Recent Posts in Paternity Category

Kevin Q. v. Lauren W., G043576 

The Fourth Appellate District has taken the next predictable step for litigants who hope to force the other side to contribute to exorbitant attorney fees incurred in certain high conflict family law cases. In so doing the law as it relates to the "relative circumstances" of the parties has been expanded to require that trial courts treat recurrent monetary infusions made by family members as "income" for purposes of interpreting the larger picture as it relates to attorney fee requests.  Previously that argument only existed within the realm of support obligations.

This is the first case that deals with what happens to attorney fees claims, in a situation family lawyers know is common where grandparents may be effectively encouraging (and often funding) a rancorous custody battle between their child and a now estranged former partner. Often in family court litigation there are not merely two individuals at war - their relatives have also been sucked into the trance. Many wealthier Americans are able to fund their child's litigation attorneys, or pay that child's household bills so that their need to find work is reduced. The parents of these children may feel forced to underwrite this status quo, effectively spending the family inheritance now. This may be the real subtext to the case.

Kevin Q. is a natural evolution of a doctrine which was recently stated in Marriage of Alter (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 718. In Alter the trial court found gifts from the former husband's mother to be disguised as loans and imputed income to him for these gifts in deciding his ability to pay child and spousal support.

In Kevin Q. and Lauren W., published on May 13, 2011, the two parties incurred over $400,000 in lawyer's fees combined fighting over the paternity of a boy born outside of marriage. That these are warring high-conflict parents is made clear from the fact that this is their second published appeal (see Kevin Q. v. Lauren W. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1119). Mother won the first appeal; Kevin prevailed here. Both sets of litigants have had the same attorneys throughout the proceedings. Kevin Q. is himself an attorney who practices family law in Orange County. As it turned out in the earlier case, Kevin is not the child's biological father but he alleged he was the child's psychological parent - the appellate ruling was that Kevin was not the boy's "legal" father. Unfortunately for the child, it sounds as though the man declared to be the legal father went "walkabout." I cannot tell whether Kevin continued to maintain any relationship with the child after he lost his paternity claim ('once a psychological parent, always a psychological parent?'). Perhaps the parties or their attorneys will weigh in this Blog so I can have the facts corrected.

The first decision is dated June 19, 2009. In December, 2009, Lauren moved the court to order that Kevin pay her outstanding attorney fees, including those from the earlier appeal. Kevin had contributed a total of $20,000 up to that point. Her attorney was Debra Opri of Opri & Associates; Kevin was represented by Marjorie G. Fuller and Marc S. Tovstein. Hence, all the litigation after the first decision appears to be over recovering attorney fees relating to it (but this is unclear). Fees upon fees?

In this round Attorney Opri filed a declaration stating that there was $55,754 due from the earlier work and that another $178,581 and costs of $6,589 was incurred thereafter. Hence, Lauren's total unpaid fees amounted to $227,746. Opri's hourly billing rate was $575 and her law clerk's was $225/hour. Of these fees, Attorney Opri had only received the $20,000 from Kevin plus $28,280, which included a payment of $15,600 from Lauren's father. Lauren urged that Opri had been effectively working for free. She owes her father "tens of thousands" and he was tapped out.

Kevin responded that Lauren's fees were unreasonable. She'd incurred $311,242 in fees for the entire case while his fees totaled $141,384. He complained that $4,200 in charges were for driving time for her attorney to travel from Beverly Hills to Orange County.

The matter was submitted for decision to the trial court, with the issue being identified as whether "attorney fees should be paid to [Lauren], based on need and ability to pay, as set forth in ... [Family Code] sections 2030, 2032, 7605, and 7640." Lauren urged that because the underlying dispute concerned paternity, Family Code section 7605 and section 7640 governed and that these statutes required a different analysis than under sections 2030 and 2032.

The court made the following findings: Kevin's average monthly income was $12,803. He had borrowed $50,000 from his relatives for attorney fees, which he was paying back at the rate of $150/month. He had monthly expenses of $13,320 leaving a deficit of $517.

Lauren had zero income from employment and had not worked since 2006, although she had a master's degree in psychology and is a certified chemical dependency counselor. She received $8,700 per month from "others." Her monthly expenses were $9,197, leaving a shortfall of $497.

Loans vs. Gifts From Family Members

Parental Relocations and Move-Away

In response to a recent article I posted about the case of F.T. vs. L.J., the mother of the Mother in Mark T. vs. Jaime Z. submitted a comment about a new reversal of a case involving Judge Lisa C. Schall, in San Diego, on this Blog - for which I thanked her. I am grateful that family law litigants in these published appeals are increasingly airing their side of the experience here, and I invite you to as well!

The decision in her daughter's case was published on Friday, last week, so I now understand what the maternal grandmother, "Shelly," was referencing.

My sense is that appellate courts are expecting more out of trial judges, like never before, and lawyers too, to be sure, and therapists and court services personnel and litigants themselves! An interesting footnote is that the father's attorneys in this case were certified family law specialists, and (presumably) local San Diego heavyweights, and the mother represented herself and yet succeeded "against all odds." Is this an Elkins Aftermath, leveling the playing field for unrepresented parties against experienced adversaries?

Mark T. and Jamie Z. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1115

Judge Lisa C. Schall doesn't like move-aways, it appears. These applications challenge the non-moving parent and can negatively impact a child's access to that parent, and disrupt parent-child bonding, if a holistic parenting plan under the move-away regime is not developed. 

Judge Schall bears the indignity of being reversed twice now in less than 30 days in a reported appellate decision - quite a scolding. Family law is damned tough for judicial officers, who are doing their best to protect children and weigh in consistently with the cutting edge policies of current mental health science as well as their in-house (FCS) advisors. The problem at present is that the opinions of MHP's (mental health providers), and the wisdom of the reviewing courts, are in conflict. The science of move-away as it affects families from the MHP perspective is still developing, and it collides with certain cherished assumptions the law makes about the rights of Americans, and specifically parents in California under our current statutory scheme (see Family Code section 7501 and the Burgess case) to move freely. 

In both cases Judge Schall accepted (mostly) the independent opinions of outside, court-appointed, mental health forensics and ignored the opinions of the Family Court Services mediator - here the very same Lynne Waldman who made recommendations in the F.T. case. FCS mediator Waldman's belief was that Jamie's move away request should be granted, noting that Jamie had been L.'s primary caretaker since his birth, that Jamie had been unable to find a job in San Diego and was "living in poverty," and that Jamie appeared "to have a clear plan for the move."

Judge Schall now has two strikes against her for using judicial body language to create a result that she felt was fair and appropriate, and her findings on the record illustrate her dilemma. I'm reminded of my early youth playing pool (not so much) and hoping if I twisted my body hard enough, the ball would fall in the pocket. Most of us are doing the best we can. Trial judges, however, have a script they must follow.

In effect, Judge Schall's mistake was to refuse to permit a move-away by a Mom with a 22 month old child who had indeed been the child's "primary caretaker since birth." By effectively coercing Mom not to move by denying her move-away request, and by ignoring the question of "in whose custody" the child's best interests were served" or what arrangement should be imposed were Mom to move, Judge Schall committed reversible error. The justices ruled:

"The court must decide de novo what physical custody arrangement would be in the child's best interests, assuming that the requesting parent will relocate ." Therapist Dr. Lori Love (we can't invent this name stuff) was appointed to evaluate the family for the Court and opined that "[t]his examiner understands the importance of having extended family around for support however this cannot be justified as being in [L.'s] best interest[s] when it means removing him from a loving and capable father. Jamie stated that she did not have an active father in her life and very much wants that to happen for [L.] It would be virtually impossible for Mark to be an active father from across the country." Dr. Love urged the child was too young for the move and went on to recommend that Mom not "be permitted to move out of the County of San Diego. At the same time, this forensic therapist was unwilling to recommend a primary change in custody and assumed that the mother would in fact remain the primary caretaker in San Diego county. She made no recommendations about what custodial arrangement should become effective when or if the Mother moved.

The appellate justices ruled: "Where, as here, a parent who shares joint custody of a minor makes a request to relocate the child in the context of an initial custody determination, the trial court must decide de novo what physical custody arrangement would be in the child's best interests. In making its custody determination, the court must proceed on the assumption that the parent who is making the request will relocate his or her own residence, regardless of whether the court grants or denies the request. In this case, the court erroneously failed to conduct its best interests analysis based on the presumption that Jamie would be relocating to Minnesota."

The trial court adopted the recommendations of Dr. Love, even though Dr. Love failed to address what should happen if and when Jamie relocates out of state. "The very issue that Dr. Love was supposed to address is what parenting plan would be in L.'s best interests, given that Jamie intended to move to Minnesota .... The court misapplied the law in adopting Dr. Love's recommendations, because in making those recommendations, Dr. Love incorrectly assumed that preserving the status quo parenting arrangement was an option, even in the face of Jamie's expressed intent to move...."
 
At trial the Father's attorney asked Mother whether she would move if the court were to deny her request to relocate, and Mom's response showed she was tortured by the question. The appellate court ruled that this question by counsel was improper - courts cannot consider whether the primary parent might alter their plan of relocate depending upon how the court rules. As a trial lawyer this is interesting to me, because this question is often used to telegraph a message to the Court that implies it can deny the move because the moving parent evidently doesn't want to move 'badly enough.'

Apparently the trial court suspected Mother's motives for moving might include frustrating Father's access, but the court did not actually make such findings. "The court's comments regarding Jamie's reasons for moving to Minnesota appear to constitute second-guessing as to the wisdom of Jamie's decision to move (i.e., questioning the "necessity" of the relocation), as opposed to a finding that her decision to move was made 'simply to frustrate the noncustodial parent's contact with the minor child.'" There is no requirement that a parent who has the right to custody of a child establish the necessity of a proposed move. "[E]ven where the court finds that a move away request is being made in bad faith, the court must view this finding as only one potential factor in deciding whether to allow the child's residence to be moved; it does not permit the court to deny the move away request on the presumption that in denying the request, the court can assure that the requesting parent will not in fact move, and that the court can thereby maintain the status quo parenting arrangement. That one parent may have been motivated, in part, to relocate the child's residence by a desire to lessen the child's contact with the other parent does not mean that the court should apply any standard other than what would be in the best interests of the child."

The Bottom Line

F.T. vs. L.J. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1

F.T. v. L.J., case number D057493, is an important opinion for move-away applicants and their attorneys not just because it clarifies existing law and provides guidance on a host of issues commonly encountered in litigation over these arguably unfortunate situations, but it is going to be widely talked about by the mental health community and will influence how  Evidence Code 730 and Family Code section 3111 evaluators report to the courts because of this appellate court's attention to the details for what various FCS ("family court service" employees) and MHP's ("mental health professionals") opined. It appears that some of them, including the court mediators, took their eye off the ball as established by earlier legal precedent on this topic and the information presented to them.

The parties in this case dated for five or six months and this brief time together produced a bouncing baby boy in January, 2006. For the first thirteen months of his life, the child lived with Mom. On February 17, 2007, however, Mother burned her baby's arm with a hot curling iron "apparently to each him a lesson by showing him how hot it was." Father picked the boy up that evening, saw the injury, and took him to the hospital. Hospital staff called CPS and the police. Criminal charges were filed against the mother.

The child was placed with Dad and Mother's visitations were ordered supervised. Two weeks later he filed a petition to establish paternity and an OSC requesting orders for sole legal and physical custody. The parties were directed to attend custody mediation through Family Court Services but were unable to reach agreement, and so the mediator recommended that the child's primary residence be with Father and that Mother have supervised visits. In April, 2007, the parents stipulated to the recommended order "without prejudice to either party."

Five months later Father filed an OSC request seeking an order allowing him to move with the child to Texas. The parties were ordered back into mediation. At that time following a custody review hearing, the trial court removed the supervision requirement for Mom's visitation. Once again (surprise!) the parties could not agree in mediation, and the mediator recommended that Father have primary physical custody and that he be allowed to move, noting that in November, 2007, Mother had pleaded guilty to one count of simple battery on the child and was given four years' probation, and that she had an eleven year old child from a previous relationship who lived with the paternal grandparents.

For unknown reasons Father's request went off calendar at the time of the scheduled December, 2007, move-away hearing. In February, 2008, he refiled his application and psychologist Yanon Volcani, Ph.D., was appointed to conduct a psych evaluation of the parents and child. He issued a report in September, 2008.

Volcani recommended against the Father's proposed move to Texas, believing that it would interfere with this 2 1/2 year old's bonding with Mother because of the distance (based upon current best mental health opinions on the developmental stages of children). Volcani concluded that telephone, webcam, and other means of contact would not be well suited for a child this age, and had concerns whether Father would "enthusiastically" support the child's relationship with his mother. He also felt that mother had learned from her experience of burning the child, and while her action was 'rash, impulsive, and insensitive' the data did not suggest a "broader abusive intent." He recommended that Mother's timeshare be incrementally expanded.

On September 18, 2008, the trial court adopted Volcani's proposed parenting plan as a temporary order pending an evidentiary hearing, without prejudice, based upon findings that this was in the best interests of the minor. The matter was then lost in the limbo of hearing continuances and further court services mediations ultimately until March 5, 2010.

By now Father was requesting permission to move to Washington instead of Texas, and was intending on marrying a woman living there. Mother had married. Lynn Waldman, a Family Court services counselor, reported to the Court that she had learned that the minor child in 2009 began exhibiting rage, temper tantrums, and other behavioral issues at school and that this three year old was seeing a counselor who couldn't explain "where [Child's] anger is coming from. She interviewed Dr. Volcani but developed incorrect impressions about whether he'd last met with the parents over the two ensuing years after his initial report, and other misconceptions. She recommended against the move to Washington, but stated that Father should remain in his role as the primary caregiver.

In February, 2010, Volcani issued a report supplementing his opinions from September, 2008. Father by then had married his fiance, who herself had two teenagers. Volcani had re-interviewed the parents, the new spouses, and the minor's preschool teacher and therapist. He noted that since the initial evaluation that the parents had been co-parenting in a "relatively cooperative and stable manner." The minor was continuing to have rage issues (e.g., throwing a chair and punching another student) but these were improving. Still, because of the child's age it was difficult to know what was causing it.

On March 5, 2010, the trial court held a hearing but did not permit live testimony and denied the Father's request to move. The court made a number of findings which were not supported by the record. Chief among them was the conclusion that the parents "are not communicating" - when in fact Dr. Volcani actually stated otherwise and that their communications had vastly improved over the two years that had passed. Moreover, without any rational MHP support, the trial court concluded that the evidence proved the child's rage, speaking out in his sleep, and bed wetting all had to do with the parents' lack of a meaningful dialog. The court stated it "feels that the anger is coming from the tension between the two parties."

Maybe, but the court didn't pull this conclusion from any evidence before it in terms of an expert assessment and conclusion that this was the case (the child's own therapist couldn't explain the child's behaviors). Some conclusions apparently exceed what common sense would otherwise suggest.

By the way, what is a three year old doing with a therapist?

Anyway, the Court adopted Volcani's conclusion that the child's healthy development was being impeded, although on different grounds than Volcani had expressed. The court concluded "Father's reasons for the move, that is to join a new wife and family, are not sufficient and a new wife and family in Washington is not a sufficiently necessary reason to move the residence of [Child] to Washington...."

Huh?

Moreover, the Court implied that if Father decided to move anyway that the Court would take custody away from dad and give it to mother, a really bad idea under existing caselaw because of its coercive overtones.

Enter the Established Law of Move-Away

This is what makes this case important - a judge that was justifiably bothered by the impact that the relocation would have on the relationship between a parent (mother) and child understandably struggled not to permit the move. But she was wrong and the appellate court scolds her harshly for it. Her decision was not an exercise of informed discretion.

At the same time, some of the Father's arguments were off-track as well. For instance, he argued that he had a presumptive right to move under authority of Family Code section 7501 which states: " A parent entitled to the custody of a child has a right to change the residence of the child, subject to the power of the court to restrain a removal that would prejudice the rights or welfare of the child." The Fourth Appellate District ruled that 7501 only applies to "final" custody determinations, and not those that are "temporary," following the case of Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249. Here the parties had lived under a "stipulation" for two years, but had never reduced it to a final agreement and no court had ever ruled as to any contested matter within the context of an evidentiary hearing. This is a rule that most family law attorneys already know well (which is why the smart ones write their orders to declare the custody agreements favoring their clients as "final" orders). The practical effect of this fact in this case was that "Mother did not have an initial burden to show [that] Child would suffer detriment were he to move with Father to Washington." 

Father also argued that because Mother had been convicted of battering her son, a presumption arose under Family Code section 3044 that she should not have custody of the boy that was possibly "conclusive" if not merely rebuttable. While the idea that the presumption might be conclusive based evidently upon the appalling seriousness of intentionally burning a child is ... creative ... it doesn't track in the slightest what California law says on the subject, and was quickly disposed of by the appellate judges. The justices ruled that "[a] section 3044 finding of domestic violence 'in a family law case changes the burden of persuasion as to the best interests test, but it does not limit the evidence cognizable by the court, and it does not eliminate the best interest requirement."  "Nor does the statute establish a presumption for or against joint custody; again, the paramount factor is the child's health, safety and welfare. And where the section 3044 presumption has been rebutted, there is no statutory bar against an award of joint or sole custody to a parent who was the subject of the order. This is particularly important in move-away cases." In this case the trial court had not made any express findings under section 3044 anyway, so on remand that is a subject the court is directed to pick up.

However, what the trial court did wrong is this:

The father had no burden to prove his move was "necessary". When the trial court opined that "Father's reasons for the move, that is to join a new wife and family, are not sufficient and a new wife and family in Washington is not a sufficiently necessary reason to move the residence of [Child] to Washington...." it supplanted the rule of law with an understandable discomfort with the effects the move would have on Mom's relationship with her son. The issue instead was the best interests of the child, and that decision must be considered in light of the established rule that "the paramount need for continuity and stability in custody arrangements - and the harm that may result from established patterns of care and emotional bonds with the primary caretaker [father here] - weigh heavily in favor of maintaining ongoing custody arrangements." 

Hence, Judge Schall's "order denying Father's motion reveals a misunderstanding of the determination a trial court must make in deciding a move-away motion by a custodial parent. In this case, the trial court, in effect, avoided the ultimate question whether a change in custody would be in Child's best interests were the custodial parent (Father) to move to Washington.... The question ... is not whether the parent may be permitted to move; the question is what arrangement for custody should be made [if and when the custodial parent moves]." A custodial parent is not required to show a planned relocation is necessary.

In other words, the trial court has to assume the plan for the proposed move is a serious one, and has to address the issue of custody as though the move will occur. Moreover, and this is the heart of the decision and the basis for reversal, "[t]o the extent the trial court denied Father's move-away motion with the goal of maintaining the status quo and/or coercing Father to abandon his plan to move to Washington, it erred." [Italics added].

Finally, while the effect of a move will naturally be detrimental to the child's relationship with the remaining parent, this is but one factor for the court to consider and cannot be the sole basis for denying a move. The case of Marriage of LaMusga (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1072 (hand's down the most important move-away case to know), establishes a litany of factors for trial courts to consider in their totality - which is the subject for another Blog.

This case is reversed and remanded to the trial court to evaluate all the LaMusga factors and so exercise an informed discretion before summarily denying Father's request to move.

Okay, sorry, I'm tired now - I'll be back to add some more thoughts!

Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 

Q. Who is responsible to pay child support in California?

A.  As used in the California Family Code, "child support" is an obligation owing on behalf of a child or an amount owing to a county for reimbursement of public assistance paid on behalf of a child. The concept also includes past due support and arrears, and includes maintenance and education. Parents have an equal responsibility to support their child in the manner suitable to the child's circumstances.  Family Code section 3900.

Q. Do grandparents owe child support?

A. Grandparents have no legal duty to support grandchildren, except in cases where they have a right to actual physical custody or court ordered visitation.

Q. What if I wasn't married to the Mother?

A. If you are the biological parent or otherwise become the legal parent of a child, you have a duty of support. However, it does need to be established that you are the bio dad or a legal or de facto parent before support can be ordered. In cases involving unmarried parents, this is typically accomplished through a [VDP Voluntary Declaration of Paternity] per FC section 7573. Often the DCSS (Department of Child Support Services) or other LCSA (local child support agency) files a paternity action to establish support for a mother who has requested support enforcement services or is receiving county aid.

If you are never identified as the bio parent for a child, you will not be found to owe support absent due process. However, you if you know are the parent but fail or refuse to support your child, you may have committed a crime.

Q. What if my parental rights have been terminated by the juvenile or family courts?

A. Parents whose parental rights have been terminated by court degree, or whose children have been adopted out, cease to have a support obligation (although they may continue to owe support for prior periods) as to those child after the date of the decree.

Also, there is no support obligation for an emancipated minor child.  But a child who has been emancipated by court order can become unemancipated upon their own application, or upon the county's application, if they are considered indigent and unable to care for themselves.

Q. What if my new spouse owes child support? Is this my responsibility?

A. The community property is liable to pay support debts predating your marriage, but there is a right of reimbursement.  Indeed, the community liable for all separate debts of either spouse. However, there is a specific right of reimbursement in qualifying situation as set forth in FC section 915.

Q. Who enforces child support?

A. A parent can enforce it. A guardian can enforce it. The county on behalf of the child can enforce it, and can enforce it on its own behalf to be reimbursed for monies paid to another on behalf of the child.  

Q. How are out of state child support orders enforced?

A. These are enforced pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. 

Q. What if my parents have been supporting my kids while I was in rehab?

A. You have no obligation to reimburse them absent either (a) an agreement to do so, (b) an existing court order to do so; or (c) the county has provided benefits, in which case the reimbursement is to the county.  FC section 3951.

Likewise, you have no obligation to reimburse the other parent absent one of the above.

Q.  How is temporary spousal support calculated in California?

A.  In order to be entitled to spousal support, parties must be married or be registered domestic partners.  Spousal support (which is not usually referred to as "alimony" in California) is available in dissolution proceedings, actions for legal separation, and in connection with domestic violence applications. 

Spousal support orders may be temporary, or they be what is called permanent.  Different rules apply to how temporary support is figured than to permanent or long-term support.  I address permanent spousal separately.

Temporary spousal support is designed to preserve the status quo pending a final judgment.  Family Code section 3600 provides that during the pendency for dissolution of marriage or legal separation or in any proceeding where there is at issue the support of a minor child, the court may order the husband or wife to pay any amount that is necessary for the support of the husband and wife (subject to limitations contained in FC section 4320 and FC section 4325).  Again, parties dissolving domestic partnerships may also be awarded support.

Temporary spousal support has nothing to do with the length of the marriage.  Courts look at what the spending pattern was pre-separation and issues a spousal support award based upon need.  If there isn't enough money on the basis of need, then an amount is ordered based upon the higher earner's ability to pay.  A party seeking spousal support isn't deprived on the right to receive support even if they have income - the question is the relative income circumstances of the two parties.

Most California counties have formulas that determine temporary spousal support, but the two most important are Santa Clara and Alameda counties.  Essentially the spousal support formula for Santa Clara County - which is the dominant one - is as follows:  From any amount which is not allocated to child support, take 40% from the net income of the payor spouse, less 50% from the net income of the recipient spouse.  The resulting number is the temporary spousal support.  You do not need to have children to be entitled to receive spousal support.

As a practical matter, courts typically use one of two computer programs that generate these numbers:  Either the Dissomaster or Xspouse.  The Indio courts use Xspouse and the Santa Clara guidelines.

Into one of these programs are inputted the respective gross incomes of the parties.  If there are children of the parties, the custodial timeshare in percentages is inputted (because only a party who has physical custody for more than 50% of the year can claim the tax benefits of HH/MLA or head of household status, the programs require one to be considered to have 51% even in true joint custody arrangements). 

Only certain expenses matter for purposes of temporary support in California.  What doesn't matter at all is most personal expenses (like mortgage payments, utilities, debt).  This effectively ignores the entire debt structure of the parties at time of separation.  Health insurance, union dues, and mandatory contributions to retirement (i.e., typically not IRA contributions), and obligations existing to other minor children living in one party's home, or as to which an actual court order requires they make support payments, are also entered.  The support program 'tax effects' these numbers and figures out the net incomes of the parties.  It renders a number that tells the Court how much the higher earning spouse must pay for purposes of a court order.

Since the court determines the support obligation some weeks after a request for support is made (by way of Motion for Order to Show Cause application), it typically makes the support order retroactive to the date of the filing for the request.  Most courts order support payable one-half on the first and fifteenth of the month.  For this reason, if you file for support on the 5th day of the month, the court will not make support retroactive to the 1st but will start of the obligation on the 15th day of the month.

This might sound like temporary spousal support is easy to fix and who needs a lawyer?  This is not at all the case.  The final support numbers depend upon how much income the Court is attributing to each party.  Each is required to submit before the hearing an FL-150 Income and Expense Declaration.

For instance:  A husband's (and wife's) income numbers are usually but not always based upon historical earnings, and the California judicial council form (FL-150) requires both to set forth there total gross for the past 12 months and also the past month.  The legal assumption is that historical earnings are a reliable guide to future earnings, but this may not be at all true.  Especially in today's economy, historical earnings may not be indicative of what the income stream will be going forward.  This information needs to be credibly presented to the Court.

In cases where one party is a self-employed spouse, their net pre-tax earnings must be determined after deducting business expenses.  This is a common and complex area of dispute, because what is deductible for purposes of Schedule C accompanying a tax return according to the federal government is in no way binding upon California courts for purposes of figuring support.  If somebody works from home and charges part of the mortgage expense as a business deduction, that expense may be added back into the income stream as being available for support.

Another support battleground often involves imputed income.  What if one party refuses to work, or insists on working at a lower paying job?  Perhaps a support recipient believes they will get more money from their spouse if they have no job but if they tried to get one, they could?  What if one party claims that they aren't working and that no jobs are available?  Imputing income cuts both ways, and is extremely sophisticated. I will address another blog to it.

Incidentally, while only temporary alimony is calculated in this way, child support is always figured in this manner regardless whether there is a spousal support obligation.

Q.  My girlfriend is having our baby in September, but I don't know if I am the dad.  I really care about her but a friend told me that I need to be careful because if I go to the hospital with her, I have to pay support no matter what.  Is this true?  What is she files a paternity action?

Keith S.

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Keith:

California law encourages hospitals to get a signed Voluntary Declaration of Paternity ("VDOP") from the male who appears to be a parent at a time when a mother gives birth. This is something that is presented to proud fathers at the time of a child's birth, along with information about legal obligations, and that they are asked to sign.  There may be a lot of guilt and confusion going on at this time. Hopefully there is simply pride.

The public policy is that the State wants to identify biological fathers early on, and to encourage them to step up to the plate both financially and in terms of providing emotional parenting to children. It is also assumed the male who shows up for the birth is most likely the bio dad, and that the parties know it. Obviously, it is not always true and sometimes a man does not turn out to be the actual father. Sometimes he believes he is, and sometimes he is told he is.

Children need their biological parents; this is  critically important. Any bio parent who shirks his responsibility out of financial or emotional selfishness lacks integrity, and their decision has serious consequences on other lives that a true parent will recognize and regret one day, unless they are a sociopath or lack any conscience.

BUT the signing of a VDOP has serious important legal consequences. It is equivalent to a Judgment of Paternity, which may only be set aside for a limited time. While children deserve parents, whether a man that has sex with a mother before a child is born should be determined based only upon that, and their sense of moral responsibility, and therefore to be adjudged a responsible parent also raises integrity and fairness questions in favor of the alleged parent. California law on this subject means well, and may statistically result in the proper outcome more times than not, in my view innocent men who turn out not to be biological parents have rights too. The law says so too, and the question becomes whether you or not you waive your rights to object in a timely fashion.

So, please understand, if you sign a voluntary declaration of paternity next month, you may be adjudicated the legal father of this child regardless whether you are the bio parent. That has privileges and it has burdens. You will have the privilege (assuming the mother does not challenge you before two years after the child's birth) of being a "legal parent" whatever the DNA turns out to be, including rights to custody, visitation, companionship, etc. You will also have the legal financial burdens which I describe under my support obligations FAQ's. For a long, long time, and even possibly forever. 

Family Code section 7573 establishes the effect of a VDOP.   Section 7575 allows you to rescind that declaration but only if you do so within 60 days after birth of the child. Otherwise, after birth, you have a 2 year window to seek paternity DNA testing and an order that you are not, in fact, the bio-dad. The court has discretion to find you are the de facto parent even if you are not bio-dad, however, so even if DNA is conclusive and you are not otherwise the father - absent another man ready, willing, and able to step up, you may find yourself stuck.

These are weighty matters.  In my experience, and in most judge's experiences, woman know who the dad is. Still, there are many reasons why a mother might lie - even including trying to insure that some bad person is never adjudicated the dad. I would never judge your girlfriend and have no opinion on what your status truly is.

So, do what your heart tells you you are the dad, fine. But consider getting DNA testing immediately before you, or the child and you, form any attachments and that way there will never be any question - nor any need to hire me to dispute paternity! 

Best of luck and, hopefully, congratulations!