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September 24, 2010
  I Have Been Paying the MORTGAGE Since SEPARATION - Am I Entitled to WATTS CREDITS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  I have been occupying our family home alone since my wife left over a year ago.  I pay all the interest only mortgage, property taxes, and insurance with no help from her.  Does she owe me half of any of this?

A.  You may be owed you something, but not necessarily one-half of what you have paid out, and different categories of expenses may be treated differently.

This situation involves at least three potential legal concepts:

    * Epstein Credits (Payment of CP Debts Reimbursed)
    * Watts Credits (Reimbursement for Exclusive Use of CP)
    * Jeffries Credits (Combination of Epstein and Watts Reimbursements)

Epstein Credits

"Epstein credits" is a doctrine that holds that as a general rule courts must reimburse one spouse who uses earnings or other separate funds after separation to pay pre-existing community estate obligations.  Courts may not order this reimbursement if under the circumstances it would be unreasonable for the paying spouse to have expected reimbursement.  Where payments are made on account of a debt for an asset that the paying spouse was or is using and the amount was not substantially in excess of the value of the use, the Court may decline to order reimbursement.  This Blog addresses your question in terms of Watts and Jeffries credits that may be owing you upon divorce or legal separation - the prior blog details Epstein credits.  

Watts and Jeffries Credits

We speak in terms of "Watts credits" when one party has the exclusive beneficial use of community property.  When money is owed on that asset, "Jeffries" reimbursements or set-offs for the payment of that debt also come into play. On the one hand you are enjoying the use of a valuable jointly owned asset and should reimburse the community for that use; on the other you are paying something to a creditor for that use, and that amount should be deducted from what you owe the community.  Watts is a calculation for the value of what should be charged for an exclusive enjoyment of community property by one spouse; Jeffries combines the value of that use with reimbursements under an Epstein analysis.  Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 373-374; Marriage of Jeffries (1991) 228 Cal.App. 3d 548, 552-553. 

Family lawyers most often see Watts and Jeffries issues arise in disputes over residences occupied by one spouse alone.  In practice none of these concepts are typically applied to automobiles, although in theory they should be, or other consumer goods.  

While Epstein credits are generally viewed by trial judges to be mandatory reimbursements, allowing Watts and Jeffries credits is discretionary.  Having a working knowledge of your local judicial bench officer's attitude on these subjects is an important bit of information for you to obtain.

Watts credits and Jeffries credits are obviously implicated in your question since you occupy the house for which you seek mortgate and other payment credits and reimbursements. 

This is how Watts Credit issues typically arise - you and  your wife jointly own a home, and both of you are obligated on the mortgage.  Assume the monthly mortgage payment is $3,200 (interest only in your case), the taxes average $400/month, and insurance costs $1,200/year.  Mortgage payments are made on the 15th of the month, and she moves out on January 14, 2009.  You were unable to make the payment on December 15, 2008, so there are two payments due on January 15.  On January 15 you make these two payments, and then continue to make all these payments until the present time or the date of settlement or trial.  You occupy the residence the entire time.  You also incur charges for water for the landscaping, etc., along with the cable bill, electricity, phone and trash.  You have a gardner and a poolman that together amount to $250/month.

Hence, you are spending $3,700 on the mortgage, taxes, and insurance plus the $250 for upkeep, along with whatever you pay for utilities each month.  Over time this amount can grow to a considerable number. 

Assume you had to borrow the money to pay December late from your mother.  This is your separate property debt to Mom if borrowed after separation.  But because your wife lived at the house up until the day she moved which include all of January, you are entitled to the equivalent of an Epstein reimbursement.  Watts and Jeffries don't yet apply.  The obligation existed before separation, was paid after separation, and the source of payment was your separate property.  The community estate owed the payment, which means you owed one-half too (she also owes one-half the utilities charged during the same period as well that were paid with your separate property).

Watts and Jeffries credits answer questions how to deal with expenses you paid after she left where you had use of the home during some some of or the entire period.  Watts credits deal with the value of that use, and Jeffries deal with the value of the use less a reimbursement claim for the cost to you of that use.  Both parties can have these claims for the same property at different times, or one party may assert these reimbursements as against one property while the other may assert them as to another. 

What if instead of you living in the home after separation, it was rented to others but the rent didn't cover all the house related debt service?  The rents are deducted from the total and you each owe one-half of the shortfall.  If you advanced the difference, you are entitled to one-half back from your wife.

Watts' Analysis

So, where one party enjoys exclusive use of a CP asset how is the reimbursement calculated?

As a pure Watts credit analysis, assume a community property house is free and clear other than upkeep and utilities and that you lived there for a time - effectively rent free since there is no mortgage.  You can imagine how it might be unfair for you to receive this benefit without paying for it.  The amount of reimbursement you owe the community depends upon the property's fair rental value.  Fair rental value (FRV) is what you would expect to pay monthly to rent the same or a similar property on the open market in an arm's length tranactions.  It is usually proven by expert broker or appraiser testimony, but as an owner of property you are free to testify to what you think its fair rental value is (as is the other spouse).  Whether your opinion is believed or given weight by the court depends upon the assumptions you make in arriving at your opinion of FRV (as well as perceived credibility).  

If the FRV is $3,000/month, and you reside in the house for 15 months from date of separation to time of trial, the total value of your use is $45,000.  From this you would deduct fixed expenses like taxes ($400/month) and insurance ($100/month).  You would therefore owe the community $2,500 x 15 = $37,500, but since you own half the community the net reimbursement to the other party is one-half that amount.  You may also be able to deduct the gardner and poolman particularly where those payments help to maintain the asset itself.  You might even deduct repairs depending upon the circumstances (installing a solid gold toilet wouldn't qualify). 

All of these reimbursements are "Watts charges" to you.  They are "Watts credits" to the party to be reimbursed. 

Jeffries' Analysis

The more commmon situation is that some mortgage debt for the house you occupy is being paid monthly.  Assume it to be $2,000 combined (including mortgage, taxes, and insurance).  If the FRV is $3,000/month but you pay $2,000 monthly then the net benefit to you is $1,000 each month or $15,000 total.  You would owe a Watts reimbursement of one-half that sum, or $7,500, on the marital balance sheet or as a direct payment to your spouse.

This is a Jeffries situation.  Note that it assumes that these costs to you were paid by your separate property.  If instead you used community monies remaining in a bank account after the DOS to pay this debt (or CP funds from some other source) then you do not subtract that from the fair rental value because the community estate has already been charged.  
 
BTW, an interesting twist on this question these days involves what happens when there is a mortgage but the party in possession fails or refuses to pay it.  They are living there at no effective charge while the other spouse may be actually paying rent elsewhere.  In that case you should not receive a credit for one-half the debt you did not actually pay, but it is difficult to predict how a judge will handle this.  After all, you may continue to owe the money and have to repay it later.  Now what happens if you then decide to file a bankruptcy, so then never have to pay it because the debt is discharged?  That bankruptcy if properly drafted should also destroy any reimbursement claims of your spouse altogether.  Great unfairness can occur in these situations.  In my experience many of the legal rules for these reimbursement claims developed in a completely different economy and fairness and common sense is struggling to keep up with the new world order.

These days with the mortgage and real estate bust another situation frequently arises:  The amount a spouse pays to maintain the mortgage and related asset expenses may exceed the FRV of the property.  Should the other spouse be charged with half of this net loss, and so forced to underwrite some of it?

Assume in the illustration above that the costs remain the same, but the mortgage is $4,000/month.  Since FRV is $3,000, you are overpaying by $1,000.  Are you entitled to a credit back for one-half of the net loss?  In my experience most courts won't give it to you but make the argument anyway.  Courts seem to feel that if you choose to live in a place that you want the other side to help underwrite, when cheaper alternate arrangements are available, then your choice to stay there should not bind the other person.  The court cannot tell you what choices to make, but it can refuse to let you benefit unfairly by them.

This makes sense on at least one level - imagine that you have a large, beautiful, expensive home that is way under water, and that your estranged wife insists on continuing to live in it despite the fact that the costs to keep it are far in excess of what comparable lodgings would cost.  Naturally she wants you to absorb as much of this to whatever extent possible which lowers her incentive to move.  If she was allowed to stay and charge you for one-half the difference between a $10,000 mortgage and its $5,000 rental value, she might continue to reside in this losing, nonproductive asset if she effectively only paid $7,500/month after credit for your $2,500.

Conclusion

While Epstein reimbursements appear to be mandatory in dividing the community assets and liabilities, Watts and Jeffries credits are viewed as discretionary reimbursements.  Many judges don't favor these reimbursements and so exercise their disrection to deny them.  I tell my clients not to count on them in negotiating settlements, and many lawyers refuse to take the argument seriously when negotiating settlement.  Another reason why lawyers tend to treat them as inconsequential, besides bluffiing, is that they can be expensive to prove and so you are being tested as to whether you have the stamina or the money to assert these claims at trial.  After all, it is best to have forensic experts testify to them, and these individuals may include an accountant and a broker/appraiser.

One solution is to request the family court to bifurcate the issue so that a short, separate trial occurs on the Watts/Jeffries issues alone.  Once the amount of Watts or Jeffries credits is fixed by judicial decision you can now place it on the marital balance sheet in your settlement discussions on the remaining issues.

The success of a Watts or Jeffries claim are fact specific.  In doing justice and equally dividing the community estate, there is broad spectrum of fairness running from "its not big deal" to being "really unfair."  You will not get much traction where the consequence of not reimbursing Watts credits or imposing Watts charges is a small number.  But where one party enjoys the asset alone without paying creditors, a very strong argument exists in favor of finding reimbursements.

Finally, be sure to include reference to Esptein reimbursements and Watts and Jeffries in your Declarations of Disclosure to make it clear that you are asserting such a claim.  If you are the spouse in possession omit any reference to it.  It is not your job to assert that argument against yourself.



Thurman W. Arnold III
September 25, 2010
All Rights Reserved.


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September 24, 2010
  My Ex Has Been EXCLUSIVELY USING Our RESIDENCE - Is There an EPSTEIN CREDIT For This?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I have been occupying the home after my wife left over a year ago.  I pay all the interest only mortgage, property taxes, and insurance with no help from her.  Does she owe me half of any of this?

A.  You may be owed you something, but not necessarily one-half of what you have paid out.

This situation involves at least three potential legal issues:
  • Epstein Credits
  • Watts Credits
  • Jeffries Credits

This particular Blog addresses your question in terms of Epsteins - the next blog deals specificially with Watts and Jeffries credits. 

Epstein Credits

I have described Epstein Reimbursements in another Blog.  "Epstein credits" is a doctrine derived from the case of Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85.  It holds that as a general rule, courts must reimburse one spouse out of the community property who uses earnings or other separate funds after separation to pay pre-existing community obligations.  This commonly occurs with credit cards where there was a balance remaining when the parties separated that one or the other pays after that date.  Epsteins only apply to payments on the portion of a debt that existed at date of separation, and not new debt on an old card that was incurred afterwards.  The rule is not limited to credit cards but can apply to almost any class of debts.

Courts are required not to order this reimbursement if under the circumstances it would be unreasonable for the paying spouse to have expected reimbursement.  If there was an agreement that a party would not be reimbursed, if the paying spouse intended the payment as a gift, or when the payment is made on account of a debt for an asset that the paying spouse was or is using and the amount was not substantially in excess of the value of the use, the Court may decline to order reimbursement.  This idea of the value of use of some property acquired through debt that continues to exist after separation underlies the concepts of Watts credits and Jeffries credits, and is obviously implicated in your question since you occupy the house for which you seek credits and reimbursements.

So, Epsteins are almost always granted as to post-separation payments for expenses, or goods and services, that didn't leave a tangible asset behind that is now being exclusively enjoyed by only one of the two spouses. 

As an example of how this works if there is $15,000 owing Visa for that trip to Hawaii, some groceries, and a child's school tuition at the time of separation and one party pays it off or makes monthly installments on the debt with their earnings or other separate property after that date, a benefit has been conferred upon the community because a joint obligation has been extinguished or reduced.  That benefit must be equalized by a payment to the payor of one-half the amount paid or a credit or set-off against other property that gets divided.  One-half is paid because the paying spouse owed their half anyway.  Any portion paid before the DOS (date of separation) ordinarily will not be reimbursed. 

This is generally true even if only one of the parties actually took the trip to Hawaii, unless that trip was in breach of a marital or fiduciary duty (if the husband snuck off with his paramour to Hawaii, an argument exists that he should not be reimbursed for paying that portion of the debt over the wife's objection).  Family Code section 2625 directs courts to award a debt incurred by one spouse to them alone if debt was not "incurred for the benefit of the community."  Family Code section 2602 empowers courts to "award ... the amount the court determines to have been deliberately misappropriated by the party to the exclusion of the interest to any other party in the community estate."  FC section 2625 is a powerful and much underused statute (many attorneys seem to be unaware of it or try to bluff as though it didn't exist).

Compare this with a situation where a credit card was used to buy a dishwasher that the paying spouse possesses or receives in the divorce - since they are retaining a tangible asset it may not be fair to allow them to both keep the asset and get reimbursed for one-half its costs.  Applying Epsteins can become fairly fact specific.

In situations involving use of a family residence or other tangible assets that continue to exist after separation and which are used and enjoyed by only one of the spouses, an Epstein analysis provides only a part of the answer to the reimbursement question.  In effect first the amount of the Epstein reimbursements are determined, and then the question requires a Watts analysis to determine under equitable principles whether it is fair to actually order reimbursement and, if so, in what amount.

Hence, to resolve your issue you would begin by adding up the costs of everything related to the house that is spent to preserve or protect the asset.  Property taxes are included, but utilities are not.  The utilities you used after the physical separation are your obligation anyway, because they were not incurred during 'the marriage.'  (Please see the Blog Category "Physical Separation.")  Mortgage payments and insurance are considered, and probably the poolman or gardner as well.

Please continue on to the next blog for detailed infomation concerning Watts credits.


Epstein Credits and Fiduciary Duty Issues

Sometimes a spouse or domestic partner will raid the credit cards and take cash advances or buy a new wardrobe, or fix a car, during the weeks prior to separating.  If it later appears that their intention was to stick the other spouse for one-half of this expense, the presumption that this is a community debt (because incurred during marriage) may be overcome and so it may be assigned to the one spouse alone.  It is not fair to hold both parties responsible for debts incurred in anticipation of separation.

However, when one partner incurs a debt frivolously as opposed to recklessly before separation, in a situation not amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty - even over the prior objection of the other spouse - it is likely to be equally divided and Epstein reimbursements ordered.  Both spouses have, under California law, equal rights of management and control of the community property and community credit.

Courts in my experience are reluctant to find breaches of fiduciary duty in Esptein situations unless the behavior was fairly eggregious.  Charging 10 pairs of shoes at Macy's a month before separation may not be viewed as a big deal.  If the debt was incurred in pursuit of an illegal activity like supporting a drug habit or sex addiction, many judges are less reluctant to declare a breach. 

To illustrate another twist, if the credit card was used to pay the spouse's tuition expense instead a child's schooling as in my example above, it may also be unfair to charge the non-schooled parent with one-half the tuition portion of the credit card balance.  A court is likely to look at whether this schooling benefited the community in some way before splitting that debt betwen the parties - i.e., because of the schooling did the student spouse earn more money which was then contributed to the community standard of living and so confer a benefit on both?  Pure student loans are usually awarded to the party who incurred the debt as their separate property obligation. 



T. W. Arnold III
http://www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com
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May 11, 2010
  What are EPSTEIN REIMBURSEMENTS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold


Q.  My soon to be ex wife and I are getting our divorce with the assistance of a paralegal.  That person has prepared a Marital Settlement Agreement.  The paralegal says she cannot give us legal advice.  There is a phrase in the agreement that says something about each of us waiving Epstein reimbursements.  I have no idea what this means.


A.  "Epstein reimbursements" deal with the question:  "How do we divide debts that we incurred during the marriage, where one of us made payments after we separated and up to the time of divorce?"  

A common situation is that parties have credit card debt that needs to be divided in the divorce.  Say there was a balance of $10,000 owing to American Express on December 31st, the day before your wife drank too much at the office New Year's celebration and had an unfortunate tryst with her boss - this isn't the first time this has happened, and your New Year's resolution is to move out (sorry, I am just trying to be colorful), and so you do move out the next day.  Her reaction is to file for divorce, because her boss looks way more interesting to her than you do these days.

Under this example January 1 is your date of separation.  From the date of separation on, the earnings of either spouse are no longer community property, or joint earnings, but instead these earnings belong to each of you separately.  Family Code § 771.

Often where a credit card is in the name of one person alone, the other spouse or domestic partner doesn't contribute to the payments after separation - sometimes because they won't and sometimes because they can't.  But as between the two of you, the $10,000 is jointly owed to American Express, even if the other spouse did not sign the credit card application or is not named on the card, or on the statement.  This is also true whether or not both parties directly benefitted from the use of the credit card - for instance, maybe the $10,000 was charged by your wife to buy shoes over the course of the past year to help make herself feel better about the fact that you never have intimate conversations with her any more (or for any other reason), or perhaps you charged the card to add more chrome to your Harley Davidson FatBoy because your hairline is receding.

If the card is not paid, American Express can pursue collection either against the spouse who is the account holder, or against the community property of both spouses.  Family Code § 910.  If the credit card is in your name alone, it will be your credit that might be ruined if the monthly installments are missed.  

Now again, as between you and your wife, the general rule is that each of you owe one-half of the credit card debt which means that all other things being equal, in a property settlement or if a Judge is forced to divide your property and estate, if one party is assigned 100% of the debt the other owes a reimbursement of $5,000.  Lawyers and Judges speak of assigning the debt to one party or the other on the "marital balance sheet" which implies a corresponding credit or right of setoff against the division of some other item of property.  

epstein reimbursements and gambling There are, of course, exceptions.  These exceptions frequently include (a) situations where a debt was incurred in breach of a fiduciary obligation owing the community estate or to the other spouse and (b) where one party retains the benefit of the property that the credit card was used to acquire (believe it or not, I am frequently asked about breast augmentations or other cosmetic surgeries - except in extreme cases, courts do not charge one party for these).  For example, if when you learned of your wife's affair your reaction included flying to Las Vegas and having a wild weekend and you recklessly charged the $10,000 at the casino, this might be considered a breach of fiduciary duty and result in the entire $10,000 being your responsibility even though the two of you had yet to physically separate.  Or, if instead you spent the $10,000 buying more chrome for your Harley and you expect to keep it in the divorce, then even though the $10,000 was otherwise a community obligation equitable considerations may result in the debt being assigned to you.  If in the divorce the two of you decide to sell the Harley but the chrome you spent $10,000 buying adds only $2,000 in value to the sale's price, in that case the $10,000 remains a joint obligation because you neither breached a fiduciary duty nor retained a sufficient benefit that the law would charge you for it and the asset is being divided.  Another common situation is where one spouse retains the furniture or refrigerator charged at Lowes - in that case more of the debt may be assigned to that party. 

Assuming you continue to make monthly payments of principal and interest on the credit card up to the point of dividing the debt in a marital settlement agreement (MSA), or if a judge makes the call for you both after a trial, as a general proposition your wife owes you one-half of all those payments.  These are called Epstein credits or Epstein reimbursements in California, and many other community property states have similar rules.  These are also called equitable reimbursements, meaning that the right to be reimbursed is not absolute and certain but that the court has wide discretion to grant the reimbursement or not depending upon fairness.  Typically California family law courts do grant the reimbursement so long as the parties benefited equally (or the money was equally wasted). 

The principle in California was first set forth in the case of Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76.  It is to be distinguished from the rule that the debt itself, if community, must be divided equally between parties in divorce.  Family Code § 2550.  It covers reimbursements rights that accrue between physical separation and the date of ultimate division of the liability.

So, the agreement the paralegal has prepared includes an agreement each of you is giving up any right to be reimbursed for debt related payments made after separation.  You are not being asked to waive your credit for $5,000 if the $10,000 debt is assigned to you (unless there is a separate provision assigning the credit card balance to you completely).  You are being asked to waive all the debt maintenance up to this point.  It is not an unusual clause in an MSA, but it may or may not be in your best interests to agree to it.

Epstein credits take a variety of forms, and are not limited to credit card debt.  The Epstein case itself involved a husband who voluntarily made the mortgage, insurance, and tax payments on the family residence during the separation period.  Wife and their son occupied the home.  Up to that point the law was that if one party used separate property (earnings after separation) to pay community debt (the mortgage, etc., on the residence), there was a presumption that this was intended to be a gift to the community unless an agreement could be proved that it was not to be a gift.

Each party may have separate Epstein claims as to different items of debt.  

Upon separating, it is a smart idea to get and keep copies of credit card statements and statements for all liability accounts as of the date of separation.  From an accounting point of view, the date of separation is a critical snapshot of a point in time.  It is essential that the parties maintain these records as proof of what the numbers were, and of what payments were made afterwards.

Whether or not you should waive the Epstein reimbursements that might be owing you is part of the give and take of negotiating a divorce settlement.  These are usually simple accounting issues, but not always.   

If your Wife gets an attorney that attorney might try to convince you to waive the Espteins, or hope that you don't understand the concept or have it independently explained to you.  In my experience where we are speaking in terms of vanilla debt (meaning there is no questionable conduct and the charges were incurred in the normal course), your wife's lawyer would also agree that you are entitled to these reimbursements without a fight if you know enough to insist.

There is an important flip side and hybrid of the Epstein reimbursement concept - that of Watts charges and credits.  The deal generally with who pays for the beneficial use of community property (i.e., the home) during the separation period, once the divorce is finalized.

I will address those separately. 



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
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February 08, 2010
  PRELIMINARY DECLARATION OF DISCLOSURE in California (PDD's)
Posted By Thurman Arnold

California Family Law Disclosure Forms

Whether you are representing yourself in your divorce, or a pro per family law litigant, you need to know about and understand the Declarations of Disclosure that are required in California before a Judgment of Dissolution may be entered.   Getting it wrong can have serious consequences.   In my experience, paralegal firms or non-lawyer mediators do not know how to properly assist clients in meeting these obligations, and even seasoned divorce attorneys get these disclosure forms wrong.   You need to understand that these disclosure forms are not simply another document that needs to be prepared in a sloppy fashion in order to complete your divorce, but rather they are the proof that you have complied with important spousal fiduciary duties after your physical separation.   

You can’t get even a default divorce and marital termination agreement past the family court clerk without a least a Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure (PDD) and when the other side has appeared in the action, you cannot obtain a Divorce Judgment without both parties have exchanged for waived the Final Declaration of Disclosure (FDD).   Even if the documents have been exchanged, if they are incomplete or inaccurate the other party may be able to set all or parts of your divorce judgment or divorce settlement for up to several years after a judgment is filed.   These rules and requirements apply equally to domestic partnerships, annulments, and legal separations.

This article covers the Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure.

California Family Code sections 2100 to 2113 cover declarations of disclosure for California divorces.  FC section 2100(a) declares it is the policy of the State of California to “(1) marshal, preserve, and protect community, and quasi-community assets and liabilities that exist at the date of separation so as to avoid dissipation of the community estate before distribution, (2) to ensure fair and sufficient child and spousal support awards, and (3) to achieve a division of community and quasi-community assets and liabilities on the dissolution or nullity of marriage or legal separation of the parties as provided by California law.”

FC section 2100(c) states that in order to promote this policy “a full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties, regardless of the characterization as community or separate, together with a disclosure of all income and expenses of the parties.”

This bears emphasis:

  • There must be a full disclosure
  • It must be accurate
  • It includes all assets
  • It includes all liabilities
  • It applies to assets or liabilities one has or may have
  • The disclosure must be made early on in the proceedings, although there is no specific time rule
  • It doesn’t matter whether you think the asset or debt is a separate property item, you still must disclose
  • You must also fully and accurately disclose all income and expenses
  • Although the statute doesn’t say it, you may see why these are forms that you do not want to lose – since, as mentioned below, the disclosures themselves are not filed with the court.

FC section 2100(c) does not, however, stop there.   The statute continues “Moreover, each party has a continuing duty to immediately, fully, and accurately update and augment that disclosure to the extent that there have been any material changes so that at the time the parties enter into an agreement for the resolution of any of these issues, or at the time of trial on these issues, each party will have a full and complete knowledge of the underlying facts.”

Family Code section 2102 sets forth the rules governing interspousal fiduciary duties, including the operation and management of community or part community businesses.   I will discuss this section elsewhere and link back to it when that article is finished.

Family Code section 2104 describes the Preliminary declaration of disclosure.   It must be completed as set forth in this Judicial Council Form.   It does not get filed with the Court, but a declaration stating it has been exchanged must be filed with the Court.  

If, as commonly occurs where parties have negotiated and signed an agreement and the Dissolution Judgment proceeds by default with a Marital Settlement Agreement signed by both being submitted, no final disclosure needs to be exchanged between the parties but the Petitioner still must himself or herself complete and serve the Preliminary declaration; the defaulting Respondent is relieved of that obligation.

Family Code sections 2120 to 2129 describe when a judgment for dissolution, or a property settlement or a support settlement, may be set aside for defects in the Preliminary declaration of disclosure and for other reasons.  

You can find the actual California Judicial Council forms here.

Again, I will write an article about that and link back once it is completed so please check back with us.

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January 18, 2010
  If my Wife and I are separated, do I have to pay the CREDIT CARDS she ran up after leaving?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.     My Wife and I are separated. Am I liable for her debts she incurs once we split up?


A. If you are a co-signor on, for instance, a credit card account you are also liable to the credit card company. The fact of divorce or separation does not itself alter your obligations with third parties (since they are not allowed to participate in the divorce and they would be prejudiced s if you could unilaterally disavow liability because of divorce).   

As between you and spouse, you may or may not be obligated for one-half the debt depending on when the other spouse incurred it - if after separation, generally speaking they owe it. If the debt was incurred before separation, sometimes the debt will be assigned to one party without offset depending upon what it was for and whether they have the use of that property that the debt acquired - for instance, the furniture charged on the credit card or those car lease payments. Family Code section 910(b). Keep in mind, however, that if you move back in together (reconcile) you may lose these protections. The surest way to establish that a separation has in fact occurred is through filing a proceeding or Judgment for Dissolution or Legal Separation, although separations are suspect where parties continue to live under the same roof.

The Court does have the power under Family Code section 2623 to divide post-separation debts for "necessaries of life of either spouse or the necessaries of life of the children of the marriage" as between the parties "according to the parties' respective needs and abilities to pay at the time the debt was incurred." This is a discretionary call for the judge, and generally debt is assigned to the party who incurs it - particularly if that party is already receiving court ordered or even voluntary child or spousal support. If the post-separation debt is not for a "necessary of life" it will assigned to the spouse who incurred the debt.  

Once your divorce is final or a decree of legal separation has been entered, each spouse is solely liable for all debts incurred thereafter, including necessaries. A Judgment or Marital Termination Agreement is going to assign the debt existing as of that date as between the parties.


TWA

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January 17, 2010
  Why is the date of PHYSICAL SEPARATION legally important?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.    Why is the idea of 'physical separation' important in California?

A.    The idea of "physical separation" is one of the most important concepts to California law.  If you think that the presumption that all property acquired during marriage is significant, the notion of physical separation is every bit if not more important.  This appears to be one of the best kept secrets of California family law.

Physical separation is the date that the marriage ends, for most practical purposes.  The date of physical separation is the date that community property ceases to accumulate.  Family Code section 771 states "The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."

Once spouses separate, all their earnings and everything that is acquired with those earnings are separate property of each spouse, respectively.

Similarly, upon separation each spouse is no longer liable for the debts of the other spouse.  The community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse "during marriage".  During marriage "does not include the period during which the spouses are living separate and apart before a judgment of dissolution ... or legal separation...."  FC section 910.  An exception exists as to "necessaries" except to the extent that the parties are living separate by agreement and whether or not support is stipulated by that agreement.  FC section 4302.

Separation is of critical importance to the expanding interpretation and growing field of the law of fiduciary duties. The duty of confidentiality that arises because of the marital relationship by legislative fiat ( Family Code section 721) and which gives rise to major exposure for the conduct of spouses with regard to property and money, ceases at separation - meaning spouses no longer have the expectation and right of relying upon one another as trusted partners.  Fiduciary duties continue pursuant to FC sections 1100 et seq. and sections 2100 et seq. as to assets that already exist, or can be considered marital opportunities arising after separation, until the time each asset in question is divided by agreement or court adjudication.  Fiduciary duties are land mines.  A good example of the consequences for breach of fiduciary duty is the Rossi case, where a wife who won the lottery and then filed for divorce the next day claiming she and her husband had already separated.  She fails to list the lottery winnings in her paperwork, and refused to disclose it to the husband later claiming, among other things, that she had been a victim of domestic violence.  Because the husband had no idea about the lottery winnings, he did not dispute the divorce or wife's asserted date of separation until much later when one day he received a letter intended for the wife by a company offering to buy out the winnings.  He called the State Lottery Board, and then filed a motion to set aside the divorce degree and for damages for wife's fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.  The court ordered the wife to disgorge all her winnings (100%) and pay them over to the husband.

The separation date is crucial to understanding reimbursement claims relating to payment on joint and separate debts, or in fixing rights to real property.  For instance, California law provides that the community has an interest in the appreciation of a residence which is owned, meaning title is held, in one spouse's name alone where principal on a mortgage is being paid down.  This is called the Moore-Marsden approach to equitable reimbursement.  If the house appreciates after separation, the titled spouse may want to argue that all that appreciation belongs to them.  Date of separation becomes important to the date of valuing the real estate and determining the relative principal loan amounts.

It is crucial where businesses are involved, regardless whether they are corporations, mom and pop shops, or sole proprietorships.  For instance, what happens when a spouse who controls or who is the business, which was established before or during the marriage, continues to derive income from it after the parties separate?  Maybe the business goes up in value.  Perhaps it goes down in value through market factors, or maybe even the spouse intentionally drives it into the ground in order to reduce the amount that will be ordered to buy out the other spouse's interest.  In all these situations a date of separation determination is crucial.

Another common area where it comes up in with regard to pensions, whether they be defined benefit plans or contributive benefit plans.  Whatever accrues to the spouse who holds the pension by way of his post-separation contributions belongs to them.

Date of separation is also critical to determining the length of the marriage for purposes of spousal support or alimony rights.  It is a snapshot in time with huge ramifications, including how long a spousal support obligation may continue and when it might be terminated.

It is critical that you hire an attorney who understands how to litigate and present the facts of physical separation.


Thurman W. Arnold III,
California Divorce Lawyer
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January 17, 2010
  What Is a LEGAL SEPARATION in California?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.   What is meant by separation in California?


A.    There are two contexts in which the word separation is used in divorce and family law in California:  (1) Legal Separation and (2) physical separation.  Both are important, but in practice the concept of physical separation has a far huger impact on people's lives.

A Decree of Legal Separation in California is identical for all purposes to a Decree of Dissolution of marriage, with one critical distinction:  A judgment for legal separation leaves the marriage (and the marital "bonds") intact.   The parties remain married, and so neither can remarry.  But for all other purposes, the marriage is effectively dissolved. 

There are religious and personal reasons why two people might want to do this, and there are some practical reasons involving most notably health insurance but sometimes job related benefits why two married persons might choose this over divorce. 

A decree of legal separation cuts off the creation of community property thereafter, which includes liability for community debts as well.  It is possible to divide all property between the parties, to fix all rights and entitlements to spousal support, and to deal with custody, visitation, and child support issues, and yet remain legally married.  It requires the consent of both parties, because if either party objects to a legal separation or seeks a dissolution instead, a Judgment of Legal Separation cannot be granted.  Even if the parties are in agreement concerning a legal separation, neither is precluded from later seeking to terminate marital status through a subsequent dissolution action.  If the parties have reached a legal separation agreement, or if the Court enters a Judgment of Legal Separation, a subsequent action does not undo any of that.

This is a fairly unusual outcome.  In my substantial experience, very few parties have been in agreement on this way of resolving their joint affairs and it doesn't usually make sense unless there are unique health, insurance, or religious or familial reasons for not dissolving the marriage.




TWA
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January 07, 2010
  My wife she used her INHERITANCE to buy our home. We are getting divorced.
Posted By Thurman Arnold, III

Q.  My wife and I separated in June 2009. When we purchased our home in March of 1998 (married December 1994), she used part of an inheritance from her grandmother to help with the down payment. I have been paying the mortgage since we bought it. Will she get her inheritance back in our divorce? What would I get?


A.     Because I need more information and the answer to some questions and then to follow up questions, I can only give you a generalized response. 

So long as your wife can trace the portion of her downpayment contribution to the inheritance, she is entitled to a Family Code section 2640 reimbursement in the amount that she proves by this tracing. She is not entitled to interest on grandma's gift to her, however, but only the principal. However, this assumes that the downpayment contribution always remained separate from any other money or bank assets that you had an interest in, or that the community had an interest in: If the inheritance monies were commingled with joint monies or your separate funds between the date she received them and the date they were used as part of the purchase price for the home, then a further tracing is required to establish that what money in the account at that time was her separate and what amount was something else. Here is Blog that discusses tracing principles in more detail.

You don't report whether you were on title to the residence when escrow closed or at any later time. Whether or not you were on title when the property was purchased, it is presumed to be community property UNLESS you (a) deeded off when escrow closed or deeded off since that time or (b) consented to or are deemed to have consented to your Wife being the sole record title holder if at the close of escrow title issued in her name.

If you were on title at close of escrow and to the present day, the answer is easy - your Wife gets her traced inheritance money first, off the top, from any equity in the home. She does not get interest on the money. The remaining net equity, without other facts, belongs to the community so that each of you is entitled to one-half of what remains.

If you were not on title when escrow closed, and if you cannot rebut by clear and convincing evidence the legal presumption set forth in Evidence Code section 662 (based upon form of taking title in her name alone) that you consented to that outcome, then (a) your Wife still gets her downpayment back and (b) the community estate is entitled to be reimbursed for carrying the mortgage all those years and reducing the principal balance due the mortgage holder. It doesn't matter who paid the mortgage, so long as it was paid from community earnings during the marriage.

There is a very important reimbursement concept under California Law known as Moore-Marsden apportionment. It applies to a common situation where a home is acquired before marriage (or during marriage as separate property), title is in the name of the acquiring spouse alone, and during the marriage and up to separation or divorce and there is or was a mortgage that was paid during the marriage.

Where this occurs the community estate acquires a legal, reimbursable, interest in what would be otherwise be entirely the separate property of the titled spouse IF community funds (earnings of either spouse, for instance, or both) are used to make the mortgage payments. The idea is that joint funds are being used to benefit a separate property interest, i.e., the separate property equity. Many legal scholars consider this to be a breach of fiduciary duty - that whenever one or the other spouse's separate property interests are increased with community funds, or community time, skill, and efforts of either spouse during the marriage, the community is disadvantaged and that this disadvantage violates the statutory duties of the parties that place the party's joint interests above their separate interests.

The formula for apportionment is that the community acquires a pro tanto (dollar for dollar) interest in the ratio that principal payments on the purchase price made with community property bear to payments made with separate property. Hence, any increase in value (appreciation) must be apportioned accordingly between the separate property and the community property estates upon separation or dissolution.

Note that this only applies to separate property owned prior to marriage with a mortgage that was paid during marriage where an equity position has been increased. For instance, if a mortgage exists but it is an interest only, payments during marriage do not reduce principal. Therefore, the separate interest of the owner spouse is not improved because the debt remains exactly the same. As a general rule, the amounts paid for interest, taxes, and insurance on the house are disregarded since that portion does not to contribute to the capital investment.

Also, it assumes that the mortgage was paid with joint (community) funds, or that the funds used were so commingled that the "separatizer" is unable to trace them to a separate property source (meaning they don't have records showing where each payment was made or are unable to provide a recapitalization of the source of the funds). If your husband reduced the mortgage throughout the marriage but he did it with an account that was his separate property then the community would not have this reimbursement right.

The Moore Marsden formula requires a number of bits of information at important points in time to be properly calculated. These include: a) what was the original purchase price; b) what was the original mortgage and downpayment; c) what was the property worth at the date of marriage (DOM); d) what was owed to the lender at that time; e) what was the property worth at the date of separation; f) what was owed at that time; g) what is the property worth on the date of the calculation (i.e., the trial date); h) and what is the principal pay-off at that time?

This is agood example of why family law and divorce cases can become quite expensive. Obtaining these records, particularly if you are the 'out spouse' can be difficult, and sometimes a forensic accountant is the best option for calculating these apportionments. Find a local CPA with family law experience to help you trace the funds. You need an experienced family law attorney for these types of matters as well.

In your case, with a lengthy marriage and little owing, you have significant Moore Marsden entitlements.



T.W. Arnold
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January 06, 2010
  My Husband Is Receiving A PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENT. Am I Entitled To Any of It?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  My Husband is receiving a large settlement for an auto accident he was in.  If we divorce, am I entitled to 1/2 of the settlement?

A.  Probably not, but maybe. 

Personal injury awards in California are community property if the injury occurs before separation no matter when the settlement comes in.  Family Code section 780.  However, Family Code section 2603 states: 

(a) "Community estate personal injury damages" as used in this section means all money or other property received or to be received by a person in satisfaction of a judgment for damages for the person's personal injuries or pursuant to an agreement for the settlement or compromise of a claim for the damages, if the cause of action for the damages arose during the marriage but is not separate property as described in Section 781, unless the money or other property has been commingled with other assets of the community estate.

(b) Community estate personal injury damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries unless the court, after taking into account the economic condition and needs of each party, the time that has elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual of the cause of action, and all other facts of the case, determines that the interests of justice require another disposition. In such a case, the community estate personal injury damages shall be assigned to the respective parties in such proportions as the court determines to be just, except that at least one-half of the damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries.

Hence, the court has discretion to divide community personal injury damages by assigning it all to the injured party.  As a practical matter, this is usually what does happen.  Still, Family Code section 781 provides certain reimbursement rights to the community for payments made from the community. 

Lesson:  Don't avoid settling your case just because you think you should get 1/2 of what your spouse recovered.  You might get something, but the expense outweighs the risks.  Judges are inclined to award PI damages to the injured spouse.
  
By the way, if the other spouse (here, you) caused the injuries, a different outcome might result.  Also, different rules can apply to worker's compensation recoveries.

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December 28, 2009
  What is permanent SPOUSAL SUPPORT in California?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  What rights do I have to permanent spousal support?

A.  Permanent spousal support is not usually "permanent," although it can be in cases of very long marriages.  Lawyers and judges also refer to it as post-judgment spousal support, alimony, judgment spousal support, or long term support.

Unlike temporary spousal support, long term spousal support is only issued after a final judgment of Dissolution of Marriage or Legal Separation.  It is equally available to domestic partners.  Also unlike temporary support, it is not based on any computer formula or state or county guideline, but must be determined and fixed depending on the facts of every individual case.  If long term support is important to your future wellbeing, you are going to need an experienced support attorney.

There are several very important rules to keep in mind.  First, a marriage in California which lasts more than 10 years (defined as the time between date of marriage and physical separation), is "long term" marriage.  The general rule is that in marriages which are not long term, spousal support should not be payable for more than one-half the length of marriage - or to put in differently, the law presumes that the recipient spouse should be rehabilitated and so become self-supporting in a period equal to 1/2 the marriage.  However, this presumption becomes less important in cases involving older couples, especially where people can not be realistically expected to re-enter the work force, in cases where there children who remain minors, or where the party asking for support has a debilitating disease or disability.

There is no magic ratio for how long a former spouse might be ordered to pay long term support.  Each case depends upon its own facts, the quality of your attorney, and the attitudes of the family court judge.  Even in cases of long term marriages, the support obligation typically will end at some point in time.  However, if usually will not end on its own - meaning that when a trial court orders long term support it will reserve jurisdiction to continue to extent it, until some time when a party petitions the court to terminate support and a judge finally says "enough is a enough." 

Imputed income is often an important argument in long term support marriages, where one party convinces the court that the other party is shirking or failing to genuinely try to become self-supporting.  It is sometimes necessary to have the supported spouse evaluated by a vocational rehabilitation expert. 

There are four components to an award of of permanent support:  1) Amount; 2) duration; 3) substantive increases or decreases over time; and 4) jurisdictional step downs and ultimately a termination date.

Second, Family Code section 4320 is a critical support statute.  I have provided a link and uploaded it so that you may read it.  Essentially it sets forth all the factors that the court must consider in setting post-judgment support, and you will see that it is not an exhaustive list and the court can consider anything else it deems important to the decision.  Support factors include the extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the marital standard of living established during the marriage, considering:  a) the marketable skills of the supported party, the job market for those skills, the time and expense required to train that party including education and b) the extent to which the supported party's present or future income earning ability is impaired by periods of unemployment or were incurred during the marriage to permit that party to devote time to domestic duties.

Another factor is whether the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, license, career, or position by the supporting party. 

Another factor is the ability of the supporting party to pay, taking in account that person's earning capacity, income, and assets and standard of living.

Another very important support consideration is the needs of each party - including both. 

Another factor is the obligations and assets of each spouse, including the separate property which each has or gained upon the dissolution.

Another is the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the needs of dependent children in their custody.

The age and health of the parties is critical in some cases.  65 years of age is the presumed retirement age for adults today, and courts cannot order a person to continue to be employed beyond that age - but, if they make that choice, their income can be considered.

A documented history of domestic violence can affect the right to receive support or the obligation to pay it.

The tax consequences between the parties must be considered.

And, basically, as I said, any other specific facts that trend one way or another.

The three most common factors are the marital standard of living (MSOL), need and ability to pay, and the assets the parties end up with upon divorcing.

Courts cannot order lump sums for support.  Spousal support is generally taxable to the recipient and deductible to the payor, but there are very specific IRS requirements that must be met for this to actually be so.

Courts are required to state their findings on each relevant issue in writing.  In practice though, most people settle their divorce cases by way of settlement agreements.  Unfortunately, lawyers often leave out these findings so that when a court is asked, down the road, by the payor to terminate or decrease support, or by the payee to increase it, there is no map for the court to use to base its modification findings on.

If support is an issue for you either way, please hire a competent lawyer.  There are many attorneys moving into family law from civil practices who are clueless about these things.  Caveat emptor!

 


 

 

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December 28, 2009
  How is TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT Determined in California?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  How is temporary spousal support calculated in California?

 

A.  In order to be entitled to spousal support, parties must be married or be registered domestic partners.  Spousal support (which is not usually referred to as "alimony" in California) is available in dissolution proceedings, actions for legal separation, and in connection with domestic violence applications. 

Spousal support orders may be temporary, or they be what is called permanent.  Different rules apply to how temporary support is figured than to permanent or long-term support.  I address permanent spousal separately.

Temporary spousal support is designed to preserve the status quo pending a final judgment.  Family Code section 3600 provides that during the pendency for dissolution of marriage or legal separation or in any proceeding where there is at issue the support of a minor child, the court may order the husband or wife to pay any amount that is necessary for the support of the husband and wife (subject to limitations contained in FC section 4320 and FC section 4325).  Again, parties dissolving domestic partnerships may also be awarded support.

Temporary spousal support has nothing to do with the length of the marriage.  Courts look at what the spending pattern was pre-separation and issues a spousal support award based upon need.  If there isn't enough money on the basis of need, then an amount is ordered based upon the higher earner's ability to pay.  A party seeking spousal support isn't deprived on the right to receive support even if they have income - the question is the relative income circumstances of the two parties.

Most California counties have formulas that determine temporary spousal support, but the two most important are Santa Clara and Alameda counties.  Essentially the spousal support formula for Santa Clara County - which is the dominant one - is as follows:  From any amount which is not allocated to child support, take 40% from the net income of the payor spouse, less 50% from the net income of the recipient spouse.  The resulting number is the temporary spousal support.  You do not need to have children to be entitled to receive spousal support.

As a practical matter, courts typically use one of two computer programs that generate these numbers:  Either the Dissomaster or Xspouse.  The Indio courts use Xspouse and the Santa Clara guidelines.

Into one of these programs are inputted the respective gross incomes of the parties.  If there are children of the parties, the custodial timeshare in percentages is inputted (because only a party who has physical custody for more than 50% of the year can claim the tax benefits of HH/MLA or head of household status, the programs require one to be considered to have 51% even in true joint custody arrangements). 

Only certain expenses matter for purposes of temporary support in California.  What doesn't matter at all is most personal expenses (like mortgage payments, utilities, debt).  This effectively ignores the entire debt structure of the parties at time of separation.  Health insurance, union dues, and mandatory contributions to retirement (i.e., typically not IRA contributions), and obligations existing to other minor children living in one party's home, or as to which an actual court order requires they make support payments, are also entered.  The support program 'tax effects' these numbers and figures out the net incomes of the parties.  It renders a number that tells the Court how much the higher earning spouse must pay for purposes of a court order.

Since the court determines the support obligation some weeks after a request for support is made (by way of Motion for Order to Show Cause application), it typically makes the support order retroactive to the date of the filing for the request.  Most courts order support payable one-half on the first and fifteenth of the month.  For this reason, if you file for support on the 5th day of the month, the court will not make support retroactive to the 1st but will start of the obligation on the 15th day of the month.

This might sound like temporary spousal support is easy to fix and who needs a lawyer?  This is not at all the case.  The final support numbers depend upon how much income the Court is attributing to each party.  Each is required to submit before the hearing an FL-150 Income and Expense Declaration.

For instance:  A husband's (and wife's) income numbers are usually but not always based upon historical earnings, and the California judicial council form (FL-150) requires both to set forth there total gross for the past 12 months and also the past month.  The legal assumption is that historical earnings are a reliable guide to future earnings, but this may not be at all true.  Especially in today's economy, historical earnings may not be indicative of what the income stream will be going forward.  This information needs to be credibly presented to the Court.

In cases where one party is a self-employed spouse, their net pre-tax earnings must be determined after deducting business expenses.  This is a common and complex area of dispute, because what is deductible for purposes of Schedule C accompanying a tax return according to the federal government is in no way binding upon California courts for purposes of figuring support.  If somebody works from home and charges part of the mortgage expense as a business deduction, that expense may be added back into the income stream as being available for support.

Another support battleground often involves imputed income.  What if one party refuses to work, or insists on working at a lower paying job?  Perhaps a support recipient believes they will get more money from their spouse if they have no job but if they tried to get one, they could?  What if one party claims that they aren't working and that no jobs are available?  Imputing income cuts both ways, and is extremely sophisticated. I will address another blog to it.

Incidentally, while only temporary alimony is calculated in this way, child support is always figured in this manner regardless whether there is a spousal support obligation.



http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawAttorney.com
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