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November 13, 2011
  Wife Bears Own ATTORNEY FEES In Failed SET ASIDE MOTION Involving MSA
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Marriage of Guilardi (11/7/11) 200 Cal.App.4th 770

The Sixth District Appellate Court (including Santa Clara County) has upheld a trial court denial of recovery for the attorney fees incurred by and during a former wife's unsuccessful bid to set aside a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA), based upon express language and implied waivers contained in that agreement (which became incorporated into the Judgment once it was approved by the court), and some misconduct on Wife's part.

Wife sought an award of $157,650 which she had paid (or that possibly remained unpaid) to her attorney, under the "needs" based provisions of Family Code section 2030, even though she incurred them on an underlying motion to set aside the MSA and Judgment that had been determined adversely to her. Her application was made on the basis of fraud, mistake, perjury and noncompliance with the Family Code disclosure requirements - which are standard grounds that Family Code section 2122 enumerates for setting aside family law judgments. It appears from this decision, which is obtusely written at times, that Wife had waived spousal support in that agreement.

Her motion was filed one day before the one-year statute of limitations expired as to some of those grounds (i.e., mistake). When Wife signed the MSA she was not represented by counsel, and for "reasons known only to her" declined to consult with anyone despite being warned by language in the MSA that she might wish to do so and would be bound by it in any event. The MSA contained two standard provisions that the trial court seized upon in denying Wife recovery of any fees: a) a waiver of all claims under Evidence Code section 1542 and b) a clause that stated that in the event of further litigation arising from the agreement, the prevailing party would be entitled to recover their attorney fees and costs. It did not contain any express waivers of need based or other attorney fee claims, but the trial court implied this waiver from the language and intent of the document. 

Unfortunately for Wife, also, the trial court found that she had intentionally destroyed a premarital agreement - although the decision is vague about how the prenup related to the MSA (apparently it too waived spousal support, but the trial court refused to uphold that waiver to the extent it arose in the premarital agreement) - and this fact may be useful to distinguish this decision from other cases, and their lines of reasoning that suggest some courts might reach a different result. (The decision recognizes this split of authority and briefly discusses these other cases). Reference to Wife's destruction of the prenup is also confusing because it was apparently nonetheless litigated so someone must have retained a copy.

So began three years of litigation, and ended after two more years of appellate processes. And lots of attorney fees for both sides. 

I have mixed feelings about this decision. Sometimes bad facts make bad law. The decision doesn't tell us what burden of proof the trial court applied in finding a "waiver" of rights - whether by a preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing proof - and the additional fact of wife's destroying the Prenup, which the appellate decision repeatedly points out, makes this case muddy in terms of its potential application. I suspect that trial judges who wish to apply this case to fact patterns they see in their courtrooms may apply this holding without regard for similar bad acts in their own cases; in this sense, if indeed wife's destruction of the prenup sealed her fate, as the decision seems to imply, other people's fates may be similarly sealed in the future even in the absence of bad faith. And, is it good public policy to declare that a party who, in good faith, prosecutes a set aside motion should not recover fees if they ultimately lose? The two provisions in this MSA that the trial court relied are pretty much universal in MSA's and Stipulated Judgments for Dissolution and related marital or domestic partnership proceedings. Provisions that might be enforceable in most business or nonmarital contracts, particularly as they relate to power imbalances over the control of property or income that may be controlled by an "in-spouse", arguably should not apply within the family law context. 

On the other hand, the fiduciary relationship arising under the fact of the marriage ("de facto" fiduciary relationship) ended when the parties separated and began their divorce battle. This is to be contrasted with the continuing legal obligations ("de jure" fiduciary duties) between the parties that don't end until the community property has been distributed. Additionally, there is a strong public policy interest in the finality of judgments - and this case, extending over 3 years at the trial court level, must have been expensive for the Husband. To have prevailed but still to have been required to pay $156,000 (or some other substantial amount) to Wife for her failed attack seems inherently unfair. This is especially so to the extent that she was destroying documents or otherwise defrauding him or the court. Moreover, Wife did sign the MSA and never apparently satisfactorily explained how this was not her own fault. While she was unrepresented at that time, she made that choice willingly.

Another unanswered question in the reported decision is whether Husband himself sought attorney fees against the Wife as the prevailing party; it seems not. Presumably this is because Wife signed away substantial rights to property and support when she executed the MSA, and so had little to give towards his attorney fees. Notably this was a lengthy 16 year marriage, and it produced a 10 year old daughter. We know nothing about Wife's education, background, or the parties' assets and income.

Incidentally, Wife complained for the first on appeal that the denying her a need's based attorney fee award per Family Code section 2030 was inappropriate given that issues of child custody and support were also determined in the MSA; she did not urge this point in the lower court. The appellate decision implies that such an argument, if properly made, could have caused a different result even if Mom still had lost the set aside application.

This is an important case for protecting the interests of parties once settlement agreements are executed and approved by family court judges. It is also one of those cases that parties who are resisting set aside motions will use to intimidate the other side. It is not at all clear from the decision what would happen where a party files a fee application to underwrite their set aside motion and sets it to be heard before the final determination, i.e., before the other side is determined to have "prevailed." But the implications seem clear. This case should not be considered the final word on the subject.




T.W. Arnold, III, CFLS
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June 02, 2011
  Pointers for Dealing With FAMILY COURT JUDGES (Difficult and Otherwise) - What Every Lawyer and PRO PER Should Know!
Posted By Thurman W. Arnold, CFLS

Working with Family Court Judges

I recently attended the AFCC (Association of Family and Conciliation Courts) Conference in Orlando. Two Canadian jurists put on a useful workshop entitled "Dealing With Difficult Judges" and kindly gave their permission to share their materials with you. Many thanks to the Honorable Carole Curtis and to the Honorable Roselyn Zisman - both family court judges within the Ontario Court of Justice system. I summarize their observations and suggestions here, and add a few of my own I. would be grateful, and it might be beneficial to many of us, if you would weigh in on this useful topic by submitting comments!

As these two bench officers freely admitted, judges like all people can be difficult and reactive at times, and it can be quite challenging for attorneys and pro se litigants to know how to prepare for, and best behave within, the often edgy atmosphere of family court. This tension, if not understood or managed correctly, can have negative consequences to the legal consumers for whom family courts exist to serve. My intention is not to criticize the judiciary, since being an effective judge requires vast reservoirs of equanimity and knowledge, but to have a frank discussion about how lawyers and self-represented parties might consider presenting their cases - or in working with cranky judges - in ways that are dignified and productive. My hope is to improve the civility and professionalism of the family court experience for all affected, and to help unrepresented parties to have a fairer access to justice.

Here are some pointers for how not to aggravate your family court judge or commissioner and a few thoughts about what to do if that happens, despite your best efforts. The opinions expressed herein are not one size fits all. I also want to start a dialogue about how to make the job of family law judges easier for them, or - to put it another way - to discuss a bit about how we might help them to help us.


Suggestions for Interacting With Family Court Judges

  • Rule #1: Be Prepared

Judges have little patience with attorneys, and pro pro litigants, who aren't prepared when they enter the courtroom. Many litigants don't seem to know what they are asking the court to do, why they are asking for it, and what the best legal or factual grounds are for the orders requested. Courts everywhere, but particularly here in California with the passage of Family Code section 217 (which requires live testimony hearings upon request), are grossly overburdened. Judicial resources are not sufficient to meet demand in these budgetary times, and this places a pressure and premium on directness and efficiency. Economic limitations can also make judges a lot crankier than if they had reasonable and adequate time and resources to manage their caseload and calendars.

Depending on County size, wealth and population, California Family Law Judges typically have between 20 and 35 or more matters on their morning calendars. In the afternoons they are often holding evidentiary hearings for the more conflicted OSC/Law and Motion litigants, or have blocked off afternoons for trials. If they are to move through these calendars by the end of the morning, brevity and efficiency becomes exceedingly important. When do we expect that they will find the time to read what is contained in possibly more than 30 files before taking the bench to listen to oral presentations and cross-examination? For the more diligent judges the answer may be evenings and weekends. Which is often when hard working lawyers likewise find the extra time that they need to prepare for hearings and trial.

Therefore, one of the biggest mistakes that agitates judges is parties or lawyers who aren't prepared and can't present their cases with clarity. If, as a lawyer who is directly paid to identify and communicate the justness of your client's position, you don't appear to care overmuch about your client's case then why should our judges care? Lack of preparation, especially for lawyers, is a cardinal sin.

  • Rule #2: Be Prepared For This Particular Judge

In jurisdictions with direct calendar assignments, where a judge is assigned to a case for all purposes or for all purposes possibly until the case is reassigned for trial, learn about the particular bench officer(s) who presides over your case. The more you know the better. Information allows you to make useful assumptions about a particular judge's attitudes and policies.

As Judges Curtis and Zisman note, the best judicial officers are predictable and consistent in their rulings. "A judge's value to the public as a judge is in direct proportion to the ability of the lawyers who frequent the court to predict how the judge will deal with a particular issue." I find this to be so true in my personal experience. Lawyers who know how judges tend to rule on a given issue can with confidence set their client's expectations realistically. Armed with such knowledge, both sides are in a better position to have productive settlement discussions that avoid a "crapshoot" and the associated risks and expense. Moreover, they don't waste time potentially infuriating bench officers with weak arguments that judges may made known that they rarely accept.

Lawyers who are active practitioners in any given court usually have good insights into local judge's attitudes. They may also be aware of information about a judge that is not generally available to the public, like their expertise, practice focus, and reputation before they took the bench. Knowing that while a lawyer your judge participated in a case that generated a published appellate decision on a move-away case, for instance, could provide you a wealth of ideas on how to tailor your presentation. Likewise, knowing whether a judge has been reversed is useful for making sensitive presentations.

Pro per litigants should consider observing a judge going through her calendar over the course of one or more days. You will learn tons about their judicial attitude from watching them in open court, and indeed you may witness other parties get scolded or reprimanded for missteps and so avoid the same mistakes. A simple but classic example is the family court litigant who brings a small retinue of family members who are there ostensibly to provide familial 

  • Rule #3: Notify the Court If the Case Will Be Continued the Day Before

Sometimes one or both attorneys or parties intend to seek a continuance of a hearing, possibly because they want to discuss settlement but often because one or both are not ready to proceed or has late papers to submit.

Different judges have very different attitudes towards continuances, particularly where they have already invested the time reading the materials and then are faced with a continuance request. Lawyers who know that a case will not proceed are well advised to contact the courtroom clerk at least a day in advance to give a head's up - otherwise, they may wind up with a judge who justifiably feels "put out" and therefore cranky. Some allow self-represented parties to give advance notice of agreed upon continuances, but the other side will need to confirm it. Often messages must be left on the clerk's answering machine, and you may not know in advance whether they were received or acted upon.

Where both sides have attorneys and a particular judge is known to permit it, counsel should always let the court know one or even two days in advance that the hearing is not expected to proceed that day.

  • Rule #4: Look At the Local Court Rules, If Any, and the California Rules of Court

Some counties or individual courts have local rules; many do not. Most judges have their own rules and styles, often never to be found in written form. It never hurts to ask the Court clerk, when the judge is off the bench, whether that courtroom follows any specific preferences, customs, or rules of procedures. 

The state-wide source for procedural rules impacting California Family Law (and Juvenile cases) are the California Rules of Court, beginning with Rule 5.100. Rule 5.118 is one of the immediately most important, since it deals with initiating common OSC and Motion requests for custody, support, etc. These rules apply to all family law matters in all California courtrooms.

The Riverside County Local Rules pertaining to Family Law cases can be found here. Start with Title 5. I discuss these in more detail below. The Los Angeles Family Court Rules can be accessed here. Basically you ought to go to the County website where your case is filed and look for the local rules for that particular venue. If they exist you will be well served to review them for relevant tips and local policies. 

  • Rule #5: Talk to the Judge, Not the Other Party or Lawyer

The time to discuss your case or argue with the other side is before you enter the courtroom. It drives judges nuts when two lawyers, two pro se parties, or any combination of them begin to argue at counsel table as though the judge was not present. Keep your focus on the judge, and generally avoid looking at the other party except for emphasis. Never address them directly.

A very important related concept is that if you bring witnesses or support people in the courtroom, tell them in advance to keep control of themselves. This means no interruptions, no head shaking or head nodding, no gasps, and no agitated movements. It is natural that the people your bring to the hearing have a some degree of investment in the outcome. However, when these people act in an uncontrolled fashion, that may affect the court's evaluation of you. Thorough lawyers always remind clients and the support people who accompany them to maintain a even demeanor and not to speak unless spoken to.

  • Rule #6: Never Assume the Court Has Read the File, and Never Ask

Judges can be easily overwhelmed at times for any number of practical or personal reasons. Never assume the Court has read your pleadings, but at the same time it is pointless to ask him if he has. Asking the question not only embarrasses the court, if they answer that they have not read it and you wind up getting what you wanted, you are inviting an appeal since appellate courts in California have reversed trial courts for ruling on matters where they've admitted on the record they've not read the file.

Instead, start your presentation as though the Judge has not read the materials. Most judges will interrupt you to advise you when they have read it. Be nimble. At the same time, understand that the court only has enough time to listen to summaries of information, not the entire case. You need to know in advance what your highlights are soundbites are, and they should be presented in as orderly a way as possible. Having outlined these in advance is very helpful in the heat of the moment, where you become distracted by some exchange you did not expect and must return your focus to your goals. Outline your highlights on a notepad in a way that a given sentence triggers your memory of the remaining points you wish to make.

  • Rule #7: Make It Easy for the Judge

This is one of the greatest challenges, particularly for young lawyers and self-represented parties. How to know what matters and what does not? You want to help the judge to help you, and in doing this you need some ability to discern what is legally or factually important to them.

The first and best opportunity is to do this in the papers that are filed when your OSC or Motion is drafted, or when replying to the other side. Here it is extremely important to know the local court rules, if any, as they pertain to how paperwork is prepared plus - use common sense.

These papers give the court the first and sometimes defining impression of the case. They are probably your biggest opportunity for persuasion. Their purpose is to instruct the Court, and to explain the justness and reasonableness of your position. Backbiting and attacking the other side, or their attorney, and engaging in irrelevant and personal argument, is not going to be helpful. Like many of the suggestions I make in this Blog, this is often hard when locked in divorce trance, whether as a trained advocate or not. In declarations consider inserting spreadsheets, Excel boxes, and tables where a point can be made visually and simply.

Most judges are older people, and their eyes are not those of a 30-something adult. Double space your writings; use at least 12 point font; some judges insist that Courier or Times Roman be used; others insist that you use recyclable paper. Never handwrite your papers where you can avoid it, except possibly in cases involving domestic violence restraining orders requests (since the Judicial Council forms are handwriting friendly); nonetheless, typewritten language should always be preferred. Do number sequentially the paragraphs in your declarations. Organize your work for ease of access.

Avoid using CAPS or Bolding, except possibly for titles and organizing sections of your written submissions, since many of us today interpret that as shouting.

The likelihood that the court will fully read your pleadings increases proportionately with its brevity and readability. Most judges consider more than eight pages to be way too long. Reduce and edit your work, and then reduce an edit it some more. I am reminded of a literature class I took in college that studied the works of Ernest Hemingway. As I recall it, he would edit and review all his work to use active verbs and cut, cut, cut unnecessary verbiage. Similarly, when the other side submits a lengthy pleading resist to impulse to respond in kind. Be surgical. This can be a tall order in family law cases, since there is so much emotionality and reactivity in "he-said", "she-said" exchanges. But try. Respect how little time a court has to review one of twenty files set for any given calendar.

Do not include evidentiary submissions in pleadings, and consider tabbing or page numbering your exhibits and then referencing those page numbers or tabs in your declarations (by page, paragraph number, or line number). Remember, if the judge can't find what you are referencing, they will not like read it. This is a tough call in my experience, because it is good practice to provide evidentiary support for claims you make and positions you take. But too many attorneys and most all pro pers I've encountered submit way too much paperwork, and I confess I've done it too.

Some courts will allow counsel or the parties to contact the clerk in advance of hearings to warn that the issues are more complex than normal. This may be a wise step on your part.

  • Rule #8: Avoid Head-Butting With the Judge (and the Other Side)

Whether or not a judge seems difficult or cranky, it does not help to get into a head-butting contest with him or her because you just can't win it. Head-butting may be a "kiss of death" for an advocate; the issues themselves have degenerated into an ego contest, and if you are in court to serve your ego you will likely have an unpleasant outcome. Remember, people are watching, including court staff. The Judge not only knows that she is the supreme power in the courtroom, she has her dignity to protect. Confrontations with judges suggests a battle between equals, and you are not equal. It also implies a winner and a loser. If you head-butt with a Judge, you are asking them to prove to everyone present who is in control. That usually ensures that you will be shown to be the loser for the simple reason that finding in your favor may then imply that you are in control.

Head-butting might well begin with an attitude on the part of the judge. If this occurs, move into "damage control." Immediately lower your tone. Avoid flailing hands or arms. Speak evenly, slowly, and respectfully. This may defuse the situation before it becomes impossible to redeem. As Judges Curtis and Zisman put it "You must do whatever you can to end this contest. Consider a retreat, whatever that means in the circumstances. Move your reaction into this range...:  be calm, be measured, be focused, and be polite (be unfailingly polite)." With a particularly difficult judge, the hotter it gets the calmer you must become.

A cautionary note here: Many judges I know respect an advocate or a person who will stand up to them, and not simply fold because there may be some debate. So much depends upon your tone and style even as you perhaps stubbornly, but calmly, present your arguments or evidence. Hence, do not take these suggestions as meaning that if the judge seems to disagree with you that you should become silent. It is how you convey your message that often matters most.

Be persistent, unless it becomes obvious that the Court has heard enough. Often judges will tell you this.This can become a real problem if you have not had the opportunity to make "a record" for purposes of a possible appeal (something you never want, but sometimes must consider).  If you are foreclosed from making a record, you should note that respectfully before quitting.

Similarly, it is usually pointless to argue with a judge once they have ruled on any given matter, but if you feel there is more to say and you are uncertain whether the judge has heard as much as she will, you might try "Your Honor, before the court moves on, might I add one more thing?" 

  • Rule #9: Never Lie to the Court

It is amazing to me how often attorneys will intentionally misstate facts to the court, or create inflammatory arguments that has little basis in fact. I am sad to tell you this happens a lot, and in fact this is one reason why divorce attorneys may be viewed as bottom feeders. Yet, this is only a small, if vocal, segment of the legal practitioner population. Similarly, parties in relationship disputes are highly motivated to misrepresent information for more directly obvious reasons. 

As a advocate, one of the most important things that lawyers possess is their reputations. Judges who will talk about it will candidly admit that they are every bit a catty lot as the next person or profession. The talk in chambers, they talk in lunchrooms, they talk in restaurants, they talk in meetings amongst themselves. One of the common topics is about the lawyers who come into their courtrooms. Their views about particular attorneys' reputations can be infectious within the judicial community, which is not to suggest that they do not attempt to remain impartial on a case by case basis. It is true that sometimes it feels that attorneys who too freely spin the facts get away with it. This is one reason I am a proponent of monetary sanctions against attorneys directly, something I suggest in my Davenport Blog. One consequence of unaccountability is that opposing sides, and unrepresented parties, take their cues from the lawyers they come into contact with and mimic bad behavior of those they observe. The behavior of legal professionals matters. terrible message to send. There are so many reasons why it is imperative that lawyers not be deceitful.

Never lie to the Court, whether you are a lawyer or a party. Once a judge gets fixed on the idea that your information is untrustworthy it will pervade his view of you within your case, and is likely to haunt you. There are subtle and not so subtle ways of punishing litigants by imposing outcomes that can be catastrophic for your life, from fixing alimony or support orders above your level to pay to depriving you of time with your children. And, be advised, lawyers love it when the other party lies. This is exactly what can be seized upon to win their client's case, sometimes far more dramatically than when people just admit the weaknesses in their positions and move on.

  • Rule #10: Don't Tell the Judge it is Obvious She's Already Made Up Her Mind

It does happen that lawyers and parties may find that the Court has prejudged the case before any oral presentation; an example being the circumstances identified above where the lawyer or litigant has lost all credibility. But at other times it can be very difficult to understand why a bench officer may seem to have already decided your case before you open your mouth.  

This is a tough one there may not be much that you can do about it. The advice of judges Curtis and Zisman is to stay calm and focused, and just keep going. Don't respond with something like well, "I can see your honor has already made up your mind," and don't otherwise communicate this with your body language, glares, or tone. This too can be a tall order. But on balance neither the client nor their case can be served in this fashion. For lawyers, my experience is that clients better appreciate the fact that you remained professional rather than snotty with the judge, because they will watch in real panic as their spokesperson begins to lose his or her poise. Similarly, they will know you did everything you could where you don't pour accelerant on the fire.

Judges Curtis and Zisman suggest that lawyers and parties need to know, under such circumstances, when to fold. They also need to know how to protect the record - that is what is said on the record that is recorded by the court reporter. As with the rude and abrasive judge discussed below, a good record for an appeal may be your only hope especially in jurisdictions that video or audio record the hearing, since tones of voice and sarcasm are often lost in a written hearing transcript. And, beware, I once had this happen with an extremely difficult Juvenile Court Judge (retired some years now) and so made a request for the written transcript (which was all that was available), and when I received it I found that major portions had been edited out entirely. Obviously the judge had instructed the court reporter to falsify the transcript, but how was I to prove it? I did manage to get a Writ of Mandate on appeal that removed the judge from future hearings in the case, and then won it in front of a much better judge at trial. BTW, proof that a judge has doctored the hearing transcript would almost certainly result in judicial discipline if proved, but that is can of worms I do not recommend since if your attack on the court fails that judge might actually make it their mission to ruin an attorney or their case.

  • Rule #11: Don't Duke it Out With the Rude and Abrasive Judge

Unfortunately I witness this more than I care to admit as an observer at courthouses, although very rarely in my cases these days and one possible reason is that I usually know when to shut up. Judges Curtis and Zisman state "Some judges are rude, aggressive, even abusive, for no apparent reason, or at least none that justifies this behaviour. It is extremely important for the lawyer (or the party) to be calm, and to remain calm, polite, [and] focused." I quote them directly to reinforce that I am not one lawyer griping about judges; similarly, I have friends who are retired bench officers and they will admit that such conduct occurs, and even that at times they regrettably engaged in it. 

The goal of lawyers in such situations is, above all, to defuse the situation. This may seem an impossible task, particularly when it is our job to protect our clients. If the behavior is really so over the top that our clients are being abused we must object to such behavior.

All I can recommend to nonlawyers is that they not get sucked into such exchanges with the court, but that at the same time they politely and firmly stand their ground.

  • Rule #12: Ideas for Coping With Judges Who Do Not Know Family Law

California matrimonial law is immensely complicated. Many lawyers who regularly practice in family court really have little clue what they are doing, in part because the simpler contests arise over and over again and many lawyers learn enough to deal with these simple situations but would be highly stressed on more complicated situations. Likewise, many family court lawyers have very little actual trial or even deposition experience. They don't know how to cross-examine witnesses. They only have a glancing familiarity with rules of evidence. Some of these lawyers actually go on to become judges. Others may be quite skilled in the criminal arena, for instance, where they were once prosecutors or public defenders. These judges were once real trial lawyers, but that doesn't mean they understand family law. Others may have been quite senior civil litigators who nonetheless rarely if ever handled these types of cases. 

Curtis and Zisman point out that this situation is actually more easily remedied than some of the others discussed here. They suggest that particularly when you know that a bench officer is not overly familiar with this area, that you adjust your presentation to ensure that you covering the basics. State what you are asking for, identify any statutory authority, and discuss the legal standards that apply. One of the reasons I blog so much is to popularize information to empower nonlawyers. Lawyers have lots of legal treatises to subscribe to and review (when they bother); the public generally does not have these so nearly accessible. I hope this website aids you. However, please remember, my blogs and articles are intended merely to be educational and it is impossible for me to guarantee their accuracy under any fact pattern. You have to do your own work and draw your own conclusions.

  • Rule #13: What to Do With the Judge Who Hates Family Law

This is usually a function of judges who don't know family law although as you might suspect, a jurist who hates family law is likely not going to bother to learn it. The best way to overcome this problem is to be polite, be brief, and educate the court about what you want and why you are entitled to it. If you have no idea as to either, the judge who hates family law may become an abusive judge as well. Politely and firmly resist being rushed. But get your points in clearly.

  • Rule #14: Cite Recent Authority Whenever Possible

If you are identifying statutes or law that you believe impacts how the judge should rule on your case, try to identify recent materials and consider having a copy of them with you. For instance, I often Blog appellate decisions that may only have been published for the first time a few days before. These cases haven't hit the law books yet. The judge may likely know nothing about them. Be sure to bring copies of the case to the courtroom to give the bailiff to hand the judge, and be sure to provide one to the other side (hopefully before the hearing begins). 

Because family law changes so rapidly, some judges only want recent authorities.

As to statutes, most that have been amended in any given year change effective on January 1 of the following year. If you are at the cusp of year's end, consider double-checking relevant statutes in advance of your hearing or when you prepare any written Points and Authorities. The Web is a great resource for these materials, as is my website, since I will attempt to give the public a heads up on important changes beginning November and December each year.

  • Rule #15: Never Try to Submit Late Declarations

I often see pro pers bring in late declarations and try to file them just before a hearing, often refusing to first give them to their opponent or their lawyer. I can't recall how many times I have had a self-represented party tell me that they intend to submit something to the Court but they wont let me have a copy until the Judge says so. 

Judges almost universally will not consider late papers, and I promise you that the first words out of my mouth in such situations to the court will be that Mr. So and So has some additional declarations to file, but refuses to let me see them. Even lawyers play this game. Don't do it. It is the kind of conduct that may bias the court against you, and the risk reward ratio doesn't merit such behavior. Why blow yourself up at the outset?

If this happens to you on the receiving end object politely, at once. Know the rules of court provisions I've given you and any others that may apply and point out that the time to file papers expired. If a judge indicates a willingness to consider these matters, ask for a continued hearing so that you may review and respond to them. If the hearing proceeds respectively ask the Court to strike any oral version of the materials that didn't get filed.

  • Rule #16: Understand the Rules Relating to Proofs of Service

I cannot tell you how often court submittals are rejected by the clerks, or hearings don't go forward, because there has not been an adequate proof of service filed with the Court. Even when late papers are accepted by the clerk,, judges often refuse to read them. Late papers burden jurists, and they aren't proper. Procedural due process within the adversary legal system requires that both sides have full and fair notice of what relief is being sought, and what is being alleged. There are strict time limits for perfecting Proof of Service, which are complex enough to tangle lawyers up as well. 

If you haven't perfected service, the best case for you is that you've wasted your day and your matter will be continued; the worse is that your materials will not be considered, or even that your matter will not be heard at all. A good idea is to consider asking the others side in advance for a continuance and get them the papers by fax or personal delivery at early on as you can, and tell the judge you did so when they insist on going forward and objecting to what you wanted to present.

  • Rule #17: The Judge Who Won't Let You Argue the Case

This is common, particularly given that law and motion (and OSC) calendars are short cause hearing settings. This is something you definitely should ask the court clerk about in advance. However, it tends to be moving target depending upon a judge's frustration level on any particular day. Judges regularly will ask litigants, particularly pro pers, to look behind them at all the other people waiting to be heard "by me" today. You may be told that you be coming back after lunch if you cannot conclude your matter within a specific time frame.  

Trials are a different matter. For non-trial order to show cause hearings assume that 10 minutes may be all you get.

As with all difficulties encountered with judges, try not to draw attention to the fact that the court is shutting you down or otherwise criticize the court, unless there is no option but to do so in order to protect the record. Which almost certainly means you've lost this round.

  • Rule #18: What to Do With The Judge Who Can't Stay Out of the Arena

Unlike many other legal areas, courts have some independent duties to investigate the facts of a case beyond questions that lawyers or parties might think to ask or decide not to ask because they know they won't like the answer. An obvious example is the best interests test in child custody and visitation proceedings.  

Those of you that remember Paul Newman in The Verdict may recall what this circumstance can look like. There is not much to be done, except not to go off and to remain calm.

  • Rule #19: Know When to Fold

This is a painful reality for both lawyers and pro per litigants. Sometimes retreat is the only option. It is a corollary of much of what has been discussed above. If you aren't getting anywhere, end the line of questioning or the argument. Young lawyers particularly don't know when to go silent. Pro pers seem to have a better sense of it, because they tend not to be as susceptible to ego battles with a judge as a lawyer filled with righteous indignation.

  • Rule #20: Be Reasonable

I find this one of the most important and effective of tools to obtain good and fair results in the courtroom, even when I can't achieve every single one of my client's goals. Reasonableness speaks to credibility. It also assumes that possibility of some win-win, and enables the Court to feel it has achieved substantial justice. Judges don't generally like giving one side everything they ask for, unless of course they are really pissed at the other side.

  • Rule #21: Treat Everyone With Respect

Clerks and deputies are watching everything that happens in and outside of the courtroom, and are part of the Judge's family. Treat them with respect and realize that they are sizing you up as well, and possibly even directly or indirectly reporting to the judge. Treat them gently and with respect. Don't think you can behave like a jerk in the hallways without it possibly being seen and reported. 

A particular problem area can arise here in dealing with Court minutes, which are taken by the court clerk. It is not uncommon for these minutes, which absent a transcript being ordered become the only written record of what transpired, to be incomplete or even incorrect. This happens, unfortunately, often but is easily understood things often move rapidly and emotionally during hearings. If it does happen and a formal order is submitted it will usually be rejected as not conforming to the Court's minutes. Ideally recite the court's orders back to the court for the benefit of the court clerk, and do it slowly and even look at them gently when you do it.


... To Be Continued!

 



Thurman W. Arnold, III, C.F.L.S.

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May 30, 2011
  Court Upholds SPOUSAL SUPPORT WAIVER In PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Marriage of Howell (May 24, 2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1062

The Fourth District out of San Diego County recently published an opinion upholding a spousal support waiver contained in a premarital agreement that was executed before 2002, when California adopted the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (UPAA) and amended Family Code section 1612.

Section 1612 invalidates any provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support, including, but not limited to, a waiver of such support if (i) the party against whom enforcement of the spousal support provision is sought was not represented by independent counsel at the time the agreement containing the provision was signed or (ii) that provision is unconscionable at the time of enforcement.

Michael and Pamela Howell began dating in 1997 and married in mid-May, 1998. They separated in March, 2008. Prior to marriage they executed a prenuptial agreement that included, among other things, a provision that they each waived any right to seek spousal support from the other in the event of divorce. At trial there was a dispute concerning the circumstances surrounding the timing and execution of the agreement, with Michael claiming he contacted his lawyer to draft the prenup a year before the wedding, and that he gave her a copy to review in December, 1998. He testified that he told Pamela to take her time in reading it, and to consult a lawyer. He said that Pamela reported she'd discussed it with family members and friends and that she concluded there was no need to have it independently reviewed because Michael had "nothing" to protect. It was signed on January 30, 1999.

Pamela's story was that Michael waited until the wedding day was fixed and paid for by Pamela and her family before raising the issue of a prenup.  She said they argued about it, and Michael threatened to call of the wedding and so cause her great embarrassment and expense if she refused to sign. She claimed she had the agreement for only about three days before she signed and didn't understand what rights she was waiving. Nor did she have the money to hire a lawyer and advise her, since she'd spent it all on the wedding and Michael never offered to pay for to consult with an attorney.

The agreement recited that Michael had been previously married twice and had a daughter; Pamela was never married and had no children. Michael worked for the U.S. Postal Service earning $38,000/year and Pamela worked at a mortgage company and made $24,000 annually. Paragraph 5 stated that the agreement had been drafted by Michael's attorney, who represented Michael only, and it urged Pamela to seek independent counsel but that she has declined to do so with full knowledge of the interests she was waiving. In another portion the language stated both parties were of sound mind and not acting under duress. Both parties fully disclosed their assets, liabilities, and income.

The spousal waiver stated: "The parties mutually waive any right to receive future spousal support, maintenance or alimony from the other in the event of a Dissolution of Marriage or Legal Separation."

The trial court found that the waiver did not comply with the 2002 amendments to Family Code section 1612, even though it was executed four years before their enactment, and that Pamela had lacked independent counsel. Nonetheless, however, the court went on to make a number of findings for the record including:
  • that Pamela entered the agreement voluntarily
  • Pamela was capable of understanding the admonition to obtain her own attorney
  • she had sufficient time to do so
  • at a minimum she could have inquired into the cost of retaining counsel but didn't
  • the premarital agreement was twelve pages long, not particularly complex, involved a small estate, made full disclosure, and basically sought to maintain the parties' separate property interests
  • she was fluent in English
  • she was employed in the field of bookkeeping, which involves the keeping of finances
  • under either parties' version, she had at least 14 days prior to the wedding to consider the agreement
  • there was no evidence of duress - it was presented to her at least four months prior to the wedding; indeed, she'd provided her own financial information some five months earlier
  • given that Michael had been twice divorced, it was reasonable that he would have raised the request for a prenup much earlier than admitted by Pamela, which was way before the parties began to plan for a wedding
  • she had mental capacity and there was no evidence of trick or deception
  • there was no evidence the agreement was unconscionable when signed

Nonetheless, because the Court believed that FC section 1612 had to be applied retroactively it declined to enforce the waiver and ordered Michael to pay spousal support of $1,015 per month as temporary support, and then $1,659/month until further of court. It ordered Michael to contribute $10,000 to Pamela's attorney fees per Family Code section 2030. Michael appealed the support ruling but not the attorney fees' order.

Justice Benke of the the Fourth District reversed the trial court's determination that FC § 1612 could be applied retroactively. The Court decided that the California legislature must have intended otherwise because (a) there was no express retroactivity provision contained in the statute itself, (b) there was nothing in the legislative history to suggest the legislature so intended; and (c) the addition of the requirement of independent counsel added in 2002 constituted a material change in prior law and to apply it retroactively would upset the expectations of parties to a contract based upon the state of the prior law by imposing a new duty (to obtain counsel) that hadn't existed earlier.

Ironically, it wasn't until 2000 that the California Supreme Court first declared that a waiver of spousal support did not per se violate public policy (IRMO Pendleton and Fireman, 24 Cal.4th 39). Up to that point it was an open question in California whether premarital agreements could ever be enforced as to support waivers.

The Howell trial court had been careful to lay the groundwork in its factual findings to support a knowing and intelligent waiver by Pamela, but for the reach of the 2002 amendments to FC section 1612. Without retro application, there was sufficient evidence in the record to enforce the waiver. Pamela's lack of independent counsel in a pre-2002 prenup was just one of several factors that a court needs to consider in answering whether a support waiver is enforceable in a pre-UPAA agreement.

The appellate court ruled:

"In light of the trial court's findings, which are supported by ample evidence in the record, and based on the law as it existed at the time the parties executed their premarital agreement, we conclude on this record that Pamela, despite not having independent counsel at the time she executed that agreement, knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to spousal support in that agreement."

This prenup was executed in January, 1999, at a time when most family law attorneys anticipated that premarital waivers of spousal support would one day be upheld as enforceable, but had no idea when and under what conditions. Prenuptial agreements used to be viewed with great suspicion by the Courts under the assumption that they were 'promotive of divorce.' The law has radically shifted since then, as has the legislative and public sentiment. Many people - and evidently Michael in this case - who have prior marriages and children won't get married without one. In that sense they may actually serve to promote marriage.

I find one of the most interesting facts of this case to be the evident simplicity of this particularly premarital agreement. Rarely have I seen a prenup agreement that is only twelve pages long. We lawyers tend to make them quite complicated, partly out of fear of committing malpractice in this area of the law; we may want to reconsider this strategy. The Howell decision, which would have had a different outcome if the agreement had been executed after the enactment of the 2002 amendments to FC § 1612, expresses a major new judicial attitude that support waivers in premarital agreements are to be enforced when they are not unconscionable at the time they are signed, or under current 1612 at the time a party seeks to enforce them. It may serve people to reduce them to their bare essence rather than elongating them. An agreement that is 50 pages long may seem incomprehensible to most nonlawyers.

By the way, prenups that don't mention spousal support will be much more easily enforced. While it is possible for a court to strike only the spousal support language in agreements that contain them, it is also possible the entire agreement could be stricken if the waiver is rejected depending upon how interrelated various provisions are.

For those contemplating drafting or signing a prenup it remains very difficult to predict whether they will be enforced under the circumstances of a contemporary divorce or legal separation. Section 1612(c) reads:

"(c) Any provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support, including, but not limited to, a waiver of it, is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement of the spousal support provision is sought was not represented by independent counsel at the time the agreement containing the provision was signed, or if the provision regarding spousal support is unconscionable at the time of enforcement. An otherwise unenforceable provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal support may not become enforceable solely because the party against whom enforcement is sought was represented by independent counsel." [Emphasis added].

We await further appellate rulings to determine what the bounds of "unconscionab[ility] at the time of enforcement" are. This is where drafting these agreements is especially tricky, and requires great skill. Don't believe that support waivers will always be enforced, particularly where they are blanket waivers (as opposed to limiting spousal support rights by duration, amount, or future circumstances at time of enforcement).

In the meantime, as to this decision, it appears that Pamela's side threw all the standard objections at the trial court that one would expect where there is a challenge to a prenup (wedding already planned, embarrassment and cost, duress, lack of understanding, no independent review and Michael didn't offer to pay for her to get one), and they didn't stick. She has to repay all the alimony she received, plus Michael's costs on appeal. 



T.W. Arnold, C.F.L.S.

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March 30, 2011
  TAX TIME Advice for SEPARATED COUPLES About JOINT TAX RETURNS
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  I'm separated from my ex-husband, and we are in the process of a divorce. He has asked me to file jointly on a 2010 return, and I am wondering if this is a good idea. Any suggestions?

Trudy


Trudy:

I am neither a tax specialist or a CPA. As a family law attorney who is frequently asked this question, I can answer it generally (and do answer it specifically for my clients). I would need much more information in order for you to rely upon my suggestions in answer to the question you present to me. This question is highly fact/situation specific.

You refer to your husband as your "ex" which people commonly do even when they are still married but an action is pending, and I am assuming that there was no termination of your marital status in 2010 in answering this question. If your marital status was indeed terminated on or before 12/31/10, you cannot file jointly for that year.

The chief attribute of filing a joint tax return (for couples who remain married at the end of the tax year), besides potential tax savings from better tax treatment for married couples (who must be opposite-sex gendered under federal law), is something called "joint and several" liability for any amounts due and owing either based upon the return itself, or that may arise later if there is an audit and a deficiency is assessed against either/both of you - if jointly filed, the tax assessment will be joint.

If you file jointly and taxes were underpaid or under-reported, the Internal Revenue Service holds you each equally responsible for the entire amounts that should have been paid. In my experience the risk of these sort of deficiencies exists most frequently where one or both parties is self-employed, particularly in a business. People write off all kinds of expenses, and the IRS audits very few returns compared to the number that are filed. Some statistics (Kiplingers) say this one out of 150 personal tax returns. The risk of tax reporting abuse is high where the IRS is relying upon schedule C's. Perhaps obviously, business write-offs are much more susceptible to IRS attack than payrollees - depending upon what salaried employees claim as write-offs.

If you received spousal support in 2010 and you file jointly with the payor, he/she doesn't get that deduction and you pay no taxes on what you actually received. Depending upon the numbers, this may benefit you. There is no deduction for child support for the payor. For more information about "Family Support" please use my on-site search engine at the top upper right of this page.

It is common for me to see people who separated and/or filed for a dissolution in the final quarter of the prior year to then decide to file jointly for that year even where spousal support was paid, because the payor may be better off overall by electing to not deduct the alimony payments that would otherwise be deductible (and therefore taxable to you) in light of other deductions (particularly head of household). Often it is useful to have a tax preparer run the numbers both way - married filing separately and jointly. A major reason for this is the head of household deduction, which gets shared in a joint filing but is only otherwise available to the parent who had physical custody of 50.1 percent or better for six months and a day or more during the prior year (2010). The high earner gets an advantage from this. Again, I want you to check with your accountant.

There may be other benefits that accrue to a child or spousal support recipient where parties file jointly - if parties file jointly, because the California support guidelines are supposed to be "tax-effected" in the sense that people's actual filing status should be inputted into guideline support calculations (see Family Code section 4059), the payor has more "net disposable income" available to pay child or temporary spousal support when they file MFS (married filing separately) or joint. They pay the greatest taxes as "single", and so their support is lowered. However, these advantages only last so long as the marriage has not been legally terminated, whether by bifurcation of marital status or otherwise.

I find that parties are better off cooperating about joint tax filings, when it is safe to do so. If you can file jointly because you are still married, and IF your soon to be ex-spouse gets a benefit from that joint filing (depending upon you receive spousal support or not) that is important to him (or her), I recommend that you negotiate a deal where he/she pays you a tad more support in exchange for helping him/her out on the joint filing. You will also want to agree how to divide any refunds - some or all of this refund may be community property depending on how late in the prior year you separated (monies paid to taxing authorities from community property sources remain community property).

Remember - we want to pay Uncle Sam as little as is legal. We want to make more money available to support children. Take advantage of the bias in favor of married couples when it makes economic sense for you. Cut a deal that benefits you too! This issue may give you important leverage that will help you to support the family in terms of net dollars. Otherwise, given the risks why file jointly at all?



Thurman W. Arnold, C.F.L.S.
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March 24, 2011
  Overcoming the PRESUMPTION Against SPOUSAL SUPPORT in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Cases
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  My wife obtained domestic violence restraining orders against me. The truth is I was not guilty of what she claimed I did, but the judge at our DV hearing said that all he needed was a 'preponderance of the evidence' to issue those orders against me. He said the evidence needed only to tip "slightly" in her favor, and he evidently believed her even though she had no witnesses and she was never injured in any way. I had no idea it would make my life a living hell. 

After I was kicked out of our home, she took control of 20 properties that we owned together, and raided our bank accounts - in fact, even before she called police that night, she was moving money out of our joint accounts. I was forced out with nothing, including my tools that I need to use as a diesel mechanic (most employers expect mechanics to work with their own equipment, and there is no way for me to free-lance without the tools). I left with only the clothes I was wearing. She was planning the whole thing.

It is now 18 months later and I am living with family. I haven't had access to anything that we amassed during our marriage, which include rentals and the properties that I owned at the time we were married (she made me put her name on the deeds). I need spousal support help. I have no job and I have no way to get one. But my lawyer tells me that I am cooked - that judges won't ever award spousal support to anybody that has had domestic violence orders issued against them.

What do you think?

"Fred"

Fred:

This is a very difficult situation, and assuming that your wife trumped these charges up against you I am sorry for your circumstance. It happens alot. Many litigants and their attorneys will exaggerate, and even invent, domestic violence scenarios to gain advantage in divorce cases. To assume that every person (be them a man or woman) who claims to be a victim of domestic violence really has been would be naive. There is no question that major benefits can inure to parties who successfully allege domestic violence. While I recognize that the majority of DV victims are women, I have seen cases where I was convinced a female claimant was gaming the system. How could it be otherwise - there is no gender priority for truth.

These benefits for falsely asserting DV include:
  • Exclusive residence possession (kick out orders) [FC §6321]
  • Ensuring the other party has limited access to children  [FC §3044]
  • Making their own spousal support claims seem more meritorious [FC §4320(i)]
  • Anticipating and cutting off an anticipated spousal support request from a lower earner spouse [FC §§ 4320(i) and 4325]

To be fair to judges, these cases are hard to evaluate. The California legislature has set a very low standard of proof and hasn't cleared up inadequacies, ambiguities, and contradictions within our own Family Code statutory scheme and so a default strategy has been assumed that it is appropriate to treat DV offenders, once a finding has been made, quite harshly (a good example of this is that the statutes below reference FC § 6211, when domestic violence is not really defined anywhere in the California Family Code). There are few appellate decisions that guide trial courts, and the ones that exist are based upon bad facts at least as far as the alleged perpetrator is concerned in the sense that the DV offenses were serious. There is no good appellate court case yet on behalf of an alleged abuser who committed a relatively minor infraction (i.e., damage to property with no physical threats or violence), and none that speak to mitigating circumstances.

I want to be very clear that I abhor domestic violence. But I abhor manipulative litigation strategies just as much - because I believe that domestic violence comes in many forms, and that abusing the system to gain power in legal proceedings is also exactly the type of violence that people, possibly like you, should be protected against. The problem for judges is that it is hard to spot, and making mistakes can result in deaths.

So this is where you are:

California Family Code section 4325 provides:

    "(a) In any proceeding for dissolution of marriage where there is a criminal conviction for an act of domestic violence perpetrated by one spouse against the other spouse entered by the court within five years prior to the filing of the dissolution proceeding, or at any time thereafter, there shall be a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that any award of temporary or permanent spousal support to the abusive spouse otherwise awardable pursuant to the standards of this part should not be made.

    (b) The court may consider documented evidence of a convicted spouse's history as a victim of domestic violence, as defined in Section 6211, perpetrated by the other spouse, or any other factors the court deems just and equitable, as conditions for rebutting this presumption.

    (c) The rebuttable presumption created in this section may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence."

Hence, in the event of a criminal conviction of DV within five years there is a rebuttable presumption of no support, period. However, notice that rebutting this is by the same standard that the judge remarked to you about when he/she issued the restraining orders - in other words, "more probable than not." One hopes that judges apply the same standards to each question they face.

Family Code section 4320(i), regarding post-judgment spousal support, is being interpreted by courts as applying to temporary support order applications as well. It reads:

    "In ordering spousal support under this part, the court shall consider all of the following circumstances:

    * * * (i) Documented evidence of any history of domestic violence, as defined in Section 6211, between the parties, including, but not limited to, consideration of emotional distress resulting from domestic violence perpetrated against the supported party by the supporting party, and consideration of any history of violence against the supporting party by the supported party.

    * * * (m) The criminal conviction of an abusive spouse shall be considered in making a reduction or elimination of a spousal support award in accordance with Section 4325."

4320(i) does not require evidence of any kind of conviction, although of course that would be relevant - and it cuts both ways: It gives the court discretion to award more spousal support just as well as giving the court to deny spousal support, upon "[d]ocumented evidence." Subsection (m) just restates 4325.

Hence, whether a presumption against spousal support attaches per 4325 or is just in the judge's mind under 4320(i), what you need to present is evidence that will overcome the presumption of 4325. This means: Why should the court not follow the legislative directive that presumes you are not entitled to spousal support? There is no case yet that gives trial courts any guidance on this subject (i.e., "what needs to be proved?"), and it will take a dedicated judge who is deeply passionate about the law - and the proper facts - to turn the populist pendulum that is still in reactive mode to the deplorable sins that true DV generates.

I recommend the following arguments for rebutting the presumption, as applicable:

  • Assuming that you had a criminal conviction, argue that you served your time
  • Assuming that you were ordered to complete a 52-week batterer's program, argue that you complied
  • If you have a long term marriage, i.e., for more than 10 years point that out
  • Did your Wife allege a single incident or a pattern of incidents? One of the thorny problems concerning domestic violence restraining orders is that so many different types of conduct, ranging from merely annoying to life threatening, can give rise to them. What your wife alleged in terms of the apparent seriousness (or lack of injury) of your offense might mitigate in your favor by a preponderance of the evidence when balanced against your need for support and all other relevant circumstances considered together
  • If there is evidence that you and your wife were mutual combatants at any time, i.e., that (as with too many families) you both behaved badly, present that evidence
  • Remind the court that at worst you have the same burden to justify support now as your wife had to justify DV orders then
  • Point out that you have been deprived of your livelihood by reason of your Wife's conduct, and that she is, as you say, in control of not only your properties, your joint funds, but also your tools
  • Demonstrate that your spouse took control of all the assets, even before the DV situation erupted, not to attack the prior court ruling (which your present judge will always assume was valid and binding), and that she has maintained this control to such an extent such that you have been entirely deprived of your community property entitlements (in breach of fiduciary duties owing you from her) but also that you have been deprived of the very items that would allow you to be self-supporting. Where DV is indeed trumped up, the reporting party tends to behave in predictably controlling ways. Point this out together with any relevant conduct on the part of your spouse - has she met her sua sponte disclosure obligations? Has she ruined your credit by not paying some of property creditors that you are obligated on? Has she changed  your mailing address so that you didn't receive information that might impact your livelihood?
  • I cannot overstate that the likelihood is that only a breach, or the substantial appearance thereof, of fiduciary duties on the part of your spouse will meet your burden. Fiduciary duties and alleged spousal abuse are linked at the hip....
  • Remind the court more than once that you have met your own burden of proof by the same standard that allowed you to get into this mess
  • Request an evidentiary hearing to establish all of the foregoing. Remember Family Code section 217! 

This is a difficult situation. We need a good appellate decision on it, or some legislative guidance.

As I come up with other ideas I will come back and supplement this article.



Thurman W.  Arnold, III, CFLS
 
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March 22, 2011
  What to Do If My CASE Is Being TRANSFERRED BETWEEN COURTS in Riverside County?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  My Wife's attorney filed a dissolution at the main Riverside County courthouse in Riverside, but we both live in the Coachella Valley. They should have filed it in Indio. It is a long drive for me to downtown Riverside from my home and I don't want the case there. But I need immediate help with spousal support and attorney fees and we filed a motion for these orders that had to be set in Riverside. Now the other side agrees they filed in the wrong court and my attorney is concerned about when my motion will finally get heard if the case gets transferred to Indio. Is there anything I should do or know?

David

David:

This can be a real problem in terms of timing and delay. Because of the Elkin's onslaught many judges are feeling cranky and overburdened by the significant increase in demands upon their time (having to hold evidentiary hearings whenever a party requests them). Your wife and her attorney may well be intentionally stalling your access to justice. It is highly likely that when you arrive in Court for the hearing on your motion, the judge is going to refuse to go forward insisting that "we already have enough business here." He may order that the case be transferred to Indio, and not issue any orders at all pending that transfer.

It typically takes a month or more to accomplish a transfer between courts, even those within the same county. In the meantime, you fall off the map. The inefficiency is really quite extraordinary, and flies in the face of the reasons for the Elkin's changes (premised on better access to justice and ensuring due process in family court cases). Elkins is creating a lot of problems for underfunded court administrators, and appears likely to have the reverse impact than was intended.

Moreover, you may find that the motion for support that never gets heard in Riverside effectively goes off calender, meaning you may have to refile or submit ex parte paperwork to the Indio judges to have it reset for hearing. In the meantime you could lose possibly two to four months of time. There may be an issue whether the orders, when you finally obtain them, are retroactive to the date your first filed for them.

In order to avoid this, do not assume that the Riverside judge or the clerks will properly manage your case, or that a hearing will get re-set by them in the interim while the transfer is occurring - without more. Have your attorney insist at the hearing in Riverside that before you leave that day a new hearing date for your motion has been set in Indio and if the Riverside judge refuses to listen, make sure that your objections are placed on the record. That is the best you can do.


T.W. Arnold, CFLS

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March 02, 2011
  Must I Submit My TAX RETURNS to the COURT or to the OTHER PARTY?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  I have a hearing coming up involving my ex-wife's request to modify spousal and child support. I've received a letter from her attorney demanding I bring my 2010 tax returns to court, and I do have them since I always file early. However, I don't want to produce these. I've always thought that these documents are confidential and that I cannot be made to produce them if I am not trying to borrow money or something like that. What are my rights?
A.  The Revenue and Taxation Code sections 14251 and 19542 do declare that our income tax records are generally privileged from disclosure. However, in California that privilege does not bar production and consideration of your income tax records according to Family Code §3552 in proceedings involving any kind of support requests. They are always available in discovery proceedings prior to the hearing itself.

However, what I do recommend is an agreement with the other party or their attorney that while the records may be voluntarily exchanged that they be disposed of or returned after the hearing. Always redact your social security number. Note that Family Code §3665(b) prohibits the other side from disclosing the contents of your tax returns to anyone except:
  • the court
  • the party's accountant
  • some other financial consultant providing assistance with the case
  • anybody else the court specifically approves
Of course, once you lose possession of them there is little practical way to enforce these limitations. This is a good reason to not simply hand them over in response to an informal request without safeguards in place.

Since you report that you were asked to bring them in a letter request rather than in response to a subpoena or some other form of discovery request that seek the returns prior to the hearing itself, you might hold on to them until the hearing. If they are to be discussed at the hearing (or if you don't exchange them before because no agreement can be reached on how to protect their confidentiality), then bring them but ask the court under FC section 3552(c) to seal them in the file if the court retains them, or to turn them back to you at the conclusion of the hearing. An advantage to you in handling it this way is that the other party won't have the benefit of reviewing them before the hearing, or have the prior opportunity to have them looked at by their expert.

Obviously, for parties who want to see the other side's returns they are better off obtaining them prior through a demand for production (assuming enough time exists since without a court order shortening time production demands don't have to be answered earlier than 35 days from the date of mailing), and receiving on the date of the hearing might justify asking the court to continue the matter to review them if they are complicated.

By the way, the rules are a little different if you file joint returns, or if your returns contain information that relates to a non-party like a new spouse or possibly a family corporation or LLC that you are only one of several participants of, since their information remains privileged and can only be produced under certain circumstances and using specific procedures - which is another Blog.


Thurman W. Arnold, CFLS

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December 03, 2010
  ELKINS and New FAMILY CODE SECTION 217: How It AFFECTS YOU!
Posted By Thurman Arnold, CFLS

Elkins Task Force


The most important new rule in decades affecting the experience of California Family Law litigants is set to be unleashed on January 1, 2011. 

It promises a radical change in the way that all family court proceedings - whether they be dissolutions, legal separations, annulments, support applications, custody, and modifications of all of the above - are processed and decided by Superior Court judges and commissioners. 

This is a result of the Elkins Task Force, which has been quietly operating in the background of the California family law world since roughly August 6, 2007, when the game changing case of Jeffrey Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 was decided by our California Supreme Court.

Elkins was a landmark decision which held that the Contra Costa County Superior Court could not through its local rules limit parties in marital dissolution actions to introducing evidence in written declaration form that had to be submitted in advance of trial, or prohibiting except in "unusual circumstances" one party from cross-examining the other about the contents of those declarations.  Such a rule, intended for the sake of calendar management and judicial economy, not only had the practical if unintended consequence of favoring parties with attorneys who understood how to work with these rules but fundamentally it violated due process by cutting off litigants' abilities to present all relevant, competent evidence on material issues.  Judges, as the triers of fact, are not able to assess witness demeanor and credibility without live testimony.

What is earth shattering about this decision in these economic times is that the Contra Costa Superior Court had urged that its policies and local rules were essential for the "expeditious resolution of family law cases."  Soon to be former Chief Justice Ronald George rejected this justification: 

        "We are aware that superior courts face a heavy volume of marital dissolution matters, and the case load is made all the more difficult because a substantial majority of cases are litigated by parties who are not represented by counsel.  [Reference omitted].... 

        In light of the volume of cases faced by trial courts, we understand their efforts to streamline family law procedures.  But family law litigants should not be subjected to second-class status or deprived of access to justice.  Litigants with other civil claims are entitled to resolve their disputes in the usual adversary trail proceeding governed by the rules of evidence established by statute.  It is at least as important that courts employ fair proceedings when the stakes involve a judgment providing for custody in the best interest of a child and governing a parent's future involvement in his or her child's life, dividing all of a family's assets, or determining levels of spousal and child support.... 

         Trial courts certainly require resources adequate to enable them to perform their function.  If sufficient resources are lacking in the superior court or have not been allocated to the family courts, courts should not obscure the source of their difficulties by adopting programs that exalt efficiency over fairness, but instead should devote their efforts to allocating or securing the necessary resources."

Justice George ended by directing the California Judicial Council to create a task force (the 'Elkins Task Force) "to study and propose measures to assist trial courts in achieving efficiency and fairness in marital proceedings and to ensure access to justice for litigants, many of whom are self-represented.  Such a task force might wish to consider proposals for adoption of new rules of court establishing state wide rules of practice and procedure for fair and expeditious proceedings in family law, from the initiation of an action to postjudgment motions.  Special care might be taken to accommodate self-represented litigants.  Proposed rules could be written in a manner easy for lay-persons to follow, be economical to comply with, and ensure that a litigant be afforded a satisfactory opportunity to present his or her case to the court."   Hence, the Elkins decision is essentially a Jeffersonian ruling that its intended to empower family law litigants and to require counties and courts to adapt.

The Elkins Task force completed its work and has issued lengthy recommendations. The first changes take place on January 1, 2011.  Possibly the most important change is embodied in Family Code section 217.  It states:

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 


December is new legislation month at the Southern California Family Law Blog presented by Family Law Attorney Thurman W. Arnold. My goal is to inform you well, and early on, on any number of topics that will improve your outcome in family law matters and hopefully help you to reach results that are fair for you, your spouse or ex-partner, your children, and your blended and extended families.


T. W. ARNOLD, III, CFLS
(State Bar of California, Board of Legal Specialization)

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November 11, 2010
  Is It Possible to Get My Ex's TAX RETURNS Without Any MOTION to MODIFY Pending Between Us?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  We were divorced three years ago and I haven't taken my ex-husband back to Court.  I think he is earning a lot more now.  Is there anything I can do to find out what his situation is short of actually filing a modification motion?


A.  Absolutely.  There is a little known trick for obtaining useful information, possibly with a minimum of trouble, once each year.  This is the Request for a completed Income and Expense Declaration (Form FL-150) pursuant to Family Code section 3664.

When there is no motion or OSC pending for a modification, termination, or set aside of earlier support orders you are limited in terms of your discovery rights in California - assuming the proceedings were completed in the sense that nothing is pending or presently calendared  (if there is no final judgment in a divorce, partnership dissolution, or paternity action then you are entitled to continue to utilize discovery and what I say here doesn't apply).  You cannot, for instance, schedule a deposition or send out interrogatories or even subpoena records, at least not properly.  I have seen lawyers send subpoenas when nothing was pending and if I had done nothing they probably would have gotten the information requested since the receiving party doesn't know the status of the case, but when I objected they backed off and canceled the subpoenas at once because it was abuse of process to do what they were attempting.

But in your case you only have the option provided for by FC section 3664.  This entitles you to send out on an approved  FL-396 Request for Production of An Income and Expense Declaration After Judgment a request no more than once each year  (Family Code section 3663) for the other party to produce for you an updated Income and Expense Declaration.

Importantly, the responding party is required to attach to it their last year's federal and state personal income tax returns.  (Family Code section 3665).

If they do not respond to you within 35 days, or if there information is incomplete as to wages, you may serve Judicial Council Form Request FL-397 upon their employer per  Family Code section 3664(b) and (c).  Unfortunately, compliance by the employer is voluntary and so this provision lacks teeth.  Yet if you later do file a motion and can show a history of noncompliance by the employer and/or the other party you are more likely to recover attorney fees or sanctions as well as prove that the other party is being evasive or possibly dishonest and this may help you not only to carry your burden of proof and obtain a modification but it may impact how strongly the court acts towards your ex.  In the case of family businesses where there is a lack of cooperation it helps the Court to see that you are being stymied.

Section 3664 is also a very useful tool for parties who are trying to modify or terminate support payments that they have been ordered to make.  If you are a payor former spouse or domestic partner and want to terminate the other party's support rights, you would begin by sending them the Request.  Again, if they fail to cooperate and comply it makes them look like they are hiding something.

Finally, Family Code section 3667 entitles you to recover certain sanctions where the Income and Expense declaration wasn't provided you, was incomplete, or lacked the required tax return attachments.  While you cannot recover attorney fees if you don't actually have an attorney (and this section doesn't provide for them anyway), you can recover deposition and related costs, like for subpoenaed records (which can be significant charges), even where you are a self-represented party.

Good luck!



Thurman W. Arnold III,
Certified Family Law Specialist
Board of Specialization, State Bar of California
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October 02, 2010
  TIPS on How to CONTINUE a SUPPORT HEARING and Buy Time
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.    My husband has not updated his I & E for six months.  I know he is not reporting his income fairly.  How do I buy time so the Judge doesn't decide my support rights based upon outdated information?


A.  So here is a secret tip for my blog readers.  FL-150 Income and Expense Declarations (the I & E you reference) must be updated every 90 days in order to be current.

After some continuances on any support application, whether child or spousal support, these declarations become 'stale.'  Whether you need to stall for time or just want an honest representation from the other party, it is essential that all information be "current".

California Rule of Court, Rule 5.128(a) states as follows:  "'Current" is defined as being completed within the past three months providing no facts have changed. Those forms must be sufficiently completed to allow determination of the issue."

Any competent judge will listen to your argument that 'facts have changed' and require the other party to update their information. 

If you cite this rule you will impress them with your devotion to the law! 

You are entitled to a continuance (which you should use well, since it may be the last one).  Now may be the time to hire a lawyer....

Good luck!



Thurman Arnold
http://www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com

10/2/10
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September 21, 2010
  How Does DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Affect My SPOUSAL SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I obtained Domestic Violence retraining orders against my ex, but I earn more money than she does.  Can I use those orders as a defense against her request for temporary spousal support from me?

A.  Yes, you can - perhaps quite effectively. 

It is evident that California Judges and Family Court Commissioners are being trained at judicial college to take seriously the language of Family Code section 4320(i), which is one of the factors that the legislature has declared trial courts must evaluate in entering post-judgment or "permanent" alimony orders.  That subsection reads that courts must consider: 

"i) Documented evidence of any history of domestic violence, as defined in Section 6211, between the parties, including, but not limited to, consideration of emotional distress resulting from domestic violence perpetrated against the supported party by the supporting party, and consideration of any history of violence against the supporting party by the supported party."

Documented evidence includes at a minimum an Order After Hearing issued against a person upon a DV application for conduct described in Section 6211.  Obviously it includes criminal arrests and convictions.

The definitions of what constitutes domestic violence in California are set forth in Family Code section 6320.  These are interpreted broadly.  One of those definitions includes reference to "disturbing the peace of the other party."  That definition can include all kinds of objectionable behavior, and really means that if the Judge is offended by the conduct, it is a form of domestic violence.  The recent case of IRMO Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483 extended DV protections to breaking into the Wife's email account and then disseminating what the Husband had obtained there.  It is also included allegations of physical threats.  The trial judge was reversed in his belief that this was not sufficient misconduct.  Clearly the legislature and the appellate courts want to send a message that DV must stop - which is a very good thing.

However, I am aware of a case where a husband was living in a casita attached to the family residence, after he moved out of the main house to avoid his wife - who was constantly verbally harassing him.  She then changed the locks.  He decided to move to a different address entirely, but after he got back into the house (which was community property) without breaking in, he allegedly removed some his belongings and took some items that belonged to both of them, and also reportedly messed up her personal effects.  She sought and obtained domestic violence restraining orders, claiming that he had violated her rights by entering what was a jointly owned property, and that this caused her fear.  It is possible that she seized upon his entry as a tool to avoid paying him spousal support. 

After the judge entered her restraining orders, the husband's motion for spousal support was heard.  The trial court refused to award him any support, despite his earning $2,000 and her earning $14,000, based upon the DV order and the emotional distress she had supposedly suffered when he removed his belongings.  

This can be viewed as an invitation to spouses to abuse their domestic violence protections regardless of gender.  Yet, domestic violence is a terrible epidemic that affects women and children most often, and it must be treated with the utmost seriousness.  Often men are the instigators, but not always. I don't care whether the perpetrator is a man or a woman - the same rules should apply to both sexes.

Family Code section 4320 is used for long term spousal support awards, but courts are applying 4320(i) even at the temporary support stage to augment or deny spousal support claims.  There is some appellate support for that view. 

So, you may have a very good defense to paying your ex any spousal support because of the domestic violence orders that you obtained and you should assert it.  I hope the courts will be gender blind in enforcing these orders - meaning, I believe it is very important that we apply the same rules to all people, period.



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com





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September 18, 2010
  Am I Entitled to Obtain DISCOVERY If I File a SET ASIDE MOTION Before the Matter is Decided?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  Hello Mr. Arnold,

I appreciate your website, it is very useful. I really hope you can let me know if I am allowed to serve Form Interrogatories on my ex after I file a FL-360 Application to set aside support order under family law section 3691. Is discovery in this manner permitted before the hearing? If so, how long do I have to wait after filing FL-360 before I serve him with Form Interrogatories? Any help is GREATLY appreciated!

Wendy
A.  Hi Wendy - 

Discovery is permitted by the CCP in any post-judgment proceeding, once its been filed - I would serve the form interrogatories along with your application together, and personally and not by mail.  The proper analysis is that each post-judgment modification or set aside motion is a discrete proceeding with discrete discovery rights and obligations.  I'm not sure that all judges see it that way though but it is an accurate statement of the law.

One problem is timing - if you file an OSC then the clerk sets the hearing date, which in most jurisdictions will be about the same time as your form interrogatory answers are due - and you can expect your ex to toy with you and so you may not get useful answers within the 30 days after you propound them.  When interrogatories are served by mail, they are due 35 days after mailed, plus the responding party can mail the responses and so this adds another 5 days. 

His answers may come in after the time your Reply to any Responsive Declaration must be filed and served, so you can't bring the quality (or lack thereof) or information contained in the responses to the judge's attention in a procedurally correct fashion.  I usually go with a Notice of Motion format where I want some discovery completed before the hearing - and set the date 60 to 75 days out to give time for the other side to have a reasonable opportunity to have gotten it done and to appear unreasonable or obstructionist if they have not. 

It never hurts to send out a set of form interrogatories because at least you can complain about the other party's failure/refusal to comply with their discovery obligations, which may win you a continuance or some bias against the ex. 

However, form interrogatories are extremely limited in their usefulness except when seeking general information in the course of a dissolution or legal separation action.  A better or additional practice would be to use a demand for production instead of or in addition to form rogs, or possibly special interrogatories if you can draft them properly.  You can use a Notice to Appear and Produce Documents at the hearing, assuming  you are looking for specific records.  I don't have that form up on my website and I'm not sure if there is a Judicial Council form for it.  Subpoenas to third parties can be useful in small jurisdictions particularly when those records won't be lost by the clerk's office, but third parties often ignore them and judges usually don't grant continuances based upon the lack of a response (for subpoean's, always demand that the custodian of records actually appear on the date and at the time specified rather than giving them the option of not appearing).

If you had a lawyer and if a lot of money was involved, you might consider a deposition.  They require only 10 day's personal service when the Notice is served personally, unless they include a document production request.  C.C.P. § 2025.270.

Finally, you might hit the "Other" box on the FL-300 and FL-310 application forms and specifically ask the Court to allow you to complete specific discovery before your application is heard on its merits, as in "I request an order permitting me to complete the following discovery (state it, but make the discovery as short and pin-pointed as you can) before this application is decided by the Court."

How this goes for you depends a lot on the personality of the judge and their custom and practices in managing their calendar.  If you have a reasonable and narrow discovery request, no good judge will preclude you from exercising these rights.

Finally, be careful not to draft your application as a sort of disguised motion for reconsideration.  If the Court feels you are just trying to take another bite of the apple from a recent hearing, unless you have material new evidence that wasn't disclosed by the other party you may not get much traction.

One more thing - I am assuming this set aside is a post-judgment application.  If you are in the middle of a dissolution, legal separation, or paternity action and no final judgment has been entered then you are free to do discovery and then file the motion afterwards or do both concurrently.  On the other hand, if there has already been a judgment and the set aside deals with an order that came as a result of a post-judgment motion either of you filed, then one route is follow my recommendations above.

Thurman W. Arnold III
225 S. Civic Drive
Suite 1-3
Palm Springs, CA  92262

760-320-7915
760-320-0725 (fax)

SBN:  107101

Website:  http://www.ThurmanArnold.com



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September 16, 2010
  My Wife is Living With a Male Renter - Does This Affect My SUPPORT OBLIGATION?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  If my wife is living with a male renter, and I suspect they are boyfriend-girlfriend, does this affect the amount of spousal and child support that I have to pay?


A.  The supported party's cohabitation with a person of the opposite sex gives rise to a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof of decreased need for spousal support. FC § 4323(a)(1).  It has no impact on child support obligations, however.

FC § 4323 states:

(a) (1) Except as otherwise agreed to by the parties in writing, there is a rebuttable presumption, affecting the burden of proof, of decreased need for spousal support if the supported party is cohabiting with a person of the opposite sex. Upon a determination that circumstances have changed, the court may modify or terminate the spousal support as provided for in Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 3650) of Part 1.

(2) Holding oneself out to be the husband or wife of the person with whom one is cohabiting is not necessary to constitute cohabitation as the term is used in this subdivision.

(b) The income of a supporting spouse's subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner shall not be considered when determining or modifying spousal support.

(c) Nothing in this section precludes later modification or termination of spousal support on proof of change of circumstances.

As stated in Marriage of Schroeder (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1154, 238 Cal.Rptr. 12, the policy underlying section 4323 [former Civil Code section 4801.5]

Section 4801.5 is a legislative acknowledgment that cohabitation may reduce the needs of the supported spouse. The arrangement between Wife and Lara elevates form over substance. By receiving reimbursement by way of "gifts," Wife's cash needs for support purposes appear unchanged despite cohabitation. While cohabitants are at liberty to deal with each other as they see fit, their "contract must be fair and reasonable with respect to the rights of [the] supporting spouse." (In re Marriage of Leib, supra, at p. 643, 145 Cal.Rptr. 733.) The trial court here failed to recognize that the allocation of expenses between Wife and Lara undermines the statute and acts to Husband's detriment.

The record strongly indicates Wife's needs have decreased as a result of cohabitation. We remand to the trial court for a factual determination of the extent of her reduced need, with due consideration for the value of the benefits received by her, as well as the value of the benefits conferred upon Lara.

Schroeder involved a post judgment modification of a permanent support order by the payor, not an initial pendente lite request by the supported spouse. The evidence was the former wife had been living with a man of the opposite sex for 18 months, that he didn’t pay rent, that he was regularly employed, that he did not contribute to utilities, but that he did contribute to joint vacations. The appellate court found those facts to strongly suggest a cohabitation. Even then, the issue on remand was not a termination of the support obligation but a determination of the value of the benefits incurred by the former wife which might reduce her needs.

Cohabitation has been loosely defined as not necessarily holding oneself out to be Husband and Wife, but is more than a simple roommate or "boarding arrangement." There must be a showing of a sexual, romantic or at least a "homemaker-companion" relationship. Marriage of Regnery (1989) 214 CA3d 1367, 263 CR 243.

Marriage of Geraci (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1278 reversed a trial court failure to consider the effect of an admitted cohabitation lasting several years with the following comments:

The court’s judgment also does not take into consideration the evidence Jane had been cohabitating since the parties separated in 2000, despite John’s requests for findings on the issue. Section 4323 states "there is a rebuttal presumption, affecting the burden of proof, of decreased need for spousal support if the supported party is cohabitating with a person of the opposite sex. . . . "Cohabitation may reduce the need for spousal support because ‘sharing a household gives rise to economies of scale. [Citation.] Also, more importantly, the cohabitant’s income may be available to the obligee spouse.’ (In re Marriage of Schroeder (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1154, 1159 [238 Cal.Rptr. 12].)"[32] "[T]he Legislature created the presumption . . . based on thinking that cohabitation . . . creates a change of circumstance so tied in with the payment of spousal support as to be significant enough by itself to require a re-examination of whether such need for support continues in such a way that it still should be charged to the prior spouse." [Italics added].

* * *

At trial, however, Jane testified she had no intention of marrying him. Jane’s father, by contrast, testified he hoped they would soon marry. The evidence showed her boyfriend supplied Jane with housing, with a leased car and a credit card in her name for her use. Jane testified she was supposed to pay him back for all her expenditures, including the equivalent of $1,000 a month for rent, whenever she became financially able to do so. She testified she then owed her boyfriend more than $30,000 in back rent, credit card and other debt. According to Jane’s evidence, she contributed to the household by providing domestic services.

The foregoing is substantial and material evidence Jane was cohabitating within the meaning of section 4323 and might have a lesser need for spousal support than the court awarded had it considered this circumstance. However, there is nothing in the record to indicate the court fairly considered Jane’s cohabitation when determining the type and amount of spousal support to award her.

In Marriage of Bower (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 893,117 Cal.Rptr.2d 520 there were two permanent support modification hearings filed by the payor husband, one held in 1997 and the second in 2000. At the 1997 hearing the evidence was that the Wife was sharing expenses and living full time at a residence with a man described as a ‘roommate.’ The Bower court noted that the Husband had been wise in not appealing that order. However, by the time of the second application over three years later in 2000, there was evidence that she was sharing at least one bank account with her "roommate," and she even stipulated she was cohabitating.

Under those circumstances, together with evidence of an increased income from her employment, it was not an abuse of discretion to reduce the Wife’s spousal support and then terminate it at the end of one year.

Bower and those cases cited herein regarding cohabitation are dealing with modifications of Permanent Spousal Support orders. They all are based upon the "two can live more cheaply than one" theory or upon actual expenses of the supported party being regularly paid for by the cohabitant beyond loans and gifts. There is no reported case that upholds a trial court refusal to provide spousal support at the temporary hearing stage.  However, I suspect most courts will apply the presumption there as well.

The philosophy underlying the cohabitation statute is that parties who share a household and live in a meretricious relationship should not benefit by continuing to receive spousal support without consideration of the reduced need this sharing produces.

Finding cohabitation just allows for the aid of a statutory presumption to assist in the presentation of factual evidence. The effect is the same without the presumption even for mere roommates, as those contributions to the obligee's living expenses may also support a factual finding sufficient to modify spousal support since rent is income.

Nonetheless, cohabitation is offensive to some judges and they be willing to terminate the spousal support obligation instead of merely reducing it.

Note that once you prove a cohabitation the burden of proof shifts to the supported party to show that they still need support. That is their problem, not yours.  Nonetheless, if you can show a substantial reduction or the end of any need for alimony you would be well advised to present that evidence.

Finally, you are not entitled to know the income of the other party as new-mate income cannot be considered by the Courts. 

For domestic partnerships, even though the statute speaks in terms of opposite sex couples it is highly unlikely that a trial court would not reduce or terminate partner support with a same-sex couple where male former partner is cohabiting with a male and so on.  Since 2005 the California Family Code is to be interpreted as applying evening to same sex couples.

If a homosexual (as opposed to bi-sexual male) is now living with a female should the opposite sex presumption be applied?  The answer would seem to turn on whether the relationship is romantic and/or intimite.  Similarly, if a former wife is now living with a female roommate and it can be established that relationship is intimate, then the same reasoning as in the above cases will likely apply.  We await appellate court pronouncements on these interesting questions.




Thurman W. Arnold III
September 16, 2010

www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com

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September 14, 2010
  ENFORCING SUPPORT: What is a REAL PROPERTY LIEN?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  How is a family law real property lien used to enforce a support judgment?

A.  An effective method for enforcing child and spousal support orders, and collecting what is owed you (plus legal interest at 10% sometimes going back years), is a real property lien.  People often find themselves at the last moment surprised by the discovery that a former wife or husband, or other creditor, has liened a home, commerical property, or vacant investment lots.  This is extremely unpleasant, particularly when a lender or buyer rightfully announces they cannot close the transaction unless and until a release from that creditor is obtained.  This provides effective leverage for the people owed money. 

Without some form of a property lien there generally exists few ways to ensure that third parties dealing with the debtor will ensure that unsecured debts owing you are paid.  Support payments that are due, whether or not they are then in arrears, are simply nonsecured without more; businesses and individuals dealing with a debtor have no way of knowing they owe such money, and no legal duty to ensure the obligor pays it even if they did.

Property liens are like an insurance policy - even if the person who owes doesn't pay it off now, the lien will haunt the payor, with accruing interest, until she/he satisfies their legal duty to pay.  Sometimes this happens years downstream - where, for instance, a person doesn't now own property in their name but one day wants to, does, or inherits.  As between families, for instance, people don't do title searches but may gift title to a child, sibling, or parent.  Once title goes into the obligor's name, who ever later receives title will end up owing the money if it is not paid.  Much like a game of musical chairs.

There is a different remedy for those creditors that believe or find that their former spouse is hiding their interest in real property by titling it in someone else's name.

Real property liens are created by recording, with the county recorder's office for the county in which the other party lives or where you know, believe, or anticipate the other property may take title, certain legal documents:  an Abstract of Judgment, a Notice of Support Judgment, a certified copy of the order or money judgment, or a federal Notice of Lien.  Secured promissory notes that deal with property division equalizations are commonly used as well as a security to obtain payment of non-support obligation and are a form of lien although of a different variety that what is discussed here.

Once you have recorded the appropriate document with the recorder's office (not the court clerk's office, although that office often has to issue the required paperwork that gets recorded elsewhere), the (former) spouse or domestic partner who owes the money is prevented from transferring, selling, or refinancing real property within that county until the lien is extinguished by you. 

This occurs because all American states have registries that serve as a data bank and clearing house showing who owns what real property.  These records include a "chain of title" history for each such property since written recording began in that jurisdiction. 

In order to sucessfully transfer title, refinance, or even purchase real property in California free of encumstrances and debts to a transferee (whether purchaser, lender, or gift recipient), some form of "title search" must be undertaken - in California usually by title companies.  These are a species of insurance company that issues a policy to title transferees for a fee.  They must do a thorough title search to determine who the legal owner of the property is and whether there are mortgages or other liens that the law requires be paid in full before a "clear title" can ben exchanged. 

Since title companies in California are essentially insurance companies, they have a financial interest in not paying out claims for title policies they issued when real property liens were property recording and so lurking in the background.

Liens filed in one county do not attach to property located in a different county.  They are only effective for the amount of matured installments due (not for future payments).  But even if the underlying principal amount changes - as where the amount increases over time or deceases with partial playments - there is no need to record a new one. 

However, when a liened party dies and if they own the residence as community property, or a joint tenant, with another person, like a new spouse or domestic partner, the lien is extinguished and property passes free and clear to the co-tenant.

Otherwise, liens are only extinguished by a satisfaction of judgment or release of judgment lien. 

I always recommend to my clients who are owed past due amounts of support, or where there is a property equalization that needs to be enforced, that they obtain a recordable judgment or order from the Family Court and record it in every California county where the obligor resides, might reside, might inherit - and certainly where that individual owns titled real property.  At the same time, there are other enforcement remedies that can be concurrently pursued. 

I have seen many situations where years after a lien is recorded that a title company or real estate broker calls to ask where 'so and so' is in order that they may be contacted so that the lien may be satisfied by paying the money and interest that is owed. 



TW Arnold
www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com


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September 14, 2010
  How do CALIFORNIA COURTS divide EDUCATION LOANS?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  My husband completed his training as a doctor after we married.  He incurred substantial educational loans which we paid off during the marriage.  What rights to I have for recovering those costs?

A.  The community estate is supposed to be reimbursed for community contributions to education or training of a spouse that substantially enhances that person's earning capacity. The amount reimbursed must include interest at the legal rate, accruing from the end of the calendar year in which the contributions were made. [FC §2641(b)(1); see FC §2627.]

Reimbursement is not appropriate in the following circumstances:
  • The parties expressly agreed in writing to the contrary [FC §2641(e)]; or
  • The contributions were for ordinary living expenses that would be incurred regardless of whether the spouse attended school, stayed home, or worked [Marriage of Watt (1989) 214 CA3d 340, 354].

If the loan is still outstanding at the time of dissolution, the balance is not divided but is instead assigned to the party who was educated or trained, except when the parties expressly agreed in writing to the contrary. [FC §2641(b)(2) (e).]

Nonetheless, the Court may reduce or modify the reimbursement and assignment of educational loans to the extent circumstances render such a disposition unjust, including the following [FC §2641(c)]:

  • When the community substantially benefited from the education, training, or loan incurred for the education or training of the party. There is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof that the community has not substantially benefited from community contributions to the education or training made fewer than 10 years before the commencement of the proceeding. On the other hand, it is presumed that the community substantially benefited from community contributions to the education or training made more than 10 years before the commencement of the proceeding.
  • The education or training received by the party is offset by the education or training received by the other party for which community contributions have been made.
  • The education or training enables the party receiving the education or training to engage in gainful employment that substantially reduces the need of the party for support that would otherwise be required.

Professional licenses and education are not "property" that can be divided in divorce or legal separation in California.  Reimbursement for community contributions and assignment of loans under FC §2641 is the exclusive remedy of the community or a party for education or training costs and any resulting enhancement of a person's earning capacity.

However, importantly, the Court should consider the effect of the education, training, or enhancement, or the amount reimbursed, on the circumstances of the parties in ordering permanent spousal support pursuant to Family Code section 4320(b). [FC §2641(d).]

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June 11, 2010
  What should I know if I want to LIMIT or TERMINATE SPOUSAL SUPPORT in the future?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  My wife and I were married for 14 years.  We have two children, aged 11 and 13.  We are both in our early 40's.  My wife has a college degree, but quit working shortly before our first child was born.  I am a doctor, and she was a nurse at the local hospital before she quit.  Our divorce is not final.  I think she should be able to support herself once she gets some updated training, although I don't object to supporting our children.  She says she won't work until until our youngest child finishes high school.  What should I ask the judge to do and what should I expect to limit my spousal support exposure?


A.  There are a number of things you need to know. 

First, you have a long term marriage within the meaning of Family Code section 4336.  Start with the expectation that you will be paying alimony for at least half the length of the marriage.

Second, Family Code section 4320 sets forth the most important factors that a court is required to consider in issuing a spousal support award; it is also the decisive section for determining whether spousal support should be modified, reduced, or terminated in the future.  As to later modifications, this means that whatever the court decides as to the 4320 factors (or depending upon what facts are recited in your Marital Termination Agreement) may have a huge impact on how much you pay and for how long.  The 4320 factors only come into play when a final judgment enters:  Although courts are supposed to consider them in dealing with temporary spousal support issues, they typically do not.

Third, it is essential that you convince the Court to give your former spouse a Gavron warning.  I have separately blogged this concept. In essence its effect is to give a supported spouse something of a free pass to rehabilitate themselves and enter the work force until and unless they've been given advance notice of that expectation.  If you settle your case without going to trial, as I sincerely hope you do, make sure that a Gavron Admonition is included in your settlement agreement.  It starts the clock ticking on your former wife's obligation to become self-sufficient.  However, you need to realize that her ability to do so will be impacted by her child rearing responsibilities to whatever extent they exist, and most courts will consider this.  It becomes less relevant with older children.  Given the length of your marriage (14 years) your youngest child will be finishing high school right about the time that you reach half the length of the marriage.

Fourth, consider trying to get what is called a Richmond Order.  Essentially this is an order or an agreement to terminate spousal support jurisdiction on a specified date unless, prior to the fixed termination date, the supported spouse files a motion showing good cause to modify the amount of support or its duration.  Unlike most orders which are open-ended, a Richmond Order discourages delay and supports the goal of California that an ex-spouse receive support only so long as is reasonably necessary to get back on their own two feet.  They are generally not appropriate in extremely lengthy marriages, or  in situations where health or age makes it unreasonable to believe the other party can become self-supporting. 

Age is a factor in your case because there is still time for your Wife to develop financial independence. 

The effect of the Richmond Order is to place the burden upon the supported spouse to justify continuing support because of unforseen future events. Most judges prefer Richmond orders, but you won't get it unless you request it.  Attorneys representing supported spouses are less likely to agree to them in Marital Settlement Agreements at first blush.  There may be good reasons, however, that be persuasive if you persevere. 

Fifth, consider a request for step down spousal support orders where support is reduced in increments into the future; this may make perfect sense depending upon the length of marriage, whether there are children, and the supported spouse's age. 

Sixth, consider a Family Code section 4331 Vocational Training Examination.  Even if the Court concludes that it is not reasonable for your wife to work now, this may create an important benchmark which will be useful to you in the future.  Downstream if she does not obtain employment she arguably might have, the Court may be convinced it should impute income to her that might have otherwise earned.

At this stage of the proceedings you are setting the stage for a future reduction.  That requires smart advance preparation.  Find a competent spousal support attorney in your area!

By the way, this is exactly why you should want mediation rather than a court judgment.  IMHO.  Mediation takes the future into consideration, and creates a safe container for the parties to talk about it!

Thurman Arnold
http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com

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June 11, 2010
  What is a GAVRON WARNING and how does it affect my right to SPOUSAL SUPPORT?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I was at our first court hearing last week requesting child and spousal support, and my husband's attorney asked the judge to give me a "Gavron Warning".  The judge said he would consider giving it to me at a future hearing and didn't go along with the lawyer, but I don't understand what this meant.  The judge did order my husband to pay child and spousal support.  What do I do if this comes up again?

A.     Gavron warnings deal with the question of when a supported spouse may be expected to become partially or totally self-sufficient, so that they can no longer be expected to rely on a former spouse for economic support.  At some point the entitlement to be supported usually ends. 

Where the court intends that party to become self-supporting by a given date, it generally must first give that person advance warning.  Marriage of Gavron (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 705 is a relatively recent case which first articulated this policy.  This advance notice is now called the Gavron Warning.   It does not impact child support.

This represents a trend in the law away from a rule which once entitled a spouse (typically women) to lifelong alimony to a right to receive spousal support for only so long as necessary to become self-supporting.  It applies equally to men and women, and to domestic partners.  There is no question that this trend has gained legislative acceptance, and in 2000 Family Code section 4330 was enacted.  It provides in part: 

"(b) When making an order for spousal support, the court may advise the recipient of support that he or she should make reasonable efforts to assist in providing for his or her support needs, taking into account the particular circumstances considered by the court pursuant to Section 4320, unless, in the case of a marriage of long duration as provided for in Section 4336, the court decides this warning is inadvisable."

Note that this statute states the court "may advise" the support recipient to make reasonable efforts to assist in supporting themselves.  This means it is up to a judge to decide at any given stage oin any given case when and whether or not to give the warning.  One of the factors that the court must consider is the length of the marriage.  

Family Code section 4336 defines a marriage of long duration as 10 years or more.  There are cases that have decided that this 10 year rule is not inflexible, and that marriages of less than ten years may qualify for this protection where the facts warrant it (i.e., disability, domestic violence, the parties' respective ages).

The effect of the Gavron decision is to require that fair advance notice in fact be given before a court can properly terminate or reduce spousal support as of a specified future date.  The idea is that a supported spouse should not be punished for failing to meet the court's unrevealed expectation that they would become self-sufficient - absent this required advance notice it is judicial error to abruptly terminate an alimony order because of a failure to make good faith efforts to become self-supporting.

However, that notice need not be express - although it usually is.  For instance, your husband's attorney was competently (but aggressively) representing your husband by asking the court early on to give you an express warning.  He or she will probably ask again at every future hearing until the judge finally does give you the Gavron admonition.  That warning need not be in any magic formula:  It merely needs to clearly tell the supported spouse that they are expected to become self-supporting.  The classic language is contained in the FL-180 Judgment of Annulment, Legal Separation or Dissolution form and reads:  "It is the goal of this state that each party will make reasonable good faith efforts to become selfsupporting as provided for in Family Code section 4320. The failure to make reasonable good faith efforts maybe one of the factors considered by the court as a basis for modifying or terminating spousal or partner support."

Except in short marriages of less than 10 years, most judges will not issue Gavron warnings early on because during the early divorce process it is not reasonable that suddenly a homemaker should become self-supporting.  At the time a Judgment of Dissolution or Legal Separation is entered, however, and possibly except in cases of very lengthy marriages lasting 20 years or more (or where the parties are too old to be expected to retrain), most judges will give the Gavron Warning.

Additionally, Gavron language is often found in Marital Termination Agreements (also known as MSA's for 'marital settlement agreements').  Whether the language is included in the settlement agreements is a matter of negotiation between the parties.  As a recipient you want to resist it.  As a payor spouse, you want to insist upon it.  The longer the marriage, the less reasonable it is to include such language.  For instance, when I represent women over the age of 50 with marriages in excess of 10-15 years, I counsel my client not to permit it.  On the other hand, if I am representing the high earner spouse, I always argue for its inclusion.  This is one of those subtle areas where having the right attorney for you can make a huge difference in your future security.  However, as you may have noted above the language has become so standard now that it is included in the FL-180 Judgment form and be used for or against you even if you never read that piece of paper (one you don't sign).

In answer to your question what to do when this comes up again, urge the court that this is too soon and too early, and not reasonable given that you have devoted your married life to child-rearing and to helping your client develop the career that you both once believed would support the family until retirement and ultimately death.

This is just an overview of the Gavron effect.  I will give more education on the topic in future blogs.


T.W. Arnold III 
http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawyer.com


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May 31, 2010
  I thought my PARTNER had REGISTERED our DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP but she says she didn't. Do I have rights?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I have been living with my girlfriend for four years.  Three years ago we agreed to enter into a domestic partnership and filled out and signed the registration papers.  She told me she had filed them with the Secretary of State.  We separated last month, and when I asked her to help me financially and to divide property we acquired during the relation she said I have no rights because she never mailed in the registration.  Is she right?

A.  She may not be right if you can meet the legal test to qualify as a "putative domestic partner." 

California Family Code section 2251 sets forth remedies regarding the division of property in cases of annulments, or where a marriage turns out to be void or voidable because of some legal defect (for instance, where the parties could not be legally married because one party had not properly obtained a termination of an earlier marital status before entering the new union).  In cases of void or voidable marriages, no marital rights or obligations actually attach unless one party can establish what is known as putative spouse status.

The putative spouse doctrine was intended to protect "innocent spouses" - the partner who reasonably believes the parties were married - as long as their is an objective basis in reality for that person to have held that belief. 

This doctrine now applies equally to putative domestic partners.

For one spouse or domestic partner to qualify for this protection there must have been an attempted compliance with the procedures for creating a valid marriage or registered domestic partnership.  Sincerely believing that a marriage or domestic partnership existed by itself is not enough.  Do you have a copy of the registration document that was never filed?  This is exactly the type of evidence that would be most useful in establishing an objective basis for having believed you were registered.

In a very similar case - In re Domestic Partnership of Ellis & Arriaga (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1000 - Darren Ellis and David Arriaga complied with the first step in the procedure for creating an RDP, the completion of the registration papers.  Arriaga was supposed to mail the registration to the Secretary of State, but he never did.  When Ellis filed a Petition to Dissolve the Domestic Partnership, Arriaga asked the trial court to dismiss Ellis' action on the ground that no RDP in fact existed.  The trial court agreed with Arriaga, but the appellate court reversed the trial court's ruling. 

The appellate court held that a person's reasonable, good faith belief that his or her RDP was validly registered with the Secretary of State entitled that person to the rights and duties of an actual registered domestic partner - even where the partnership never was in fact registered - under this equitable putative spouse doctrine.

However the court also restated the rule of putative spouses that the question is tested by an objective standard  - not just by what one party believed, however genuinely.  For instance, if both parties know that the registration was never mailed neither can qualify as putative domestic partners because without a belief in the mailing it would not be objectively reasonable to conclude an RDP existed.

Parties who qualify for putative spouse and putative domestic partnership status may be entitled to all of the benefits and burdens of marital partners or RDP's.  This includes rights to property acquired during marriage, responsbilities for debt incurred during marriage, and support benefits.  You can get more information concerning those issues - which are largely the same as if you were married persons - by using our search engine at the top of the page.

The likelihood of your success depends a lot on what evidence you can produce establishing that you reasonably believed the formalities were complied with.  If your former partner admits that you both completed the document but that she never mailed it AND never told you that she hadn't mailed it (unfortunately people tend to be dishonest about these things in the face of legal proceedings), you are likely to prevail. 

If she denies it and you don't have a copy of the registration papers you need to look to other evidence to establish the basis for your belief the two of you were registered - for instance, if a witness can testify that your partner held herself out to be your RDP that may persuade a court. 

Are there any other documents that were ever signed (i.e., applications for benefits of any kind, joint bank accounts, trust documents or wills) that make reference to your purported status?  If so these should be collected and submitted to the Court.

You would initiate a proceeding just like you would if there had actually been a RDP - this would be a Petition to Dissolve a Domestic Partnership.

Finally, you still may have the basis for a civil Marvin claim which is founded upon written or oral promises to undertake a joint asset pooling arrangement or joint venture when two people decide to share lives (however, your chances of recovering support or "palimony" are slim).  I will blog Marvin actions another day.

Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
5/31/10



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May 20, 2010
  What are the TAX CONSEQUENCES of CHILD SUPPORT and SPOUSAL SUPPORT?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  My husband and I have separated, and pretty much agreed to work everything out without going to Court.  But I would like some information about how any support we agree upon is taxed.

A. Child support is not taxable to the recipient, nor is it deductible by the payor. 

Spousal support, or "alimony" as it is known in some states, is taxable to the recipient and deductible to the payor as long as certain Internal Revenue Code requirements are met.  It is important that you obtain a professional explanation and review of these requirements in terms of what you write up in the settlement agreement (the agreement should be filed with the Court), because in some situations people have the highly unpleasant surprise of believing their support agreement passes muster only to find years later that it violated one of the provisions of the IRC - if that happens, the paying spouse may be forced to recapture the deductions in such a way that they are denied by the IRS, which now means not only that the payor owes monies for increased taxes, but they also owe substantial penalties.

To be deductible spousal support must meet the requirements of IRC section 71.  These are known as DRTRA (pronounced "durtra").  The general requirements are that the spousal support obligation must be set forth in a written instrument (i.e., a Marital Termination Agreement), the payments must terminate at death, the payments must be in cash (and not as a swap of property, although it is possible to structure a property settlement in periodic payments of spousal support if done properly), and the parties must reside in separate households. 

A common mistake includes "front-loading" or concentrating spousal support in the period immediately after divorce.  Spousal support awards that decrease by no more than $10,000 per consecutive years are usually safe, but if you are contemplating a progressive decrease in spousal support over some years, you must have this agreement examined by a qualified professional in order to assure you are protected - this could be an accountant. 

A common inadvertent mistake is to terminate spousal support on a date coinciding with a child's age of majority (turning 18).  The IRS views this as an attempt to classify or hide what is really child support as deductible spousal support, and when this occurs the IRS may declare these payments that you believed were alimony for tax purposes all to have been child support - regardless of your true intentions - and so disallow the deductions from the time of the agreement forward.  This will mean that the receiving spousal who has declared them as income may then be entitled to file an amended return to recover the taxes he or she paid.  (Incidentally, the way this problem is often brought to the IRS's attention is where the recipient spouse doesn't declare the income, but you declare the deduction).  There should be at least a six month differential between the timing of the termination of spousal support and a child's 18th birthday.

These issues can create a real shock, and totally undermine parties' expectations.  Please have your settlement agreement reviewed by a competent attorney, and seek advice beyond the scope of this Blog in order to safeguard your interests!

Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com



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May 17, 2010
  My husband was HOSPITALIZED after we SEPARATED; am I liable for the bill?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  After my husband and I separated, he was hospitalized and incurred $28,000 in medical bills.  The creditor is threatening to sue me.  Am I liable?  Is there anything I should do?


A.  In a recent appellate decision out of San Diego County (CMRE Financial Services, Inc. v. Parton), the wife called police after an incident of domestic violence and shortly thereafter filed for DV restraining orders.  A week later the parties separated, and the husband was admitted to Tri-City Medical Center for treatment for a severe emotional illness.  He incurred substantial medical bills.

The wife filed a dissolution action three months after that.  In her Schedule of Assets and Debts she listed the debt as owed by her husband.  A judgment for dissolution came to be entered several months later, and it did not assign the hospital obligation to the wife.  It appears to have been a default judgment against the husband.

CMRE, the assignee of Tri-City Hospital, sued both the husband and wife to collect the money for husband's treatment; by then husband had disappeared and was never served with the lawsuit.  Wife responded by denying liability, and with a cross-complaint that alleged that by sending her collection notices CMRE had violated the provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Title 15, United States Code section 1692 et seq.), and that she should obtain damages against them. 

CMRE filed a motion to toss out the cross-complaint, relying on the language of Family Code section 914(a)(2), which states that spouses are liable for debts incurred by the other when separated if these are for "necessaries of life." 

The trial court agreed with CMRE, and the matter proceeded to a judgment against the wife for the full amount plus interest.  Wife appealed.

The appellate court ruled in favor of wife, and reversed the trial court.  Wife would have been liable for these medical costs IF a dissolution including property division had not been granted, or if the dissolution judgment had assigned the debt to her, or if she had agreed to support her estranged husband while they were separated.  For instance, if the parties had reconciled and if CMRE had sued the wife and obtained a money judgment against her, she would have been on the hook.  But once a dissolution judgment was entered that did not assign the debt to the wife she was protected.  Family Code section 916.

The appellate court also noted that an independent basis for holding wife free of the debt included Family Code section 4302 which states that a person is not liable for the support of their spouse when the person is living separate from the spouse by agreement, unless the agreement calls for support.  The court reasoned that while the starting point is that spouses are liable for the other's necessaries while living separately that rule will not apply where they are separated by agreement (apparently the agreement can be verbal or implied from conduct), unless the agreement includes a promise to support the other.

This appellate decision seems confusing because the language of the statutes themselves conflict.  The court continued by noting that the legislature has declared that one spouse's liability for the other spouse's post-separation necessaries is entirely derivative of the fact of marriage and not the same as a debt personally incurred by the supporting spouse.  This means that "the liability imposed by section 914 can be avoided by the simple expedient of entering into a separation agreement which does not provide for support."

The only exception might be where a creditor alleges a marital settlement agreement violates the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.  CMRE did not allege any fraud between these spouses.

This is landmark case because up to this point most lawyers and judges believed that spouses were liable for the necessaries of life of the other, even after separating, and that this was a special exception to the general rule that once spouses separate liability for debt ends.

Now we know that you have at least two ways to avoid this debt:  (1) Obtain a Judgment for Dissolution before the creditor obtains a civil judgment against you, but be sure that the debt is assigned to the other spouse; and (2) be sure that you don't have an agreement to support the other spouse in place, at least at the time the debt is incurred.  The judgment can be based upon a marital termination agreement.

If you pretend to separate, or separate just to avoid the debt, and if the creditor claims you did this fraudulently to avoid liability, the outcome might be different.

One additional point of information:  Under the circumstances of this case, CMRE was found to have in fact violated the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act just by sending threatening letters, and of course by filing suit.  Knowledge of this case can be used to back off creditors who are harassing you.



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.thurmanarnold.com






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May 14, 2010
  What do I do about SPOUSAL SUPPORT if my ex-spouse is COHABITING with another man?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q. My ex-wife is living with another guy.  I am paying her spousal support per our settlement agreement.  I have remarried, and this really upsets my present wife.  Besides, I don't think it is fair.  What can I do?

A.  Where it can be negotiated, most lawyers who represent "payor" spouses attempt to write in a provision within the Marital Settlement Settlement Agreement that says cohabitation will terminate spousal support.  If your agreement so provides, you have additional leverage to modify or terminate spousal support.

But even if your agreement, or the Judgment, doesn't say this Family Code section 4232 must be considered by the Court upon your application to modify or terminate spousal support.  That section tracks the public policy of this state that you should not be underwriting your ex-wife's new household, or that you should not be made to pay her spousal support, where her expenses are being covered by a new romantic partner.

§ 4323 creates a rebuttable presumption for a decreased need for alimony once you convince the Court that your ex-wife is living with a person of the opposite sex, who is actually contributing to her expenses.  This does not include persons who are simply opposite sex roommates.  Look to establishing the length of their joint living circumstances, consider utilizing discovery to establish whether they have joint credit cards or household accounts, and be patient and don't file for relief too early.  An ex partner may take on a roommate for purely financial reasons - that is not by itself cohabitation.  On the other hand, even if you are not successful terminating support the first time, if they continue to live together you will have an improved chance at success a year or more later.

Don't expect to ever learn what that person earns.  California law is pretty clear that you won't ever get that information.  Look instead to what that person contributes to joint expenses, or to your ex-wife's expenses.

I do not recommend that you hire a private investigator to peek into their bedroom to establish that they have an intimate relationship.  But what course you take may depend upon how she characterizes the relationship.  For instance, if she claims there is not an intimate relation, then proving there is may be useful to you.

Additionally, even if your ex spouse is receiving financial benefits from her boyfriend or girlfriend, that does not mean that the Court will terminate as opposed to reduce her support - if the marital standard of living that the two of you enjoyed was high, and she is shacking up with a tennis coach, the Court might choose to reduce her support by imputing income to her commensurate with the benefits she is receiving rather than cutting her off entirely.  Don't think that just because you feel violated that the Court will view it in the same way.

Finally, California law on cohabitation only speaks in terms of living with a person of the opposite sex.  However, if the fact is that your ex-spouse is living in a romantic relationship with a same sex partner, it is hard to imagine that a courageous judge will not act to reduce your exposure.  We have no appellate decisions on this question yet, but we will soon.

Thurman W. Arnold III 
http://www.thurmanarnold.com 
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May 12, 2010
  Is there any way to request that the Judge RECONSIDER her rulings in my case?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  I was in Court three days ago and the Judge ordered me to pay an amount in support that there is no way I can afford.  The Judge averaged my earnings over the past 12 months, and then entered that information into the Dissomaster.  She then told me how much I had to pay for child and spousal support.  The problem is that my hours were drastically cut back by my employer 10 days before the hearing and what I have been earning is not what I will be earning.  I was so nervous in the courtroom I didn't explain this change to the Judge.  Is there anything I can do to get the Judge to reconsider this order?


A.  There are two important procedures that you can use to try to get a rehearing or a reconsideration of a court's award or decision, a motion for reconsideration and an application for CCP § 473 relief.  Each is tricky and they do not succeed too often.  I know of no statistics, but my guess is that court's will reconsider and reverse or modify their earlier decisions less than 10% of the time.  473 relief is more commonly granted.

The first is called a Motion for Reconsideration.  The California statute governing reconsideration motions is California Code of Civil Procedure section 1008.  It has at least two important parts:  a)  it must be timely filed and b) it must be based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law than what was known or shown at the time the hearing took place.

The threshold requirement is timing:  § 1008(a) states that the motion must be filed "within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order."  Courts consider that the failure to timely file a motion to reconsider is jurisdictional - which means they don't have the power to even consider your request if you are too late.

A literal reading of this statute suggests that the 10 day clock doesn't start ticking until you receive a hard copy of the court's order or ruling (typically through the mail or sometimes by personal service), but this is generally not how judges view it.  Typically a judge announces their decision in open court.  In the case of a Dissomaster or other support calculation they may print it out and give each party or the attorney for each party a copy.  A minute order will be written by the court clerk, and placed in the file.  It usually goes out in the mail to both sides the same day.

Sometimes a party or attorney will be directed by the Court to prepare a formal order.  That formal order is usually on a Judicial Council form.  The losing side is customarily asked to review and approve it before it is submitted to the judge for signature, except that many courts do not require an attorney to get the approval of an unrepresented party first and so it may wind up just being prepared and approved by the drafting attorney alone.  Once the order after hearing gets signed by the court, it is supposed to be served upon the other party but often through sloppy practices or oversight it is not.

What this means is that you cannot rely on written notice as triggering your obligation to get the reconsideration motion filed - and you definitely cannot sit back and think that your time is not running just because no written order has been received by you.

Where the Judge makes their ruling while you are present in court, in my experience, most courts start the time running from the date of hearing regardless whether written notice or a formal written order is to follow.  An exception is where a judge takes the matter "under submission" and makes her decision later, when a decision or ruling is mailed.

Many judges believe you have been "served" with the decision when you hear it - and therefore that your time to file a motion for reconsideration begins to run from that moment.  This means that the only safe practice is to file your reconsideration motion no later than 10 calendar days after the hearing (not counting the first day, and if the 10th day falls on a weekend or holiday, your time is extended to the next calendar day). 

10 days is not a lot of time to put a Motion for Reconsideration together.  It needs to include a Notice of Motion form, an application form which includes your detailed declaration, and it is a good idea to provide legal authorities.

Assuming you meet the deadline you will find that Judges don't like to be asked to reconsider their decisions except for really good reason, and do not appreciate parties that simply are unhappy with the outcome and want to take another shot at it.  They apply the technical rules technically to avoid changing their rulings, which makes some sense in terms of court efficiency because in litigation one side is almost always unhappy with the outcome and would like to reargue the matter.

The second half of a motion for reconsideration requires you establish that you have discovered "new or different facts or law."  The "new law" situation is rare and does not mean that you just discovered that you quoted the wrong legal authorities to the Court and so now have "new" ones to present; it is intended to cover situations where the law  changes or is clarified by statute or case decision in a way that would caused the Court to make a different decision. 

Another important ground for reconsideration motions is the Court's inherent power "to do equity" or correct its own mistakes.  

These motions are complicated and this Blog is just to give you some familiarity with them. These are the points I want to leave you with at the moment: 
  • If you can, try to research CCP § 1008, including looking at some legal treatise or the reported appellate decisions that mention it
  • New or different facts don't generally include things you forgot to mention, unless you have some really credible explanation of why you forgot
  • You must explain to the Court what you learned, how and when you learned it, why you didn't learn it earlier, and why these new or different facts matter enough that the Court should render a different outcome.  If the other party withheld facts that you became aware of only after the hearing, you need to describe your reasonable diligence in having attempted to first get all the facts
  • New facts are not the same as different facts.  Be specific
  • Telling the judge you just think she was wrong is rarely helpful - judges know they will be wrong some of the time, and they are trained as much to just make a decision as to get it right (clearly they want to get it right).  Most of us don't like being told we are wrong and that is rarely a useful persuasive tool.  Instead, focus on the justice or injustice of the situation and be humble
  • Explaining that you made a mistake without more is also risky, because lawyers and parties do make mistakes in presenting their cases but the law favors finality in decision-making.  Your  mistake needs to have been a reasonable one. 
  • Always consider combining your reconsideration request with a request for relief under Code of Civil Procedure § 473, which is a very important statute that covers relief from orders or judgments that result from your inadvertence, surprise, mistake, or reasonable neglect

In your situation the question will be:  If you knew 10 days before the hearing that your time had been cut back, why didn't you mention it?  If you did mention it, then the Court considered your evidence and ruled against you, so this would not be new information. 

Also, how different would the outcome have been if the Court had considered or known of the cut backs in your work?  For instance, if those cut backs are partial and your income is 15% less than the Court supposed, this may not seem so important to the Judge that she thinks she needs to correct the unfairness of the result.  If it is 40% less, she might.  There are no hard and fast rules that can be applied with consistency.

It is quite common for clients to wind up hiring attorneys after they attempted to handle their case on their own, and it blew up at the hearing, and now they need desperately to get more or better information in front of the judge.  It is very difficult to "un-ring the bell." 

When these things happen they are a good lesson of why the adversarial court process is to be avoided whenever possible, and of the importance of finding and listening to a competent lawyer early on in your case.



Thurman W. Arnold
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
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April 25, 2010
  When do SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS commence after divorce?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  When do Social Security Benefits begin after I divorce, and what might I be entitled to? 


A.  Although retirement benefits can begin at age 62, the amount received will be at least 20 percent less than the full benefits would be at normal retirement age. 

These are 65 years if born before 1937; for those born between 1938 and 1954, between 65 years and 2 months to 66; from 1955 to 1960, 66 years plus 2 months for each year after 1955; and, if born after 1960, benefits begin at 67.

When a divorced dependent spouse elects to receive benefits at age 62, these benefits will be reduced by about 25%.  Medicare benefits do not begin until age 65, except as recently changed in the federal health legislation. 

This means that conditioning a reduction of alimony upon anticipated receipts at age 62 will result in an important lifetime loss of retirement benefits and may necessitate the purchase of health care insurance until age 65.

Another important limitation on when benefits can begin is when a divorced spouse seeks to collect derivative benefits based upon the earnings of a former spouse who has not yet applied for benefits, even though they are age 62 or older and have qualified for benefits.

In such situations the dependent spouse must wait until two years after the entry of the divorce decree to begin collecting these derivative benefits (they are entitled to collect the benefits they themselves paid in).  Pay attention to this if you are the older spouse.



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
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April 25, 2010
  Are SOCIAL SECURITY benefits income for purposes of SUPPORT calculations?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  Are my social security benefits includible as income to me for purposes of my spousal support and child support application?



A.  Pursuant to California Family Code section 4058 gross income for purposes of child support "means income from whatever source derived".  Subsection (1) specifically identifies social security benefits as included.

While FC section 4058 is a child support statute, there is no companion definition of income for temporary spousal support and as a result section 4058 is generally applied to that context as well.

The question often arises whether Social Security is inputted into the support calculation as a taxable or nontaxable benefit - federal taxes are imposed on some of Social Security benefits, depending upon on combined income (the sum of adjusted gross income plus nontaxable interest plus one-half of Social Security benefits).  The bottom line is that ask the Court to include it within "other taxable income" to avoid paying both taxes on the income and higher child or spousal support!


Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
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April 24, 2010
  Will California recognize a SAME SEX MARRIAGE from Vermont?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.   My same sex spouse and I were married in Vermont in 2001 but moved to Palm Springs five months ago.  Now it looks like we are splitting up.  She works full time and I take care of the home.  Can I seek spousal support in California and get our marriage dissolved here?


A.  As you probably know, Vermont was the first state to offer civil union status to same-sex couples (2000) which was identical to that offered to opposite-sex couples.  California was the first state to offer any legal status to same-sex couples.  Today the only states/territories that permit same-sex marriages or the equivalent civil unions are Connecticut, Washington D.C., Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont.

Other states give varying recognition to same sex partnerships - for instance, California, Nevada, Washington, and Oregon give broad recognition to domestic partners and other states like Colorado and Maine give limited recognition. 

In California some 18,000 couples marry between June 16, 2008 and November 4, 2008, when the window closed on same-sex marriage according to our Supreme Court's ruling in Straus v. Horton.  Our office has assisted some of these couples in divorce in our offices since that time.

Even though it is not presently possible for same-sex couples to marry in California, California will recognize valid marriages and civil unions from other states. 

On January 1, 2010, Family Code section 308 was amended to recognize any "marriage" between two persons of the same sex outside of California which is valid by the laws of that state so long as the marriage was contracted prior to November 5, 2008 (the date the California Constitutional Amendment was upheld prohibiting same-sex "marriage").

As to same sex marriages that are lawful in other states which occur after November 5, 2008, California will not allow them to be called "marriages" but will accord these couples all of the rights of California law concerning marriage.

This leaves open the question of what we call dissolutions between "married" same sex couples in California that were entered after November 4, 2008.  Clearly in your case California recognizes a full-blown marriage in the traditional use of the term because you legally married in 2001 in Vermont.  But for those married since 11/4/08 in another jurisdiction there is uncertainty which California Judicial Council forms (which are mandatory) be utilized because those marriages are not domestic partnerships (Family Code section 299.2), nor are they "marriages."  Our office practice will be to simply use the old forms and modify them as necessary.

You may file a marriage dissolution in this state and request all orders that any divorcing couple could request; however, please note that California requires that you be a resident of this state for at least six months before filing for Dissolution but that you can opt to file a Legal Separation Petition at this time, obtain the necessary support orders, and then file an amended pleading for Dissolution once you perfect residency.

Good luck!



Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com
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April 13, 2010
  How Do I Defend a Request by My (Former) Spouse to SET ASIDE our Support Orders?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  My former spouse claims that I lied on my Income and Expense Declaration and filed a motion to set aside that order, and is now seeking more money.  What are my rights?


A.  This type of support modification can occur in two situations:  Where it is alleged that you aren't paying enough because you committed some fraud or where you alleged you are paying too much because the other party committed some fraud in connection with an Income and Expense Declaration [FL-150] or some other sworn pleading filed with the Court.

If you are defending a support set aside motion, there are three bits of law you need to know.

First, there are important time limitations on when a motion must be filed before a Court will set aside a prior support order.  As action based upon fraud or perjury must be brought within six months after the date on which the complaining party discovered or should reasonably have discovered the fraud or perjury.  Family Code section 3691.

Second, the moving party must convince the trial court that all the other party has established is that it was a) inequitable when made or b) subsequent circumstances caused the the supported ordered to be inadequate or excessive, but that nothing more has been proved that that those grounds are insufficient by themselves.  Family Code section 3692.

Third, on April 8, 2010, the case of In re Marriage of Zimmerman was decided and certified for publication and it is the first reported California appellate decision to squarely address these family code provisions.  You will want to cite this case to the judge.

In Zimmerman a mother and former wife filed a motion to have all child support recalculated going back some five years, on the ground that the father had committed fraud and perjury with respect to prior order by concealing income in his earlier FL-150's.  However, because of facts alleged in earlier pleadings she had filed with the Court a declaration making reference to these very same claims, the trial court was affirmed when it found that more than six months before she filed the Motion she had discovered or reasonably should have discovered the alleged fraud and perjury.

This is a very important case in this area because family law litigants are frequently claiming in their papers that the other side is lying or concealing information.  This case stands for the proposition that it is unwise practice to even mention these claims prematurely, because if one does then the defending party will point to those statements - 'you see, she knew she had this claim two years ago.'  It is always unwise to make statements to the Court about dishonest conduct on the part of the other side where there is no solid proof, yet, in any event. 


Thurman W. Arnold III
http://www.ThurmanArnold.com 
4/13/10
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April 13, 2010
  What Are My Rights When I Believe My Spouse Committed Fraud in Their Income & Expense Statement?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  What remedies do you have if you believe your spouse concealed income or lied about assets in their Income and Expense Declaration [Form FL-150]?


A.      The FL-150 Income and Expense Declaration must be filed by each party in every California family law case involving requests for money (whether support or attorney fees), and it must accompany the FL-142 Schedule of Assets and Debts that is part of the Preliminary Declaration of Disclosure that must be exchanged in all action for dissolution of marriage or domestic partnership, legal separation, and annulment.  In addition, Rule of Court 5.128 requires these Income and Expense Declarations to be current, which means they need to be updated so that they are, generally speaking, not more than 90 days stale.

Family Code section 3691 sets for the grounds and time limits for filing a Motion or OSC to set aside and correct an order for child support or spousal support which was obtained by your present or former spouse, or the other parent.  You need to be very careful with these time limits, because they are shorter than other set aside remedies contained in the Family Code (for instance, Family Code section 2122 dealing with property settlements and judgments).  It is important get the applicable code sections right, because different time limits apply for seeking relief from the Court.

Family Code lists the grounds for a support set aside as a) actual fraud; b) perjury; and c) lack of notice.

a)  Fraud - this occurs when 1) the defrauded party is kept in ignorance or 2) in some manner other than their own lack of care or attention was fraudulently prevented from fully participating in the proceeding.  This set aside ground is different from perjury.  It applies to a situation, for instance, where you were told that your spouse was not seeking certain orders and so you failed to attend to the hearing only to learn later that in your absence much broader relief was requested than represented.  It also applies any time information is provided by the other side that was materially false and when you relied on that false information not knowing that it was false (for instance, a party fails to disclose another job, much higher earnings, or property).

b) Perjury - where the other side has simply lied outright under oath in their Income and Expense Declaration or in the supporting verified application.  Be sure to allege fraud as well since a perjurious statement is often a fraud.

c)  Lack of Notice - this generally applies to situations where the other side claims you received notice of the proceedings but in fact you were not served.  This can be difficult to prove where a proof of service was filed with the Court which itself is perjurious (i.e., your husband's best friend he claims he hand delivered to the documents to you on a day you were in New York).

This section applies equally to orders which were way too high based upon any of the above grounds as those that were way too low.

Family Code section 3691 will not help you in situations addressed in Family Code section 3692, where your support order was merely unfair or subsequent circumstances caused the order to be excessive or inadequate. Section 3692 is your first argument in defending a support order set aside motion.

In any of the above cases, you must file your motion within six months of the time you discovered or reasonably should have discovered the fraud, perjury, or reasonably adequate notice of the order.


Thurman W.  Arnold, III
California Family Law Attorney


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March 25, 2010
  What is GUIDELINE SUPPORT in California?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  How is child support calculated in California?  I have heard about "Guideline Support" but am wondering what this means?


A.  In 1993 California adopted a Statewide Uniform Guideline to come into compliance with a federal mandate.  (Family Code section 4050).  This followed wide variability of orders and a prior failed attempt to ensure predictability.  Its effect was to greatly increase the monies available to children and to begin to end gender bias in assessing support.    Family Code section 4052 requires California court Commissioners to adhere to the uniform guidelines and to "depart from the guideline only in special circumstances...." 

Family Code section 4053 lists principles to be followed by the Court in implementing the guidelines.  This is a statute worth reviewing, and using to remind family court judges of what our State child support policy is.  These include the directives that:

(1)  A parent's first and principal obligation is to support their minor children "according ot the parent's circumstances and station in life."

(2)  Both parents are mutually responsible.

(3)  The guideline must take into account each parent's actual income and the level of responsibility for the children.

(4)  "Each parent should pay for the support of the children or according to his or her ability."

(5)  The interests of children are the State's top priority.

(6)  Children should share in the standard of living of both parents.  Child support may therefore be appropriately used to increase the standard of living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the children.

(7)  Disparities of living standards in both homes, particularly where both parents have high levels of responsibility for raising the children, should be minimized through the use of guideline child support orders.

(8)  A parent having primary physical responsibility for the children (a term that is nowhere defined in the Family Code) is presumed to be contributing a significant portion of their available financial resources to the support of these children.

(9)  The guideline is intended to encourage settlement between parents by creating predictability.

(10)  The guideline is presumptively correct in all cases, and ony in special circumstance should child support orders be less than guideline.

(11)  Child support orders must reflect the greater standard of living and costs of living in California as opposed to other states. 

California Family Code section 4055 sets forth the formula for assessing guideline support.  Don't even bother to look at it, you will need to be a mathematician or logics teacher to understand or explain it.  While gross income numbers (or imputed income) are used, the guideline tax effects this income so that net income is generally what is determinative - however, this complicates doing the math.  The percentage of parent's income allocated to children is called the "K" factor, and this number moves depending upon how many children there are.  It assumes, for instance, that 26% of the joint income of most families is spent on families with one child, and 60% where there are three children.  Forturnately these calculations are done for us through computer programs.  The most common are the Dissomaster and Xspouse, which I will explain further in another blog.  Riverside County in Indio utilizes the Xspouse.  The Xspouse is a spin off from the people who devised the Dissomaster, after they had a parting of the ways.

Child support always takes precedence over spousal support, or personal expenses.  Relative timeshare between the parents is a major factor in using the formula - the higher the noncustodial parent's timeshare, the less they pay. 

Unfortunately this means in practice that there is much legal wrestling between parents about timeshare that has nothing to do with the children's best interests but often everything to do with economic warfare.  I write about this in separate articles detailing Collaborative Law processes where we attempt to refocus parents on best interests rather than legal rights (per the guideline formula, for instance) so that primary parent's (often mothers) will give up more custodial time and fathers will pay a little more for this time and then actually undertake using that time (as opposed to having it on paper in a court order, but generally ignoring the increased responsibilities).  Please see this link to our Collaborative Divorce Team.

Importantly, even when courts order child or spousal support to women, studies have shown that most children who are entitled to child support from their fathers never receive it (Huang, Mincy, and Garfinkel, 2005). There may be a number of reasons for this. One determinant of fathers meeting these obligations is their ability to pay.  Researchers have found that when child support obligations exceed 35% of a father' sincome, he is less like to comply (Meyer and Barfeld, 1996).  Lower earner fathers are generally required to pay a higher proportion of their income in child support in child support than higher earners, which pressures the poorest members of our society (Huang, et al., 2005).

Women in heterosexual relationships, as single parents (or child-caretaking partners), are at greatest risk of becoming systemically impoverished (Strong, et al., 2008). Following divorce, women are principally responsible for both child-rearing and their own economic support. At a minimum a woman may suffer a significant decrease in her financial condition. Studies have shown that a single mother's income may decrease by twenty-seven percent or more.  (Peterson, 1996; Smock, 1993).  [Please contact me if you want the actual citations to these studies].

These realities may or may not interest you.  They do affect children and parents in very deep ways, nonetheless.

In any event, now that you have the background I will provide more detailed information on how the Xspouse and Dissomaster programs work in practice very soon.  Try using our search engine at the upper right corner of any page on this site and you will find those articles when they are up.

TWA


Thurman Arnold is a child support attorney practicing in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties, including the cities ranging from Blythe, Indio, Indian Wells, La Quinta, Palm Desert, Rancho Mirage, Palm Springs, Desert Hot Springs, Joshua Tree, Hemet, San Bernardino and Riverside, CA.

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March 24, 2010
  I am remarried. How does my NEW MATE'S INCOME affect my SPOUSAL SUPPORT or CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  I remarried in August, 2009, and my new wife is a doctor.  She has one child from her prior marriage and I have two.  I am still paying my former wife alimony and child support even though the kids we have together live at our home 40% of the time.  I have been hit hard by the economy and we largely depend upon my wife's medical income to make ends meet.  Now my ex is threatening to take me back to court to increase my support based upon my new wife's income, while my own income is down from when the court last decided it.  My new wife is upset at the idea that my ex can learn anything about the medical practice or income.  What should I do?

A.  If there has been a material decrease in your income since the time of your last order, you may safely file a support modification motion to lower your child support and to lower or possibly terminate your spousal support.  Whether that is advisable based upon your numbers has nothing to do with your new mate's income, and should not cause you to hesitate - but again, it does depend on the actual respective numbers between you and Wife 1, which you did not provide me.  You also need not worry about W1 filing a motion to increase (you can't stop her, but she will not win based on W2's earnings).  Maybe you should give her this link so she will think twice.

California law is quite clear that new mate income cannot generally be considered against you in ordering or modifying child or spousal support.  The controlling California Family statute is section 4057.5.

In the normal situation, Family Code section 4057.5 leaves the Court no discretion to consider your new wife's earnings, period.  You do not need to report those earnings on your FL-150 (Income and Expense Declaration). This is a statement of California legislative policy effective in 1993 when this section was added to the Family Code.  This is true for both spousal and child support.

However, section 4057.5 does contain an exception for the "extraordinary case" which the statute makes clear is intended to address situations where "where excluding that income would lead to extreme and severe hardship to any child subject to the child support award" or where "a parent ... voluntarily or intentionally quits work or reduces income, or who intentionally remains unemployed or underemployed and relies on a subsequent spouse's income."  Even if the court were to find a severe hardship on the children of marriage number one, it would be required not to impose a severe hardship on your wife's child by reallocating her income to you for purposes of supporting your two children. 

In practice, so far, Courts almost never find facts sufficient overcome this clear statutory prohibition.  So far there is no published California appellate decision defining these extraordinary circumstances.  No doubt one day someone will so abuse this protection and hide behind it that we will get a reported decision that fleshs out how bad someone needs to behave before the protection is lost.  But "extraordinary" means really extraordinary.  In the average case, your new Wife has nothing to be concerned about. 

With regard to attorneys fee awards, however, there is authority for an argument that new mate income may be considered in granting or denying an attorney fee request, but the odds are against a judge doing that.

Incidentally, this section also applies to income from nonmarital partners as well as new spouses.  In one reported case (IRMO Loh), a trial court was reversed for inceasing dad's child support obligation after the mother produced photos of the father's "lifetyle" to show imputed nontaxable income in the form of his new girlfriend's contributions to him, since she paid for all his toys. 

The new mate question is a subset of the "imputed income" situations where a father or mother may quit work or reduce hours because they are relying on their new mate to contribute the difference.  That is not likely going to be an extraordinary case, but  W1 can separately seek to impute income to you on the basis that you have a higher earning capacity than you are exercising.  Earning capacity and imputed income is a blog for another day.  Also, I will mention here that another argument exists in favor of W1 that has nothing to do with the right to obtain the records or income of W2:  Equalizing the lifestyle's of the two households where yours is rich and grandiose and W1 is impoverished (an extreme example) pursuant to FC section 4057(b)(4).

The tax returns are privileged as they relate to your new wife's medical practice.  For instance, if she is a medical corporation (which I recommend be set up), she will almost never be forced to divulge those records.  Even as to your joint returns, you may be entitled to redact the information concerning your new spouse or have the Court review them in camera (meaning they are not turned over to the other side).  Your former mate is entitled to see your side of the tax returns, however, and they are not insulated from scrutiny simply because you filed joint with the Doctor Wife.  If you don't file jointly, your former wife will almost certainly never get her hands on your new wife's Married Filing Separately (MFS) returns.  Structuring things this way may or may not be advisable and you should consult a tax accountant.

An interesting twist here is that because you marry a higher, wealthy earner, your taxes actually increase because under federal IRS (and the California FTB), you are responsible for one-half of your new mate's income - and this is true even if you don't file jointly.  One case (County of Tulare vs. Campbell) has held that this additional tax you become liable for can form the basis for a reduction in your support because you have less net income available for support after the tax hit is deducted.  Hence, based on these tax consequences you may have an additional argument for decreased support - although a Court may try to deny you some discretionary offset to even the score since this feels a bit unfair to the spouse who is  primarily supporting the children and so lessen the downward modification.

The take-away:  So long as you are not playing games, have not intentionally reduced your income by relying upon your new mate's income, and there is no really extraordinary difference in the two households, your new wife's income is just not relevant and so it is protected.

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March 06, 2010
  Is a WAIVER OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT in a PRENUP VALID?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  Before I married we signed a prenup that says I waived any right to spousal support.  Is this valid?

A.  Maybe yes, maybe no.  Sections 1612 and 1615 of the California Family Code impose important limitations on spousal support waivers effective 1/1/02.    

Spousal support waivers absolutely require that the party waiving the right was represented by independent legal counsel at the time the agreement was entered into.  Family Code section 1612(c).  If a lawyer has not advised the party and signed off on the agreement, the waiver is unenforceable.

Even if a party was in indeed represented by independent counsel who advised the client and approved the prenup, the spousal support waiver will not operate "if the provision regarding spousal support is unconscionable at the time of enforcement."  Family Code section 1612(c).  Time of enforcement means when a party attempts to force the other party to adhere to the terms of the agreement, or is resisting a support request in divorce court. 

Creative attorneys anticipate these potential bars to enforcement by carefully drafting the language of the prenuptial agreement, and by creating various scenarios within the support waiver.  For instance, a straight waiver of spousal support is much less likely to be enforced than a conditional waiver of support.  A conditional waiver might contain language that precludes the waiver if the party seeking support is gravely ill, unable to work, or receiving welfare benefits.   

Lawyers drafting premarital agreements tend to charge moderate minimum fees because of the potential attorney malpractice exposure years down the road.  Many attorneys won't handle them at all, or refuse to recommend that a party ever waive support and so they will not execute the agreement.

There are a number of other restrictions which must be overcome before a premarital agreement can be enforced.  One is that at least seven calendar days must have passed between the date that a party was first presented with the agreement and then later signed it.   

While you may be able to accomplish what both parties say they want are are willing to do before marriage in a prenup, you must retain legal counsel who is experienced in this area of the law or things may turn out differently than you expect down the road.   

Once a wedding date is set, the earlier you get the agreement negotiated and signed the greater the likelihood it will survive objection or attack later.  

If you already signed one and want to know whether it will be enforced for or against you, seek a family law expert immediately.

TWA


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January 24, 2010
  Can CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS be made RETROACTIVE?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q. Can child support orders be made retroactive in a court proceeding?

A. Except when the county has paid benefits, or possibly where a third party has provided necessaries like food, shelter, or clothing for the benefit of a child living with you under certain circumstances, the earliest a support order can be made effective is the date any initial pleading is filed in a court proceeding.  FC Section 4009.

However, if you were not served with the papers within 90 days of that initial filing, support can only be ordered retroactive to the date a motion seeking support was filed.

Most judges will order support retroactive to the first or the fifteenth day of the month.  This means that if you file for support on April 2nd, your order may only go back to April 15 but if you filed March 27th, your order would become effective on April 1.  You should time your filing to maximize retroactivity.

To the extent your partner has contributed monies to your support voluntarily before the order becomes effective, they will usually receive a credit off-set against the support award for the time period in question (i.e., if support commences April 1, they will not likely receive credits for payments made prior to that time).  These payments do not need to be paid to you directly for the credit to apply, as where a mortgage or rent payment is made.

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January 17, 2010
  Why is the date of PHYSICAL SEPARATION legally important?
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.    Why is the idea of 'physical separation' important in California?

A.    The idea of "physical separation" is one of the most important concepts to California law.  If you think that the presumption that all property acquired during marriage is significant, the notion of physical separation is every bit if not more important.  This appears to be one of the best kept secrets of California family law.

Physical separation is the date that the marriage ends, for most practical purposes.  The date of physical separation is the date that community property ceases to accumulate.  Family Code section 771 states "The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, while living separate and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the spouse."

Once spouses separate, all their earnings and everything that is acquired with those earnings are separate property of each spouse, respectively.

Similarly, upon separation each spouse is no longer liable for the debts of the other spouse.  The community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse "during marriage".  During marriage "does not include the period during which the spouses are living separate and apart before a judgment of dissolution ... or legal separation...."  FC section 910.  An exception exists as to "necessaries" except to the extent that the parties are living separate by agreement and whether or not support is stipulated by that agreement.  FC section 4302.

Separation is of critical importance to the expanding interpretation and growing field of the law of fiduciary duties. The duty of confidentiality that arises because of the marital relationship by legislative fiat ( Family Code section 721) and which gives rise to major exposure for the conduct of spouses with regard to property and money, ceases at separation - meaning spouses no longer have the expectation and right of relying upon one another as trusted partners.  Fiduciary duties continue pursuant to FC sections 1100 et seq. and sections 2100 et seq. as to assets that already exist, or can be considered marital opportunities arising after separation, until the time each asset in question is divided by agreement or court adjudication.  Fiduciary duties are land mines.  A good example of the consequences for breach of fiduciary duty is the Rossi case, where a wife who won the lottery and then filed for divorce the next day claiming she and her husband had already separated.  She fails to list the lottery winnings in her paperwork, and refused to disclose it to the husband later claiming, among other things, that she had been a victim of domestic violence.  Because the husband had no idea about the lottery winnings, he did not dispute the divorce or wife's asserted date of separation until much later when one day he received a letter intended for the wife by a company offering to buy out the winnings.  He called the State Lottery Board, and then filed a motion to set aside the divorce degree and for damages for wife's fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.  The court ordered the wife to disgorge all her winnings (100%) and pay them over to the husband.

The separation date is crucial to understanding reimbursement claims relating to payment on joint and separate debts, or in fixing rights to real property.  For instance, California law provides that the community has an interest in the appreciation of a residence which is owned, meaning title is held, in one spouse's name alone where principal on a mortgage is being paid down.  This is called the Moore-Marsden approach to equitable reimbursement.  If the house appreciates after separation, the titled spouse may want to argue that all that appreciation belongs to them.  Date of separation becomes important to the date of valuing the real estate and determining the relative principal loan amounts.

It is crucial where businesses are involved, regardless whether they are corporations, mom and pop shops, or sole proprietorships.  For instance, what happens when a spouse who controls or who is the business, which was established before or during the marriage, continues to derive income from it after the parties separate?  Maybe the business goes up in value.  Perhaps it goes down in value through market factors, or maybe even the spouse intentionally drives it into the ground in order to reduce the amount that will be ordered to buy out the other spouse's interest.  In all these situations a date of separation determination is crucial.

Another common area where it comes up in with regard to pensions, whether they be defined benefit plans or contributive benefit plans.  Whatever accrues to the spouse who holds the pension by way of his post-separation contributions belongs to them.

Date of separation is also critical to determining the length of the marriage for purposes of spousal support or alimony rights.  It is a snapshot in time with huge ramifications, including how long a spousal support obligation may continue and when it might be terminated.

It is critical that you hire an attorney who understands how to litigate and present the facts of physical separation.


Thurman W. Arnold III,
California Divorce Lawyer
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December 30, 2009
  My New Wife Works. Can this NEW MATE INCOME Be Used to Increase my CHILD SUPPORT?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  I have two children from a previous marriage.  I remarried two years ago, and my new spouse earns $8,500 month.  While my hours have been reduced during this recession and my monthly gross averages $3,500.  The ex is threatening to take me back to Court to increase child support based upon my new mate's income.  Can she do this?

A.  Of course ex-spouses can always take the other back to court, but that doesn't mean they will win.  We call these support modification proceedings.  In order to obtain a new order, she must prove there has been some material change of circumstances with regard to her needs, the childrens' needs, or your ability to pay a greater sum in support.

The key California statute on when and how new mate income can be considered is Family Code section 4057.5.  The basic rule is that courts cannot consider new mate or nonmarital partner income in the context of making child support or support spousal orders.  This means as a general proposition that your new wife's income of $8,500/month is not to be inputted into the support guideline formulas. 

There are two exceptions where new mate income may need to be disclosed and where it can be considered in setting child support:  1) Where there are "extraordinary circumstances" that would cause the exclusion of this income to create an extreme or severe hardship to a supported child.  However, if this hardship is shown, the court must first consider the effect of inclusion of new mate income on any other children including the new mate's children, and so that their interests trump the hardship to the child for which support orders are being sought.  2) By marrying somebody with high earnings, a spouse will pick up additional taxes based upon the other's income.  Since as far as the IRS and California Franchise Tax Board (FTB) is concerned, you are liable under community property laws for one-half of your new mate's income, regardless whether you file jointly, the added tax consequences upon this additional income can actually be the basis for a downward decrease in child support (County of Tulare v. Campbell) since there is less after tax income available to you from which to pay support.

There are very few reported California appellate decision on new mate income or which explain how FC section 4057.5 is to be applied.  In Marriage of Loh (93 CA4 325) a mother/former spouse convinced a trial court, based upon photos of the father's extravagant lifestyle (homes, cars, etc.) which were funded by his girlfriend's income and assets, to impute income to him for purposes of basing a child support award.  The appellate court reversed, stating "Evidence of lifestyle, particularly a lifestyle subsidized by a new 'nonmarital partner', is not a cheap substitute for proper discovery of income reported on tax returns."

In a very recent appellate decision (Marriage of Knowles (Oct. 2009) 178 CA4 35) a trial court was reversed after it accepted the former wife's argument that the community property income and assets of both he and his new wife should be used to determine his income available for support.  The trial court's mistake was include the half that belonged to the new wife, although it could have included just the half that belong to him.   There was no evidence of extreme hardship that justified considering the new mate's half. 

We’ve waited a long time for another case dealing with consideration of new-mate income under Fam C §4057.5. One of the few cases that has, In re Marriage of Wood (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1059 is cited here, but it came down in 1995. Neither the statute nor the cases provide any definitive answer regarding what actually constitutes either an “extraordinary case” or an “extreme and severe hardship,” although Wood seems to say that new-mate income can be considered where one of the parents is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.

Rather than arguing for NMI (new mate income), a party seeking to have income assigned to a person who has remarried or is living with a nonmarital partner may find more success by arguing that income should be imputed to that spouse on the basis that they have an earning capacity which is not being realized.  For instance, if because your new spouse had sufficient income you chose to quit work or take a lower paying job it might appear you are shirking your support responsibilities.  Rather than charging you with NMI, a trial court could find that you had the ability to earn X dollars a month and so charge you for this phantom income by making that the basis for a support award.  Then, the community property (including your new mate's share) could be tapped to satisfy this obligation.

Incidentally, a California prenup can be an effective way to limit this exposure.

 


 

 


 

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December 28, 2009
  What is permanent SPOUSAL SUPPORT in California?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  What rights do I have to permanent spousal support?

A.  Permanent spousal support is not usually "permanent," although it can be in cases of very long marriages.  Lawyers and judges also refer to it as post-judgment spousal support, alimony, judgment spousal support, or long term support.

Unlike temporary spousal support, long term spousal support is only issued after a final judgment of Dissolution of Marriage or Legal Separation.  It is equally available to domestic partners.  Also unlike temporary support, it is not based on any computer formula or state or county guideline, but must be determined and fixed depending on the facts of every individual case.  If long term support is important to your future wellbeing, you are going to need an experienced support attorney.

There are several very important rules to keep in mind.  First, a marriage in California which lasts more than 10 years (defined as the time between date of marriage and physical separation), is "long term" marriage.  The general rule is that in marriages which are not long term, spousal support should not be payable for more than one-half the length of marriage - or to put in differently, the law presumes that the recipient spouse should be rehabilitated and so become self-supporting in a period equal to 1/2 the marriage.  However, this presumption becomes less important in cases involving older couples, especially where people can not be realistically expected to re-enter the work force, in cases where there children who remain minors, or where the party asking for support has a debilitating disease or disability.

There is no magic ratio for how long a former spouse might be ordered to pay long term support.  Each case depends upon its own facts, the quality of your attorney, and the attitudes of the family court judge.  Even in cases of long term marriages, the support obligation typically will end at some point in time.  However, if usually will not end on its own - meaning that when a trial court orders long term support it will reserve jurisdiction to continue to extent it, until some time when a party petitions the court to terminate support and a judge finally says "enough is a enough." 

Imputed income is often an important argument in long term support marriages, where one party convinces the court that the other party is shirking or failing to genuinely try to become self-supporting.  It is sometimes necessary to have the supported spouse evaluated by a vocational rehabilitation expert. 

There are four components to an award of of permanent support:  1) Amount; 2) duration; 3) substantive increases or decreases over time; and 4) jurisdictional step downs and ultimately a termination date.

Second, Family Code section 4320 is a critical support statute.  I have provided a link and uploaded it so that you may read it.  Essentially it sets forth all the factors that the court must consider in setting post-judgment support, and you will see that it is not an exhaustive list and the court can consider anything else it deems important to the decision.  Support factors include the extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the marital standard of living established during the marriage, considering:  a) the marketable skills of the supported party, the job market for those skills, the time and expense required to train that party including education and b) the extent to which the supported party's present or future income earning ability is impaired by periods of unemployment or were incurred during the marriage to permit that party to devote time to domestic duties.

Another factor is whether the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, license, career, or position by the supporting party. 

Another factor is the ability of the supporting party to pay, taking in account that person's earning capacity, income, and assets and standard of living.

Another very important support consideration is the needs of each party - including both. 

Another factor is the obligations and assets of each spouse, including the separate property which each has or gained upon the dissolution.

Another is the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the needs of dependent children in their custody.

The age and health of the parties is critical in some cases.  65 years of age is the presumed retirement age for adults today, and courts cannot order a person to continue to be employed beyond that age - but, if they make that choice, their income can be considered.

A documented history of domestic violence can affect the right to receive support or the obligation to pay it.

The tax consequences between the parties must be considered.

And, basically, as I said, any other specific facts that trend one way or another.

The three most common factors are the marital standard of living (MSOL), need and ability to pay, and the assets the parties end up with upon divorcing.

Courts cannot order lump sums for support.  Spousal support is generally taxable to the recipient and deductible to the payor, but there are very specific IRS requirements that must be met for this to actually be so.

Courts are required to state their findings on each relevant issue in writing.  In practice though, most people settle their divorce cases by way of settlement agreements.  Unfortunately, lawyers often leave out these findings so that when a court is asked, down the road, by the payor to terminate or decrease support, or by the payee to increase it, there is no map for the court to use to base its modification findings on.

If support is an issue for you either way, please hire a competent lawyer.  There are many attorneys moving into family law from civil practices who are clueless about these things.  Caveat emptor!

 


 

 

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December 28, 2009
  How is TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT Determined in California?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.  How is temporary spousal support calculated in California?

 

A.  In order to be entitled to spousal support, parties must be married or be registered domestic partners.  Spousal support (which is not usually referred to as "alimony" in California) is available in dissolution proceedings, actions for legal separation, and in connection with domestic violence applications. 

Spousal support orders may be temporary, or they be what is called permanent.  Different rules apply to how temporary support is figured than to permanent or long-term support.  I address permanent spousal separately.

Temporary spousal support is designed to preserve the status quo pending a final judgment.  Family Code section 3600 provides that during the pendency for dissolution of marriage or legal separation or in any proceeding where there is at issue the support of a minor child, the court may order the husband or wife to pay any amount that is necessary for the support of the husband and wife (subject to limitations contained in FC section 4320 and FC section 4325).  Again, parties dissolving domestic partnerships may also be awarded support.

Temporary spousal support has nothing to do with the length of the marriage.  Courts look at what the spending pattern was pre-separation and issues a spousal support award based upon need.  If there isn't enough money on the basis of need, then an amount is ordered based upon the higher earner's ability to pay.  A party seeking spousal support isn't deprived on the right to receive support even if they have income - the question is the relative income circumstances of the two parties.

Most California counties have formulas that determine temporary spousal support, but the two most important are Santa Clara and Alameda counties.  Essentially the spousal support formula for Santa Clara County - which is the dominant one - is as follows:  From any amount which is not allocated to child support, take 40% from the net income of the payor spouse, less 50% from the net income of the recipient spouse.  The resulting number is the temporary spousal support.  You do not need to have children to be entitled to receive spousal support.

As a practical matter, courts typically use one of two computer programs that generate these numbers:  Either the Dissomaster or Xspouse.  The Indio courts use Xspouse and the Santa Clara guidelines.

Into one of these programs are inputted the respective gross incomes of the parties.  If there are children of the parties, the custodial timeshare in percentages is inputted (because only a party who has physical custody for more than 50% of the year can claim the tax benefits of HH/MLA or head of household status, the programs require one to be considered to have 51% even in true joint custody arrangements). 

Only certain expenses matter for purposes of temporary support in California.  What doesn't matter at all is most personal expenses (like mortgage payments, utilities, debt).  This effectively ignores the entire debt structure of the parties at time of separation.  Health insurance, union dues, and mandatory contributions to retirement (i.e., typically not IRA contributions), and obligations existing to other minor children living in one party's home, or as to which an actual court order requires they make support payments, are also entered.  The support program 'tax effects' these numbers and figures out the net incomes of the parties.  It renders a number that tells the Court how much the higher earning spouse must pay for purposes of a court order.

Since the court determines the support obligation some weeks after a request for support is made (by way of Motion for Order to Show Cause application), it typically makes the support order retroactive to the date of the filing for the request.  Most courts order support payable one-half on the first and fifteenth of the month.  For this reason, if you file for support on the 5th day of the month, the court will not make support retroactive to the 1st but will start of the obligation on the 15th day of the month.

This might sound like temporary spousal support is easy to fix and who needs a lawyer?  This is not at all the case.  The final support numbers depend upon how much income the Court is attributing to each party.  Each is required to submit before the hearing an FL-150 Income and Expense Declaration.

For instance:  A husband's (and wife's) income numbers are usually but not always based upon historical earnings, and the California judicial council form (FL-150) requires both to set forth there total gross for the past 12 months and also the past month.  The legal assumption is that historical earnings are a reliable guide to future earnings, but this may not be at all true.  Especially in today's economy, historical earnings may not be indicative of what the income stream will be going forward.  This information needs to be credibly presented to the Court.

In cases where one party is a self-employed spouse, their net pre-tax earnings must be determined after deducting business expenses.  This is a common and complex area of dispute, because what is deductible for purposes of Schedule C accompanying a tax return according to the federal government is in no way binding upon California courts for purposes of figuring support.  If somebody works from home and charges part of the mortgage expense as a business deduction, that expense may be added back into the income stream as being available for support.

Another support battleground often involves imputed income.  What if one party refuses to work, or insists on working at a lower paying job?  Perhaps a support recipient believes they will get more money from their spouse if they have no job but if they tried to get one, they could?  What if one party claims that they aren't working and that no jobs are available?  Imputing income cuts both ways, and is extremely sophisticated. I will address another blog to it.

Incidentally, while only temporary alimony is calculated in this way, child support is always figured in this manner regardless whether there is a spousal support obligation.



http://www.DesertDivorceandFamilyLawAttorney.com
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August 29, 2009
  Woman not from this country mistreated by American husband
Posted By Thurman Arnold
Q.  From J:

Hello, I am an Australian woman who married almost 4 years ago an American and he treats me like a housekeeper not as his wife. We are in Phoenix right now, but we were living most of the time in Indian Wells, CA, at his house.  He is also threatening me that he is going to take my two daughters away from me. (Mine from a previous relation).  He changed since we become a married couple. I really fell alone and he is denying my existence. I have nobody here and he doesn't even let my go visit my parents for a few weeks. What would be a good advice?  

Best Regards.

J.

A.  Hello J: 

That kind of treatment may be a form of domestic violence, and you have my sympathy and concern. Have there been threats or hitting?

When do you return to the desert? I assume you have no ability to travel on your own because you have no money? You may need to look to your family for help.

This gentlemen is not going to take your children away from you, no matter what he says.  

In terms of dissolution rights, you are absolutely entitled to have the marriage dissolved, but you are not going to have huge support or property rights – typically support for a short marriage is half its length although it is possible to stall a case to stretch that out in this case, and figure if you have no income you might be entitled to about 35% of what he grosses, all other things being equal. 

In terms of property, if nothing was acquired during marriage there is not going to be much to divide, although if there has been a mortgage payment on the Indian Wells residence there might be some reimbursement.


 T.W. Arnold

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August 29, 2009
  Is OVERTIME considered in fixing CHILD SUPPORT?
Posted By Thurman Arnold

Q.:  Is overtime a factor in considering child support?

from T

A.  T:

Yes, if there is already a history of overtime - meaning a court won't order a parent to work overtime who hasn't been (there is case authority that a court cannot order a parent to work more than a regular work regimen), but if they have already been working it then the court must take that history into account when projecting future income for purposes of guideline support (Xspouse or Dissomaster, depending which California county you are in).

Please see this Blog article about temporary support. This applies equally to spousal support.



T.W.A.
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