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Recent Posts in Same Sex Marriages Category

December 21, 2010
  We Married As a California SAME-SEX Couple But Since I Have Completed My SEX-CHANGE OPERATION.
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I was married in June, 2008 as Patricia B. to Jill G. I obtained a name and gender change court decree several months later. We now want to marry as a different-sex couple. Do we need to first dissolve the same-sex marriage?

-Alex-

A.  Alex, thanks for a challenging and specialized question which I don't normally encounter in my practice. It sounds like you are two of the 14,000 same-sex couples who married in California 2008. I can only give you impressions before researching a couple of issues and hence do my best to assist you now without more information that I would require to give a legal opinion. I don't want you to rely on this response without more, plus I don't intend by responding to your email to create an attorney-client relationship, which is true with all my writings.

First, I'm assuming that Patricia B. is your birth name, or that you had previously obtained a name change whether by court decree or prior marriage. I say this because Family Code section 354 (dealing with marriage licenses) requires a photo ID that accurately lists your given or subsequently legal name so I expect that is what you presented to obtain the license.

Second, your existing marriage to Jill is valid at least as of the date of marriage, for all statewide applications under California law. It is hard to imagine that your post-marriage gender operations (and hence post-marriage gender status as a male) in any way changes that. It makes me wonder what happens to an opposite sex couple where one subsequently completes the procedures that you have undertaken (i.e., opposite genders marry, but then one changes their gender so they are both now the same-sex) - would that invalidate the marriage?  Complicated stuff.

Third, no California statute speaks to gendered changed individuals as qualifying as a man (in your case) for purposes of marriage, where they were born as a woman, for purposes of Family Code 300 or the amendment to the California constitution (Proposition 8) that occurred after your marriage. This means to me that it would require an appellate decision (or legislative enactment) to provide such authority and I can't tell you of any specific California case that has so found but, again, I've not researched it in detail. If California does accept your sex change as legally making you a male this would improve your position under federal law, discussed below. Do you have an affidavit from your doctor verifying that the surgery changed your sex designation? Have you investigated amending your birth certificate? I recommend it. The legal viability of sex change is a matter for states to determine, according to the 10th Amendment of the United States Constitution. 

Fourth, I would be concerned that dissolving your existing marriage without a clear understanding of these issues could place you at risk in the sense that, at least as of today, you can't remarry Jill IF you are legally a woman. Hence, I would be very careful about dissolving your existing marriage. You would have exactly the same rights in California as a same-sex married couple as you would as domestic partners. However, if you dissolved the marriage, didn't entered into a RDP, and then some court ruled later that your remarriage was not legally valid you would have no legal status other than possibly as a "putative" domestic partner or spouse. This could negatively impact your legal rights and responsibilities, and increase litigation costs, should the relationship end.

Fifth, at this time, federal law especially as it relates to tax filing status, isn't bound by any state's statutes and doesn't recognize same-sex marriage for that purpose and a number of others. This results from the Federal Defense of Marriage Act and a history of gender prejudice, among other things.

I also don't know whether federal law recognizes the gender change as making you a male since your sex-change operation (but it might, as discussed above). I am aware of at least one federal administrative case that suggests that if California recognizes your sex change operation, you might qualify as an opposite gendered person under federal law at least for some purposes (i.e., interpreting immigration rules and statutes per In Re Lovo-Lara).

Sixth, I can't see how remarrying under your new name, and post-surgery, would add anything to the mix, legally speaking.  You have changed your name and so Jill is now married to Alex. The only area where it seems it might matter from a legal perspective is qualifying for some status or benefits under federal law. It doesn't add anything in California for you to divorce and remarry under your current name and gender. I recognize you haven't asked about federal legal status and this may be irrelevant to you, and I don't pretend to be an expert on federal law.

Seventh, I do understand why you would want your different sex status to accurately track reality, and that that reality did shift after your marriage by reason of the surgery. You and Jill are proud of what you both have accomplished, and I imagine you would like to share the equal dignity historically only accorded to opposite-sex couples by having your status accurately recognized. 

Finally, my feeling is that your transformation is complete and that you need do nothing further, but I respect that you may feel that it is only partial. If it is essential that the two of you be legally recognized as an opposite sex married couple, then the answer lies with California law, at present in terms of judicial interpretations and not legislative enactments. My brief investigation does not reveal any California appellate decisions or statutes that answer the question. Unfortunately, the type of legal issues that you are grappling with tend only to arise upon a divorce or nullity of marriage proceeding, where courts are squarely forced to decide the issue, which is not my wish for you. Sometimes people file sham divorces to create new law, but this is not something I would ever recommend.

______________

I cannot resist speaking to your situation as a metaphor for all of us. My belief is that until we each expand beyond our myopic judgments of what others should choose for themselves our internecine cultural, gender, familial, racial and nationalistic struggles will escalate. Mind you, any student of human history knows that such is part of our collective personality structure - that we ban together against 'outsiders' to protect our group - and possibly this trait is even a reason for our success as a species thus far, if not for the "others" who were sacrificed. In an increasingly crowded and heterogeneous world the things that worked before may presently assure our common peril.

Pioneering such as yours challenges us to rethink our biases, and sometimes even to consider that they might only be artificial points of view 'full of fit and fury, signifying nothing.' We can just as easily hold a belief with righteous self-certainty one day only to hold its opposite to be true with equal earnestness the next (or simply recognize that we were mistaken in the first instance). In my experience as a family attorney who has listened to countless individuals express what they think went wrong with their marriage or domestic partner, and in the course of my own life, I am always humbled how little we and I know 'for sure' and how the "truth" shifts from moment to moment. When we misplace humility we tend to become fixated on forcing others conform to our expectations - inevitably leading to conflict. 

Our brains may actually be hard-wired to hold biases. Most people recognize they have little control over the thoughts that pop into our minds. I suspect that we don't lose biases as an effort of will, but instead that they fall away as part of a larger process. Until they do fall away, the trick may be simply to remember to distrust these thoughts and not to believe they are true simply because they arose. Certainly that strategy might relieve the emotional component to prejudice.

All beings desire peace, and freedom. May each of us find it in our own way. But perhaps the web of our interdependence requires that we allow others to do so, first..., I don't know, dear reader. What makes sense to you?



Thurman Arnold, Attorney and Part-Time Philosopher 
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December 03, 2010
  ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Elkins Task Force


The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011. 

It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners. 

This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.

Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations.  Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues.  Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.

What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases."  Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification: 

        "We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel.  [Reference omitted].... 

        In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures.  But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice.  Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute.  It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support.... 

         Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function.  If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."

Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented.  Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions.  Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants.  Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court."   Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.

The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011.  Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217.  It states:

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 


December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.


T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization)

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September 16, 2010
  My Wife is Living With a Male Renter - Does This Affect My SUPPORT OBLIGATION?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  If my wife is living with a male renter, and I suspect they are boyfriend-girlfriend, does this affect the amount of spousal and child support that I have to pay?


A.  The supported party's cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex gives rise to a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof of decreased need for spousal support. FC § 4323(a)(1).  It has no impact on child support obligations, however.

FC § 4323 states:

(a) (1) Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing, there is a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof, of decreased need for spousal support if the supported party is cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex. Upon a determination that circumstances have changed, the court may modify or terminate the spousal support as provided for in Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 3650) of Part 1.

(2) Holding oneself out to be the husband or wife of the person with whom one is cohabiting is not necessary to constitute cohabitation as the term is used in this subdivision.

(b) The income of a supporting spouse's subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner shall not be considered when determining or modifying spousal support.

(c) Nothing in this section precludes later modification or termination of spousal support on proof of change of circumstances.

As stated in Marriage of Schroeder (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1154, 238 Cal.Rptr. 12, the policy underlying section 4323 [former Civil Code section 4801.5]

Section 4801.5 is a legislative acknowledgment that cohabitation may reduce the needs of the supported spouse. The arrangement between Wife and Lara elevates form over substance. By receiving reimbursement by way of "gifts," Wife's cash needs for support purposes appear unchanged despite cohabitation. While cohabitants are at liberty to deal with each other as they see fit, their "contract must be fair and reasonable with respect to the rights of [the] supporting spouse." (In re Marriage of Leib, supra, at p. 643, 145 Cal.Rptr. 733.) The trial court here failed to recognize that the allocation of expenses between Wife and Lara undermines the statute and acts to Husband's detriment.

The record strongly indicates Wife's needs have decreased as a result of cohabitation. We remand to the trial court for a factual determination of the extent of her reduced need, with due consideration for the value of the benefits received by her, as well as the value of the benefits conferred upon Lara.

Schroeder involved a post judgment modification of a permanent support order by the payor, not an initial pendente lite request by the supported spouse. The evidence was the former wife had been living with a man of the opposite sex for 18 months, that he didn’t pay rent, that he was regularly employed, that he did not contribute to utilities, but that he did contribute to joint vacations. The appellate court found those facts to strongly suggest a cohabitation. Even then, the issue on remand was not a termination of the support obligation but a determination of the value of the benefits incurred by the former wife which might reduce her needs.

Cohabitation has been loosely defined as not necessarily holding oneself out to be Husband and Wife, but is more than a simple roommate or "boarding arrangement." There must be a showing of a sexual, romantic or at least a "homemaker-companion" relationship. Marriage of Regnery (1989) 214 CA3d 1367, 263 CR 243.

Marriage of Geraci (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1278 reversed a trial court failure to consider the effect of an admitted cohabitation lasting several years with the following comments:

The court’s judgment also does not take into consideration the evidence Jane had been cohabitating since the parties separated in 2000, despite John’s requests for findings on the issue. Section 4323 states "there is a rebuttal presumption, affecting the burden of proof, of decreased need for spousal support if the supported party is cohabitating with a person of the opposite sex. . . . "Cohabitation may reduce the need for spousal support because ‘sharing a household gives rise to economies of scale. [Citation.] Also, more importantly, the cohabitant’s income may be available to the obligee spouse.’ (In re Marriage of Schroeder (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1159 [238 Cal.Rptr. 12].)"[32] "[T]he Legislature created the presumption . . . based on thinking that cohabitation . . . creates a change of circumstance so tied in with the payment of spousal support as to be significant enough by itself to require a re-examination of whether such need for support continues in such a way that it still should be charged to the prior spouse." [Italics added].

* * *

At trial, however, Jane testified she had no intention of marrying him. Jane’s father, by contrast, testified he hoped they would soon marry. The evidence showed her boyfriend supplied Jane with housing, with a leased car and a credit card in her name for her use. Jane testified she was supposed to pay him back for all her expenditures, including the equivalent of $1,000 a month for rent, whenever she became financially able to do so. She testified she then owed her boyfriend more than $30,000 in back rent, credit card and other debt. According to Jane’s evidence, she contributed to the household by providing domestic services.

The foregoing is substantial and material evidence Jane was cohabitating within the meaning of section 4323 and might have a lesser need for spousal support than the court awarded had it considered this circumstance. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate the court fairly considered Jane’s cohabitation when determining the type and amount of spousal support to award her.

In Marriage of Bower (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893,117 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 there were two permanent support modification hearings filed by the payor husband, one held in 1997 and the second in 2000. At the 1997 hearing the evidence was that the Wife was sharing expenses and living full time at a residence with a man described as a ‘roommate.’ The Bower court noted that the Husband had been wise in not appealing that order. However, by the time of the second application over three years later in 2000, there was evidence that she was sharing at least one bank account with her "roommate," and she even stipulated she was cohabitating.

Under those circumstances, together with evidence of an increased income from her employment, it was not an abuse of discretion to reduce the Wife’s spousal support and then terminate it at the end of one year.

Bower and those cases cited herein regarding cohabitation are dealing with modifications of Permanent Spousal Support orders. They all are based upon the "two can live more cheaply than one" theory or upon actual expenses of the supported party being regularly paid for by the cohabitant beyond loans and gifts. There is no reported case that upholds a trial court refusal to provide spousal support at the temporary hearing stage.  However, I suspect most courts will apply the presumption there as well.

The philosophy underlying the cohabitation statute is that parties who share a household and live in a meretricious relationship should not benefit by continuing to receive spousal support without consideration of the reduced need this sharing produces.

Finding cohabitation just allows for the aid of a statutory presumption to assist in the presentation of factual evidence. The effect is the same without the presumption even for mere roommates, as those contributions to the obligee's living expenses may also support a factual finding sufficient to modify spousal support since rent is income.

Nonetheless, cohabitation is offensive to some judges and they be willing to terminate the spousal support obligation instead of merely reducing it.

Note that once you prove a cohabitation the burden of proof shifts to the supported party to show that they still need support. That is their problem, not yours.  Nonetheless, if you can show a substantial reduction or the end of any need for alimony you would be well advised to present that evidence.

Finally, you are not entitled to know the income of the other party as new-mate income cannot be considered by the Courts. 

For domestic partnerships, even though the statute speaks in terms of opposite sex couples it is highly unlikely that a trial court would not reduce or terminate partner support with a same-sex couple where male former partner is cohabiting with a male and so on.  Since 2005 the California Family Code is to be interpreted as applying evening to same sex couples.

If a homosexual (as opposed to bi-sexual male) is now living with a female should the opposite sex presumption be applied?  The answer would seem to turn on whether the relationship is romantic and/or intimite.  Similarly, if a former wife is now living with a female roommate and it can be established that relationship is intimate, then the same reasoning as in the above cases will likely apply.  We await appellate court pronouncements on these interesting questions.




Thurman W. Arnold III
September 16, 2010

www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com

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April 24, 2010
  Will California recognize a SAME SEX MARRIAGE from Vermont?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.   My same sex spouse and I were married in Vermont in 2001 but moved to Palm Springs five months ago.  Now it looks like we are splitting up.  She works full time and I take care of the home.  Can I seek spousal support in California and get our marriage dissolved here?


A.  As you probably know, Vermont was the first state to offer civil union status to same-sex couples (2000) which was identical to that offered to opposite-sex couples.  California was the first state to offer any legal status to same-sex couples.  Today the only states/territories that permit same-sex marriages or the equivalent civil unions are Connecticut, Washington D.C., Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont.

Other states give varying recognition to same sex partnerships - for instance, California, Nevada, Washington, and Oregon give broad recognition to domestic partners and other states like Colorado and Maine give limited recognition. 

In California some 18,000 couples marry between June 16, 2008 and November 4, 2008, when the window closed on same-sex marriage according to our Supreme Court's ruling in Straus v. Horton.  Our office has assisted some of these couples in divorce in our offices since that time.

Even though it is not presently possible for same-sex couples to marry in California, California will recognize valid marriages and civil unions from other states. 

On January 1, 2010, Family Code section 308 was amended to recognize any "marriage" between two persons of the same sex outside of California which is valid by the laws of that state so long as the marriage was contracted prior to November 5, 2008 (the date the California Constitutional Amendment was upheld prohibiting same-sex "marriage").

As to same sex marriages that are lawful in other states which occur after November 5, 2008, California will not allow them to be called "marriages" but will accord these couples all of the rights of California law concerning marriage.

This leaves open the question of what we call dissolutions between "married" same sex couples in California that were entered after November 4, 2008.  Clearly in your case California recognizes a full-blown marriage in the traditional use of the term because you legally married in 2001 in Vermont.  But for those married since 11/4/08 in another jurisdiction there is uncertainty which California Judicial Council forms (which are mandatory) be utilized because those marriages are not domestic partnerships (Family Code section 299.2), nor are they "marriages."  Our office practice will be to simply use the old forms and modify them as necessary.

You may file a marriage dissolution in this state and request all orders that any divorcing couple could request; however, please note that California requires that you be a resident of this state for at least six months before filing for Dissolution but that you can opt to file a Legal Separation Petition at this time, obtain the necessary support orders, and then file an amended pleading for Dissolution once you perfect residency.

Good luck!



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
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September 09, 2009
  I am a COMMON LAW spouse under Canadian law. We have been living in California for 4 years and acquired property.
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.   My husband and I qualify as common law spouses in Canada, where we lived until 4 years ago when we moved to Palm Desert, CA. Does this mean anything?

Gwen.

A.   There is no common law marriage in California, but the following American states do recognize it: 
  • Alabama
  • Colorado
  • District of Columbia
  • Georgia (if created before 1/1/97)
  • Idaho (if created before 1/1/96)
  • Iowa
  • Kansas
  • Montana
  • New Hampshire (for inheritance purposes only)
  • Ohio (if created before 10/10/91)
  • Oklahoma
  • Pennsylvania (if created before 1/1/05)
  • Rhode Island
  • South Carolina
  • Texas

In a handful of states (listed above), heterosexual couples can become legally married without a license or ceremony. This type of marriage is called a common law marriage. Contrary to popular belief, a common law marriage is not created when two people simply live together for a certain number of years. In order to have a valid common law marriage, the couple must do all of the following:

  • live together for a significant period of time (not defined in any state)
  • hold themselves out as a married couple - typically this means using the same last name, referring to the other as "my husband" or "my wife," and filing a joint tax return, and that they intend to be married.

When a common law marriage exists, the spouses receive the same legal treatment given to formally married couples, including the requirement that they go through a legal divorce to end the marriage.

Now, what about California?

California doesn't recognize common law marriage within this State, but it does recognize common-law marriages contracted in any other State or jurisdiction, including foreign jurisdictions. 

Specifically, California Family Code section 308 provides that "[a] marriage contracted outside this state that would be valid under the laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage is was contracted is valid in this state."  Section 308.5 limits this to a marriage between "a man and a woman".  

Therefore, a valid common law marriage in another jurisdiction is valid in California to the extent it is between opposite sexes. 

Your common law marriage will be treated as a valid marriage here, with all the attendant rights and obligations, if under Canadian law, as interpreted in California, you qualify.




TWA

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