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Recent Posts in Residences Category

August 15, 2011
  IRMO MARGULIS - Managing Spouse Has BURDEN OF PROOF To Explain MISSING ASSETS
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Marriage of Margulis (8/11/2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 277

Part One

I am always pleased to report cutting edge rulings by our appellate courts, and this is one of the most important decisions in recent years affecting who has the burden of proof to explain what happens to assets that disappear after marriage partners separate, and what the consequences are for managing "in-spouses" who cannot explain what happened to liquid (or other assets) that existed at separation but seem to have evaporated in the meantime. While upon reflection it is hard to imagine how this decision could be news because it makes such perfect sense, the Fourth Appellate District's pronouncements (by the Honorable J. Aronson) are indeed a new extension of existing law - which is why the trial court in this case was reversed.

Special kudos to Attorneys Stephen Temko and Dawn Gray on behalf of the Association of Certified Law Specialists (an organization serving the public interest that I am proud to be a member of) for weighing in with amicus curiae briefs that probably helped to inform the appellate justices in positive ways.

Because this case is important I am going to help it be digested in two gulps - this is Part I.

The root holding of IRMO Margulis is this: Once a nonmanaging spouse makes a prima facie showing concerning the existence and value of community assets in the control of the other spouse postseparation, the burden of proof shifts to the managing spouse to rebut the showing or prove the proper disposition or lesser value of these assets. It is now clear that managing spouses have the burden of proof to account for missing assets that they controlled. Family Code section 1100 states that "either spouse has the [right of] management and control of the community personal property, ..., as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse." 
 
But when parties separate the more empowered partner often grabs or already manages all the marbles, and then enjoys the advantage of continuing to carry those marbles around and even spending them down until the community property pot is ultimately divided. Without accountability this frequently led to abuses and misappropriations that - in the absence of this new rule - favored that party and facilitates their practical ability to defraud the community property estate, notwithstanding a legal duty per Family Code section 721(b) to account for what went where. Until now. The Margulis rule is necessary to protect the rights of an "out-spouse" as a matter of basic fiduciary protections.

The facts of the case as set forth in the appellate decision are these (and are reminiscent of the facts of the Davenport decision):  Alan and Elaine separated after 33 years of marriage in August, 1996. Alan moved out of the parties' Irvine home and moved to Chicago to start a  new job. Elaine remained in the family residence. They owned a home in Palm Desert, California.The marriage yielded two children who are now adults.

During the marriage Alan was the sole working spouse and exercised "complete control" of the couple's finances - sound familiar? This included retirement, bank, and investment account personal property assets. Although Alan moved out in 1996, Elaine did not file for divorce for another six years - in 2002. Five more years passed before Alan even filed a response in those proceedings. Throughout this period Alan paid Elaine just enough, evidently, for her to be satisfied with the financial status quo so that she undertook no steps to move the divorce towards a conclusion. I can only speculate what psychological and emotional dynamics were at play in these people's lives, but infer that Elaine trusted Alan enough that she did not perceive that she needed to take vigorous steps to protect herself. Which gave him free reign for a long, long time.

Once the case did begin to move forward, as often happens when there is a significant power imbalance in relationship, it began to move quickly and that pace certainly further advantaged the husband. Commonly it is the in-spouse who is rushing the case to trial while the out-spouse plays catch-up and the parties, or the in-spouse, play discovery games and hide and seek with assets, disclosures, and backup. Bank accounts are easily susceptible to this type of abuse because they are document intensive, and expensive to evaluate. In and out transactions (deposits in, transfers out) must each be traced in order for forensic experts and the court to know how to characterize and characterize transactions and the flow of cash. Here Alan filed his Response to Elaine's 2002 Petition on February 21, 2007, and the parties found themselves in a pre-trial Mandatory Settlement Conference only six months later. This means that Elaine's team had very little time to prepare since Alan knew where the marbles were but elected not to share their identity and location.

There was a single "smoking gun" in the case which consisted of what became at trial "Exhibit 18." This was a two-page document that was entitled "confidential personal financial statement" for "Alan/Elaine Margulis," dated February 1, 1999. It reflected total assets of $1,305,500. The liquid (i.e., cash) portion amounted to more than half of that number.

At trial Elaine testified that, as the nonmanaging spouse, she had no personal knowledge or records of the value of the accounts at any time. This was the sole extent of her evidence at trial about the status of the assets near the date of separation, and essentially Alan's attorneys argued that this proved nothing. Elaine's attorney responded insightfully that the effect of this document was to shift the burden of proof to Alan to explain and show that he had properly disposed of those assets, or that the stock holdings lost their value as a result of market conditions - as opposed to them having been withdrawn or mismanaged by him or for his sole benefit. But the trial judge disagreed, which set up this reversal in favor of Elaine. The trial court explained "I don't believe it supports, standing alone [that] your assets listed did, in fact, exist." Wife had no other evidence to prove that they did - hence, without the rule established by Justice Aronson in this case, she would be out of luck. Her proof would have failed on the contested issues, and it did fail at the trial court level. Before this decision the trial court's perspective was a bit shallow but not surprising. It takes bold judges with considerable family law experience to read the sub-text. 

Who has the burden of proof on a topic is often key to which party wins or loses on a given issue. This is why Marulis is important to control of asset cases.

Shifting the Burden of Proof

There are two common principles linked to the concept of the "burden of proof." One is the burden of persuasion and the other is the burden of producing evidence. Often if a party cannot produce evidence on a subject that the law imposes a burden upon them to produce in order to prevail, they lose. Irmo Margulis has implications beyond family law.

The Margulis decision observes: "the trial court concluded that Elaine, the nonmanaging spouse who lacked both personal knowledge and records concerning the assets listed on exhibit 18, failed to meet the difficult burden of proving these now missing assets had existed....

The trial court's failure to place the burden of the duty on Alan relieved him of the duty to account for his postseparation management of these assets. Thus, Alan did not have to prove the amounts that had been in these accounts or that he had properly disposed of those sums. This lack of accountability poses a risk of abuse and runs afoul of the statutory scheme imposing broad fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting on a managing spouse." [Emphasis added].

It continued: "Given that 'bedrock concerns' of 'policy and fairness' drive the analysis [citation omitted] , it is not surprising that a common trigger for burden-shifting is 'when the parties have unequal access to evidence necessary to prove a disputed issue. 'Where the evidence necessary to establish a fact essential to a claim lies peculiarly within the knowledge and competence of one of the parties, that party has the burden of going forward with the evidence on the issue although it is not the party asserting the claim.'....

Concerns over 'unequal access to evidence' [citations omitted]
are particularly pressing in the context of a marital dissolution where financial records can be crucial to ensuring the equal division of property required by Family Code section 2550.... Undoubtedly, in marriages and separations like the Margulis's where one spouse exercised exclusive control over community property, the parties will have vastly unequal access to evidence concerning the disposition of that property. When this occurs, fairness requires shifting to the managing spouse the burden of proof on missing assets. Moreover, ...,  the statutory fiduciary duties of disclosure and accounting owed between spouses further justify that result."

The Appellate Court goes on to explain why this result is fair in light of the fiduciary obligations between spouses that I have written about so much over the past few years. I will separately blog that portion of the decision.

But as I have been trumpeting now for many months, the appellate courts are working overtime to save the existing California scheme of family law to ensure transparency - it is my opinion long overdue but much appreciated!

For those in-spouses who do act in good faith after separation and the pendency of the marital proceedings, Margulis is a cautionary tale - managing spouses had better keep records of transactions affecting the community property estate and make all required disclosures or find themselves assuming the risk of loss or diminution of the value of those assets.

Please note that the appellate Court's initial decision of August 11, 2011, was modified on August 26 and September 9, 2011. The citation to the modified opinion is Marriage of Prentis-Margulis v. Margulis (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1252. I have yet compare the differences in the two decisions. 




Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S.
Continue reading "IRMO MARGULIS - Managing Spouse Has BURDEN OF PROOF To Explain MISSING ASSETS" »

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December 19, 2010
  What Are TRACINGS In California DIVORCE Proceedings? Tossed Salad and Mixed Vegetables!
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  My attorney has used the word "tracings" several times, and I really don't understand how this works.  Can you give me a simple explanation?


A.  Unlikely (sorry!).

Tracings may be required by California law in a number of settings in order to find out what each spouse's share of the community property is. They generally show up in several recurring situations, but unfortunately for simplicity's sake there are numerous permutations of where tracings come into play. Chief among them is where cash or assets that was used to purchase property was "commingled" (think tossed salad with separate property lettuce leaves and community property mixed vegetables) at the time it was contributed. Please use the search engine at the upper right to see my Blog Articles for the definitions of community and separate property.

These include:

  • Determining the community verses separate property attributes of an asset that was acquired with funds contributed during marriage that were a combination of each (CP and SP). This is called "characterization" - does the asset belong in whole or in part to the community estate, or to one party's separate estate, or both in different degrees? The community component is sometimes earnings that were used to pay down secured debt each month when, for instance, a mortgage principal payment is made for a separate property asset (a Moore-Marsden situation). It can include one time downpayments from joint bank accounts that contain community income or earnings (or separate property accounts that may have been commingled with joint funds or not or community property accounts that include separate property components) further complicated in the case of a refinance, and more.
  • It is extremely common that a community property asset (acquired during marriage, possibly but not necessarily in joint names), or improvements to it, traces partly or 100% to a separate property source. Many parents 'gift' their child part or all of  the downpayment for the couple's first home. Or, a separate property asset (acquired during marriage but titled in one spouse's name alone - usually seen with real estate) may be purchased using joint funds.  In either event there is a tracing right of reimbursement per Family Code section 2640 to the respective community or separate property interests that bought it, in the event of a dissolution or legal separation. FC §2640 is in the top five of all California property division statutes and is critical for an understanding of what your legal interests are if either spouse has any colorable claims to separate property used during marriage. Many middle income and high asset property division cases are a puzzle map of assets that are not what they seem at first glance.
  • There are a number of situations where reimbursement claims arise from the payment of joint or separate debts using money that the other spouse had an interest in (whether community funds or separate). Under limited situations there may be a right for the community, or the other spouse's separate property, to be reimbursed, but you will be required to trace these funds to claim them.
  • Often intended or unintended transmutations have occurred. Family Code section 852 is the chief transmutation statute, and another of the top five California dissolution property statutes. Transmutations involve a change in the character of property, from community to separate or from separate to community or separate to the other party's separate property. These commonly require tracings in order to establish the FC § 2640 interest. For instance, husband and wife own a residence together in joint names. It was purchased during marriage. But there is need for a refinance, and one spouse's credit is bad. The parties agree that husband will borrow the money, and the lender requires that wife sign a quitclaim deed before escrow can close. Husband assures wife 'not to worry.' Wife signs the transfer deed and doesn't seek legal advice. She has unwittingly transmuted her community interest to husband's separate property. Years later the property has appreciated. What is Wife's interest? (Breach of fiduciary duty questions have to be the subject of a separate Blog but, again, please try our search engine for more information!)

Did I say I would give a simple answer?  No?  Good!

In order to unwind transactions during marriage where monies and property with separate and community property attributes have been mixed together, the "separatizer" (the party seeking to establish their separate property contributions to the community or separate property of the other spouse or partner) has the burden of proof to present reliable tracing evidence to the Court. In order to settle even mildly complex dissolutions as between the parties without going to trial, this information must be provided and laid out in a concrete manner to convince the other side that you have the ability to meet your burden.

Here are some of the rules that apply the mechanics of tracings in dissolution actions and legal separations.

If the commingled funds are used to purchase property, the party who deposited the separate funds may attempt to trace the source of the funds used to purchase the property to establish that it is separate because separate funds were used to purchase it. This may overcome the presumption that property acquired during marriage is community. Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604.

If separate and community property or funds are commingled in such a manner that it is impossible to trace the source of the property or funds, the whole must be treated as community property. Marriage of Mix, supra.

If the title to the property was taken jointly, tracing cannot be used to overcome the presumption from the form of title. Marriage of Lucas (1980) 27 Cal.3d 808, 813–814.

Direct tracing and tracing through family expenses are two independent methods of tracing to establish that property purchased with commingled funds is separate property.

Direct Tracing

Separate funds do not lose their separate character when commingled with community funds in a bank account so long as the amount of separate funds can be ascertained and at no time period were the funds spent down below the balance of SP claimed unless replenished with SP instead of CP. Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604.

If money is withdrawn to purchase specific property, questions of fact that must be determined include (Marriage of Mix, supra):

  • Whether separate funds continue to be on deposit; and

  • Whether the drawer intended to withdraw separate funds.

The party seeking to establish a separate interest in presumptive community property must keep adequate records. The party must show the exact amount of money allocable to separate property and the exact amount of money allocable to community property before it can be said that the money allocable to separate property is not so commingled that all funds in the account are community property. Marriage of Frick (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 997. If the payments claimed to be separate were made periodically, each payment must have been made when separate property funds were in the account and must have been accompanied by an intent to use those funds rather than community funds. Marriage of Higinbotham (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 322, 329.

Tracing Through Family Expenses

The second method of tracing to establish that property purchased with commingled funds is separate property requires a consideration of family expenses. This tracing method is based on the presumption that family expenses are paid from community funds.

If at the time the property is acquired it can be shown that all community cash and income in a commingled account was exhausted by family expenses, then all funds remaining in the account at the time the property was purchased were necessarily separate funds. Marriage of Mix, supra.

This method can be used only when, through no fault of the spouse claiming separate property, it is not possible to ascertain the balance of income and expenditures at the time property was acquired. See v See (1966) 64 Cal.2d 778, 784.

The spouse claiming separate property must keep adequate records to overcome the presumption that property acquired during marriage is community property. See v See, supra.  Most people don't.

The take-away:  If you are contemplating a divorce and have tracing issues, protect your records now so that they do not 'disappear.'  It can be very expensive to obtain bank statements and canceled checks dating back years, and with all of the bank failures and mergers today these records may become impossible to obtain.  If you cannot meet your tracing burden of proof, you lose on the particular reimbursement issue.

As you probably have guessed, tracings are quite expensive and typically involve the assistance of a forensic accountant. Moreover, not just any attorney will know what to do with this information!


Thurman W. Arnold III, CFLS
All Rights Reserved
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December 15, 2010
  REPUTABLE APPRAISERS in the PALM SPRINGS VICINITY: Appraising RESIDENCE in DIVORCE
Posted By Thurman Arnold

I have residential property in La Quinta  My wife and I are divorcing and in the process of splitting assets.  She and her parents employed * * * of * * * in Palm Desert to value the property.  I'd like a second opinion regarding its value.  

I need some help in getting an honest appraisal.  What would your fee be to provide some help in finding an appraiser?

Thanks.

Frederic


A.  Frederic - no fee for answering the question. 

I feel comfortable relying on either Joseph Mroczka or Richard Hill, both local appraisers in the Coachella Valley whom I have worked with and found to be honest and hard-working real estate experts.

Thurman

Continue reading "REPUTABLE APPRAISERS in the PALM SPRINGS VICINITY: Appraising RESIDENCE in DIVORCE" »

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October 11, 2010
  Our Disso is Final But We Never Changed the JOINT TENANCY DEEDS. My Ex Just DIED.
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I just found out that my ex-partner passed away last week.  Our partnership disso became final six months ago.  We had agreed to hold some commercial property jointly until the real estate market improved, and then to sell it and divide what we netted.  They were held in "joint tenancy" and that was never changed.  Does this mean I now inherit his share?


A.  Probably not, but read on.  I talk about this in my last blog about title to property held as "Community Property" and describe "rights of survivorship".  But this raises a point that might be useful for you or someone out there - it is not all that uncommon, especially these days, that people agree to continue to jointly own real estate hoping the market is better down the road when they will finally sell.  Sometimes they'd actually prefer that their former domestic partner or spouse inherit their share if they die first, before the property is sold especially when there are no children or when adult children have been disinherited.

However, it is not enough that a Judgment, Stipulated Judgment, or Settlement or Termination Agreement say "we will continue to hold the property jointly after the divorce is final and will agree to sell it later (or maybe after a specific time period)" to preserve a joint tenancy interest and its chief attribute - a right of survivorship.  This is because without more once the domestic partner (or marital) status is terminated, all joint tenancies that existed prior to that point become tenancies in common as a matter of law.  California Probate Code section 5601.  Tenancies in common do not contain any survivorship rights.

There is a big "however", however.  Section 5601(b) has two exceptions that might help you: (1) Where the joint tenancy is not subject to severence at the time of death, possibly where a written agreement specifically says so (as in a settlement agreement filed with the Court or (2) there is "clear and convincing" evidence that the person who died intended the preserve the joint tenancy in favor of the former partner or spouse.

Hence, where anybody intends to preserve joint tenancy status they should specifically say so in a written document, preferably as part of the Judgment.  I always reference the Probate Code section itself.  Or, there may be something else that is sufficient to cause the Probate Court to find no severence was intended.   My bet is that if there were no other heirs at law for the deceased party, the court would be more easily convinced to find in your favor then if there are surviving children or other family left. 

Notice that under the statute the outcome would be different if the Judgment was a decree of legal separation instead.




T.W. Arnold
http://www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com
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October 11, 2010
  What does "COMMUNITY PROPERTY WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP" Mean?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I am considering a divorce.  I have found the deed to our home, and I see that the grant deed by which we took title is held like this "to Jim ... and Mary ..., husband and wife, as Community Property, with Right of Survivorship."  What does this mean for me?

A.  There are several very important consequences that flow from this language.  The way is which title is held (or "form of title") is also called "vesting."  Everything I say here applies to title for any form of property - bank or brokerage accounts, for instance, as well as any kind of real estate and the types of personal property for which we use title documents.

First, a "right of survivorship" means that if one party dies - but only before a final judgment of termination of the marriage of domestic partnership, or where a termination of marital status or partnership status occurs before the rest of the case is resolved in judgment form, the party that survives them inherits 100% of the dying party's share of the community property.  It does not matter that there exist a Will or Estate document that purports to create a different transfer upon death.  Where a right of survivorship exists there is no need to probate an estate in order to obtain full title - all that is required is that a Affidavit of Death of Joint Tenant be recorded with the County Recorder for the County where the real property is located.  A Death Certificate must be attached to it.  The transfer is then complete.

For other forms of property, as with jointly held bank accounts, the same results occur.  However instead of recording an Affidavit of Death with the County Recorder's Office, a Certified Copy of the Death Certificate is simply provided to the banking institution.  As a practical matter vehicle titles are different in the sense (a) they are filed with any DMV office in California and (b) the title language rarely references "community property" or 'rights of survivorship', and instead titles the property to Jim "and" "or" Mary.  I will have to discuss the rules relating to inheritances and surviving widows and widowers in a different blog.

Second, if a party dies after a Final Judgment dissolving a marriage or domestic partnership, or after a "status termination" before final judgment, but title to the property has never been changed for whatever reason then there is no automatic right of survivorship - in legal effect, the survivorship rights were terminated (severed) upon the by operation of law as a consequence of the Status Termination. 

Likewise, if a party to a divorce proceeding dies before the termination of status then the survivorship right controls (see below).  Since people don't expect this, something lawyers call a "Blair warning" based upon a particular appellate decision is set forth in the Family Law Summons Form FL-110 that no one ever seems to actually read (hopefully your lawyer told you about it).

This is one reason by marital bifurcations can have unforseen consequences and should be taken seriously when another spouse in the course of a divorce seeks to terminate status before the entire case is resolved by Final Judgment.

Third, in California when property is vested in both parties as "CP with right of survivorship" it is the equivalent of a "joint tenancy."  All the same rules apply.  Thus, what we are speaking to applies whether the "CP with right of survivorship" language was used for more common "to Jim and Mary as Joint Tenants is used."

Fourth, there does not need to be any reference to whether the parties are "husband and wife" for these rules to apply.  Non-married people can be joint tenants as to any form of real (land) or personal property and the death of one vests the remaining title in the other - however, since there will be no termination of marital status since there is no marriage (assuming no domestic partnership either), there is only one way to destroy the right of survivorship:  By transferring at least one party's interest as a "joint tenant" to themselves as a "tenant in common".  The transfer of tenant in common interests after death follow the rules of testacy (a will exists and directs who gets what) and intestacy (no will exists, and specific legal rules declare who gets one depending upon their familial relationship to the decedent.

Fifth, many lawyers and savvy unrepresented parties will destroy the right of survivorship before the termination of marital status through the method outlined directly above.  It only requires one party to accomplish this and it does not require the other party's consent.  This has risks, however, since if you destroy a joint tenancy interest prematurely and other spouse dies then you will not inherit their interest but you will of course inherit you own 50%.  If you are a child of a parent married to a nonparent or estranged parent and wish to protect your inheritance rights for an ailing father or mother - and they want you to inherit - you should consult a lawyer to assist in destroying the right of survivorship in a legally enforceable way.  Note that a termination of this survivorship right violates the automatic temporary restraining orders that arise at the moment that every California dissolution or legal separation proceeding is filed, and that special rules exist for terminating joint tenancies which - if ignored - may not only render the attempt transfer void but further subject you to contempt or other penalties including attorney fees for trying to sever it improperly.  Family Code section 2040(b)(c).

Sixth, and most important for the average divorce and in answer to your question, important legal presumptions arise from the Form of Title that have a huge impact on whether property is considered as community or separate.  Way simply put, title held as you describe will almost certainly be declared community property for purposes of divorce and each spouse will be entitled to an equal one-half equity interest.  However, that outcome does not require the "community property" language to be present in order to apply - any form of title acquired in joint names (tenancies in common, joint tenancies, tenancies by the entirety) triggers the presumption.  The relevant Family Code section here is 2581.

Seventh and last for this Blog article, title presumptions are a kind of "super presumption" under the law in the sense that generally in order to rebut (disprove) them, the evidence that you submit must be "clear and convincing."  A garden variety presumption in comparison is the rule that property acquired during marriage in whatever form (including title) is presumed to belong to the community.  Family Code section 760.
Although FC section 760 doesn't use the word "presumption" that is what it means, and this presumption is the ordinary "by a preponderance of the evidence" presumption - meaning 51% likely or better.  Clearing and convincing can be considered as 75% or better - although that is a simplification. Take a look at FC section 2581(a) and (b).

Unfortunately, that is not the end of the analysis because even where property is titled jointly, a party who can trace separate property contributions to its acquisition or certain improvements to it can recover those (Family Code section 2640) if they can follow the money through written records in a legally sufficient way in the event of a divorce.  In the event of a death, these reimbursements are extinguished.  I discuss "tracings" on this Blog.

Different but similar rules apply to Living Trusts which are beyond the subject of today's Blog. I can see this is a good topic and "I'll be back."




T. Wesley Arnold
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com

Continue reading "What does "COMMUNITY PROPERTY WITH RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP" Mean?" »

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September 24, 2010
  I Have Been Paying the MORTGAGE Since SEPARATION - Am I Entitled to WATTS CREDITS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  I have been occupying our family home alone since my wife left over a year ago.  I pay all the interest only mortgage, property taxes, and insurance with no help from her.  Does she owe me half of any of this?

A.  You may be owed you something, but not necessarily one-half of what you have paid out, and different categories of expenses may be treated differently.

This situation involves at least three potential legal concepts:

    * Epstein Credits (Payment of CP Debts Reimbursed)
    * Watts Credits (Reimbursement for Exclusive Use of CP)
    * Jeffries Credits (Combination of Epstein and Watts Reimbursements)

Epstein Credits

"Epstein credits" is a doctrine that holds that as a general rule courts must reimburse one spouse who uses earnings or other separate funds after separation to pay pre-existing community estate obligations.  Courts may not order this reimbursement if under the circumstances it would be unreasonable for the paying spouse to have expected reimbursement.  Where payments are made on account of a debt for an asset that the paying spouse was or is using and the amount was not substantially in excess of the value of the use, the Court may decline to order reimbursement.  This Blog addresses your question in terms of Watts and Jeffries credits that may be owing you upon divorce or legal separation - the prior blog details Epstein credits.  

Watts and Jeffries Credits

We speak in terms of "Watts credits" when one party has the exclusive beneficial use of community property.  When money is owed on that asset, "Jeffries" reimbursements or set-offs for the payment of that debt also come into play. On the one hand you are enjoying the use of a valuable jointly owned asset and should reimburse the community for that use; on the other you are paying something to a creditor for that use, and that amount should be deducted from what you owe the community.  Watts is a calculation for the value of what should be charged for an exclusive enjoyment of community property by one spouse; Jeffries combines the value of that use with reimbursements under an Epstein analysis.  Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 366, 373-374; Marriage of Jeffries (1991) 228 Cal.App. 3d 548, 552-553. 

Family lawyers most often see Watts and Jeffries issues arise in disputes over residences occupied by one spouse alone.  In practice none of these concepts are typically applied to automobiles, although in theory they should be, or other consumer goods.  

While Epstein credits are generally viewed by trial judges to be mandatory reimbursements, allowing Watts and Jeffries credits is discretionary.  Having a working knowledge of your local judicial bench officer's attitude on these subjects is an important bit of information for you to obtain.

Watts credits and Jeffries credits are obviously implicated in your question since you occupy the house for which you seek mortgate and other payment credits and reimbursements. 

This is how Watts Credit issues typically arise - you and  your wife jointly own a home, and both of you are obligated on the mortgage.  Assume the monthly mortgage payment is $3,200 (interest only in your case), the taxes average $400/month, and insurance costs $1,200/year.  Mortgage payments are made on the 15th of the month, and she moves out on January 14, 2009.  You were unable to make the payment on December 15, 2008, so there are two payments due on January 15.  On January 15 you make these two payments, and then continue to make all these payments until the present time or the date of settlement or trial.  You occupy the residence the entire time.  You also incur charges for water for the landscaping, etc., along with the cable bill, electricity, phone and trash.  You have a gardner and a poolman that together amount to $250/month.

Hence, you are spending $3,700 on the mortgage, taxes, and insurance plus the $250 for upkeep, along with whatever you pay for utilities each month.  Over time this amount can grow to a considerable number. 

Assume you had to borrow the money to pay December late from your mother.  This is your separate property debt to Mom if borrowed after separation.  But because your wife lived at the house up until the day she moved which include all of January, you are entitled to the equivalent of an Epstein reimbursement.  Watts and Jeffries don't yet apply.  The obligation existed before separation, was paid after separation, and the source of payment was your separate property.  The community estate owed the payment, which means you owed one-half too (she also owes one-half the utilities charged during the same period as well that were paid with your separate property).

Watts and Jeffries credits answer questions how to deal with expenses you paid after she left where you had use of the home during some some of or the entire period.  Watts credits deal with the value of that use, and Jeffries deal with the value of the use less a reimbursement claim for the cost to you of that use.  Both parties can have these claims for the same property at different times, or one party may assert these reimbursements as against one property while the other may assert them as to another. 

What if instead of you living in the home after separation, it was rented to others but the rent didn't cover all the house related debt service?  The rents are deducted from the total and you each owe one-half of the shortfall.  If you advanced the difference, you are entitled to one-half back from your wife.

Watts' Analysis

So, where one party enjoys exclusive use of a CP asset how is the reimbursement calculated?

As a pure Watts credit analysis, assume a community property house is free and clear other than upkeep and utilities and that you lived there for a time - effectively rent free since there is no mortgage.  You can imagine how it might be unfair for you to receive this benefit without paying for it.  The amount of reimbursement you owe the community depends upon the property's fair rental value.  Fair rental value (FRV) is what you would expect to pay monthly to rent the same or a similar property on the open market in an arm's length tranactions.  It is usually proven by expert broker or appraiser testimony, but as an owner of property you are free to testify to what you think its fair rental value is (as is the other spouse).  Whether your opinion is believed or given weight by the court depends upon the assumptions you make in arriving at your opinion of FRV (as well as perceived credibility).  

If the FRV is $3,000/month, and you reside in the house for 15 months from date of separation to time of trial, the total value of your use is $45,000.  From this you would deduct fixed expenses like taxes ($400/month) and insurance ($100/month).  You would therefore owe the community $2,500 x 15 = $37,500, but since you own half the community the net reimbursement to the other party is one-half that amount.  You may also be able to deduct the gardner and poolman particularly where those payments help to maintain the asset itself.  You might even deduct repairs depending upon the circumstances (installing a solid gold toilet wouldn't qualify). 

All of these reimbursements are "Watts charges" to you.  They are "Watts credits" to the party to be reimbursed. 

Jeffries' Analysis

The more commmon situation is that some mortgage debt for the house you occupy is being paid monthly.  Assume it to be $2,000 combined (including mortgage, taxes, and insurance).  If the FRV is $3,000/month but you pay $2,000 monthly then the net benefit to you is $1,000 each month or $15,000 total.  You would owe a Watts reimbursement of one-half that sum, or $7,500, on the marital balance sheet or as a direct payment to your spouse.

This is a Jeffries situation.  Note that it assumes that these costs to you were paid by your separate property.  If instead you used community monies remaining in a bank account after the DOS to pay this debt (or CP funds from some other source) then you do not subtract that from the fair rental value because the community estate has already been charged.  
 
BTW, an interesting twist on this question these days involves what happens when there is a mortgage but the party in possession fails or refuses to pay it.  They are living there at no effective charge while the other spouse may be actually paying rent elsewhere.  In that case you should not receive a credit for one-half the debt you did not actually pay, but it is difficult to predict how a judge will handle this.  After all, you may continue to owe the money and have to repay it later.  Now what happens if you then decide to file a bankruptcy, so then never have to pay it because the debt is discharged?  That bankruptcy if properly drafted should also destroy any reimbursement claims of your spouse altogether.  Great unfairness can occur in these situations.  In my experience many of the legal rules for these reimbursement claims developed in a completely different economy and fairness and common sense is struggling to keep up with the new world order.

These days with the mortgage and real estate bust another situation frequently arises:  The amount a spouse pays to maintain the mortgage and related asset expenses may exceed the FRV of the property.  Should the other spouse be charged with half of this net loss, and so forced to underwrite some of it?

Assume in the illustration above that the costs remain the same, but the mortgage is $4,000/month.  Since FRV is $3,000, you are overpaying by $1,000.  Are you entitled to a credit back for one-half of the net loss?  In my experience most courts won't give it to you but make the argument anyway.  Courts seem to feel that if you choose to live in a place that you want the other side to help underwrite, when cheaper alternate arrangements are available, then your choice to stay there should not bind the other person.  The court cannot tell you what choices to make, but it can refuse to let you benefit unfairly by them.

This makes sense on at least one level - imagine that you have a large, beautiful, expensive home that is way under water, and that your estranged wife insists on continuing to live in it despite the fact that the costs to keep it are far in excess of what comparable lodgings would cost.  Naturally she wants you to absorb as much of this to whatever extent possible which lowers her incentive to move.  If she was allowed to stay and charge you for one-half the difference between a $10,000 mortgage and its $5,000 rental value, she might continue to reside in this losing, nonproductive asset if she effectively only paid $7,500/month after credit for your $2,500.

Conclusion

While Epstein reimbursements appear to be mandatory in dividing the community assets and liabilities, Watts and Jeffries credits are viewed as discretionary reimbursements.  Many judges don't favor these reimbursements and so exercise their disrection to deny them.  I tell my clients not to count on them in negotiating settlements, and many lawyers refuse to take the argument seriously when negotiating settlement.  Another reason why lawyers tend to treat them as inconsequential, besides bluffiing, is that they can be expensive to prove and so you are being tested as to whether you have the stamina or the money to assert these claims at trial.  After all, it is best to have forensic experts testify to them, and these individuals may include an accountant and a broker/appraiser.

One solution is to request the family court to bifurcate the issue so that a short, separate trial occurs on the Watts/Jeffries issues alone.  Once the amount of Watts or Jeffries credits is fixed by judicial decision you can now place it on the marital balance sheet in your settlement discussions on the remaining issues.

The success of a Watts or Jeffries claim are fact specific.  In doing justice and equally dividing the community estate, there is broad spectrum of fairness running from "its not big deal" to being "really unfair."  You will not get much traction where the consequence of not reimbursing Watts credits or imposing Watts charges is a small number.  But where one party enjoys the asset alone without paying creditors, a very strong argument exists in favor of finding reimbursements.

Finally, be sure to include reference to Esptein reimbursements and Watts and Jeffries in your Declarations of Disclosure to make it clear that you are asserting such a claim.  If you are the spouse in possession omit any reference to it.  It is not your job to assert that argument against yourself.



Thurman W. Arnold III
September 25, 2010
All Rights Reserved.


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September 24, 2010
  My Ex Has Been EXCLUSIVELY USING Our RESIDENCE - Is There an EPSTEIN CREDIT For This?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I have been occupying the home after my wife left over a year ago.  I pay all the interest only mortgage, property taxes, and insurance with no help from her.  Does she owe me half of any of this?

A.  You may be owed you something, but not necessarily one-half of what you have paid out.

This situation involves at least three potential legal issues:
  • Epstein Credits
  • Watts Credits
  • Jeffries Credits

This particular Blog addresses your question in terms of Epsteins - the next blog deals specificially with Watts and Jeffries credits. 

Epstein Credits

I have described Epstein Reimbursements in another Blog.  "Epstein credits" is a doctrine derived from the case of Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 84-85.  It holds that as a general rule, courts must reimburse one spouse out of the community property who uses earnings or other separate funds after separation to pay pre-existing community obligations.  This commonly occurs with credit cards where there was a balance remaining when the parties separated that one or the other pays after that date.  Epsteins only apply to payments on the portion of a debt that existed at date of separation, and not new debt on an old card that was incurred afterwards.  The rule is not limited to credit cards but can apply to almost any class of debts.

Courts are required not to order this reimbursement if under the circumstances it would be unreasonable for the paying spouse to have expected reimbursement.  If there was an agreement that a party would not be reimbursed, if the paying spouse intended the payment as a gift, or when the payment is made on account of a debt for an asset that the paying spouse was or is using and the amount was not substantially in excess of the value of the use, the Court may decline to order reimbursement.  This idea of the value of use of some property acquired through debt that continues to exist after separation underlies the concepts of Watts credits and Jeffries credits, and is obviously implicated in your question since you occupy the house for which you seek credits and reimbursements.

So, Epsteins are almost always granted as to post-separation payments for expenses, or goods and services, that didn't leave a tangible asset behind that is now being exclusively enjoyed by only one of the two spouses. 

As an example of how this works if there is $15,000 owing Visa for that trip to Hawaii, some groceries, and a child's school tuition at the time of separation and one party pays it off or makes monthly installments on the debt with their earnings or other separate property after that date, a benefit has been conferred upon the community because a joint obligation has been extinguished or reduced.  That benefit must be equalized by a payment to the payor of one-half the amount paid or a credit or set-off against other property that gets divided.  One-half is paid because the paying spouse owed their half anyway.  Any portion paid before the DOS (date of separation) ordinarily will not be reimbursed. 

This is generally true even if only one of the parties actually took the trip to Hawaii, unless that trip was in breach of a marital or fiduciary duty (if the husband snuck off with his paramour to Hawaii, an argument exists that he should not be reimbursed for paying that portion of the debt over the wife's objection).  Family Code section 2625 directs courts to award a debt incurred by one spouse to them alone if debt was not "incurred for the benefit of the community."  Family Code section 2602 empowers courts to "award ... the amount the court determines to have been deliberately misappropriated by the party to the exclusion of the interest to any other party in the community estate."  FC section 2625 is a powerful and much underused statute (many attorneys seem to be unaware of it or try to bluff as though it didn't exist).

Compare this with a situation where a credit card was used to buy a dishwasher that the paying spouse possesses or receives in the divorce - since they are retaining a tangible asset it may not be fair to allow them to both keep the asset and get reimbursed for one-half its costs.  Applying Epsteins can become fairly fact specific.

In situations involving use of a family residence or other tangible assets that continue to exist after separation and which are used and enjoyed by only one of the spouses, an Epstein analysis provides only a part of the answer to the reimbursement question.  In effect first the amount of the Epstein reimbursements are determined, and then the question requires a Watts analysis to determine under equitable principles whether it is fair to actually order reimbursement and, if so, in what amount.

Hence, to resolve your issue you would begin by adding up the costs of everything related to the house that is spent to preserve or protect the asset.  Property taxes are included, but utilities are not.  The utilities you used after the physical separation are your obligation anyway, because they were not incurred during 'the marriage.'  (Please see the Blog Category "Physical Separation.")  Mortgage payments and insurance are considered, and probably the poolman or gardner as well.

Please continue on to the next blog for detailed infomation concerning Watts credits.


Epstein Credits and Fiduciary Duty Issues

Sometimes a spouse or domestic partner will raid the credit cards and take cash advances or buy a new wardrobe, or fix a car, during the weeks prior to separating.  If it later appears that their intention was to stick the other spouse for one-half of this expense, the presumption that this is a community debt (because incurred during marriage) may be overcome and so it may be assigned to the one spouse alone.  It is not fair to hold both parties responsible for debts incurred in anticipation of separation.

However, when one partner incurs a debt frivolously as opposed to recklessly before separation, in a situation not amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty - even over the prior objection of the other spouse - it is likely to be equally divided and Epstein reimbursements ordered.  Both spouses have, under California law, equal rights of management and control of the community property and community credit.

Courts in my experience are reluctant to find breaches of fiduciary duty in Esptein situations unless the behavior was fairly eggregious.  Charging 10 pairs of shoes at Macy's a month before separation may not be viewed as a big deal.  If the debt was incurred in pursuit of an illegal activity like supporting a drug habit or sex addiction, many judges are less reluctant to declare a breach. 

To illustrate another twist, if the credit card was used to pay the spouse's tuition expense instead a child's schooling as in my example above, it may also be unfair to charge the non-schooled parent with one-half the tuition portion of the credit card balance.  A court is likely to look at whether this schooling benefited the community in some way before splitting that debt betwen the parties - i.e., because of the schooling did the student spouse earn more money which was then contributed to the community standard of living and so confer a benefit on both?  Pure student loans are usually awarded to the party who incurred the debt as their separate property obligation. 



T. W. Arnold III
http://www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com
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September 20, 2010
  How Can I Be Sure a Court Will Enforce My AGREEMENT Reached With My Spouse OUT OF COURT?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  My wife and I have reached some agreements about support and property division in our dissolution proceedings.  Neither of us have attorneys.  I want to write something up that is enforceable.  Is there anything I should know?

A.  If a case has already been filed and so is "pending", and whether you have attorneys or not, if you and your wife reach an agreement on any issue outside of court and you want to be sure that she can't back out of it before it is signed by a Judge and becomes an order, it is essential that you make reference to California Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 in any written agreement you prepare.

The terms of all types of agreements that you reach as an incident to pending family law litigation must be independently approved by a court commissioner or judge.  Usually these judicial officers just want to know that both parties are in agreement, and will not substitute their opinions for what you've decided, but not always.  Particularly where children are involved, judges have an independent obligation to ensure that a child's best interests are protected.  Still, judges will not usually reject your agreements - however, if one side backs out before the agreement becomes an order or a judgment, when children are involved a court may be more inclined to refuse to enter the disputed order than it would be if the issues involved property division, debts, or spousal support.

Often times people reach agreements in the hallway outside the courtroom, and then come into court and tell the judge what their agreement is - once that agreement is 'on the record', most courts are going to enforce it.  Those agreements often require, however, some further writing like a stipulation and it when the stipulation is presented days or weeks later that the other party may have changed their mind.  You now need to enforce that agreement, possibly by a Motion under CCP 664.6.

The problem also arises when cases get settled away from court, during the lunch break, or when the agreement doesn't get put on the record for any number of reasons.  Maybe they won't sign some other document that the signed agreement contemplated or obligated them to comply with. 

Any agreement you reach with anyone is a contract if certain conditions are met.  Unfortunately, failure to abide by such promises may only give rise to a claim for breach of contract under civil law - which is pretty worthless in family law proceedings because you have to file an independent civil action to enforce them, which takes months or years to resolve.

You want enforceable orders.  These are something more than mere verbal or written promises, or contracts that haven't ripened into Orders or Judgments.

C.C.P. section 664.6 is extremely important and useful for enforcing written agreements, because it gives the Court the power to enforce the terms of those the agreements as court orders, and to interpret them later if there is disagreement about what was in fact agreed to. 

However, in order for 664.6 to work for you, you need to either reference the statute in the document that is signed or in an oral statement on the record.  You don't need to mention the section specifically, but I recommend that the following language should appear in the agreement or court transcript:  "The parties request the Court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement  per CCP 664.6" is the optimal language to use.




Thurman Arnold
http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com
 


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September 13, 2010
  When Is It Possible to Keep the FAMILY RESIDENCE From Being Sold?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  My wife cares for our children, but now she insists on keeping the residence that I moved out of 3 months ago.  Is it true that it will be ordered sold or that she has to buy me out in our divorce?

A.   Not necessarily.  If she has an experienced attorney, she may seek a "deferred sale of home" order.  These are formerly known as "Duke" orders and once (when I was a puppy attorney) were quite common - today they are rare.  However, upon a proper showing a trial judge may issue them.

A "deferred sale of home order" means an order that temporarily delays the sale and awards the temporary exclusive use and possession of the family home to the custodial parent of a minor child or child for whom support is authorized under FC §§3900 and 3901 or under FC §3910. It is authorized whether or not the custodial parent has sole or joint custody. Such an order is made to minimize the adverse impact of dissolution of marriage or legal separation on the welfare of the child.[FC §3800(b)].

If one of the parties requests a deferred sale of home order, the judge must first determine whether it is economically feasible to maintain [FC §3801(a)]:

  • The payments of any note secured by a deed of trust, property taxes, and insurance for the home during the period the sale of the home is deferred; and
  • The condition of the home comparable to that at the time of trial.

In making this determination, the court must consider all of the following[FC §3801(b)]:

  • The resident parent's income;
  • The availability of spousal support, child support, or both spousal and child support; and
  • Any other sources of funds available to make those payments.

The legislative intent behind these determinations include [FC §3801(c)]:

  • Avoiding the likelihood of possible defaults on the payments of notes and resulting foreclosures,
  • Avoiding inadequate insurance coverage,
  • Preventing deterioration of the condition of the familyhome, and
  • Preventing any other circumstance that would jeopardize both parents' equity in the home.

A judge asked to consider the issue will consider the following in determining whether a deferred sale is necessary to minimize the adverse impact of dissolution or legal separation on the child. [FC §3802(a).]  Factors considered in exercising discretion include all of the following [FC §3802(b)]:

  • The length of time the child has resided in the home;
  • The child's placement or grade in school;
  • The accessibility and convenience of the home to the child's school and other services or facilities used by and available to the child, including child care;
  • Whether the home has been adapted or modified to accommodate any physical disabilities of a child or a resident parent in a manner that a change in residence may adversely affect the ability of the resident parent to meet the needs of the child;
  • The emotional detriment to the child associated with a change in residence;
  • The extent to which the location of the home permits the resident parent to continue employment;
  • The financial ability of each parent to obtain suitable housing;
  • The tax consequences to the parents;
  • The economic detriment to the nonresident parent of a deferred sale of home order; and
  • Any other factors the court deems just and equitable.




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May 19, 2010
  When are ASSETS VALUED for purposes of DIVISION in a California DISSOLUTION?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  My wife and I separated two years ago and we have decided to file for divorce.  We don't agree on what date we should be setting the value of some of our property, like the residence where she has been living with the kids all this time.  She wants it valued today, since prices are down, but when I left we agreed that she would take it at its value then.  That value was substantially higher than today, and I don't think it is fair that I have suffer the decrease in real estate prices.  What might a Court do?


A.  First, it is always my hope that you and your spouse can agree on as many issues as possible, without court intervention.  One never knows for sure what a Court will do, and my experience is that people are far better off working through their disagreements by way of Mediation.  One reason why is to ensure you are in charge of your life, not a stranger.  It is possible to mediate parts of your divorce.

Still, valuing real property is not a difficult legal issue.  Family Code section 2552(a) directs the court to "value assets and liabilities as near as practicable to the time of trial."  Time of trial is also the equivalent of the time of settlement - in order words, if you cannot settle your divorce and you take it to a judge, that will be the time of trial so the same rule for the date of valuation should apply to your settlement negotiations.

Family Code section 2552(b), however, gives the court discretion to pick another date before trial for the valuation of property "for good cause" in order to "accomplish an equal division of the community estate ... in an equitable manner."  This concept is called an "alternate valuation date."  It is often applied in cases of business valuations, which is a complex topic I will separately address, but the basic reasons for the potential different treatment includes the fact that business values can be intentionally depressed by the spouse who controls the assets (and so it may not be fair to apply a lower value) or because the "in-spouse" has contributed substantial value to the company since separation and it is not necessarily fair that the other spouse share those benefits.

Here you might argue that you and your spouse reached a verbal agreement to divide all your assets two years ago if that is in fact what you did, in order to hold to those values.  But verbal agreements are difficult to prove if they are not admitted by the other party, absent witnesses and she will continue have various defenses where she was not independently advised before reaching agreement. 

Most courts are going to value passive assets like houses or investments or pensions at the time of trial.  That does not mean that post-separation increases in value, like increased equity by paying down principal on a mortgage, or contributions to a pension after the date of separation, will not be reimbursed to one or the other of you to compensate the separate property (post-separation) contributions. 

If you do seek an alternate valuation date, you need to file a Notice of Motion to Bifurcate the issue (FL-315), along with the accompanying declaration establishing why this is more fair and appropriate than the basic rule.  These forms appear in our Family Law Form Library.

A bifurcation is essentially a request of the court to carve off one or more issues in the divorce for separate trial or adjudication.  It is often used where a call needs to be made on one issue that, once decided, will assist in resolving other aspects of the case.



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.thurmanarnold.com
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May 11, 2010
  What are EPSTEIN REIMBURSEMENTS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold


Q.  My soon to be ex wife and I are getting our divorce with the assistance of a paralegal.  That person has prepared a Marital Settlement Agreement.  The paralegal says she cannot give us legal advice.  There is a phrase in the agreement that says something about each of us waiving Epstein reimbursements.  I have no idea what this means.


A.  "Epstein reimbursements" deal with the question:  "How do we divide debts that we incurred during the marriage, where one of us made payments after we separated and up to the time of divorce?"  

A common situation is that parties have credit card debt that needs to be divided in the divorce.  Say there was a balance of $10,000 owing to American Express on December 31st, the day before your wife drank too much at the office New Year's celebration and had an unfortunate tryst with her boss - this isn't the first time this has happened, and your New Year's resolution is to move out (sorry, I am just trying to be colorful), and so you do move out the next day.  Her reaction is to file for divorce, because her boss looks way more interesting to her than you do these days.

Under this example January 1 is your date of separation.  From the date of separation on, the earnings of either spouse are no longer community property, or joint earnings, but instead these earnings belong to each of you separately.  Family Code § 771.

Often where a credit card is in the name of one person alone, the other spouse or domestic partner doesn't contribute to the payments after separation - sometimes because they won't and sometimes because they can't.  But as between the two of you, the $10,000 is jointly owed to American Express, even if the other spouse did not sign the credit card application or is not named on the card, or on the statement.  This is also true whether or not both parties directly benefitted from the use of the credit card - for instance, maybe the $10,000 was charged by your wife to buy shoes over the course of the past year to help make herself feel better about the fact that you never have intimate conversations with her any more (or for any other reason), or perhaps you charged the card to add more chrome to your Harley Davidson FatBoy because your hairline is receding.

If the card is not paid, American Express can pursue collection either against the spouse who is the account holder, or against the community property of both spouses.  Family Code § 910.  If the credit card is in your name alone, it will be your credit that might be ruined if the monthly installments are missed.  

Now again, as between you and your wife, the general rule is that each of you owe one-half of the credit card debt which means that all other things being equal, in a property settlement or if a Judge is forced to divide your property and estate, if one party is assigned 100% of the debt the other owes a reimbursement of $5,000.  Lawyers and Judges speak of assigning the debt to one party or the other on the "marital balance sheet" which implies a corresponding credit or right of setoff against the division of some other item of property.  

epstein reimbursements and gambling There are, of course, exceptions.  These exceptions frequently include (a) situations where a debt was incurred in breach of a fiduciary obligation owing the community estate or to the other spouse and (b) where one party retains the benefit of the property that the credit card was used to acquire (believe it or not, I am frequently asked about breast augmentations or other cosmetic surgeries - except in extreme cases, courts do not charge one party for these).  For example, if when you learned of your wife's affair your reaction included flying to Las Vegas and having a wild weekend and you recklessly charged the $10,000 at the casino, this might be considered a breach of fiduciary duty and result in the entire $10,000 being your responsibility even though the two of you had yet to physically separate.  Or, if instead you spent the $10,000 buying more chrome for your Harley and you expect to keep it in the divorce, then even though the $10,000 was otherwise a community obligation equitable considerations may result in the debt being assigned to you.  If in the divorce the two of you decide to sell the Harley but the chrome you spent $10,000 buying adds only $2,000 in value to the sale's price, in that case the $10,000 remains a joint obligation because you neither breached a fiduciary duty nor retained a sufficient benefit that the law would charge you for it and the asset is being divided.  Another common situation is where one spouse retains the furniture or refrigerator charged at Lowes - in that case more of the debt may be assigned to that party. 

Assuming you continue to make monthly payments of principal and interest on the credit card up to the point of dividing the debt in a marital settlement agreement (MSA), or if a judge makes the call for you both after a trial, as a general proposition your wife owes you one-half of all those payments.  These are called Epstein credits or Epstein reimbursements in California, and many other community property states have similar rules.  These are also called equitable reimbursements, meaning that the right to be reimbursed is not absolute and certain but that the court has wide discretion to grant the reimbursement or not depending upon fairness.  Typically California family law courts do grant the reimbursement so long as the parties benefited equally (or the money was equally wasted). 

The principle in California was first set forth in the case of Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76.  It is to be distinguished from the rule that the debt itself, if community, must be divided equally between parties in divorce.  Family Code § 2550.  It covers reimbursements rights that accrue between physical separation and the date of ultimate division of the liability.

So, the agreement the paralegal has prepared includes an agreement each of you is giving up any right to be reimbursed for debt related payments made after separation.  You are not being asked to waive your credit for $5,000 if the $10,000 debt is assigned to you (unless there is a separate provision assigning the credit card balance to you completely).  You are being asked to waive all the debt maintenance up to this point.  It is not an unusual clause in an MSA, but it may or may not be in your best interests to agree to it.

Epstein credits take a variety of forms, and are not limited to credit card debt.  The Epstein case itself involved a husband who voluntarily made the mortgage, insurance, and tax payments on the family residence during the separation period.  Wife and their son occupied the home.  Up to that point the law was that if one party used separate property (earnings after separation) to pay community debt (the mortgage, etc., on the residence), there was a presumption that this was intended to be a gift to the community unless an agreement could be proved that it was not to be a gift.

Each party may have separate Epstein claims as to different items of debt.  

Upon separating, it is a smart idea to get and keep copies of credit card statements and statements for all liability accounts as of the date of separation.  From an accounting point of view, the date of separation is a critical snapshot of a point in time.  It is essential that the parties maintain these records as proof of what the numbers were, and of what payments were made afterwards.

Whether or not you should waive the Epstein reimbursements that might be owing you is part of the give and take of negotiating a divorce settlement.  These are usually simple accounting issues, but not always.   

If your Wife gets an attorney that attorney might try to convince you to waive the Espteins, or hope that you don't understand the concept or have it independently explained to you.  In my experience where we are speaking in terms of vanilla debt (meaning there is no questionable conduct and the charges were incurred in the normal course), your wife's lawyer would also agree that you are entitled to these reimbursements without a fight if you know enough to insist.

There is an important flip side and hybrid of the Epstein reimbursement concept - that of Watts charges and credits.  The deal generally with who pays for the beneficial use of community property (i.e., the home) during the separation period, once the divorce is finalized.

I will address those separately. 



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
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January 07, 2010
  My wife she used her INHERITANCE to buy our home. We are getting divorced.
Posted By Thurman Arnold, III

Q.  My wife and I separated in June 2009. When we purchased our home in March of 1998 (married December 1994), she used part of an inheritance from her grandmother to help with the down payment. I have been paying the mortgage since we bought it. Will she get her inheritance back in our divorce? What would I get?


A.     Because I need more information and the answer to some questions and then to follow up questions, I can only give you a generalized response. 

So long as your wife can trace the portion of her downpayment contribution to the inheritance, she is entitled to a Family Code section 2640 reimbursement in the amount that she proves by this tracing. She is not entitled to interest on grandma's gift to her, however, but only the principal. However, this assumes that the downpayment contribution always remained separate from any other money or bank assets that you had an interest in, or that the community had an interest in: If the inheritance monies were commingled with joint monies or your separate funds between the date she received them and the date they were used as part of the purchase price for the home, then a further tracing is required to establish that what money in the account at that time was her separate and what amount was something else. Here is Blog that discusses tracing principles in more detail.

You don't report whether you were on title to the residence when escrow closed or at any later time. Whether or not you were on title when the property was purchased, it is presumed to be community property UNLESS you (a) deeded off when escrow closed or deeded off since that time or (b) consented to or are deemed to have consented to your Wife being the sole record title holder if at the close of escrow title issued in her name.

If you were on title at close of escrow and to the present day, the answer is easy - your Wife gets her traced inheritance money first, off the top, from any equity in the home. She does not get interest on the money. The remaining net equity, without other facts, belongs to the community so that each of you is entitled to one-half of what remains.

If you were not on title when escrow closed, and if you cannot rebut by clear and convincing evidence the legal presumption set forth in Evidence Code section 662 (based upon form of taking title in her name alone) that you consented to that outcome, then (a) your Wife still gets her downpayment back and (b) the community estate is entitled to be reimbursed for carrying the mortgage all those years and reducing the principal balance due the mortgage holder. It doesn't matter who paid the mortgage, so long as it was paid from community earnings during the marriage.

There is a very important reimbursement concept under California Law known as Moore-Marsden apportionment. It applies to a common situation where a home is acquired before marriage (or during marriage as separate property), title is in the name of the acquiring spouse alone, and during the marriage and up to separation or divorce and there is or was a mortgage that was paid during the marriage.

Where this occurs the community estate acquires a legal, reimbursable, interest in what would be otherwise be entirely the separate property of the titled spouse IF community funds (earnings of either spouse, for instance, or both) are used to make the mortgage payments. The idea is that joint funds are being used to benefit a separate property interest, i.e., the separate property equity. Many legal scholars consider this to be a breach of fiduciary duty - that whenever one or the other spouse's separate property interests are increased with community funds, or community time, skill, and efforts of either spouse during the marriage, the community is disadvantaged and that this disadvantage violates the statutory duties of the parties that place the party's joint interests above their separate interests.

The formula for apportionment is that the community acquires a pro tanto (dollar for dollar) interest in the ratio that principal payments on the purchase price made with community property bear to payments made with separate property. Hence, any increase in value (appreciation) must be apportioned accordingly between the separate property and the community property estates upon separation or dissolution.

Note that this only applies to separate property owned prior to marriage with a mortgage that was paid during marriage where an equity position has been increased. For instance, if a mortgage exists but it is an interest only, payments during marriage do not reduce principal. Therefore, the separate interest of the owner spouse is not improved because the debt remains exactly the same. As a general rule, the amounts paid for interest, taxes, and insurance on the house are disregarded since that portion does not to contribute to the capital investment.

Also, it assumes that the mortgage was paid with joint (community) funds, or that the funds used were so commingled that the "separatizer" is unable to trace them to a separate property source (meaning they don't have records showing where each payment was made or are unable to provide a recapitalization of the source of the funds). If your husband reduced the mortgage throughout the marriage but he did it with an account that was his separate property then the community would not have this reimbursement right.

The Moore Marsden formula requires a number of bits of information at important points in time to be properly calculated. These include: a) what was the original purchase price; b) what was the original mortgage and downpayment; c) what was the property worth at the date of marriage (DOM); d) what was owed to the lender at that time; e) what was the property worth at the date of separation; f) what was owed at that time; g) what is the property worth on the date of the calculation (i.e., the trial date); h) and what is the principal pay-off at that time?

This is agood example of why family law and divorce cases can become quite expensive. Obtaining these records, particularly if you are the 'out spouse' can be difficult, and sometimes a forensic accountant is the best option for calculating these apportionments. Find a local CPA with family law experience to help you trace the funds. You need an experienced family law attorney for these types of matters as well.

In your case, with a lengthy marriage and little owing, you have significant Moore Marsden entitlements.



T.W. Arnold
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August 29, 2009
  Woman not from this country mistreated by American husband
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  From J:

Hello, I am an Australian woman who married almost 4 years ago an American and he treats me like a housekeeper not as his wife. We are in Phoenix right now, but we were living most of the time in Indian Wells, CA, at his house.  He is also threatening me that he is going to take my two daughters away from me. (Mine from a previous relation).  He changed since we become a married couple. I really fell alone and he is denying my existence. I have nobody here and he doesn't even let my go visit my parents for a few weeks. What would be a good advice?  

Best Regards.

J.

A.  Hello J: 

That kind of treatment may be a form of domestic violence, and you have my sympathy and concern. Have there been threats or hitting?

When do you return to the desert? I assume you have no ability to travel on your own because you have no money? You may need to look to your family for help.

This gentlemen is not going to take your children away from you, no matter what he says.  

In terms of dissolution rights, you are absolutely entitled to have the marriage dissolved, but you are not going to have huge support or property rights – typically support for a short marriage is half its length although it is possible to stall a case to stretch that out in this case, and figure if you have no income you might be entitled to about 35% of what he grosses, all other things being equal. 

In terms of property, if nothing was acquired during marriage there is not going to be much to divide, although if there has been a mortgage payment on the Indian Wells residence there might be some reimbursement.


 T.W. Arnold

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