Recent Posts in Support Modifications Category

Special Circumstances in Child Support Cases
Involving an Extraordinarily High Earner

IRMO Cryer (8/29/11) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039

Jon and Sarah were married, producing a son together, and later divorced. Sarah subsequently had a second child by a different marriage, which also ended. Although Mom had primary physical custody of the child with Jon for which she received "substantial" child support of $10,000 each month and a 65 % "timeshare", she began to suffer some difficulties that first resulted in Jon's ex parte application to modify the prior agreed upon orders to sole custody in his favor in May, 2009. Jon alleged that she had left his child unsupervised. The family law court denied that ex parte request but admonished Sarah not to leave her children unsupervised. Later that same month CPS became involved when her younger child suffered an injury at Sarah's home. A dependency proceeding was filed against her by the Department of Children and Family Services, which resulted in each child being placed with their respective fathers. There is no commentary in the decision about whether the fathers are working together to preserve and protect the sibling bonding.

When a dependency proceeding is filed by child protective services there are strict rules governing procedure that are generally designed to move the proceeding quickly towards determining whether jurisdiction properly exists, in order to ensure that the public policy favoring reunification with the problem parent is honored. However, Sarah's dependency proceeding moved extraordinarily slowly. In the meantime Jon battled her in Judge Pellman's courtroom. In addition, she was also likely defending against the claims of her second husband over custody of the younger child. We don't know what the exact alleged facts are over the circumstances giving rise to the dependency proceeding, but it is obvious that Sarah had her hands full with "two and a half men" - two former husbands and a young child.

Once his son was placed into his custody, Jon filed an application to modify the $10,000 in monthly support to zero since, after all, the child had temporarily been placed with him. Did he hope this might be the killing stroke (coup de grace) that would bring Mom to her knees, forever? There are litigants who feel that if they seize upon the other party's moment of weakness they will remain in power for the remainder of a child's minority, and a lawyer might reasonably advise this tactic under the aegis of "zealous representation". Jon's extreme request was his first mistake. When people want it all they are sometimes sorely disappointed.

Mother argued that $10,000/month was no burden to Jon because that amount was only 3 percent of his income at the time. She urged that the outcome of the dependency proceeding was uncertain, temporary, and subject to change and that without a steady child support order she would have no money to pay her mortgage, car payments, or any other bills. She pointed out that such a result could never serve the child's best interests.

This is where an outstanding trial judge makes all the difference, because superficially Jon's contentions were reasonable.

Prior to the hearing the parties exchanged income and expense declarations. Jon's "stated income" was alleged as $327,000 monthly when averaged over three years, he held $7 million in liquid assets, and monthly expenses of $29,000. By the way, if people want to go public about their affairs, litigation is the right choice. Sarah had "negligible" assets and overhead expenses of $10,000 monthly, not including attorney fees.

A "guideline" child support order using the "Dissomaster" based upon mother's reduced timeshare would have resulted in her favor of a modified amount of $1,141/month. Sarah argued she would lose everything if that was her only income.

The matter was heard on November 2, 2009. Judge Pellman declined to reduce Jon's child support to zero, even though Sarah had little custodial time under the pending dependency court orders, but she did reduce it significantly from $10,000 to $8,000 monthly. The trial court noted that since Sarah's custody arrangement could be modified by the dependency court in short order (which was expected to be the situation) and DCFS could liberalize Mom's visitation schedule at any time, and therefore found that the minor's best interest was best served if the boy could return to the same home that he had shared with his mother prior to the proceedings, and further that it was important for both the mother and child that she have the ability to have regular and consistent contact with him. She ordered the father to pay $20,000 in attorney fees to Sarah's attorneys.

Jon was not satisfied with this ruling. He immediately filed a motion for reconsideration together with a separate Order to Show Cause seeking an accounting of how all child support funds he'd paid had been used, alternatively requesting that these funds be placed into a trust account for the 'direct benefit' of his son. Evidently he believed that paying a mortgage, and having a car, only benefited Sarah and not the boy. Judge Pellman denied his requests (after making some technical corrections to her orders) and awarded that Sarah receive another $5,000 in attorney fees, which was likely only a portion of what she actually incurred.

Three months later Jon filed supplemental authorities prior to a review hearing that had been set, arguing that the dependency proceedings had still not be resolved and that Sarah's visitations had not been "liberalized" as the Court had anticipated. Further, he argued that Sarah wasn't looking for a job and that she was the one benefitting from the child support payments and therefore the Court should stay child support until such time as Sarah's timeshare was increased by the dependency court. This would have had the effect of "starving" Sarah out and really speaks volumes to the level of resentment that Jon was exhibiting - made ever more poignant for us by reflecting upon the degree of privilege from the extraordinary earnings that he enjoys. Again, a trial and appellate court would be reasonable in questioning his motives based upon all the economic circumstances, and in protecting the disadvantaged party consistent with the law. Which is exactly what happened in both courts. As a further expression of his overreaching (or that of his lawyers), Jon filed a new income and expense showing $474,861 in monthly earnings that averaged his income over the prior three years. While it is true that there is no fixed rule in what span of time courts review in determining income, still they are required to look to relevant evidence. Often times the prior 12 months provides this yardstick. 

Sarah's counsel rejoined that Jon's income over the past 12 months was $791,666/month. Sarah was apparently the tick on the back of the elephant. In addition, Sarah's visitation had been liberalized to include home visits. Sarah argued it would be nice for the boy to have a home where these visitations could occur. Also, she had monthly expenses of $13,271 and no income beyond CS.

On May 10, 2010, Judge Pellman ruled that no changed circumstances existed from the time of her earlier orders to modify support further. There still was no "exit order" from the dependency court. The proceedings had not resolved. Moreover, the finding was unavoidable that Sarah would lose her home without support monies to pay the mortgage. The judge ordered Jon to pay another $40,000 in fees to Sarah's attorney.  

Family Code section 4057(b) is an important provision that cuts both ways in terms of adhering to or departing from "guideline" support. That section states that the amount of child support that is presumed under our state-wide formula may be rebutted by showing that the amounts otherwise rendered by the guideline "would be unjust or inappropriate in [a] particular case." Increasingly attorneys for prime time parents are directing trial Courts to this section to support their claims that when custody is cut-off with the other parent, or severely restricted, that support should be zeroed out. For instance, the argument is frequently made, and sometimes accepted, that where the low earner parent has a de minimis timeshare that would otherwise result in some child support to them based upon the parties' respective incomes, that the de minimis timeshare parent should not receive child support because the prime time parent bears the substantial bulk of the financial burden. The problem with this analysis is that child related expenses for living accommodations are a fixed expense. Marriage of Cryer implicitly recognizes this reality, and Judge Pellman apprehended the paradox clearly.

Jon apparently made this argument - he told the appellate court that Judge Pellman had abused her discretion because "he had nearly total responsibility for the child." Indeed, Justice Boren agreed that "under normal circumstances, such a deviation from guideline support would be an abuse of discretion." But given Jon's income, these were not normal circumstances but not necessarily for the reasons that Jon urged. "The trial court was faced with a pending and uncertain dependency case over which it had no control...." "The trial court also faced the strong possibility that visitation and custody arrangements could change quickly,..." "Furthermore, while one parent enjoyed an extraordinarily high income and could easily afford to pay monthlyl child support of $8,000 or $10,000, the other parent had essentially no income, and would be unable to maintain a household of the sort to which the child was accustomed absent substantial support." Therefore, Judge Pellman did not abuse her discretion. 

The Court noted that although the child support formula, "a complicated algebraic" equation, is often referred to as "guideline" the term is "misleading. Instead, the formula yields "presumptively correct" numbers in all cases which may be rebutted by the particular circumstances of the parties and of the children. In this case the guideline presumption was rebutted consistent with the state policies that:

• Placing the interests of child has been legislatively declared to be the state's top priorty
• A "parent's first and principal obligation is to support his or her minor children according to the parent's circumstances and station in life
• Each parent should pay for the support of children according to his or her ability
• "Children should share in the standard of living of both parents and child support may therefore appropriately improve the standard of living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the children."

Here "an order that resulted in [the] child's spending time with his father in an opulent abode and time with his mother in a low-rent apartment would have conflicted with principles of Family Code section 4053."

Moreover, while the father "may have found the situation unfair, the primary focus must remain on the child's wellbeing, not the parents' feelings" about money. The revised $8,000/month child support order was only from 1 to 2 1/2 percent of Jon's mnothly income. Judge Pellman's order therefore also served to minimize the harm that might inure to the parties' son had each parent merely supplying living conditions based upon their respective incomes, without help from the other. Finally, the appellate court dismissed Jon's argument that he should not be obligated to pay $8,000 month where the mother's Income and Expense declaration showed that she only paid $4,999 in monthly housing relating expenses. The trial Court had discretion to look the broad view of the parties circumstances and was not required to fix a number based upon any one element of their total expense package.

Irmo Cryer is also an important case for ordering attorney's fees to financially weaker parties. Jon argued that the initial award of $20,000 was more than the mother's attorney had asked for in her moving declaration, but Mom's attorney made an oral request for a greater suma that the hearing based upon fees that had increased since the moving declaration had been filed, and her papers had noted that further fees would be incurred. Next Jon argued that he had won a motion for reconsideration that made him a prevailing party, and that he should not therefore been required to pay Mom's fees. Not so said the appellate court, "[b]ecause of the importance of ensuring that the parties both have the ability to present their cases effectively, attorney fees may be awarded against a prevailing party in family law proceedings."

I have had the great good fortune to have met Judge Pellman, and applaud her efforts and her well reasoned trial court decision!

    "(a) At a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code, absent a stipulation of the parties or a finding of good cause pursuant to subdivision (b), the court shall receive any live, competent testimony that is relevant and within the scope of the hearing and the court may ask questions of the parties.

    (b) In appropriate cases, a court may make a finding of good cause to refuse to receive live testimony and shall state its reasons for the finding on the record or in writing. The Judicial Council shall, by January 1, 2012, adopt a statewide rule of court regarding the factors a court shall consider in making a finding of good cause.

    (c) A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief description of the anticipated testimony.

If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing."

Family Code section 217 will cause a sea-change in day to day family court proceedings across our state, unless family court judicial officers ignore it to the limited extent possible by court rules.  It will likely have immense financial and resource consequences upon not only the courts but upon parties to family court proceedings.  It will force the state government in coming years to study whole new paradigms for resolving divorce and domestic partnership dissolution outside the adversary template, including those currently practiced in New Zealand and southern Australia. 

It will also pressure parties to consider mediation, and collaborative processes which occur outside congested courthouses, much more carefully.  The costs of adversary litigation are about to sky-rocket, making mediation even more appealing from a financial perspective (I have written extensively about the emotional and psychological benefits here an elsewhere).  There simply is no governmental money available to absorb the coming Elkins Onslaught. For more information about an alternative method for resolving family disputes, please visit us at www.DesertFamilyMediationServices.com.
  
At the same time, at least in the short run taken together with some of the other revisions that become effective next month, it may encourage more people to litigate more stubbornly and so make mediation seem less attractive than it did before the changes (just the reverse will be true).  Some folks will mistakenly assume that this invites the use of court hearings as a live-testimony forum for sharing unresolved complaints relating to their marriage or domestic partnership dissolution with the other party in open court.  Instead, judges will sustain objections to such irrelevant material and parties who seek to use Family Court as a platform to air relationship grievances will find themselves alienating the trier of fact in ways that will have adverse consequences to them beyond just the time and expense of the exercise. 

The purpose of today's Blog is to introduce you to section 217 and the new changes.  I will follow up with more articles in coming weeks.  Without a doubt the new rules will make all the information I provide on my websites more relevant and timely for my readers. 

Q.  How is child support calculated in California?  I have heard about "Guideline Support" but am wondering what this means?

A.  In 1993 California adopted a Statewide Uniform Guideline to come into compliance with a federal mandate.  (Family Code section 4050).  This followed wide variability of orders and a prior failed attempt to ensure predictability.  Its effect was to greatly increase the monies available to children and to begin to end gender bias in assessing support.    Family Code section 4052 requires California court Commissioners to adhere to the uniform guidelines and to "depart from the guideline only in special circumstances...." 

Family Code section 4053 lists principles to be followed by the Court in implementing the guidelines.  This is a statute worth reviewing, and using to remind family court judges of what our State child support policy is.  These include the directives that:

(1)  A parent's first and principal obligation is to support their minor children "according ot the parent's circumstances and station in life."

(2)  Both parents are mutually responsible.

(3)  The guideline must take into account each parent's actual income and the level of responsibility for the children.

(4)  "Each parent should pay for the support of the children or according to his or her ability."

(5)  The interests of children are the State's top priority.

(6)  Children should share in the standard of living of both parents.  Child support may therefore be appropriately used to increase the standard of living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the children.

(7)  Disparities of living standards in both homes, particularly where both parents have high levels of responsibility for raising the children, should be minimized through the use of guideline child support orders.

(8)  A parent having primary physical responsibility for the children (a term that is nowhere defined in the Family Code) is presumed to be contributing a significant portion of their available financial resources to the support of these children.

(9)  The guideline is intended to encourage settlement between parents by creating predictability.

(10)  The guideline is presumptively correct in all cases, and ony in special circumstance should child support orders be less than guideline.

(11)  Child support orders must reflect the greater standard of living and costs of living in California as opposed to other states. 

California Family Code section 4055 sets forth the formula for assessing guideline support.  Don't even bother to look at it, you will need to be a mathematician or logics teacher to understand or explain it.  While gross income numbers (or imputed income) are used, the guideline tax effects this income so that net income is generally what is determinative - however, this complicates doing the math.  The percentage of parent's income allocated to children is called the "K" factor, and this number moves depending upon how many children there are.  It assumes, for instance, that 26% of the joint income of most families is spent on families with one child, and 60% where there are three children.  Forturnately these calculations are done for us through computer programs.  The most common are the Dissomaster and Xspouse, which I will explain further in another blog.  Riverside County in Indio utilizes the Xspouse.  The Xspouse is a spin off from the people who devised the Dissomaster, after they had a parting of the ways.

Child support always takes precedence over spousal support, or personal expenses.  Relative timeshare between the parents is a major factor in using the formula - the higher the noncustodial parent's timeshare, the less they pay. 

Unfortunately this means in practice that there is much legal wrestling between parents about timeshare that has nothing to do with the children's best interests but often everything to do with economic warfare.  I write about this in separate articles detailing Collaborative Law processes where we attempt to refocus parents on best interests rather than legal rights (per the guideline formula, for instance) so that primary parent's (often mothers) will give up more custodial time and fathers will pay a little more for this time and then actually undertake using that time (as opposed to having it on paper in a court order, but generally ignoring the increased responsibilities).  Please see this link to our Collaborative Divorce Team.

Importantly, even when courts order child or spousal support to women, studies have shown that most children who are entitled to child support from their fathers never receive it (Huang, Mincy, and Garfinkel, 2005). There may be a number of reasons for this. One determinant of fathers meeting these obligations is their ability to pay.  Researchers have found that when child support obligations exceed 35% of a father' sincome, he is less like to comply (Meyer and Barfeld, 1996).  Lower earner fathers are generally required to pay a higher proportion of their income in child support in child support than higher earners, which pressures the poorest members of our society (Huang, et al., 2005).

Women in heterosexual relationships, as single parents (or child-caretaking partners), are at greatest risk of becoming systemically impoverished (Strong, et al., 2008). Following divorce, women are principally responsible for both child-rearing and their own economic support. At a minimum a woman may suffer a significant decrease in her financial condition. Studies have shown that a single mother's income may decrease by twenty-seven percent or more.  (Peterson, 1996; Smock, 1993).  [Please contact me if you want the actual citations to these studies].

These realities may or may not interest you.  They do affect children and parents in very deep ways, nonetheless.

In any event, now that you have the background I will provide more detailed information on how the Xspouse and Dissomaster programs work in practice very soon.  Try using our search engine at the upper right corner of any page on this site and you will find those articles when they are up.

TWA

Thurman Arnold is a child support attorney practicing in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties, including the cities ranging from Blythe, Indio, Indian Wells, La Quinta, Palm Desert, Rancho Mirage, Palm Springs, Desert Hot Springs, Joshua Tree, Hemet, San Bernardino and Riverside, CA.

Q.  I remarried in August, 2009, and my new wife is a doctor.  She has one child from her prior marriage and I have two.  I am still paying my former wife alimony and child support even though the kids we have together live at our home 40% of the time.  I have been hit hard by the economy and we largely depend upon my wife's medical income to make ends meet.  Now my ex is threatening to take me back to court to increase my support based upon my new wife's income, while my own income is down from when the court last decided it.  My new wife is upset at the idea that my ex can learn anything about the medical practice or income.  What should I do?

A.  If there has been a material decrease in your income since the time of your last order, you may safely file a support modification motion to lower your child support and to lower or possibly terminate your spousal support.  Whether that is advisable based upon your numbers has nothing to do with your new mate's income, and should not cause you to hesitate - but again, it does depend on the actual respective numbers between you and Wife 1, which you did not provide me.  You also need not worry about W1 filing a motion to increase (you can't stop her, but she will not win based on W2's earnings).  Maybe you should give her this link so she will think twice.

California law is quite clear that new mate income cannot generally be considered against you in ordering or modifying child or spousal support.  The controlling California Family statute is section 4057.5.

In the normal situation, Family Code section 4057.5 leaves the Court no discretion to consider your new wife's earnings, period.  You do not need to report those earnings on your FL-150 (Income and Expense Declaration). This is a statement of California legislative policy effective in 1993 when this section was added to the Family Code.  This is true for both spousal and child support.

However, section 4057.5 does contain an exception for the "extraordinary case" which the statute makes clear is intended to address situations where "where excluding that income would lead to extreme and severe hardship to any child subject to the child support award" or where "a parent ... voluntarily or intentionally quits work or reduces income, or who intentionally remains unemployed or underemployed and relies on a subsequent spouse's income."  Even if the court were to find a severe hardship on the children of marriage number one, it would be required not to impose a severe hardship on your wife's child by reallocating her income to you for purposes of supporting your two children. 

In practice, so far, Courts almost never find facts sufficient overcome this clear statutory prohibition.  So far there is no published California appellate decision defining these extraordinary circumstances.  No doubt one day someone will so abuse this protection and hide behind it that we will get a reported decision that fleshs out how bad someone needs to behave before the protection is lost.  But "extraordinary" means really extraordinary.  In the average case, your new Wife has nothing to be concerned about. 

With regard to attorneys fee awards, however, there is authority for an argument that new mate income may be considered in granting or denying an attorney fee request, but the odds are against a judge doing that.

Incidentally, this section also applies to income from nonmarital partners as well as new spouses.  In one reported case (IRMO Loh), a trial court was reversed for inceasing dad's child support obligation after the mother produced photos of the father's "lifetyle" to show imputed nontaxable income in the form of his new girlfriend's contributions to him, since she paid for all his toys. 

The new mate question is a subset of the "imputed income" situations where a father or mother may quit work or reduce hours because they are relying on their new mate to contribute the difference.  That is not likely going to be an extraordinary case, but  W1 can separately seek to impute income to you on the basis that you have a higher earning capacity than you are exercising.  Earning capacity and imputed income is a blog for another day.  Also, I will mention here that another argument exists in favor of W1 that has nothing to do with the right to obtain the records or income of W2:  Equalizing the lifestyle's of the two households where yours is rich and grandiose and W1 is impoverished (an extreme example) pursuant to FC section 4057(b)(4).

The tax returns are privileged as they relate to your new wife's medical practice.  For instance, if she is a medical corporation (which I recommend be set up), she will almost never be forced to divulge those records.  Even as to your joint returns, you may be entitled to redact the information concerning your new spouse or have the Court review them in camera (meaning they are not turned over to the other side).  Your former mate is entitled to see your side of the tax returns, however, and they are not insulated from scrutiny simply because you filed joint with the Doctor Wife.  If you don't file jointly, your former wife will almost certainly never get her hands on your new wife's Married Filing Separately (MFS) returns.  Structuring things this way may or may not be advisable and you should consult a tax accountant.

An interesting twist here is that because you marry a higher, wealthy earner, your taxes actually increase because under federal IRS (and the California FTB), you are responsible for one-half of your new mate's income - and this is true even if you don't file jointly.  One case (County of Tulare vs. Campbell) has held that this additional tax you become liable for can form the basis for a reduction in your support because you have less net income available for support after the tax hit is deducted.  Hence, based on these tax consequences you may have an additional argument for decreased support - although a Court may try to deny you some discretionary offset to even the score since this feels a bit unfair to the spouse who is  primarily supporting the children and so lessen the downward modification.

The take-away:  So long as you are not playing games, have not intentionally reduced your income by relying upon your new mate's income, and there is no really extraordinary difference in the two households, your new wife's income is just not relevant and so it is protected.

Q.  What rights do I have to permanent spousal support?

A.  Permanent spousal support is not usually "permanent," although it can be in cases of very long marriages.  Lawyers and judges also refer to it as post-judgment spousal support, alimony, judgment spousal support, or long term support.

Unlike temporary spousal support, long term spousal support is only issued after a final judgment of Dissolution of Marriage or Legal Separation.  It is equally available to domestic partners.  Also unlike temporary support, it is not based on any computer formula or state or county guideline, but must be determined and fixed depending on the facts of every individual case.  If long term support is important to your future wellbeing, you are going to need an experienced support attorney.

There are several very important rules to keep in mind.  First, a marriage in California which lasts more than 10 years (defined as the time between date of marriage and physical separation), is "long term" marriage.  The general rule is that in marriages which are not long term, spousal support should not be payable for more than one-half the length of marriage - or to put in differently, the law presumes that the recipient spouse should be rehabilitated and so become self-supporting in a period equal to 1/2 the marriage.  However, this presumption becomes less important in cases involving older couples, especially where people can not be realistically expected to re-enter the work force, in cases where there children who remain minors, or where the party asking for support has a debilitating disease or disability.

There is no magic ratio for how long a former spouse might be ordered to pay long term support.  Each case depends upon its own facts, the quality of your attorney, and the attitudes of the family court judge.  Even in cases of long term marriages, the support obligation typically will end at some point in time.  However, if usually will not end on its own - meaning that when a trial court orders long term support it will reserve jurisdiction to continue to extent it, until some time when a party petitions the court to terminate support and a judge finally says "enough is a enough." 

Imputed income is often an important argument in long term support marriages, where one party convinces the court that the other party is shirking or failing to genuinely try to become self-supporting.  It is sometimes necessary to have the supported spouse evaluated by a vocational rehabilitation expert. 

There are four components to an award of of permanent support:  1) Amount; 2) duration; 3) substantive increases or decreases over time; and 4) jurisdictional step downs and ultimately a termination date.

Second, Family Code section 4320 is a critical support statute.  I have provided a link and uploaded it so that you may read it.  Essentially it sets forth all the factors that the court must consider in setting post-judgment support, and you will see that it is not an exhaustive list and the court can consider anything else it deems important to the decision.  Support factors include the extent to which the earning capacity of each party is sufficient to maintain the marital standard of living established during the marriage, considering:  a) the marketable skills of the supported party, the job market for those skills, the time and expense required to train that party including education and b) the extent to which the supported party's present or future income earning ability is impaired by periods of unemployment or were incurred during the marriage to permit that party to devote time to domestic duties.

Another factor is whether the supported party contributed to the attainment of an education, training, license, career, or position by the supporting party. 

Another factor is the ability of the supporting party to pay, taking in account that person's earning capacity, income, and assets and standard of living.

Another very important support consideration is the needs of each party - including both. 

Another factor is the obligations and assets of each spouse, including the separate property which each has or gained upon the dissolution.

Another is the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment without interfering with the needs of dependent children in their custody.

The age and health of the parties is critical in some cases.  65 years of age is the presumed retirement age for adults today, and courts cannot order a person to continue to be employed beyond that age - but, if they make that choice, their income can be considered.

A documented history of domestic violence can affect the right to receive support or the obligation to pay it.

The tax consequences between the parties must be considered.

And, basically, as I said, any other specific facts that trend one way or another.

The three most common factors are the marital standard of living (MSOL), need and ability to pay, and the assets the parties end up with upon divorcing.

Courts cannot order lump sums for support.  Spousal support is generally taxable to the recipient and deductible to the payor, but there are very specific IRS requirements that must be met for this to actually be so.

Courts are required to state their findings on each relevant issue in writing.  In practice though, most people settle their divorce cases by way of settlement agreements.  Unfortunately, lawyers often leave out these findings so that when a court is asked, down the road, by the payor to terminate or decrease support, or by the payee to increase it, there is no map for the court to use to base its modification findings on.

If support is an issue for you either way, please hire a competent lawyer.  There are many attorneys moving into family law from civil practices who are clueless about these things.  Caveat emptor!