise there would have been no need for the revisions). 

As a result of the Elkins Task Force's year long study, which included obtaining commentary from jurists, lawyers, and family law specialists among others, the legislature has declared that the times when one spouse was able to grab or control community funds and so starve the other out in the course of adversary litigation, are ending.

Family Code section 2030 changes this playing field importantly by minting new judicial policies that include: 
  • Facilitating access to counsel by parties early on in the proceedings should be encouraged, and attorney fee awards help to accomplish this.  This is because cases are more likely to settle when people begin with a parity of access to resources, and settlement is always the ultimate goal.  FC §2030(a). 
  • Courts must now make findings on whether an award for attorney fees and costs is appropriate, including based upon the question whether there is a disparity in access to funds to retain counsel, and whether one party is able to pay for the legal representation of both parties.  FC §2030(b).  This revision directs trial courts to apply a variation of the disparity of earnings analysis that was first expressed in Marriage of Hatch (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 1213, an appellate decision that some trial courts had ignored.  Relative access measured in terms of such disparity is now key.  "Disparity" implies 'a great distance or gap.'
  • The California Judicial Council is directed, by January 1, 2012, to promulgate and adopt state-wide court rules in order to implement this directive in terms of what information is to be submitted to court's to support attorney fee requests.

From an experienced family lawyer's point of view, my take on this revision is that its greatest value is in telling family court judges that attorney fee awards in appropriate cases are to be the standard and not the exception.  I suspect, however, that judges and commissioners will remain overly conservative.

From a family sciences point of view I believe it is a significant improvement in the law if we are to equalize power between spouses and, frankly, genders.  More often than not women have been on the losing side of the attorney fee question in the sense that they have not controlled community or other resources to the same extent, and in the same manner, as many of their husbands.  I think that it will advance woman's rights in family law litigation.  

I do not want to overstate the power of this revision.  It is a move in the right direction, but nonetheless something of a baby step.  We will await appellate court pronouncements as to what standards family courts should apply as trial courts are reversed for being too timid or parsimonious, or even too generous.  The California Judicial Council is given to 2012 to propose state wide guidelines that will give direction to courts, and that may help to foster uniformity between different venues, in coming years.

Continue reading "Making Attorneys Accessible to Family Law Litigants: 2011 ATTORNEY FEE REVISIONS TO THE FAMILY CODE" »

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December 03, 2010
  ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Elkins Task Force

The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011. 

It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners. 

This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.

Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations.  Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues.  Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.

What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases."  Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification: 

        "We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel.  [Reference omitted].... 

        In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures. But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice.  Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute. It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support.... 

         Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function.  If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."

Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented.  Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions.  Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants.  Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court."   Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.

The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011.  Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217 It states:

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 

December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.

T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization)
Continue reading "ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!" »

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December 01, 2010
  New Family Code Section 3042 - Will It Serve to Accelerate the GENDER CUSTODY WARS?
Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, III, CFLS

custody gender wars hurt children

AB 1090, sponsored by Assemblywoman Fiona Ma, becomes law on January 1, 2011 as  revised Family Code section 3042.  It directs courts to allow children age 14 or over to testify about their custody preferences except where judges make findings on the record why they will not permit it beginning January 1, 2012.  The legislation also directs the California Judicial Council to develop policies and procedures for examining child witnesses in the meantime.

Is section 3042 a good idea?  On balance I strongly doubt it.  The likelihood of misusing this new license, given how we humans tend to behave when we are steeped in relationship conflict, will for many parents be just too powerful a force to avoid.  Parents will feel invited to have discussions that were previously considered inappropriate under the guise of fulfilling a perceived legislative mandate to inquire into childhood preferences.  And it won't stop with "Johnny, who would you rather live with, your mom or me" but will inevitably expand into questions about what underlies Johnny's preferences.  California is theoretically a no-fault state at least in terms of grounds for dissovling marriage, but fault has always lurked beneath the surface in custody contests.  Newly enacted section 3042 takes this to a new, much messier level that potentially assaults children directly as potential co-conspirators with parents who have no concept of age appropriate boundaries.  The legislation is silent on creating resources to help parents understand that children are not supposed to be one parent's best friend after the other parent leaves the family.

Which is not to imply that no children will benefit from it. Still,....

While it is true that children are routinely blocked from meaningfully expressing important preferences in custody cases under current law before this change, I have to observe that in my years of family law practice I have had many clients (both mothers and fathers) who I have either witnessed or suspected of pressuring children in alienating ways to express a preference in that parent's favor (and I also attempted to put a stop to it by explaining the emotional damage this may cause).  I have seen many more parents on the opposing side who do so, and their lawyers whom I believed encouraged such activity. 

What happened at father's house, at mother's house, with their new spouse or girlfriend or boyfriend, and so much more is just too enticing a subject for some parents and now that information will be considered relevant by parents who may feel they are being invited to obtain children's statements of parental preference.  These parents will attempt to introduce such information to the court, whether in their own declarations and testimony or through the voice of the kids.  Children will be questioned and interviewed by parents, and enlisted as co-participants in particularly the high conflict parenting struggles. If the parents are unable to maintain a sensible decorum in managing discussions with their children, how can we expect children not to be cast adrift on the seas of emotion that accompany divorce and custody contests?

Under the new statute either minor's counsel, an evaluator, investigators, or mediators who provide custody recommendations to the court, must indicate to the Judge whether the child wishes to address the court - and the judge is also required to ask this question.  Either parent's attorney may also make that representation to the Court, which then triggers the issue.  It is hard to imagine that any attorney or self-represented party who finds themselves on the otherwise loosing end of a custody evaluation or recommendation will not make this request. Indeed, it will be attorney malpractice not to do so!

An unfortunate consequence of this new statute will be to aggravate what I see as the gender wars between mothers and fathers in custody disputes.  Some mothers believe that they are by nature better suited to child rearing, and the reality is that many do serve their children very well as the primary psychological parent particularly in early life.  Some fathers believe that they are disenfranchised by such views, and make a conscious decision to step out of children's lives "until they get older".  Any battle is unfortunate, and also creates victims.  We all decry in theory the lack of fathering in our society.

Since mothers are statistically in greater control of children than fathers (again, perhaps for good and valuable reasons), the effects of this statute will fall more heavily in favor of mothers and so against fathers - which is possibly, but not of a certainty, one reason why Assemblywoman Ma may have introduced it.  More likely, the idea sounded better than the reality may become.

I suspect I will be accused of gender bias in saying this.  But because mothers more commonly find themselves as children's primary parents for much of children's adolescence (sometimes by default since some fathers don't seem willing to assume the role or take on a greater parenting responsibility) this statute will have an effect of encouraging behaviors that promote manipulating discussions with children about which parent they should prefer.  Few parents of either sex will likely resist the challenge of not overstating their child's supposed desires in their own favor.

Courts and the Judicial Council will need to develop policies and procedures that minimize the negative impacts of this new battlefield on our children.  There are certain to be child casualties, however, and I am left wondering which outweighs the other:  the costs to children of conflicted parents, or the benefits?
Continue reading "New Family Code Section 3042 - Will It Serve to Accelerate the GENDER CUSTODY WARS?" »

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December 01, 2010
  Can My CHILDREN TESTIFY About Their PARENT PREFERENCE in Our Custody Case?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  We have a hearing coming up before the Christmas holidays over custody and visitation issues.  I believe my children should testify in court about their father's living conditions, as well as what they have told me about some things involving the woman he has sleeping over, and what their preferences are as to custody.  Is this possible?

A.  It is possible under current Family Code section 3042.  It may or may not be a wise choice for the sake of your kids, however, since it sounds as if you expect one or more of them to say things to the judge that might be make them feel as if they've betrayed their dad, chosen you over them, or that they are being placed into the middle of your dispute.  I beg you think carefully about what you say to your children, and what you do here.

AB 1050 passed both houses of the California legislature in August, 2010.  It becomes law on January 1, 2011 as revised Family Code section 3042.  However, it is not implemented until 1/1/2012.  Existing law required family courts "if a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, to consider and give due weight to the wishes of the children" in making custody orders.  

New Family Code section 3042 will require courts to permit a child who is 14 years of age or older to address the court regarding custody or visitation unless the court determines that doing so is not in the child's best interests, and in that case the court must explain that finding on the record.  When judges and family court commissioners are instructed to state their findings on the record, it can sometimes be easier for them not to error on the side of permitting the testimony - which is why such provisions are added to statutes by their supporters.  At the same time, requiring judges to state their reasoning does cause thinking judges to better evaluate the issues before them. 

New Family Code section 3042 requires the court to provide an alternative means of obtaining information regarding the child's preferences if it does not allow a child 14 or older to testify as a witness.

Either minor's counsel, an evaluator, investigators, or mediators who provide custody recommendations to the court, must indicate to the Judge whether the child wishes to address the court - and the judge is also required to ask this question.  Either parent's attorney may also make that representation to the Court, which then triggers the issue. 

According to its author, Assemblywoman Fiona Ma, current law was not sufficient because children over a certain age who had the capacity to express important preferences were routinely not allowed to testify under former section 3042.  Hence, she believed that children's wishes were ignored except through the voices of third party evaluators or minor's counsel, and even then that they were not given proper weight.  In my experience this was factually true.  There is a longstanding judicial antipathy towards the unseemingless of testimony from children, questions about the reliability of such testim

The statute does not preclude younger children from testifying and so the law is essentially unchanged as to them - in their cases the court is not required to make findings on the record if it does not permit testimony.

The Bill's author also stated that nothing in the statute will require a child to express his or her preference.  Instead she claims that section 3042 is strictly intended to provide a better avenue for participation in the proceedings and not to pressure children to express their wishes against their will.  By the way, Assemblywoman Ma also sponsored Assembly Bill 102 of 2007, which permitted parties to registered domestic partnerships to change their names to the last name of their new legal partner, which I support.

Accordingly, the Bill directs the California Judicial Council to promulgate standards and guidelines and rules and procedures for the examination of child witnesses, and to suggest alternate and less intrusive methods for obtaining the information about preferences beyond directly questioning them in court.

Hence, at least as to your children's custody preferences, depending upon their ages, after January 1, 2012, you will likely be able to have the judge listen to them, particularly since there will be a period of confusion, especially in smaller jurisdictions, about how to manage child testimony for months to come. 

I beg you to be careful with the power this new law gives custodial parents, which I fear if misused may become an invitation and an opportunity to increase conflictual and alienating behaviors rather than a simple and useful means of allowing children a voice in the proceedings.


T.W. Arnold, III, CFLS
December 1, 2010

parentall preferences and alienation


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December 01, 2010
  What STANDARDS Are JUDGES Likely to APPLY When A REQUEST FOR CHILD TESTIMONY Is Made?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I have heard that children will be able to decide which parent they want to live with in 2011, is this true?

A.  No.  However, at certain ages their imput may become more important to courts in deciding the question effective 1/1/2012.

Revised Family Code section 3042, effective January 1, 2011 but not implemented until January 1, 2012, directs trial courts to allow testimony from children who are aged 14 years or more on issues relating to custody or visitation, unless the judge or family court commissioner makes a finding on the record that doing so would not be in the child's best interest.  In the event a court makes such a finding, it is nonetheless required to "provide an alternate means of obtaining input from the child."  This statute is on its face intended to allow children to express preferences about their relationships with their parents, whether they be in terms of primary residences or visitations, but it opens the door to much more.  Some judges will struggle to limit its application, for some reasons. 

I predict that it is going to become a time-consuming, destructive mainstay in the diet of family law courts and custody attorneys or that judges will develop a method of nullifying the intent of the statute.  As an experienced custody and family law attorney, I believe it is a really bad idea.  But for now the reality is that children will be testifying in court like never before.  How will family law courts deal with this legislative mandate?  I suspect quite reluctantly since family judges see the problem more clearly than our legislators apparently do.

Judicial policy is likely to require, as a threshold question, a balancing of a number of concerns.  These include the need to protect the child from perceived harm from the act and consequences of testifying, the new statutory obligation to consider children's expressed wishes and their supposed desire to express those wishes (as probably urged by the proponent parent), and the probative value of the child's input in deciding the issuers at hand (this probative value is implicit in the statute).  I think most judges will want to avoid such testimony, but are going to have figure out reasons they can readily articulate why not to take the testimony in order to avoid reversals by appellate courts.

In arguing in favor or against introducing such testimony, you will want to be able to talk to the court about the following likely threshold judicial concerns:
  • Will it be useful to the court to permit questioning of this child?
  • What will be the risks and benefits to a particular child of being permitted to testify in favor or against a parent?
  • How shall testimony occur?  Will it be allowed in open court, or in the judge's chambers? 
  • Will there be uniformity between jurists or branches or counties in terms of court policies, or will it just be every department decides for itself how and what rules apply?
  • Who besides the judge will be allowed to ask questions of the child?  This includes questioning outside the court proceeding, say when a third party is appointed to obtain the information for the court.
  • What type of cross-examination will be permitted, since cross-examination is essential to assuring due process within the adversary court setting by testing the credibility and basis for testimony?
  • Will any safety measures be adopted, and will there be any sensitivity to the potential consequences to children once kids are drawn into testifying, since they can't possibly have any understanding of how such testimony will affect their parental relationships with the nonfavored parent?
  • Should different standards be applied in deciding to allow testimony from children about their parental preference when those requests are made after therapist based or similar recommendations come out and disfavor a party, as opposed to before they recommendations are known?  After all, what is to stop every disgruntled parent from demanding that their child state their preference (which that parent doesn't like or accept) in every case?
  • What testimonial facts will be relevant?  A child's stated preference is one thing, but shouldn't a party or their attorney then be permitted to ask questions about parental coaching?  Spoiling and buying kid's loyalty?  Whether the child wants to live with mom or dad because they don't impose rules in their home?
  • Does the court even have enough information to answer the threshold question of whether a child should be permitted to testify without first seeking outside assistance?

In order to succeed in achieving a client's goal of hearing from children when it serves that parent's agenda or perceptions, or in limiting either a child's input or damage to the child by having to voice a preference for one parent over another, custody lawyers and self-represented parties will do well to consider these questions in advance of making requests to the court.

It will be interesting to see if some judges effectively nullify the statutory mandate by imposing roadblocks or alternate routes that keep the questioning outside the family court proceeding itself.

Note: The Judicial Council has now, a year after this article was written, adopted Cal.Rules of Court Rule 5.250. Be sure you read and follow it carefully if a child wishes to express a preference.

Continue reading "What STANDARDS Are JUDGES Likely to APPLY When A REQUEST FOR CHILD TESTIMONY Is Made?" »

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April 08, 2010
  I've heard that CHILDREN can state their PREFERENCE at 13....
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.    I've heard that children can state their preference at age 13, is this true?

[NOTE:  THIS BLOG CONTENT IS LARGELY SUPERSEDED BY REVISED FAMILY CODE SECTION 3042 WHICH TAKES EFFECT 1/1/11 - T.W. Arnold, 12/3/10]

A.    Not as you pose the question. This is what Family Code section 3042 says:

        "Wishes of child to be given due weight; Preclusion of calling of child as witness

            (a)    If a child is of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent preference as to custody, the court shall consider and give due weight to the wishes of the child in making an order granting or modifying custody.

            (b)    ..., the court shall control the examination of the child witness so as to protect the best interests of the child. The court may preclude the calling of the child as a witness where the best interests of the child so dictate and may provide alternative means of obtaining information regarding the child's preferences."

The threshold question is always going to be whether the child is of a sufficient age and capacity to reason to form an intelligent preference and there is no bright line rule or specific age on the subject. One can make generalizations for instance that some children nearing the age of 12 or 13 or 14 have a sufficient capacity, but that is not automatically assumed.  It depends on each child. You can imagine that the child's opinion of their own capacity to reason is not determinative, nor is your opinion. Children may be subject to conditions or "disorders" that affect the characterization.  

Commonly where a preference must be expressed, it comes through the medium of a mediator, the child's therapist, or a forensic therapist or psychologist. Most judges are extremely reluctant to take testimony from a child, even in chambers, especially on routine matters like preferences (as opposed to situations where a child is alleged to be a victim of some form of abuse and so may need to be questioned). In Indio, the family court mediators will often meet with children upon request. There always remains a fear that one child or the other or both is actively coaching the child - another reason why child's preferences as expressed should be given "due weight."

So, my advice to you is this: Consider what you propose carefully. Try to work through it with the other parent. Attempt to understand the root causes of a child's stated preference, and whether they are independently reasonable - or even true, since of course your son loves you and may be reluctant to leave you at the end of the summer.

And, certainly, where objective facts exist that strongly argue for a change of custody, the child's preference may tip the scales in one direction or the other.
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