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December 30, 2011
  Attorney Michael C. Peterson Speaks About FINANCIAL TRANSPARENCY (Before and Once Divorce Happens)
Posted By Michael C. Peterson

Advice for Couples in 2012, Including How to Balance Power in Your Marriage

One of the most common problems I see arising in (and sometimes leading to) any divorce action is a lack of financial transparency between the spouses or partners. Often, over time, and for various personal, practical and familial and historical reasons, one party has assumed a dominant or exclusive role in the management of community assets, including depository accounts, real estate, investments, and small businesses.That role effectively puts a managing spouse in a position to have vastly superior information about the family finances, and the power to act on such information in the context of divorce to the detriment of the non-managing spouse. This may wind up prejudicing one party if the relationship ends.

It has been my repeated experience that, in anticipation of a divorce action, an unethical or abusive spouse will take strategic steps to hide assets and obfuscate the methods used to hide them. The ramifications to the non-managing spouse can include not only an unfair disbursement of community assets upon resolution of the case, but also manifest into reduced calculations of temporary and permanent spousal support and child support. 

California family law attempts to minimize the potential for financial fraud during the life of a divorce action. For example, it creates rules for mandatory disclosures of assets. It creates fiduciary duties for managing spouses. It creates methods for discovery of financial and asset information (but only in the context of a legal action, after the relationship has broken down). It creates pre-judgment and post-judgment penalties for non-disclosure. 

In a perfect world such legal tools alone would fully prevent the potential for financial dishonestly between separating spouses. But the reality is that the law routinely fails to protect the financial interests of the non-managing spouse in this regard, and the root cause of that failure occurs because non-managing spouses don't take steps to equalize the playing field when it comes to information about family finances during the course of the marriage. Stated another way, individual non-managing spouses are often unable to utilize the tools that the law provides to ensure they receive a just and equitable share of the fruits of the community's efforts during the course of the marriage because they lack the information necessary to have their lawyer fully protect their interests.  Too many non-managing spouses wait until the time of separation to learn about the family finances.  By then, non-managing spouses and their attorney are playing catch up, and not always winning. As such, it is of paramount importance that a non-managing spouse be proactive in learning as much information about the family finances as possible, and do so not only on the eve of a divorce, but also during the entire course of the marriage itself.   In this day and age, knowledge is the coin of the realm.

Economists recognize that one source of market failure (i.e. inefficient allocation of resources) is caused by a phenomenon called asymmetric information. Asymmetric information affects decisions in transactions where one party has more or better information than the other. In adverse selection models, the ignorant party lacks information while negotiating a contract to the transaction. Common examples of information asymmetry include 'insider' trading in the stock market, or buying a 'lemon' used car. Understanding and combating asymmetric information is crucial to economists because market failure leads to net losses for society as a whole. Understanding and combating asymmetric information should be equally important to the non-managing spouse and his/her attorney because of its strong potential to lead to inequitable settlements or trial results.  In the economic sense, asymmetric information between spouses about the family finances is a form of market failure. To be sure, if you are contemplating or undergoing a divorce action, you will (in most cases) effectively be negotiating a transaction that will bind you and impact your financial future.

The best way overall way to combat a managing spouse 's tendency to commit acts of misfeasance or non-disclosure regarding financial interests is to equalize the flow of financial information from the very outset of the marriage, with information parity being a non-managing spouse's goal.

Hand-in-hand with the goal of information parity is a mindset that fosters such parity being present throughout the marriage. That mindset is, simply stated, one of equality and mutual appreciation. Two people will divide labor in a marriage so as to maximize their relative strengths and weaknesses, and in so doing the synergy benefits the martial community as a whole to a greater extent than either person could do individually. Economists refer to this phenomenon as comparative advantage, and recognize that such a situation is optimal in the context of maximizing social utility. So too is comparative advantage optimal for managing a household. 

As a simple 'traditional' example, assume Chris and Pat are married. Chris has a greater income earning potential due to holding a doctorate degree and having a good network of people to whom Chris is favorably known in the locale. Pat has greater domestic abilities due to having a bachelors degree in nutrition a work background in home decor. Based on these comparative strengths, Chris and Pat decide that Chris will work full-time and Pat will take care of the home full-time. Pat's excellent meals keep Chris energized and in good health.  Pat's superior aesthetic tastes keep Chris in style with cool cloths. Chris's boss comes over for dinner and is impressed by the feng shui of the domicile. Over time Chris gets promoted and raises. Chris uses the additional income to make financial investments, go on vacations with Pat, and purchase a better home. By Chris and Pat each doing what they are relatively strong at, they, both individually and as a whole, are made economically better off. But more to the point, it is their interdependence that necessarily caused the mutual gain. The law recognizes this fundamental principal in the context of divorce by creating the concept of community property; that regardless of whether it was Chris's paycheck that allowed for the growth of assets, Pat's contributions to Chris's earned income are equally important and therefore necessitate equal division should Pat and Chris's relationship end. So as to a non-managing spouse's mindset, I strongly encourage all such people who are contemplating marriage, married, contemplating divorce, or involved in a divorce have one that recognizes their contributions to the community and requires takes a role.

On the practical side of things, here is a list of information parity objectives that I believe healthy marital relationships should achieve:

  • Spouses should store copies of written financial documents in a safe place and where the other spouse doesn't have access.
  • Spouses should have all depository, investment, retirement, and debt account numbers written down in an asset ledger. Annual inventories of all assets with a value over $500.00 should be maintained and signed off on by spouses and kept in the asset ledger.
  • Spouses should keep copies of income information, including payroll stubs and other documents showing income such as rental checks from investment property or brokerage statements from securities dealers. 
  • Spouses should copy and store all financial account information from banks savings and loans, credit unions, particularly monthly statements. Spouses should also copy and store other banking information such as passbooks, check registers, and deposit slips. 
  • Spouses should agreed to have all financial information statements should be sent to each spouse individually, directly from the applicable financial institution, and be received only at that spouses primary residential address (and not, for example, at a business). If one spouse insists on receiving their financial information from home or stops receiving financial information mail at the residence, it is often a red flag. 
  • Spouses should maintain copies of tax documents, including personal tax returns and business tax returns, and attached forms, for the preceding five years.
  • Spouses should receive and keep business financial statements, including net worth and income statements, in the case of a small business.
  • Spouses should keep copies of all wills and trusts, and attachments thereto (such as a grant deed that has been recorded in favor of a trust for the benefit of the spouses).
  • Spouses should keep copies of all life insurance policies.
  • Spouses should keep copies of all outstanding debts incurred during the marriage that are in either spouses name.
  • Spouses should keep a list of all personal and real property owned prior to the marriage.
  • Spouses should keep a list of all safe deposit boxes and their contents.

Other tips you should know about and red flags you should watch out for to protect you from an unscrupulous spouse:

  • Don't wait until things are going badly in the relationship to achieve financial information parity. Work towards that goal from the outset.
  • Conduct asset searches of your spouse's biographical information by professional third-parties on an annual basis.
  • Be aware that there is a statistically higher incidence of spouses hiding money in their second, third, or later marriages.
  • Its best to have only a certified public accountant prepare the spouses' tax returns (as opposed to 'bookkeepers' of other unlicensed persons acting as pseudo-accountants), as they are subject to professional  conflict of interest rules. Do not sign any document seeking your informed consent to waive any conflict of interest rules with respect to accountants without consulting an attorney.   
  • Particularly in the case of a small business, become knowledgeable about the business's employees, its normal income, its normal expenses, and how it accounts for them. A small business in particular is breeding grounds for accounting tricks to make it appear less valuable. I have seen this occur by the managing spouse: favor/incentivize cash payments from customers, funnel personal expenses as payments from the business, creating and paying fake employees (including the spouses' own children) and then voiding the uncashed checks after the divorce is final, or delaying new long-term business opportunities (i.e. taking new customer orders, signing new clients, or receiving transfers from escrow-like accounts such as paypal.com). It's important to be familiar with the inner-workings of a small business so you can note when something is amiss. Carefully review and copy customer/client payment agreements and accounts where a small business operates on a largely cash basis.
  • Review financial statements on a regular basis. It is easier to access and digest three months of recent transactions than five years of relatively distant transactions. Look out for large or out-of-the ordinary deposits or withdrawals, and try to trace the source/end-point of the transaction to the best of your ability.
  • Be aware that municipal bonds and certain savings bonds, because they are tax-free, are not reported to the IRS and therefore can be a vehicle for asset hiding because they do not need to be disclosed on tax returns. Look out for large investments in these assets.
  • Non-managing spouses should be careful about signing joint tax returns that claim large deductions for various expenses, particularly in the case where a small business is involved. Although it might mean a larger tax burden in a particular year, in the context of a divorce it often results in lower spousal support and a lower business valuation, with attestation proof presented to a judge in the form of your signature.
  • Big changes to the administration of finances can be a red flag: applying for large new loans, the closing of a bank account or change to an investment portfolio, particularly without the input of the non-managing spouse, might give opportunity to hide money.
  • Know your spouse's boss well, and make sure they like you. I have experienced collusion between employers and employee so as to show short-run decreases (bonus or raise deferral) to income agreed on increases after the divorce is complete.  If you separate from your spouse, let your spouse's boss know that event has occurred in writing. 
  • Do not sign deeds or other papers concerning real estate papers without consulting an attorney.
  • Watch out for bank accounts opened in the name of spouse's children, as they do not get listed on that spouse's tax statements they can be a method of hiding community assets.
  • Also watch out for overpayments on taxes. A managing spouse may try to receive a tax return later after the divorce is final by overpayment now, or alternatively filing amended taxes.
  • Avoid 'loans' to friends or family.           
  • Be a Missourian, i.e. don't take your spouse's word. Have the managing spouse show you with the documents that corroborate what they tell you about the family finances. 
  • Don't allow fear of ruining the relationship, cultural values, or laziness prevent your pro-activity in becoming astute in the family finances. Defensive responses to your inquiries and requirements for financial information parity by the managing spouse may indicate diversion of community assets.  
  • Always remember that the burden of proof rests on the accuser, not the accused, to prove diverted assets to a court. Take all actions to protect your interests with this rule in mind.

These are my thoughts at the end of 2011 - I wish each of you, and each of us, a Happy New Year in 2012, and I hope that we all strive to be transparent and ethical during the coming year!



Michael C. Peterson, Esq. - Indio and Coachella Valley Divorce Attorney  
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August 16, 2011
  Marriage of MARGULIS - Fiduciary Duties of MANAGING SPOUSES
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Marriage of Margulis, Part 2 - Duties of Managing Spouses

Please see Part I of my evaluation of  IRMO Margulis as the launching point for understanding the appellate court's outline of interspousal fiduciary duties.

The Margulis rule states that once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets.

The rule is justified by examining the scope of fiduciary duties imposed by the California Family Code. Interestingly, the trial court had found that the Husband (Alan) had breached his fiduciary duties to Wife (Elaine) "to maintain proper records of all community assets which he had exclusive control and management over...." Yet, other than imposing $20,000 in sanctions and assessing $30,000 in attorney fees against Alan, the trial court did not believe Elaine had produced sufficient evidence to explain what had really happened to the deposit accounts that were at issue beyond Exhibit 18, 'the smoking gun'. $50,000 in sanctions was a cheap price to pay relative to the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of dollars. It was reversed for applying too narrow a breach of fiduciary duty and applying the wrong remedy.

Since Margulis contains a great explanation of how statutory fiduciary duties operate I quote the decision as follows:

"Family Code provisions detailing the fiduciary obligations between spouses provide strong support for shifting the burden of proof to the managing spouse when determining the value and disposition of missing assets. The starting point is section 721, which provides that accountability for the management of community assets is a fundamental aspect of the fiduciary duties owed between spouses.

Section 721, subdivision (b), states, in relevant part: between themselves, a husband and wife are subject to the general rules governing fiduciary relationships which control the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. This confidential relationship imposes a duty of the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in Sections 16403, 16404, and 16503 of the Corporations Code, including, but not limited to, the following: ¶(1) Providing each spouse access at all times to any books kept regarding a transaction for the purposes of inspection and copying. ¶(2) Rendering upon request, true and full information of all things affecting any transaction which concerns the community property. Nothing in this section is intended to impose a duty for either spouse to keep detailed books and records of community property transactions. ¶(3) Accounting to the spouse, and holding as a trustee, any benefit or profit derived from any transaction by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse which concerns the community property.

Section 721's specific incorporation of the same rights and duties of nonmarital business partners, as provided in• section 16403 of the Corporations Code, makes clear that the duty to disclose relevant information concerning transactions affecting the community property is an affirmative and broad obligation. Corporations Code section 16403 requires each partner to furnish to a partner ... [¶] (1) Without demand, any information concerning the partnership's business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of the partner's rights and duties under the partnership agreement or this chapter.... (Corp. Code, § 16403, subd. (c), italics added.)

Section 1100 further delineates the scope of a managing spouse's accountability. That statute not only prohibits a spouse from engaging in certain conduct, such as making a unilateral gift of community personal property or disposing of it for less than fair and reasonable value, without the written consent of the other spouse (§ 1100, subd. (b)), but it also requires each spouse to act as a fiduciary toward the other in the management of community assets in accordance with the general rules governing fiduciary relationships ... as specified in Section 721, until such time as the assets and liabilities have been divided by the parties or by a court. This duty includes the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an interest.... (§ 1100, subd. (e).)

Importantly, section 1101 creates a right of action and specific remedies for the breach of fiduciary duty between spouses. Subdivision (a) of section 1101 gives each spouse a claim against the other spouse for any breach of the fiduciary duty that results in impairment to the claimant spouse's present undivided one-half interest in the community estate.... The statutory remedies for a breach of fiduciary duty, specifically including a breach of those [duties] set out in Sections 721 and 1100, include a mandatory award of 50 percent of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney's fees and court costs.... (§ 1101, subd. (g).)

If the nondisclosure or wrongful disposition of community property falls within the ambit of Civil Code section 3294 (punitive damages upon clear and convincing evidence of oppression, fraud or malice), the court must award to injured spouse the entire value of
the asset (§ 1101, subd. (h)).

Finally, section 2100 makes clear that these fiduciary obligations of disclosure and accounting continue to bind spouses after separation until final distribution of assets. Section 2100 states: [A] full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which one or both parties have or may have an interest must be made in the early stages of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation of the parties.... Moreover, each party has a continuing duty to immediately, fully, and accurately update and augment that disclosure to the extent there have been any material changes so that at the time the parties enter into an agreement for the resolution of any of these issues, or at the time of trial on these issues, each party will have a full and complete knowledge of the relevant underlying facts. (§ 2100, subd. (c), italics added; see also § 2102, subd. (a)(1) [from date of separation to date community assets are distributed, spouses are subject to § 721's fiduciary duty to disclose assets and update material changes].)

Taken together, these statutes impose on a managing spouse affirmative, wide-ranging duties to disclose and account for the existence, valuation, and disposition of all community assets from the date of separation through final property division. Simply put, these statutes require the spouse to account for his or her management of the property. The managing spouse must reveal if the community property changes value, ceases to exist, or is transferred for less than its worth, thereby depriving the nonmanaging spouse of his or her half-interest. Because of the fiduciary relationship between spouses, the managing spouse must reveal any self-dealing or other conduct that impaired the value of the property and entitles the other spouse to compensation.

Applying these statutes to the facts of this case, a trial court could conclude Alan breached his fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting. A court could find he breached his duty to provide full and accurate disclosure of all community assets when in pretrial exchanges he failed to inform Elaine that $20,000 was in the Charles Schwab IRA's, asserting that the only existing community property was the Sycamore house. A trial court similarly could find Alan breached his duty to disclose immediately and fully any material changes in the community property (§ 2100, subd. (c)), by failing to tell Elaine until just before trial that all the community investment and checking accounts he had managed were virtually empty. Additionally, by refusing to provide Elaine with any documentary or other corroborating proof of what actually happened to the money that had once been in those accounts, Alan may have breached his duty to furnish to Elaine any information concerning the [community's] business and affairs reasonably required for the proper exercise of [her] rights (Corp. Code, § 16403, subd. (c)(1); § 721, subd. (b)), which included her right to pursue a claim against Alan for impairment to [her] ... one-half interest in the community estate (§ 1101, subds. (a), (g) & (h)).

The trial court, however, found a single, narrow breach of duty by Alan: a breach of the duty to keep and provide adequate records. In so ruling, the trial court impliedly found Alan did not owe broader fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting. The trial court's erroneous finding on the scope of Alan's duties led it to apply the wrong remedy. Instead of awarding Elaine at least 50 percent of the value of undisclosed or wrongfully transferred assets (§ 1101, subds. (g) [50 percent], (h) [100 percent upon proof of oppression, fraud or malice]), the trial court ordered Alan to pay Elaine $20,000 as sanctions, plus attorney fees.

The trial court's failure to find Alan breached his broader fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting stemmed from the court's denial of Elaine's request to charge Alan with the exhibit 18 asset values unless he disproved those values or proved he properly disposed of those assets. Although the trial court found that Elaine had satisfied the requisite foundation to admit the exhibit, it accorded the document little or no weight because Elaine had not prepared it and had no evidence to support it. Consequently, according to the trial court, Elaine failed to carry her burden of proving the accounts itemized in exhibit 18 ever had the values listed in that document, and Alan could not be charged with wrongfully disposing of assets he never possessed. But, as discussed above, the trial court misapplied the burden of proof.

Elaine's introduction of exhibit 18, which Alan conceded he prepared, satisfied her initial burden. The statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting then effectively shifted the burden to Alan to rebut the presumption he should be charged with the assets listed on exhibit 18, a document that was prima facie evidence of the account values it stated."

Based upon the foregoing the case was reversed and remanded to the trial court. The sanctions award of $20,000 plus $30,000 was also reversed "so that the court may revisit the question of the appropriate remedy should the evidence establish Alan's breach of fiduciary duty" - in other words, the appellate court is directing the trial court to hit Alan harder than was amounted to a slap on the wrist. As Justice Aronson wryly directs:
 
"Alan's cross-appeal merits little discussion. His challenge to the trial court's finding that he breached his fiduciary duties to Elaine is meritless. Likewise, his additional challenges to the award against him for sanctions and attorney fees fails, given the clear statutory authorization for both awards in light of Alan's breach of duty.... Nevertheless, we reverse the attorney fees and sanctions award so the court may revisit the question of the appropriate remedy should the evidence established Alan's breach of duty." Elaine is to be awarded her attorney fees and costs for this appeal.

Margulis also contains an excellent discussion regarding Epstein credits, debt payment in lieu of support, and tracing issues. I will endeavor to blog that portion of the decision in Part III.




Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.
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August 15, 2011
  IRMO MARGULIS - Managing Spouse Has BURDEN OF PROOF To Explain MISSING ASSETS
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Marriage of Margulis (8/11/2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 277

Part One

I am always pleased to report cutting edge rulings by our appellate courts, and this is one of the most important decisions in recent years affecting who has the burden of proof to explain what happens to assets that disappear after marriage partners separate, and what the consequences are for managing "in-spouses" who cannot explain what happened to liquid (or other assets) that existed at separation but seem to have evaporated in the meantime. While upon reflection it is hard to imagine how this decision could be news because it makes such perfect sense, the Fourth Appellate District's pronouncements (by the Honorable J. Aronson) are indeed a new extension of existing law - which is why the trial court in this case was reversed.

Special kudos to Attorneys Stephen Temko and Dawn Gray on behalf of the Association of Certified Law Specialists (an organization serving the public interest that I am proud to be a member of) for weighing in with amicus curiae briefs that probably helped to inform the appellate justices in positive ways.

Because this case is important I am going to help it be digested in two gulps - this is Part I.

The root holding of IRMO Margulis is this: Once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets. It is now clear that managing spouses have the burden of proof to account for missing assets that they controlled. Family Code section 1100 states that "either spouse has the [right of] management and control of the community personal property, ..., as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse." 
 
But when parties separate the more empowered partner often grabs or already manages all the marbles, and then enjoys the advantage of continuing to carry those marbles around and even spending them down until the community property pot is ultimately divided. Without accountability this frequently led to abuses and misappropriations that - in the absence of this new rule - favored that party and facilitates their practical ability to defraud the community property estate, notwithstanding a legal duty per Family Code section 721(b) to account for what went where. Until now. The Margulis rule is necessary to protect the rights of an "out-spouse" as a matter of basic fiduciary protections.

The facts of the case as set forth in the appellate decision are these (and are reminiscent of the facts of the Davenport decision):  Alan and Elaine separated after 33 years of marriage in August, 1996. Alan moved out of the parties' Irvine home and moved to Chicago to start a  new job. Elaine remained in the family residence. They owned a home in Palm Desert, California.The marriage yielded two children who are now adults.

During the marriage Alan was the sole working spouse and exercised "complete control" of the couple's finances - sound familiar? This included retirement, bank, and investment account personal property assets. Although Alan moved out in 1996, Elaine did not file for divorce for another six years - in 2002. Five more years passed before Alan even filed a response in those proceedings. Throughout this period Alan paid Elaine just enough, evidently, for her to be satisfied with the financial status quo so that she undertook no steps to move the divorce towards a conclusion. I can only speculate what psychological and emotional dynamics were at play in these people's lives, but infer that Elaine trusted Alan enough that she did not perceive that she needed to take vigorous steps to protect herself. Which gave him free reign for a long, long time.

Once the case did begin to move forward, as often happens when there is a significant power imbalance in relationship, it began to move quickly and that pace certainly further advantaged the husband. Commonly it is the in-spouse who is rushing the case to trial while the out-spouse plays catch-up and the parties, or the in-spouse, play discovery games and hide and seek with assets, disclosures, and backup. Bank accounts are easily susceptible to this type of abuse because they are document intensive, and expensive to evaluate. In and out transactions (deposits in, transfers out) must each be traced in order for forensic experts and the court to know how to characterize and characterize transactions and the flow of cash. Here Alan filed his Response to Elaine's 2002 Petition on February 21, 2007, and the parties found themselves in a pre-trial Mandatory Settlement Conference only six months later. This means that Elaine's team had very little time to prepare since Alan knew where the marbles were but elected not to share their identity and location.

There was a single "smoking gun" in the case which consisted of what became at trial "Exhibit 18." This was a two-page document that was entitled "confidential personal financial statement" for "Alan/Elaine Margulis," dated February 1, 1999. It reflected total assets of $1,305,500. The liquid (i.e., cash) portion amounted to more than half of that number.

At trial Elaine testified that, as the nonmanaging spouse, she had no personal knowledge or records of the value of the accounts at any time. This was the sole extent of her evidence at trial about the status of the assets near the date of separation, and essentially Alan's attorneys argued that this proved nothing. Elaine's attorney responded insightfully that the effect of this document was to shift the burden of proof to Alan to explain and show that he had properly disposed of those assets, or that the stock holdings lost their value as a result of market conditions - as opposed to them having been withdrawn or mismanaged by him or for his sole benefit. But the trial judge disagreed, which set up this reversal in favor of Elaine. The trial court explained "I don't believe it supports, standing alone [that] your assets listed did, in fact, exist." Wife had no other evidence to prove that they did - hence, without the rule established by Justice Aronson in this case, she would be out of luck. Her proof would have failed on the contested issues, and it did fail at the trial court level. Before this decision the trial court's perspective was a bit shallow but not surprising. It takes bold judges with considerable family law experience to read the sub-text. 

Who has the burden of proof on a topic is often key to which party wins or loses on a given issue. This is why Marulis is important to control of asset cases.

Shifting the Burden of Proof

There are two common principles linked to the concept of the "burden of proof." One is the burden of persuasion and the other is the burden of producing evidence. Often if a party cannot produce evidence on a subject that the law imposes a burden upon them to produce in order to prevail, they lose. Irmo Margulis has implications beyond family law.

The Margulis decision observes: "the trial court concluded that Elaine, the nonmanaging spouse who lacked both personal knowledge and records concerning the assets listed on exhibit 18, failed to meet the difficult burden of proving these now missing assets had existed....

The trial court's failure to place the burden of the duty on Alan relieved him of the duty to account for his postseparation management of these assets. Thus, Alan did not have to prove the amounts that had been in these accounts or that he had properly disposed of those sums. This lack of accountability poses a risk of abuse and runs afoul of the statutory scheme imposing broad fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting on a managing spouse." [Emphasis added].

It continued: "Given that 'bedrock concerns' of 'policy and fairness' drive the analysis [citation omitted] , it is not surprising that a common trigger for burden-shifting is 'when the parties have unequal access to evidence necessary to prove a disputed issue. 'Where the evidence necessary to establish a fact essential to a claim lies peculiarly within the knowledge and competence of one of the parties, that party has the burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue although it is not the party asserting the claim.'....

Concerns over 'unequal access to evidence' [citations omitted]
are particularly pressing in the context of a marital dissolution where financial records can be crucial to ensuring the equal division of property required by Family Code section 2550.... Undoubtedly, in marriages and separations like the Margulis's where one spouse exercised exclusive control over community property, the parties will have vastly unequal access to evidence concerning the disposition of that property. When this occurs, fairness requires shifting to the managing spouse the burden of proof on missing assets. Moreover, ...,  the statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting owed between spouses further justify that result."

The Appellate Court goes on to explain why this result is fair in light of the fiduciary obligations between spouses that I have written about so much over the past few years. I will separately blog that portion of the decision.

But as I have been trumpeting now for many months, the appellate courts are working overtime to save the existing California scheme of family law to ensure transparency - it is my opinion long overdue but much appreciated!

For those in-spouses who do act in good faith after separation and the pendency of the marital proceedings, Margulis is a cautionary tale - managing spouses had better keep records of transactions affecting the community property estate and make all required disclosures or find themselves assuming the risk of loss or diminution of the value of those assets.

Please note that the appellate Court's initial decision of August 11, 2011, was modified on August 26 and September 9, 2011. The citation to the modified opinion is Marriage of Prentis-Margulis v. Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252. I have yet compare the differences in the two decisions. 




Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S.
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December 03, 2010
  ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Elkins Task Force


The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011. 

It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners. 

This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.

Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations.  Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues.  Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.

What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases."  Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification: 

        "We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel.  [Reference omitted].... 

        In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures.  But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice.  Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute.  It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support.... 

         Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function.  If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."

Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented.  Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions.  Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants.  Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court."   Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.

The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011.  Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217.  It states:

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 


December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.


T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization)

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October 28, 2010
  What Do I Do to Protect My Community Interest In PERS and STRS RETIREMENT PLANS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  What should I consider to ensure that I have a claim in my husband's teacher's retirement plan once he files for divorce?


A.  CalPERS (PERS) is the California Public Employee's Retirement System.  California Government Code sections 20000 to 21703 describe it.  This includes all kinds of California state employees including police officers, firefighters, emergency services employees, and other public safety employees as well as university teachers, professors, and other professionals.

CalSTRS (STRS) is the State Teachers' Retirement System, which is governed by California Education Code sections 22000-25115.

Both require a joinder pursuant to Family Code section 2060 as a condition to complying with an order against the plan, and they are generally cooperative in facilitating this.  Likewise, most other municipal plans require joinder and cooperate with parties who are attempting to accomplish it.

In order to protect your rights, we recommend that you not only serve the Joinder Summons and related pleadings (see our Family Law Forms Library page) but that you also give written notice, by certified mail, on the Plan per Family Code section 755.

The joinder process for those California employee benefits that you can join is easy.  The forms you need are the

It is important to name the plan correctly.  The plan is a separate entity from the employer.  Next, they do need to be properly served per FC section 2062.

Within 30 days the plan must respond by a Notice of Appearance.  However, they rarely do.  If they fail to, the clerk must enter their default.  As a practical matter, the Plan will likely accept the order of the court or any settlement you reach thereafter so long as it meets the plan administrator's requirements.



Thurman W. Arnold III, CFLS

www.ThurmanArnold.com

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October 22, 2010
  How Can I STOP My Spouse From LIQUIDATING OUR COMMUNITY PENSION?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I am afraid my husband may liquidate our 401k and IRA's that are in his name. Is there anything I can to do freeze the accounts or make sure he can't empty them out before I can hire a lawyer or file for dissolution?


A.  There is always the risk that one party will loot the community estate in anticipation of a family law proceeding, or that they may even act innocently but still wind up depriving the other spouse of their community interest in a pension asset. 

If the spouse in whose name an IRA, 401k, or other pension device is held wants to access these monies and you object, or just want to make it impossible for them to do so without first securing your agreement, there are important steps that will work so long as you undertake them in time.

Two situations with pension plans or retirement assets are common: 1) a retired or disabled spouse is already drawing upon them on a monthly or other basis and 2) or they may want to liquidate the account entirely. The latter situation is especially common, in my experience, with plans valued under $50,000. 

Lets assume your husband has a Roth IRA for $50,000. It was opened during marriage when all contributions were made, and half therefore belongs to you. He instructs Fidelity Investments to cash it out.  Since this is an early withdrawal (presumably), there is a both a 15% penalty to the IRS (unless the money is rolled into a new IRA within 60 days, or the withdrawal occurs within 60 days from the date of entry of a Divorce Judgment dividing the assets) and the monies he receives will be taxed as ordinary income at rates that depend upon his bracket. 

If there is sufficient other property in the community estate to ensure that you will get your half from some other source down the road, this may not be a problem for you. However, down the road has a habit of never arriving and in this economy other assets from which you expected a reimbursement might evaporate.

Perhaps, this is not okay with you from a number of angles. For instance, an exception to the automatic restraining orders contained in the California Dissolution Summons regarding the prohibition from invading accounts allows parties to do so to generate the monies to hire their lawyers. These "ATRO's" will not likely protect you from this type of withdrawal after the fact - however, it may protect you as a preemptory strike. As always I urge you to act fairly and not to abuse power or be manipulative in your divorce.

You have a couple of options for protecting your interests, including joining the pension plan into the family law proceedings. 

But the most important and immediate device you can use is a notice to the Plan Administrator pursuant to Family Code section 755(b). Essentially this written demand tells them that you are claiming an adverse interest in the pension assets and its legal effect is to put the Plan on the hook for any payments they make after receiving the notice. They will not release any money once you properly draft and serve it.

Serve it either personally through a process server (which may be difficult and expensive if they are in another town or state), or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.

Keep in mind that joinder of certain types of pensions - like federal public entity plans - cannot be achieved through a California joinder pursuant to Family Code section 2060. Thus, this §755 Notice is really important to freeze the status quo pending an ultimate QDRO.

By the way, this will also work to freeze other forms of payments - for instance from insurance companies.



T.W. ARNOLD

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October 22, 2010
  Are STOCK OPTIONS COMMUNITY PROPERTY?
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS
Q.  How are stock options treated if I decide to dissolve my domestic partnership?


A.  Stock options are commonly used to attract or retain key employees with incentives outside the basic salary structure. Whether you are dissolving a marriage or a RDP (registered domestic partnership), valuing and dividing stock options can be tricky. 

The simplest situation is where the stock options were earned before separation. In such cases they are clearly CP.  But often there is a question of when these benefits were in fact "earned" because employee services that generate them are sometimes contributed over long periods. These may include a pre-marriage period (when time, skill, and efforts of either party are always SP) and they may extend for some time past the date of physical separation (and so be SP). The question when stock options were earned becomes quite fact specific and depends a lot on what the employer intended and what kind of options they are. In re Marriage of Hug (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 780, 201 Cal.Rptr. 676.

Stock options that are earned during the marriage, but vest afterwards, generally belong to the community. They are treated as deferred compensation, like certain types of pensions. Usually an employee is granted the right to buy stock, now or in the future, at a fixed price. They may be forced to sell that stock back to the company if they leave. What controls whether the options are characterized as community or separate is when they are granted and when they vest. If they do not vest at all, as where a minimum number of years of service by the employee are required which is not met (even where the employee-spouse quits after separation and so blows them up), they are neither separate or community property - instead, they are not viewed as a property interest at all.  In those cases they were a "mere expectancy" that never matured.

In cases where an employee must work for the company for a fixed number of years to be eligible, but the spouses or RDP's separate before those years have been served, the options have both community and SP attributes. To the extent that they result from post-separation efforts too, they must be apportioned between CP and SP. As with how interests in pensions are commonly evaluated, courts tend to follow a "time-rule". The time rule looks like this:

DOG to DOS
__________  X  # of Shares Exercisable = C/P shares
DOG to DOV
    
        DOG = Date of Grant
        DOS = Date of Separation 
        DOV = Date of Vesting

Stock options that are granted after the DOS are usually treated as the separate property of the recipient, even where some of the employee's contributions occurred before. This is because of the importance of what the employer intended to the analysis.

This Blog is intended just to give you some sense of the law over these potentially complex questions. As with everything, different facts can lead to different outcomes and stock options are complicated financial devices. 

Also, stock option disputes sometimes involve claims of fraud - as where a small closely held company or family business tries to funnel or manipulate how when the options are granted or vest in an effort to favor one spouse over another. 

Perhaps the only practical way that a former spouse or partner may learn that stock options exist or when they vest or are exercised is by the self-disclosure of the employee. The law is clear that spouses and domestic partners are required by their fiduciary obligations to make these disclosures. Refusals to disclose can have severe consequences under Family Code section 1101.


T. W. Arnold III
http://www.MindfulDivorces.com

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September 25, 2010
  How Do I Use a MARITAL BALANCE SHEET to Figure Out How to Best DIVIDE OUR PROPERTY?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  I am considering filing for divorce, and am beginning to pencil out what the division of our assets and debts might look like.  What is a good way to go about this?


A.  Prepare a Marital Balance Sheet.  This will give you an idea of how your property could be divided in a dissolution or legal separation, and to allow you to try out different combinations of division. 

Its usefulness will depend the accuracy of your assumptions.  Often times more information or outside opinions are required to do this with any degree of correctness.  Sometimes the outside opinion that is required is the judge's decision on a disputed issue.  Marital balance sheets can range from being exquisitely simple to exceedingly complex. Remember that it is the duty of the Court to divide the community estate equally - this division means an equal division in dollars, not that you divide the family residence with a chain saw. 

The format itself is simple.  You want two columns, one for you and one for your partner or spouse.  You will categorize, value, and assign the community property between each of you.  Some categories might be listed on a different balance sheet, like pensions. 

Here are some suggestions for drafting a Marital Balance Sheet you can work with.
  • Use net value numbers, i.e., equity in homes and automobiles.  Secured debt is subtracted from fair market value - it is not divided as unsecured debt would be.  If you take the house, you take 100% of the mortgage.
  • Be sure to use realistic fair market value numbers.  Don't make your final decisions based on Zillow.  If your assumptions are flawed, your balance sheet analysis will be of limited use.
  • Use wholesale Kelly Blue Book values for cars or at least make sure whatever yardstick you use is consistent for both parties.
  • Obtain accurate and current pay-off information as to debts.  Typically that will be the value of the debts on the date they are assigned, as adjusted for Epstein Credits. 
  • Don't treat apples and oranges as apples.  For instance, list pension assets as a class separate from other assets - the present value of IRA's, 401k's, and other defined contribution plans is always different than the present value of a bank account.  These pension accounts are not valued in real dollars but must be discounted, and that may require a pension forensic or CPA.
  • Don't include separate property (the other spouse may dispute that characterization).  Pure SP doesn't go on the marital balance sheet. 
  • Assign the debts, placing those numbers in parentheses to ensure they are subtracted and not added in your running total.  Remember that it doesn't matter in whose name a credit card is parked.  If a debt was incurred during marriage the general rule as between spouses is that each owes 50-50.
  • Separate property debts don't go onto the balance sheet because they don't get evenly divided and if they were listed you may inadvertently charge yourself for half.
  • Use total values rather than 1/2 community values.  These numbers get divided as one of the last steps.
  • Don't include support or support arrears.
  • Include Epstein credits.
  • Calculate and note Watts' and Jeffries' claims
  • List professional practices and businesses but realize you probably have no practical way to put a number on them, would be entirely guessing as to their value, and would probably be wrong anyway.  Understand that business are worth more than the sum of their balance sheets or book values.
  • If you share this document with your spouse, be sure to write "Confidential Evidence Code section 1152 Materials" on it, which makes them inadmissible as evidence against you.  Otherwise you may find yourself stuck with your preliminary numbers when that is not what you intended.
  • Realize that if you share this document, no matter how preliminary it is, with your spouse you will be creating in them expectations concerning value or division that they may become stuck on.
  • Be careful how you treat negative equity on property.  For instance, if you own a car that is worth $15,000 but you owe $25,000 and want that vehicle awarded to you, the other party will not be charged for one-half of the $10,000 in negative equity.  
  • Leased vehicles should be identified but have no value.  I believe it is a good idea to list everything that you own or owe whether or not it has a value or can be valued at that time, since this list becomes an important road map for you and your lawyer.
  • Make a note of alleged breach of fiduciary duty claims, but don't value them.
  • Don't include your separate property.  Include their separate property if you claim it to be all or partly community, but understand those aren't real numbers until a judge rules.  
  • Don't leave the document lying around where someone else might find it.
  • If property is held in one spouse's name alone but a mortgage or taxes were paid during marriage, or if it was improved or refinanced during marriage, understand that the community probably has some Moore-Marsden interest in that property but that you will have great difficulty figuring out what that is without expert assistance.
  • Similarly, if one spouse owned property (i.e, real estate) prior to marriage and the other was placed on title during the marriage, note to yourself that the property has community and separate property attributes and understand you will need more information or help to value those competing interests.
  • Make a note of all separate property contributions you made for the acquisition or improvement of any property.  These are called Family Code section 2640 credits.
  • List all other reimbursements due to the community.  For instance, there are many situations where the community property is used to pay one party's separate obligations (i.e., child support from a previous marriage) and if you know to assert the claim the community may be entitled to a reimbursement.
  • List consumer goods like furniture at garage sale prices unless there is something truly special about the items.  Nothing is valued at its purchase price or even its replacement cost new.
  • Be sure to include loans from parents, work, or family members that were made during the marriage and assign those that relate to your family or work to you.
  • Make a note of any gifts to one or the other of you alone that were used to purchase or improve community property, whether they were received before or during the marriage. 
  • Look at your bank balances at the date of separation and assign those balances appropriately.  If your husband emptied the savings account the day before he walked out, list the amount he took under his column.

This is just a starting point and is valuable as a roadmap to get you thinking about what needs to be done to conclude the divorce.  Once you discipline yourself to begin to overcome any paralysis you might feel, the marital balance sheet will speak to you about what is important for you, what the issues are, and will give you some idea of what important paperwork you need to obtain to evaluate your interests now or in the future.  Get that paperwork at once.  You are going to have to do this exercise anyway once a legal actin is filed. 

This the some of the information that you must provide in your Declarations of Disclosure.  It is an efficient idea to use those forms from the beginning.  These California Judicial Council Forms include:

Getting started on this early will make any meeting with a family attorney cheaper and far more useful then if you've not even thought about these things.

To the extent you can determine values or ranges of values, add up the net equity in your column for the community property you want or get, and subtract 100% of the debts that are to be assigned to you.  Again, chances are there will be categories where you can't put a number on the items.  But if you had the numbers, then after totalling the total net to the other party, subtract the two net numbers.  One of you will show a higher number.  This number will reflect the over-credit amount to that person which needs to be equalized between you.  Divide this number by 2, and the person who netted more owes that resulting number to the one who received less.  This amount is called an "equalization payment."

This is just one way to do a marital balance sheet.  Often times there is no money to pay the equalization payment because all or most of the community is held in the form of personal and real property.  An equalization payment is no good to you unless you can collect it.  Perhaps you can get a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on the family residence that is awarded to the wife.  That is usually a bad idea - you don't want to become a bank, with all the attendant risks of default and depreciation.

Another option once you have these numbers are pencilled out is to go back and rethink how the property was divided.  Maybe you should take those Peter Max lithographs after all.  Maybe the residence or that vacant lot must be sold to raise money for the equalization payment.  It is frequently seen in Stipulated Judgments or Marital Termination Agreements.  It is not common in litigated judgments because courts generally must equalize the division at the time of trial, not in the future.  This is why property may be ordered sold to ensure an equal, current division of the estate.

If defined contribution pension plans exist these are a good place to find the money to assure the equalization payment is actually honored.  But a 401k with a net asset value of $100,000 might only be worth $80,000 after penalties and ordinary income taxes are charged on it.  Pensions can be divided without tax consequences (QDRO's) but if you are owed a $100,000 equalization, creating a new pension in your name and transferring $100,000 from the other party's interest in it is like being handed a check for $80,000. 



Thurman W. Arnold III
September 25, 2010
All Rights Reserved
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September 24, 2010
  I Have Been Paying the MORTGAGE Since SEPARATION - Am I Entitled to WATTS CREDITS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  I have been occupying our family home alone since my wife left over a year ago.  I pay all the interest only mortgage, property taxes, and insurance with no help from her.  Does she owe me half of any of this?

A.  You may be owed you something, but not necessarily one-half of what you have paid out, and different categories of expenses may be treated differently.

This situation involves at least three potential legal concepts:

    * Epstein Credits (Payment of CP Debts Reimbursed)
    * Watts Credits (Reimbursement for Exclusive Use of CP)
    * Jeffries Credits (Combination of Epstein and Watts Reimbursements)

Epstein Credits

"Epstein credits" is a doctrine that holds that as a general rule courts must reimburse one spouse who uses earnings or other separate funds after separation to pay pre-existing community estate obligations.  Courts may not order this reimbursement if under the circumstances it would be unreasonable for the paying spouse to have expected reimbursement.  Where payments are made on account of a debt for an asset that the paying spouse was or is using and the amount was not substantially in excess of the value of the use, the Court may decline to order reimbursement.  This Blog addresses your question in terms of Watts and Jeffries credits that may be owing you upon divorce or legal separation - the prior blog details Epstein credits.  

Watts and Jeffries Credits

We speak in terms of "Watts credits" when one party has the exclusive beneficial use of community property.  When money is owed on that asset, "Jeffries" reimbursements or set-offs for the payment of that debt also come into play. On the one hand you are enjoying the use of a valuable jointly owned asset and should reimburse the community for that use; on the other you are paying something to a creditor for that use, and that amount should be deducted from what you owe the community.  Watts is a calculation for the value of what should be charged for an exclusive enjoyment of community property by one spouse; Jeffries combines the value of that use with reimbursements under an Epstein analysis.  Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 373-374; Marriage of Jeffries (1991) 228 Cal.App. 3d 548, 552-553. 

Family lawyers most often see Watts and Jeffries issues arise in disputes over residences occupied by one spouse alone.  In practice none of these concepts are typically applied to automobiles, although in theory they should be, or other consumer goods.  

While Epstein credits are generally viewed by trial judges to be mandatory reimbursements, allowing Watts and Jeffries credits is discretionary.  Having a working knowledge of your local judicial bench officer's attitude on these subjects is an important bit of information for you to obtain.

Watts credits and Jeffries credits are obviously implicated in your question since you occupy the house for which you seek mortgate and other payment credits and reimbursements. 

This is how Watts Credit issues typically arise - you and  your wife jointly own a home, and both of you are obligated on the mortgage.  Assume the monthly mortgage payment is $3,200 (interest only in your case), the taxes average $400/month, and insurance costs $1,200/year.  Mortgage payments are made on the 15th of the month, and she moves out on January 14, 2009.  You were unable to make the payment on December 15, 2008, so there are two payments due on January 15.  On January 15 you make these two payments, and then continue to make all these payments until the present time or the date of settlement or trial.  You occupy the residence the entire time.  You also incur charges for water for the landscaping, etc., along with the cable bill, electricity, phone and trash.  You have a gardner and a poolman that together amount to $250/month.

Hence, you are spending $3,700 on the mortgage, taxes, and insurance plus the $250 for upkeep, along with whatever you pay for utilities each month.  Over time this amount can grow to a considerable number. 

Assume you had to borrow the money to pay December late from your mother.  This is your separate property debt to Mom if borrowed after separation.  But because your wife lived at the house up until the day she moved which include all of January, you are entitled to the equivalent of an Epstein reimbursement.  Watts and Jeffries don't yet apply.  The obligation existed before separation, was paid after separation, and the source of payment was your separate property.  The community estate owed the payment, which means you owed one-half too (she also owes one-half the utilities charged during the same period as well that were paid with your separate property).

Watts and Jeffries credits answer questions how to deal with expenses you paid after she left where you had use of the home during some some of or the entire period.  Watts credits deal with the value of that use, and Jeffries deal with the value of the use less a reimbursement claim for the cost to you of that use.  Both parties can have these claims for the same property at different times, or one party may assert these reimbursements as against one property while the other may assert them as to another. 

What if instead of you living in the home after separation, it was rented to others but the rent didn't cover all the house related debt service?  The rents are deducted from the total and you each owe one-half of the shortfall.  If you advanced the difference, you are entitled to one-half back from your wife.

Watts' Analysis

So, where one party enjoys exclusive use of a CP asset how is the reimbursement calculated?

As a pure Watts credit analysis, assume a community property house is free and clear other than upkeep and utilities and that you lived there for a time - effectively rent free since there is no mortgage.  You can imagine how it might be unfair for you to receive this benefit without paying for it.  The amount of reimbursement you owe the community depends upon the property's fair rental value.  Fair rental value (FRV) is what you would expect to pay monthly to rent the same or a similar property on the open market in an arm's length tranactions.  It is usually proven by expert broker or appraiser testimony, but as an owner of property you are free to testify to what you think its fair rental value is (as is the other spouse).  Whether your opinion is believed or given weight by the court depends upon the assumptions you make in arriving at your opinion of FRV (as well as perceived credibility).  

If the FRV is $3,000/month, and you reside in the house for 15 months from date of separation to time of trial, the total value of your use is $45,000.  From this you would deduct fixed expenses like taxes ($400/month) and insurance ($100/month).  You would therefore owe the community $2,500 x 15 = $37,500, but since you own half the community the net reimbursement to the other party is one-half that amount.  You may also be able to deduct the gardner and poolman particularly where those payments help to maintain the asset itself.  You might even deduct repairs depending upon the circumstances (installing a solid gold toilet wouldn't qualify). 

All of these reimbursements are "Watts charges" to you.  They are "Watts credits" to the party to be reimbursed. 

Jeffries' Analysis

The more commmon situation is that some mortgage debt for the house you occupy is being paid monthly.  Assume it to be $2,000 combined (including mortgage, taxes, and insurance).  If the FRV is $3,000/month but you pay $2,000 monthly then the net benefit to you is $1,000 each month or $15,000 total.  You would owe a Watts reimbursement of one-half that sum, or $7,500, on the marital balance sheet or as a direct payment to your spouse.

This is a Jeffries situation.  Note that it assumes that these costs to you were paid by your separate property.  If instead you used community monies remaining in a bank account after the DOS to pay this debt (or CP funds from some other source) then you do not subtract that from the fair rental value because the community estate has already been charged.  
 
BTW, an interesting twist on this question these days involves what happens when there is a mortgage but the party in possession fails or refuses to pay it.  They are living there at no effective charge while the other spouse may be actually paying rent elsewhere.  In that case you should not receive a credit for one-half the debt you did not actually pay, but it is difficult to predict how a judge will handle this.  After all, you may continue to owe the money and have to repay it later.  Now what happens if you then decide to file a bankruptcy, so then never have to pay it because the debt is discharged?  That bankruptcy if properly drafted should also destroy any reimbursement claims of your spouse altogether.  Great unfairness can occur in these situations.  In my experience many of the legal rules for these reimbursement claims developed in a completely different economy and fairness and common sense is struggling to keep up with the new world order.

These days with the mortgage and real estate bust another situation frequently arises:  The amount a spouse pays to maintain the mortgage and related asset expenses may exceed the FRV of the property.  Should the other spouse be charged with half of this net loss, and so forced to underwrite some of it?

Assume in the illustration above that the costs remain the same, but the mortgage is $4,000/month.  Since FRV is $3,000, you are overpaying by $1,000.  Are you entitled to a credit back for one-half of the net loss?  In my experience most courts won't give it to you but make the argument anyway.  Courts seem to feel that if you choose to live in a place that you want the other side to help underwrite, when cheaper alternate arrangements are available, then your choice to stay there should not bind the other person.  The court cannot tell you what choices to make, but it can refuse to let you benefit unfairly by them.

This makes sense on at least one level - imagine that you have a large, beautiful, expensive home that is way under water, and that your estranged wife insists on continuing to live in it despite the fact that the costs to keep it are far in excess of what comparable lodgings would cost.  Naturally she wants you to absorb as much of this to whatever extent possible which lowers her incentive to move.  If she was allowed to stay and charge you for one-half the difference between a $10,000 mortgage and its $5,000 rental value, she might continue to reside in this losing, nonproductive asset if she effectively only paid $7,500/month after credit for your $2,500.

Conclusion

While Epstein reimbursements appear to be mandatory in dividing the community assets and liabilities, Watts and Jeffries credits are viewed as discretionary reimbursements.  Many judges don't favor these reimbursements and so exercise their disrection to deny them.  I tell my clients not to count on them in negotiating settlements, and many lawyers refuse to take the argument seriously when negotiating settlement.  Another reason why lawyers tend to treat them as inconsequential, besides bluffiing, is that they can be expensive to prove and so you are being tested as to whether you have the stamina or the money to assert these claims at trial.  After all, it is best to have forensic experts testify to them, and these individuals may include an accountant and a broker/appraiser.

One solution is to request the family court to bifurcate the issue so that a short, separate trial occurs on the Watts/Jeffries issues alone.  Once the amount of Watts or Jeffries credits is fixed by judicial decision you can now place it on the marital balance sheet in your settlement discussions on the remaining issues.

The success of a Watts or Jeffries claim are fact specific.  In doing justice and equally dividing the community estate, there is broad spectrum of fairness running from "its not big deal" to being "really unfair."  You will not get much traction where the consequence of not reimbursing Watts credits or imposing Watts charges is a small number.  But where one party enjoys the asset alone without paying creditors, a very strong argument exists in favor of finding reimbursements.

Finally, be sure to include reference to Esptein reimbursements and Watts and Jeffries in your Declarations of Disclosure to make it clear that you are asserting such a claim.  If you are the spouse in possession omit any reference to it.  It is not your job to assert that argument against yourself.



Thurman W. Arnold III
September 25, 2010
All Rights Reserved.


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September 20, 2010
  How Can I Be Sure a Court Will Enforce My AGREEMENT Reached With My Spouse OUT OF COURT?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  My wife and I have reached some agreements about support and property division in our dissolution proceedings.  Neither of us have attorneys.  I want to write something up that is enforceable.  Is there anything I should know?

A.  If a case has already been filed and so is "pending", and whether you have attorneys or not, if you and your wife reach an agreement on any issue outside of court and you want to be sure that she can't back out of it before it is signed by a Judge and becomes an order, it is essential that you make reference to California Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 in any written agreement you prepare.

The terms of all types of agreements that you reach as an incident to pending family law litigation must be independently approved by a court commissioner or judge.  Usually these judicial officers just want to know that both parties are in agreement, and will not substitute their opinions for what you've decided, but not always.  Particularly where children are involved, judges have an independent obligation to ensure that a child's best interests are protected.  Still, judges will not usually reject your agreements - however, if one side backs out before the agreement becomes an order or a judgment, when children are involved a court may be more inclined to refuse to enter the disputed order than it would be if the issues involved property division, debts, or spousal support.

Often times people reach agreements in the hallway outside the courtroom, and then come into court and tell the judge what their agreement is - once that agreement is 'on the record', most courts are going to enforce it.  Those agreements often require, however, some further writing like a stipulation and it when the stipulation is presented days or weeks later that the other party may have changed their mind.  You now need to enforce that agreement, possibly by a Motion under CCP 664.6.

The problem also arises when cases get settled away from court, during the lunch break, or when the agreement doesn't get put on the record for any number of reasons.  Maybe they won't sign some other document that the signed agreement contemplated or obligated them to comply with. 

Any agreement you reach with anyone is a contract if certain conditions are met.  Unfortunately, failure to abide by such promises may only give rise to a claim for breach of contract under civil law - which is pretty worthless in family law proceedings because you have to file an independent civil action to enforce them, which takes months or years to resolve.

You want enforceable orders.  These are something more than mere verbal or written promises, or contracts that haven't ripened into Orders or Judgments.

C.C.P. section 664.6 is extremely important and useful for enforcing written agreements, because it gives the Court the power to enforce the terms of those the agreements as court orders, and to interpret them later if there is disagreement about what was in fact agreed to. 

However, in order for 664.6 to work for you, you need to either reference the statute in the document that is signed or in an oral statement on the record.  You don't need to mention the section specifically, but I recommend that the following language should appear in the agreement or court transcript:  "The parties request the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement  per CCP 664.6" is the optimal language to use.




Thurman Arnold
http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com
 


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September 16, 2010
  How Are Funds in a JOINT BANK ACCOUNT Treated in Dissolution or Legal Separation?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  My Wife removed all the money from our joint savings account immediately before filing for divorce.  Some of that money included an inheritance from my grandmother.  What are my rights to recover any of it?

A.  When there is a joint bank account in the names of parties who are married, their net contributions to the account is presumed under the law to be and remain their community funds.  This applies regardless whether the deposit agreement with the institution describes them as married.  Probate Code section 5305(a).

Affected "accounts" mean a contract for deposit of funds between a depositor and a financial institution and includes a checking or savings account, a certificate of deposit, share account, and similar arrangements.  Probate Code section 5122(a).

However, this presumption can be rebutted - as in the case of your inheritance contributions to the account if you can meet your burden of proof by either of the following:
  • If some or all of the funds on deposit you contend are your separate property can be traced from separate property (i.e., the inheritance) they will be confirmed to you unless your wife can establish you made a written agreement that expressed a clear intent that those sums would become community property (a transmutation)
  • If the two of you made a written agreement, separate from the deposit agreement itself, that expressly provided that the deposited sums that are claimed not to be community property were in fact not to be community property then you will not be reimbursed.

Hence, you need the paper trail for the receipt of the inheritance monies into this joint account in order to establish they still belong to you as separate property.  As long as you do trace these funds, your wife's argument that you gifted the monies to her or the both of you by verbal agreement or by your conduct will not succeed. 

However, when monies are commingled over time this tracing becomes more difficult. Particularly in checking accounts, money comes in from other sources (like community earnings) and goes out (often to pay community expenses).  The question becomes which money is applied to what outflows?  
  
The law presumes that money that goes out of a commingled account is spent first on the community needs and expenses, meaning that what remains is more likely to be considered separate.  The law expects the community to pay community expenses, not that you first use your separate property - as long as their are sufficient community funds on hand.  If these community funds become exhausted then withdrawals of what is your separate remaining monies may be lost to the community.

In your situation you have a reimbursement claim for what she took and you should receive a credit on the marital balance sheet.  She may owe you 100% of the inheritance and 50% of the balance.  Your worst case is that she owes you half of what she took. Immediately begin to collect the needed bank and inheritance records to prove your claims.

Maintaining records during and after marriage is the most important thing you can do to preserve and protect your interests.  Unfortunately, few people realize this until after the horse has left the barn.




Thurman W. Arnold III

www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com


 

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September 13, 2010
  When Is It Possible to Keep the FAMILY RESIDENCE From Being Sold?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  My wife cares for our children, but now she insists on keeping the residence that I moved out of 3 months ago.  Is it true that it will be ordered sold or that she has to buy me out in our divorce?

A.   Not necessarily.  If she has an experienced attorney, she may seek a "deferred sale of home" order.  These are formerly known as "Duke" orders and once (when I was a puppy attorney) were quite common - today they are rare.  However, upon a proper showing a trial judge may issue them.

A "deferred sale of home order" means an order that temporarily delays the sale and awards the temporary exclusive use and possession of the family home to the custodial parent of a minor child or child for whom support is authorized under FC §§3900 and 3901 or under FC §3910. It is authorized whether or not the custodial parent has sole or joint custody. Such an order is made to minimize the adverse impact of dissolution of marriage or legal separation on the welfare of the child.[FC §3800(b)].

If one of the parties requests a deferred sale of home order, the judge must first determine whether it is economically feasible to maintain [FC §3801(a)]:

  • The payments of any note secured by a deed of trust, property taxes, and insurance for the home during the period the sale of the home is deferred; and
  • The condition of the home comparable to that at the time of trial.

In making this determination, the court must consider all of the following[FC §3801(b)]:

  • The resident parent's income;
  • The availability of spousal support, child support, or both spousal and child support; and
  • Any other sources of funds available to make those payments.

The legislative intent behind these determinations include [FC §3801(c)]:

  • Avoiding the likelihood of possible defaults on the payments of notes and resulting foreclosures,
  • Avoiding inadequate insurance coverage,
  • Preventing deterioration of the condition of the familyhome, and
  • Preventing any other circumstance that would jeopardize both parents' equity in the home.

A judge asked to consider the issue will consider the following in determining whether a deferred sale is necessary to minimize the adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the child. [FC §3802(a).]  Factors considered in exercising discretion include all of the following [FC §3802(b)]:

  • The length of time the child has resided in the home;
  • The child's placement or grade in school;
  • The accessibility and convenience of the home to the child's school and other services or facilities used by and available to the child, including child care;
  • Whether the home has been adapted or modified to accommodate any physical disabilities of a child or a resident parent in a manner that a change in residence may adversely affect the ability of the resident parent to meet the needs of the child;
  • The emotional detriment to the child associated with a change in residence;
  • The extent to which the location of the home permits the resident parent to continue employment;
  • The financial ability of each parent to obtain suitable housing;
  • The tax consequences to the parents;
  • The economic detriment to the nonresident parent of a deferred sale of home order; and
  • Any other factors the court deems just and equitable.




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September 13, 2010
  My Husband and I Want to Informally DIVIDE OUR PROPERTY. What are some IDEAS for How We Go About It?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.   My Husband and I are separating and plan to divorce.  Can you give us some ideas for informally dividing our property without court intervention between ourselves?

A.  The following are alternative methods for resolving community property division and valuation disputes. [See Marriage of Cream (1993) 13 CA4th 81, 94-95.]  They cannot be ordered by a Court, but are frequently suggested by family law judges and lawyers.  You need first to stipulate to the method used, since absent a Stipulation your division may not be later enforceable if either of you refuse to ratify and abide by it.  Oral agreements about how you will divide your property are not by themselves enforceable, even if they have been fully executed (i.e., complied with).

    * In-Kind Division: Each party takes one-half of assets such as bank accounts and stock in a corporation, and/or one-half of the debts.

    * Trade-off Division: You may stipulate to settle your property disputes, without regard to value, by agreeing one of yoiu will take certain items of property, e.g., the furniture, and the other will take other items, e.g., the car.

    * Piece-of-Cake Division: This method gets its name from the common situation where two children have a piece of cake to be cut in half. To avoid the argument over who gets the "bigger" half, it is agreed that one will cut the cake and the other gets to choose which piece he or she will receive. In the marital property context, one party makes up two lists of the property in question that he or she believes are equal, and the other party chooses which list of items she or he will take. (You may want to agree not to break up sets, e.g., a dining room set, a set of dishes, matching art works, etc.) The piece-of-cake method is particularly useful for dividing furniture and furnishing that usually have a real value to the parties far in excess of their fair market value. The method is also useful in short-term marriages for dividing wedding gifts.

    * One Values, the Other Chooses: One of you places a value on each item of community property in dispute and the other party chooses those items he or she will take at the stated value up to one-half the total value. Alternatively, the party choosing may choose any, all, or none of the items, with any items not chosen going at the stated value to the one who set the value. An equalization payment can be required. In dividing furniture and furnishings, an alternative to piece-by-piece choice is to list furniture and furnishings room-by-room, and each party chooses by room.

    * You Take It or I Will Take It: One party places a value on an asset at which that party is willing to let the other party be awarded the asset, or else the former will be awarded the asset at that value.

    * Appraisal and Alternate Selection: An appraiser is selected by stipulation to value each of the items in question. The parties then choose items alternately until all items are taken. The one to make the first choice can be designated by the flip of a coin. Another approach is to let one party go first and the other party then gets two selections, after which choices are made alternately. It is usually preferable to agree that sets not be broken up. It might be agreed that if a party takes a set it counts as that many choices, e.g., a dining room table and four matching chairs counts as five choices, and the other party then makes the next five choices.

    * Sale: The parties agree that the items in question be sold at a public sale or to a particular buyer with the proceeds divided equally, or in whatever other proportion is necessary to accomplish a satisfactory or equal division, considering the other marital assets or obligations each is receiving. For modest furniture or furnishings, the sale may be a garage sale.

    * Sealed Bid: Each of the parties submits a sealed bid on each item of property in dispute, using the same list. The bids are opened simultaneously and the one bidding the highest amount for an item gets that item valued at the figure he or she bid, with an equalizing payment to be made, if necessary. This method can also be used for disposition of the family home, other real property, or a family business that both parties have operated, where each seeks to have it awarded to him or her.

    * Interspousal Auction: This is a straight auction between the parties, usually with an agreed minimum incremental increase over the last bid being required. The high bidder gets the asset at the amount of his or her bid with an equalizing payment being made, if necessary. To the extent a major asset is involved such as a family business or real estate, the stipulation might provide that each of the parties have an advisor present during the bidding.

    * Arbitration: The valuation and division of the community property in question is determined by an arbitrator selected by the parties. The parties should understand that the arbitrator is not required to follow the law, and his or her decision, for all practical purposes, is final and not subject to appeal. Because arbitration usually takes much less time than a court trial, the parties might consider stipulating with your consent that you hear the case as an arbitrator.

    * Mediation: Mediation is greatly underutilized in family law cases. It can be a very effective and satisfying way for the parties to reach agreement on the value and division of their marital property.

    * Real Property: If both parties want community real property, one of the foregoing methods of resolution can be used. If neither wants it, it can be listed for sale with a broker stipulated to by the parties, at a listing price recommended by the broker. If one wants the property but the other feels that he or she is offering too little, the latter can list it for sale with a broker of his or her choosing. If the property does not sell within a specified period of time, the listing price will be periodically reduced until it reaches the figure where the net proceeds would be equal to what the other party offered. The property then goes to the offering party for the amount of the offer.

    * Combination: When more than one marital asset is in dispute, one of the foregoing methods might be used for one asset, while one or more other methods might be used for other assets.



 

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July 16, 2010
  DISCOVERY in California Marital Proceedings - What Are Requests for Admission?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  How do I use Requests for Admission in my dissolution  proceeding?

A.  Requests for Admission ("RFA's") can be a useful discovery tool in family law proceedings because they allow parties in divorce and partnership litigation to resolve issues one way or another so that no evidence need be introduced at trial by asking the other party to admit or deny something.  This typically involves establishing that certain documents are genuine (i.e., a prenuptial agreement entered into before marriage or a transfer deed or promissory note or copies of documents where original are missing or destroyed).  Once this document is admitted as genuine, no further foundational evidence needs to be offered to admit the item into evidence.  Other uses include establishing that certain property belongs to the community estate, or that it is one party's separate property.  In such situations no further evidence need be offered on the subject issue at any later hearing in order for the Family Court to take what was admitted to be established fact.  Once something is established in this way, no contradicting evidence can be introduced to disprove it.

Requests for Admission are governed by California Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.010 and the statutes that follow with that code.  We have provided some of the more important ones on our Family Code Statutes page. 

You are entitled to ask a total of 35 RFA's as a matter of right.  But you can ask as many as you need, as long as they are requested for a proper purpose, relevant, not overly burdensome, and you also have executed and supplied the Declaration for Additional Discovery required by CCP § 2033.050.

There is a Judicial Council form that you can use for RFA's, but it is not required.  I will upload and link to that form shortly.  I also intend to provide my own form that you can modify for your use on our California Family Law Form Library page.

Another important use for Admission's Requests is that you can combine them with Civil Form Interrogatories, Number 17.1, which requires the responding party to state all facts and evidence that they know of, and other relevant information, for each RFA which they refuse to admit.  This can flesh out claims and defenses of the other party that you may be wondering about, and the evidence and witnesses which the other party claims will support them.  The answers to these form interrogatories may also establish that a denial of an otherwise undisputed fact, or genuine document, was not in good faith.

One of the chief benefits of RFA's beyond putting to rest matters that are really not issues (and hence saving the time and money to otherwise prove or disprove them), is that a failure to admit them in good faith gives the Court discretion to award the asking party their legal expenses and costs in producing evidence on those same issues if the Court later decides at trial that they were not reasonably in dispute.

As with some other types of discovery (interrogatories and production requests) the responding party has thirty days to answer (plus five more if you serve them by mail).  Make sure you always provide a proof of service signed by a nonparty with any type of discovery you serve.

If the other party fails to respond to your Requests for Admission, you are entitled to file a motion that the requests be deemed admitted.  Other sanctions might be available, like a court finding no evidence challenging the proposed undisputed items may be offered by the other side in later proceedings.

The subject of objections to discovery is a complicated one for another day.  Check our search engine to see if I 've written about it by the time you've landed here.

TWA


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June 14, 2010
  Is a PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT signed without an attorney ENFORCEABLE?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  Before my wife and I married, she convinced me to sign a Prenup prepared by her brother, who is a Los Angeles divorce attorney.  It says that I waive any right to property acquired with her earnings.  It also says I had the opportunity to get legal advice but was choosing not to.  At the time she had all the money and I couldn't afford an attorney.  Besides, she told me she would be fair if we separated.  Now, six years later, she says I have no rights to the house we bought soon after our honeymoon.  A friend told me that since I didn't have an attorney at the time I signed it, the agreement cannot be enforced.  Is this true?

A.  Whether or not a Prenup - formally known as a premarital agreement - gets enforced is highly fact specific, so it is impossible for me to answer your question except in general terms.  I would need more information and to look at the document carefully.  I can give you some useful pointers, however.

California has adopted the UPAA (The Uniform Premarital Act) as Family Code sections 1600-1617.  Prior to its adoption prenups were viewed by courts with suspicion, and they were much harder to enforce.  One reason was that as a matter of public policy it was believed that prenuptial agreements undermined marriage and so promoted divorce.  Today they are viewed as supportive of the marriage institution, particularly in cases of second marriages where many people won't remarry without one.  Although we speak in terms of marriage, the UPAA applies equally to registered domestic partnerships.

Still, they are viewed somewhat technically and to be enforceable they must meet the requirements of the statutes.  Family Code section 1612 speaks to what rights are properly altered by a Prenup.  Subsection (a)(1) and (3) deal with property interests.  As a starting point, there is no question but that a premarital agreement can waive interests in real property like residences.

The critical family code section dealing with enforceability is section 1615.  Anybody considering a Prenup, or questioning its validity, should scan this statute.  The chief defense to a Prenup is that it was not executed voluntarily.  If you can prove that, it will be treated as void.  If the agreement was signed as result of duress, coercion or  undue influence it will likely not be enforced.  The lack of an independent attorney can result in a finding that the agreement was not entered voluntarily. 

If one expects a premarital agreement to be enforceable, there is simply is no safe reason for dispensing with legal counsel.  Prenups should only and always be drafted by qualified attorneys, and both parties must actually be advised about their legal effect, or they may not be worth the paper they are written on. 

In all cases where my office drafts a premarital agreement, we will not proceed if the other party is unrepresented.  In fact, where the other party lacks sufficient financial resources to do so, we insist that person select counsel and that our client pay for it. In my opinion it is a dangerous practice to deny a less financially empowered spouse or domestic partner the ability to access legal counsel in these situations. 

The importance of having independent counsel in these matters is evident from the language of FC section 1615:

"(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves either of the following:
* * *
(c) For the purposes of subdivision (a), it shall be deemed that a premarital agreement was not executed voluntarily unless the court finds in writing or on the record all of the following:

(1) The party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by independent legal counsel at the time of signing the agreement or, after being advised to seek independent legal counsel, expressly waived, in a separate writing, representation by independent legal counsel.

(2) The party against whom enforcement is sought had not less than seven calendar days between the time that party was first presented with the agreement and advised to seek independent legal counsel and the time the agreement was signed.

(3) The party against whom enforcement is sought, if unrepresented by legal counsel, was fully informed of the terms and basic effect of the agreement as well as the rights and obligations he or she was giving up by signing the agreement, and was proficient in the language in which the explanation of the party's rights was conducted and in which the agreement was written. The explanation of the rights and obligations relinquished shall be memorialized in writing and delivered to the party prior to signing the agreement. The unrepresented party shall, on or before the signing of the premarital agreement, execute a document declaring that he or she received the information required by this paragraph and indicating who provided that information...."

Notice how these provisions are almost shouting 'independent legal counsel.'  It is rare to see a phrase repeated so often within the same code section. 

So examine whether your agreement, and the required separate writing, seem to address these requirements.  Also, check to see whether the other conditions for enforceability are met.  There may be other reasons why your Prenup will not be enforced, as where undue influence was exerted to obtain your signature (notice the seven day waiting period, which is intended to overcome the social pressures where a wedding date is looming).  But you would be ill-advised to embark upon a challenge to the agreement without legal counsel this time around; don't compound the problem.

A final comment:  Setting aside the prenuptial agreement may only have a limited affect upon the status of the house.  For instance, the rules relating to transmutations and reimbursements still apply.  I have written about those elsewhere in this Blog, but if the house was acquired by your wife as her separate property independently of the Prenup it remains her separate property even if the agreement is voided.  However, if there was a mortgage and it was paid down with her earnings during marriage the cancelation of the Prenup may benefit you because the community will thereby gain a Moore Marsden reimbursement right in the principal pay down and appreciation.

Again, seek out an experienced family law attorney.  And, I always urge that people consider mediating these types of family law disputes.



T.W. Arnold
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com

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May 31, 2010
  I thought my PARTNER had REGISTERED our DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP but she says she didn't. Do I have rights?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I have been living with my girlfriend for four years.  Three years ago we agreed to enter into a domestic partnership and filled out and signed the registration papers.  She told me she had filed them with the Secretary of State.  We separated last month, and when I asked her to help me financially and to divide property we acquired during the relation she said I have no rights because she never mailed in the registration.  Is she right?

A.  She may not be right if you can meet the legal test to qualify as a "putative domestic partner." 

California Family Code section 2251 sets forth remedies regarding the division of property in cases of annulments, or where a marriage turns out to be void or voidable because of some legal defect (for instance, where the parties could not be legally married because one party had not properly obtained a termination of an earlier marital status before entering the new union).  In cases of void or voidable marriages, no marital rights or obligations actually attach unless one party can establish what is known as putative spouse status.

The putative spouse doctrine was intended to protect "innocent spouses" - the partner who reasonably believes the parties were married - as long as their is an objective basis in reality for that person to have held that belief. 

This doctrine now applies equally to putative domestic partners.

For one spouse or domestic partner to qualify for this protection there must have been an attempted compliance with the procedures for creating a valid marriage or registered domestic partnership.  Sincerely believing that a marriage or domestic partnership existed by itself is not enough.  Do you have a copy of the registration document that was never filed?  This is exactly the type of evidence that would be most useful in establishing an objective basis for having believed you were registered.

In a very similar case - In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000 - Darren Ellis and David Arriaga complied with the first step in the procedure for creating an RDP, the completion of the registration papers.  Arriaga was supposed to mail the registration to the Secretary of State, but he never did.  When Ellis filed a Petition to Dissolve the Domestic Partnership, Arriaga asked the trial court to dismiss Ellis' action on the ground that no RDP in fact existed.  The trial court agreed with Arriaga, but the appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling. 

The appellate court held that a person's reasonable, good faith belief that his or her RDP was validly registered with the Secretary of State entitled that person to the rights and duties of an actual registered domestic partner - even where the partnership never was in fact registered - under this equitable putative spouse doctrine.

However the court also restated the rule of putative spouses that the question is tested by an objective standard  - not just by what one party believed, however genuinely.  For instance, if both parties know that the registration was never mailed neither can qualify as putative domestic partners because without a belief in the mailing it would not be objectively reasonable to conclude an RDP existed.

Parties who qualify for putative spouse and putative domestic partnership status may be entitled to all of the benefits and burdens of marital partners or RDP's.  This includes rights to property acquired during marriage, responsbilities for debt incurred during marriage, and support benefits.  You can get more information concerning those issues - which are largely the same as if you were married persons - by using our search engine at the top of the page.

The likelihood of your success depends a lot on what evidence you can produce establishing that you reasonably believed the formalities were complied with.  If your former partner admits that you both completed the document but that she never mailed it AND never told you that she hadn't mailed it (unfortunately people tend to be dishonest about these things in the face of legal proceedings), you are likely to prevail. 

If she denies it and you don't have a copy of the registration papers you need to look to other evidence to establish the basis for your belief the two of you were registered - for instance, if a witness can testify that your partner held herself out to be your RDP that may persuade a court. 

Are there any other documents that were ever signed (i.e., applications for benefits of any kind, joint bank accounts, trust documents or wills) that make reference to your purported status?  If so these should be collected and submitted to the Court.

You would initiate a proceeding just like you would if there had actually been a RDP - this would be a Petition to Dissolve a Domestic Partnership.

Finally, you still may have the basis for a civil Marvin claim which is founded upon written or oral promises to undertake a joint asset pooling arrangement or joint venture when two people decide to share lives (however, your chances of recovering support or "palimony" are slim).  I will blog Marvin actions another day.

Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
5/31/10



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May 24, 2010
  What METHODS are used for VALUING BUSINESSES in divorce?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I own a business that I began shortly after marriage.  Now I am getting divorced.  Is this community property even though my partner never worked the business, and if it is what methods might be used to value it?


A.  With certain exceptions where, for instance, there has been a transmutation of a community property interest in a business to your separate property per Family Code section 852 (which requires a writing signed by the party adversely affect showing an intent change the character of property from community to separate), all property acquired during marriage through the time, skill and efforts of either spouse is community property.  Family Code section 760. 

A business begun by one spouse after the date of marriage and before physical separation will need to be divided in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding, and if you and your spouse cannot agree on its value it may need to be evaluated by an expert.  This is usually accomplished under the provisions of Evidence Code section 730.

There are a number of methods that can be used to value a business, and depending upon whether the business sells services or products different valuation methods may be more appropriate than others.  As a general overview, these include:
  • Evaluating sales proceeds
         When a business is actually being sold in an arm's length transaction to a third party, the price that a willing buyer will pay and a willing seller accept determines value.  This is rare in the case of business valuations, but more common with respect to real property.
  • Comparables

         The specific asset is valued based upon the actual sales of similar assets or properties with actual sales that can be tracked.  With professional practices, this is common with dental businesses which are commonly bought and sold, and so numbers from the sales of other dental practices may be persuasive to a court.  Whether this method is useful depends very much on the nature of the business - sometimes there is nothing comparable or little published information about comparable sales.   Comparables are also considering in setting the value of real estate. 

  • Liquidation value

Sometimes businesses will be cut up into parts that are sold separately.  Sometimes the business is valued in terms of what these parts would sell for.  It is rarely used except when the parties intend to actually liquidate the company.  Liquidation value does not generally include valuing goodwill (because the assumption is there will be no on-going concern).  Goodwill is the nightmare component to valuing businesses.  Many people in divorce who manage the business believe strongly this is how businesses should be valued (in part because in the absence of an actual sale, it is a fiction to say what a buyer might pay when no such buyers as a practical matter exist).

  • Book Value

This relies upon the company records to determine what 'retained value' is.  It is rarely used, because it is more a statement of how the company perceives itself, or structured (or even 'cooked') its books, than any objective indication of value.

  • Adjusted book value

This is performed through a forensic audit.  Usually it is performed on a cash basis, and accounts receivable and much more must be analyzed.

  • Going concern value

This describes a method that includes valuing the business as greater than the sum of its parts.  There are a number of factors that are used.

  • Capitalized earnings

This is the most common method for valuing businesses used in California because courts find it to be most reliable.  If you hope to use a different method, you will need to justify why that method is fairer to the out-spouse. This method requires expensive forensics. 



It is not uncommon to bifurcate the question of business valuations to try them separately because often this is the thorniest issue to be decided in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding.  



The law of business valuations is extremely complex and even contradictory.  The purpose of this blog is merely to introduce the concepts.  I will develop these themes in more detail in additional family law blogs. 




Thurman W. Arnold III 

http://www.ThurmanArnold.com

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May 11, 2010
  What are EPSTEIN REIMBURSEMENTS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold


Q.  My soon to be ex wife and I are getting our divorce with the assistance of a paralegal.  That person has prepared a Marital Settlement Agreement.  The paralegal says she cannot give us legal advice.  There is a phrase in the agreement that says something about each of us waiving Epstein reimbursements.  I have no idea what this means.


A.  "Epstein reimbursements" deal with the question:  "How do we divide debts that we incurred during the marriage, where one of us made payments after we separated and up to the time of divorce?"  

A common situation is that parties have credit card debt that needs to be divided in the divorce.  Say there was a balance of $10,000 owing to American Express on December 31st, the day before your wife drank too much at the office New Year's celebration and had an unfortunate tryst with her boss - this isn't the first time this has happened, and your New Year's resolution is to move out (sorry, I am just trying to be colorful), and so you do move out the next day.  Her reaction is to file for divorce, because her boss looks way more interesting to her than you do these days.

Under this example January 1 is your date of separation.  From the date of separation on, the earnings of either spouse are no longer community property, or joint earnings, but instead these earnings belong to each of you separately.  Family Code § 771.

Often where a credit card is in the name of one person alone, the other spouse or domestic partner doesn't contribute to the payments after separation - sometimes because they won't and sometimes because they can't.  But as between the two of you, the $10,000 is jointly owed to American Express, even if the other spouse did not sign the credit card application or is not named on the card, or on the statement.  This is also true whether or not both parties directly benefitted from the use of the credit card - for instance, maybe the $10,000 was charged by your wife to buy shoes over the course of the past year to help make herself feel better about the fact that you never have intimate conversations with her any more (or for any other reason), or perhaps you charged the card to add more chrome to your Harley Davidson FatBoy because your hairline is receding.

If the card is not paid, American Express can pursue collection either against the spouse who is the account holder, or against the community property of both spouses.  Family Code § 910.  If the credit card is in your name alone, it will be your credit that might be ruined if the monthly installments are missed.  

Now again, as between you and your wife, the general rule is that each of you owe one-half of the credit card debt which means that all other things being equal, in a property settlement or if a Judge is forced to divide your property and estate, if one party is assigned 100% of the debt the other owes a reimbursement of $5,000.  Lawyers and Judges speak of assigning the debt to one party or the other on the "marital balance sheet" which implies a corresponding credit or right of setoff against the division of some other item of property.  

epstein reimbursements and gambling There are, of course, exceptions.  These exceptions frequently include (a) situations where a debt was incurred in breach of a fiduciary obligation owing the community estate or to the other spouse and (b) where one party retains the benefit of the property that the credit card was used to acquire (believe it or not, I am frequently asked about breast augmentations or other cosmetic surgeries - except in extreme cases, courts do not charge one party for these).  For example, if when you learned of your wife's affair your reaction included flying to Las Vegas and having a wild weekend and you recklessly charged the $10,000 at the casino, this might be considered a breach of fiduciary duty and result in the entire $10,000 being your responsibility even though the two of you had yet to physically separate.  Or, if instead you spent the $10,000 buying more chrome for your Harley and you expect to keep it in the divorce, then even though the $10,000 was otherwise a community obligation equitable considerations may result in the debt being assigned to you.  If in the divorce the two of you decide to sell the Harley but the chrome you spent $10,000 buying adds only $2,000 in value to the sale's price, in that case the $10,000 remains a joint obligation because you neither breached a fiduciary duty nor retained a sufficient benefit that the law would charge you for it and the asset is being divided.  Another common situation is where one spouse retains the furniture or refrigerator charged at Lowes - in that case more of the debt may be assigned to that party. 

Assuming you continue to make monthly payments of principal and interest on the credit card up to the point of dividing the debt in a marital settlement agreement (MSA), or if a judge makes the call for you both after a trial, as a general proposition your wife owes you one-half of all those payments.  These are called Epstein credits or Epstein reimbursements in California, and many other community property states have similar rules.  These are also called equitable reimbursements, meaning that the right to be reimbursed is not absolute and certain but that the court has wide discretion to grant the reimbursement or not depending upon fairness.  Typically California family law courts do grant the reimbursement so long as the parties benefited equally (or the money was equally wasted). 

The principle in California was first set forth in the case of Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76.  It is to be distinguished from the rule that the debt itself, if community, must be divided equally between parties in divorce.  Family Code § 2550.  It covers reimbursements rights that accrue between physical separation and the date of ultimate division of the liability.

So, the agreement the paralegal has prepared includes an agreement each of you is giving up any right to be reimbursed for debt related payments made after separation.  You are not being asked to waive your credit for $5,000 if the $10,000 debt is assigned to you (unless there is a separate provision assigning the credit card balance to you completely).  You are being asked to waive all the debt maintenance up to this point.  It is not an unusual clause in an MSA, but it may or may not be in your best interests to agree to it.

Epstein credits take a variety of forms, and are not limited to credit card debt.  The Epstein case itself involved a husband who voluntarily made the mortgage, insurance, and tax payments on the family residence during the separation period.  Wife and their son occupied the home.  Up to that point the law was that if one party used separate property (earnings after separation) to pay community debt (the mortgage, etc., on the residence), there was a presumption that this was intended to be a gift to the community unless an agreement could be proved that it was not to be a gift.

Each party may have separate Epstein claims as to different items of debt.  

Upon separating, it is a smart idea to get and keep copies of credit card statements and statements for all liability accounts as of the date of separation.  From an accounting point of view, the date of separation is a critical snapshot of a point in time.  It is essential that the parties maintain these records as proof of what the numbers were, and of what payments were made afterwards.

Whether or not you should waive the Epstein reimbursements that might be owing you is part of the give and take of negotiating a divorce settlement.  These are usually simple accounting issues, but not always.   

If your Wife gets an attorney that attorney might try to convince you to waive the Espteins, or hope that you don't understand the concept or have it independently explained to you.  In my experience where we are speaking in terms of vanilla debt (meaning there is no questionable conduct and the charges were incurred in the normal course), your wife's lawyer would also agree that you are entitled to these reimbursements without a fight if you know enough to insist.

There is an important flip side and hybrid of the Epstein reimbursement concept - that of Watts charges and credits.  The deal generally with who pays for the beneficial use of community property (i.e., the home) during the separation period, once the divorce is finalized.

I will address those separately. 



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
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December 29, 2009
  How Are SOCIAL SECURITY benefits Treated In DIVORCE?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  How are Social Securities Benefits Divided in Divorce?

A.  The Social Security Act of 1935, which as been amended numerous times over the years, is governed solely by the federal law.  States are powerless to effect changes in its rules and procedures.  Social Security benefits are not actually divided in divorce, and California courts do not divide social security rights.  They are not the subject of divorce settlements.  Social security benefits are considered the separate the property of the contributing spouse.  This is odd, since all other retirement plans are considered as part of the marital estate.  Government employees do not contribute to Social Security.  It is wasteful because, as discussed below, multiple former spouses can collect benefits on the same worker's history.  It is unfair because gays and lesbians who are domestic partners under state law gain no rights in the other's work history.

A spouse of a retired or disabled worker is entitled to derivative social security benefits IF the marriage was at least 10 years in duration.  This is defined as the period between the date of marriage and the date of termination of marital status.  It has nothing to do with periods of physical separation, and is not affected by a decree of legal separation.  It has nothing to do with the filing of a divorce itself.

The Social Security Act originally only covered certain job categories which reinforced traditional stereotyped views of family systems. Women generally qualified for insurance only through their husbands or children.  Amendments in 1939 added women, who became eligible to collect on their own earnings' record and became entitled to collect that or 50% of their husband's.  It was not until 1950 that benefits were extended to former spouses with children.  In 1965, former spouses without children were added but they had to have been married at least 20  years.  In 1977 this time period was reduced to 10 years.

Former spouses married for at least 10 years are now entitled to receive 50% of the Social Security beneficiary's benefits (as either derivative or dependent benefits) without reducing the worker's 100% benefit - in order words, in divorce the working spouse who contributed does not divide or share their retirement benefits and so the derivative benefits for former spouses do not cost either spouse.  They certainly, however, cost the taxpayers.  If the worker spouse dies, a former spouse(s) receives 100% of the benefits of the worker as a surviving former spouse.

This has many strange consequences.  One is that since spouses and state courts cannot divide the benefits, and it costs the working former spouse nothing to allow the other spouse to claim these benefits.  Imagine what hardship this might cause to a spouse whose marriage is terminated 9 years, 11 months, and 355 days after the date of marriage.  They would receive no derivative benefits, period.  It would cost the worker spouse nothing to delay dissolving the marriage one more day.  Many spouses who anticipate a future divorce strategically hold off filing until they are assured this time has passed or will pass, for good reason.  In California marital status cannot be terminated earlier than 6 months after the dissolution is filed and served.  I always alert clients to this area of the law, and have many times recommended patience; it would be attorney malpractice not to.  Sometimes raging working spouses want an earlier divorce just to deprive the other of this benefit.  This can be most unfortunate and downright ugly.  There is a procedure in California for dissolving marital status before a divorce case is completely finished (e.g., where property rights have not been determined) called bifurcation of marital status.  Sometimes a spouse wishes to get divorced immediately so that they can remarry, and this can interrupt the 10 years if the Court approves it.  Courts can order that the bifurcating party indemnify the other out of their own pocket for the loss of benefits, but as a practical matter there is no way for this indemnification to occur.  

Another consequence illustrates a major waste within the Social Security system.  Imagine that Fred marries Nancy the homemaker when they are 19.  After 10 years, they divorce. and Fred marries Jennifer.  After 10 years he moves on, dissolving that marriage and marrying Diane next.  He is now 49 years of age.  With his record, he still may have a couple of more marriages in him.  At this point, assuming that none of these three women have remarried or that they remarry after age 60 (a new marriage before age 60 terminates the right to derivative benefits), each of them are eligible to receive 50% of Fred's benefits while he continues to be entitled to 100%.  This means that 250% worth of benefits will be paid upon Fred's earning history alone.  Even better, if Fred dies before them, each ex-wife is thereupon entitled to receive Fred's 100% - which means 300% will be paid out and, since Fred is a serial monogamist, he will probably leave a widow (Tara) who likewise receives 100%.

Also, note the risks to the women.  If Nancy or Jennifer remarry before age 60 they lose any claims to the benefits generated by Fred and the count begins at zero with their new spouse and are based on the new spouse's earnings record with Social Security (assuming this person is not a government worker).  If their new marriage does not make the 10 year mark, they receive nothing from Social Security from either spouse.  This makes you want to reconsider a second marriage doesn't it - at least if you are a non wage earning wife!  Of course, few people ever think about this because they don't know about it; this is one goal of my website as an informational tool.

California has two state pension plans for government workers which exist outside of Social Security.  These are the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS) and the California State Teachers' Retirement System (CalSTRS).  There are a number of city and county pension plans.  California teachers, state public safety officers (police and firefighters), and other workers who don't pay into the retirement portion of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA), do not receive social security benefits once they retire. 

They only may be eligible for some SS benefits based upon their spouse's record or their own earnings from private sector jobs.  However, even these benefits may be reduced under the Windful Elimination Provision (WEP) or the Government Pension Offset (GPO).  These are complicated rules and formulas which are beyond the scope of this answer. 

Social Security rights divorce



http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com

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August 29, 2009
  Woman not from this country mistreated by American husband
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  From J:

Hello, I am an Australian woman who married almost 4 years ago an American and he treats me like a housekeeper not as his wife. We are in Phoenix right now, but we were living most of the time in Indian Wells, CA, at his house.  He is also threatening me that he is going to take my two daughters away from me. (Mine from a previous relation).  He changed since we become a married couple. I really fell alone and he is denying my existence. I have nobody here and he doesn't even let my go visit my parents for a few weeks. What would be a good advice?  

Best Regards.

J.

A.  Hello J: 

That kind of treatment may be a form of domestic violence, and you have my sympathy and concern. Have there been threats or hitting?

When do you return to the desert? I assume you have no ability to travel on your own because you have no money? You may need to look to your family for help.

This gentlemen is not going to take your children away from you, no matter what he says.  

In terms of dissolution rights, you are absolutely entitled to have the marriage dissolved, but you are not going to have huge support or property rights – typically support for a short marriage is half its length although it is possible to stall a case to stretch that out in this case, and figure if you have no income you might be entitled to about 35% of what he grosses, all other things being equal. 

In terms of property, if nothing was acquired during marriage there is not going to be much to divide, although if there has been a mortgage payment on the Indian Wells residence there might be some reimbursement.


 T.W. Arnold

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